




Centre for Peace Studies
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Whose ‘Home’?
The Repatriation of Somali Refugees in Dadaab

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Abstract:

Somali refugees started to flee to Kenya first in the early 1990s, followed by another influx in 2011. Their current number in Dadaab camp where the majority is residing is estimated to be around 300,000-400,000. Citing increased insecurity due to the refugees presence Kenya has decided to repatriate Somali refugees back to Somalia, signing a tripartite agreement with UNHCR and the Somali state. This study aims to identify what are the perceptions and perspectives of the refugees towards repatriation. It also wants to explore how the refugees perceive the notion of 'home' in Dadaab. It also looks into the possible security implications that might be experienced in both Somalia and Kenya due to the repatriation process. To get answers to these questions the study used semi-structured interviews and observation to determine the perspectives of the informants mainly Somali refugees dwelling in Dadaab. Post-colonial theory and other related concepts are used to analyze the findings. The research findings show that there are similar negative perceptions in the refugee population towards the repatriation process to Somalia. This is strengthened by strong attachment to the place with many calling it 'home'. On the security part, the findings indicate that there are more possible security implications in Somalia than in Kenya. However, Kenya could suffer the ripple effects.

Key Words: Repatriation, Somali refugees, Kenya, Dadaab, Post-Colonial theory, 'home'

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List of Abbreviations:

AMISOM	African Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
DC	District Commissioner
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
EU	European Union
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
NEP	North Eastern Province
NFD	Northern Frontier District
OAU	Organization of African Unity
SNL	Somali National League
SYL	Somali Youth League
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

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Chapter 1: Background of The Study

1.1 Introduction

In contemporary politics, population migration has been branded to be one of the most serious threats to peace, security, and the sovereignty of nations in the post Cold War era. Endless wars in the world and particularly in Africa have produced a sizable number of refugees that straddle across neighboring countries borders, making their presence being seen as threat to the security and prosperity of the host countries. No other place has this problem been more severe and visible in recent history than in the Horn of Africa, thus forcing some countries to devise hasty policies that are not popular with the international human rights law by bringing a speedy removal or repatriation of the refugees within their territories (Bariagaber, A. 2006:3). Repatriation has been regarded as the most favorable solution to the international refugee problem. It has always been considered the international community's ideal solution to refugee crises. This is because organized repatriation emerged in the early twentieth century in parallel with the consolidation of the liberal nation-state. Repatriation offered an apparent formula through which liberalism and nationalism might, at least in theory be reconciled (Long, K. 2013:45).

Unfortunately policies produced and understood in certain ways in some parts of the world might not have the same meaning in others parts of the world where they are most likely to be implemented at. Africa has produced and hosts today a fair share of the world refugees. However, the complex thing about Africa's refugees is their ethnic demography as a result of their divisions within different states during colonization. Most of these ethnic groups cross over to other states during crisis and war and join their brethren on the other side. After spending sometime, at times decades with their other brethren returning or repatriating these refugees becomes problematic as they have not only integrated to their new environment but they see themselves still being within 'their own territory'.

It is a quite strange and difficult to understand why people and for that matter refugees would not want to go back to their homelands and consider 'foreign territories' as their own. In order for us to understand this we have to go back to the colonial

partition of Africa and how ethnic groups were divided into different administrative territories. According to Amadife & Warhola (1993) it was in the interest of the European powers that were partitioning Africa to divide ethnic groups in order to secure European over lordship with minimum force and cost to themselves. The idea was to divide and conquer (Amadife & Warhola 1993:538). As a result postcolonial nationalism emerged in Africa after the exit of the colonial powers and until today some African states are still struggling with how they can maintain these false frontiers often at the cost of very important development projects. In many cases states were superimposed upon a number of ethnic groups imperialistically, resulting in self-declared “nation-states” that subsumed one or a number of subordinated ethnic groups under a dominant leadership group. The frontier making mechanism that was adopted was to minimize costs to the colonial powers was executed on the basis of sparse information (ibid: 538).

It is as a result of these colonial divisions in the Horn of Africa that this thesis has chosen to focus on this issue in relation to the repatriation of Somali refugees from Dadaab Kenya, an area that they have a connection with as much as their homeland. In order for us to understand what connection Somali refugees might have with Kenya, we have to look back into the colonial history of Somalia and how it was divided into five administrative territories. The Somali Peninsula was divided by the colonial powers into French Somaliland, British Somaliland, the Ethiopian Haud and Ogaden, Italian Somalia and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya. These divisions reinforced the Somali sentiments of national identity (Lewis, I.M. 1963:148).

The interest of this thesis is with the latter region, namely the NFD of Kenya which its hopes of rejoining the Somali republic formed by the Italian and the British Somaliland in 1960 was thwarted by the British who refused to separate the territory in question from Kenya on the eve of Kenya’s independence culminating to banditry which intensified the following years (Touval, S. 1967:111). Since then the experience of the Somalis in this region though not publicly confirmed, has been marked by three dominant processes, the restriction of movement, the denial of political voice, and militarization (Lochery, E. 2012:620).

But on the other side of the coin, it is worth mentioning that Kenya as well has been deeply affected by the conflict in Somalia. After the collapse of the Somali government

in 1991, thousands of Somali refugees crossed over to the Kenyan boarder as the conflict intensified in southern Somalia. The influx intensified during the drought and famine in 2011, earning Dadaab the title of the world's largest refugee camp. Originally meant to host 90,000 people, by the end of 2011 it had nearly half a million residents, living in squalor conditions and subject to brutal harassment by the Kenyan security forces. This has further contributed to the troublesome relationship between Kenya and Somalia that has existed since their independence from colonial powers (Harper, M. 2012:189).

After years of hosting and showing a gesture of goodwill towards the Somali refugees the Kenya government attitude towards the refugees changed after new asylum seekers were allegedly linked to terrorist groups with ties to Al-Qaeda, exacerbated by the global war on terror after the incursion of Ethiopian military into Somalia in late 2006 to oust the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). With the US backing, Ethiopia launched a full-scale invasion, sending in 14,000 troops accompanied by heavy aerial bombardment killing many civilians (ibid: 172).

Faced with the onslaught of the war between the ICU fighters and the cosmetic transitional federal government (TFG) of Somalia backed by the Ethiopian army, more Somalis fled and sought sanctuary in Dadaab, overstretching the capacity of the camp. This led to the deployment of the Kenyan security forces along the Kenyan-Somali boarder and parallel raids in Eastleigh Nairobi, a suburb mainly inhabited by ethnic Somalis to flush out illegal refugees. This later transformed into a military incursion by the Kenyan army into Somalia in 2011 (Jaji, R. 2013:359). Consequently extremist groups took advantage of the situation purporting to be fighting for the rights of the Somali refugees launched serious guerilla attacks against Kenya with the most infamous one being the attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi that left around 70 dead. Consequently Kenya decided to return all Somali refugees and signed a tripartite agreement with the Somali government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for the repatriation of Somali refugees from Kenya (unhcr.org).

It is the combination of the above-mentioned scenarios of refugees and its colonial links that has inspired this thesis.

1.2 Research questions

From the short introduction presented above, the thesis wants to demonstrate how long standing unresolved political issues that Kenya has grappled with the NFD region for decades could resurface with the repatriation of Somali refugees in Daddab. Could that also rekindle the ever-present greater Somali nationalism feelings that have continuously lingered around the residents of this region as a result of the repatriation of their kinsmen and how it could bring challenges to the security of the region. With that in mind the following questions will be investigated.

- 1) What is the perception/perspectives of Dadaab refugees on repatriating to Somalia?
- 2) What is 'home' in a post-colonial setting?
- 3) What is the potential impact of en-mass repatriation on security of the region?

1.3 Literature review

Several studies have been done on the issue of refugee repatriation and it has been fronted as one of the main durable solution to refugee crisis. However, in order to champion repatriation, as the best solution for a particular case, one has to understand and scrutinize the cause of the crisis and investigate if it has been remedied before embarking on repatriation. This study chose to focus on this topic because of the ongoing process of the repatriation of Somali refugees in Kenya.

Kibreab (2003) argues that refugees in the global south don't enjoy the same rights as those in the global north. Citizenship rights through naturalization is beyond non-nationals and even worse for refugees in the developing countries. On the contrary policies are designed to prevent refugees from being given citizenship status in the host state regardless of the length of time spent in exile. Consequently they repatriate or vote with their feet in order to gain back those rights they lost when they were displaced. In the areas where the refugees enjoy favorable conditions they tend to remain in the countries of asylum, regardless of whether or not the conditions that prompted their displacement are eliminated (Kibreab, G. 2003).

Pottier (1996) points out that international organizations that mostly are the main agents in the refugee camps and the principal organizers of repatriation process fail to identify who the real representatives of the refugees are. He points out that observers and evaluators continually fail to situate those who claim to speak for the majority of refugees. It is important that they understand the political situations in the camps in order to avoid refugees to land again in the hands of those who persecuted them upon repatriation. He concludes that hard political questions need to be addressed and in order for that to happen aid agencies can no longer remain to be ignorant about the complexities of local politics. He blatantly argues that the general lack of political awareness is a barrier to reconciliation and repatriation (Pottier, J. 1996:428).

Schultheis (1989) writing on the geopolitics of forced displacement maintains that major refugee flows are deeply rooted in the dominant geopolitical institutions of the global system and are directly or indirectly related to the conflicts between the superpowers. He calls for the international organizations to listen to the responses of the refugees and displaced people and let them guide their responses. He also calls for the revision of international conventions and documents, which are government friendly in order for these documents to address and adequately reflect on present conditions of refugees (Schultheis, M.J. 1989:22).

Crisp (1986) on his research on the repatriation of Ugandan refugees in Sudan and Zaire explains that when people are forced out of their homelands because of prosecution and conflict they tend to be reluctant to go back if their security is not guaranteed despite living in hardship in exile. Repatriation becomes difficult to convince to these groups. He also adds that pressure from donor and host countries has forced UNHCR to adopt measures that it was not known for before, that of actively promoting the idea of repatriation amongst refugees who have not decided to return back home, and countries where fundamental political changes have taken place. He concludes that there is need for refugees to be consulted about repatriation program and be given a room to participate in discussions and decisions (Crisp, J. 1986:178). Agreeing with Crisp, Harrell-bond (1989) condemns the fact that UNHCR has deviated from its main pillar of voluntarism and protecting the rights of refugees but instead, has shifted to promoting the interests of

governments. She recommends that people should be given the choice to remain in exile, and return home, wherever the conditions are most promising.

On the individual's notion of 'home', by default, voluntary repatriation is usually associated with returning home. The place attachment and territorial view is held by Waltzer (1980), Coles (1985) and Connolly (1991), who maintain that the identity of a people is embedded in the historical notion of the nation-state, characterized by communities, territory and government. For them the country of origin can also be a space of collective memory and personal attachment before displacement.

On the contrary Zetter (1999) on a study on how refugees adjust to exile, their dilemmas of their status and the meaning of home argues that there is evidence of transition and adaptation taking place in the socio-cultural and economic fabric of refugees households in exile. He compares the preceding conditions before exile and how they are replicated in exile. The process of transition and adjustment to the present determines the notion of 'home'. For the second and third generation refugees, they are more prone to integration in the host country. It is only the myth of 'home' created by their parents and other first generation refugees, by which they can identify their connections with the past (Zetter, R. 1999:17). Refugees born in the camps are even more likely to have adopted local attitudes and trends through schools and local friends, and hence might not identify themselves with their land of origin any longer.

On the social factors side, there are ranges of issues that influence refugees' decisions to return. Social and demographic change, particularly after prolonged exile, can profoundly change the ethnic and cultural setting of a region. These are all reasons why displaced populations can hesitate to go back. Positive local integration within the area encampment could discourage people from returning. Once integrated socially, economically and culturally, a return to the past may not be ideal answer.

The issue of return becomes more problematic for transnational refugees who have been relocated to areas of similar ethnic composition and kinship ties. This has been the case for Kenya-Somalia, Burundi-Tanzania, Sudan-Chad and other areas where the same

ethnic group is found on both sides of the boarder. Kinship ties facilitate understanding and communication, allay xenophobia and enable cohesion and support.

On the security related issues, it is widely believed that people flee from their area of origin because of the deterioration of the general security and threats to their own safety. In most prolonged refugees situations, refugees opt not to return if given a chance until the conditions that caused their flight have substantially changed and war has ceased.

1.4 Relevance to peace studies

According to some scholars, such as Amadife & Warhola (1993), Laremont (2005) among others argue, problems created by some boundaries are among the more frequent causes of crisis in Africa, who have some of the strangest boundary problems in the world. Much of the recent political conflict in Africa can be classified as conflict over political boundaries. Amadife & warhola believe that, as a result of recent developments in Africa, the redrawing of the map of Africa may well be on its way. They further argue that, conventional arguments in favor of inherited boarders' rationally generally failed to foresee the deepening complications that ethnic politics would eventually impose upon Africa's weak states (Amadife & warhola 1993:534). Robinson clarifies that the colonial partition of Africa divided many cultural groups into more than one colony and subsequently into multiple states, leading to the "dismemberment" of ethnic groups. She further argues that such partition is thought to have had profound effects on the likelihood of successful nation-building, because it calls into question the legitimacy of the territorial state and the potentially creates incentives to redraw state boarders (Robinson, A. L. 2014:716). As a result, nation-state building of Somalia since independence has been playing catch up compared to its neighbors as it was too preoccupied lobbying for regaining its lost territory to its neighboring states namely Kenya and Ethiopia. The Kenyan state has dealt with its 'Somali problem' by marginalizing its Somali-inhabited regions, manipulating clan and lineage divisions, and leaving Somalis vulnerable to abuse by security machinery of the state (Lochery, E. 2012:616).

It is in relation to this uneasy and at times cold relation between Kenya and the refugees it is hosting that the study wants to find out what the refugees perception is

towards repatriation. It also wants to find out how ‘home’ is defined in a transnational border and what security implications it could have if any?

This study is relevant to peace studies by trying to find out if there can be any connection between repatriation and insecurity or peace through repatriation.

Muller, J. Z. while describing the situation in Europe in the nineteenth and early twentieth century found out that people who spoke the same language had a tendency of believing that they belonged together and defined themselves in contrast to other communities (Muller, J.Z. 2008:23). It is therefore reasonable to believe that Somali refugees on repatriation process are likely to align themselves with the local Kenyan-Somalis who they share same language, culture, ancestry and religion.

1.5 Motivation for research

The motivation of this research is invigorated by several incidents whereby Somali refugees and Kenyan-Somalis were arrested in a major police crackdown against Somalis living in Eastleigh Nairobi in April 2014. All the arrested people were assembled in a football stadium in Nairobi, and then later identified if they were “genuine” Kenyans or refugees who left their camps illegally, despite not being a secret to the Kenyan authorities that there were urban refugees. Some were hurriedly deported back to Somalia without following the conventions and guidelines on the treatment of asylum seekers and refugees. The *non-refoulement* principle states that, no contracting state shall expel or return a refugee to the country where his/her life is in danger (Jaji, R. 2013:357).

Kenyan police boss David kimaiyo was quoted saying in an April 20th 2014 Standard media article entitled ‘over 200 refugees deported to camp as swoop continues’, “We plan to deport more as soon as there is space in these planes” (standardmedia.co.ke). This led to Kenyan-Somali leaders crying foul and calling the process discriminatory against their community after seeking audience with the president. A senator from the Somali community of NEP, Mr. Billow Kerrow, who wrote a column in the standard newspaper on April 13th 2014 entitled ‘is Operation Usalama Watch a Somali Gulag’ warned that, “the community has been stigmatized and portrayed as “terrorists” by the xenophobic narrative of the State, and other Kenyans psyched against them”.

He further stated that the tactics used by the state were reminiscent of the ones used by the colonialists saying “the British Gulag policy that incarcerated Kikuyu’s is now the government’s prescription for Somalis”. However, it is his conclusion that is spot on to what this research wants to find out when he says that locking up and discriminating against one group or in this case refugees would eventually back fire on the state and radicalize the youth.

“Terrorism is a global scourge affecting many countries and ours is no exception. Blaming the Somali community collectively is wrong and will create more resentment towards the State and radicalize its youth. We went into Somalia to pursue Al-Shabaab knowing there will be a price to be paid. And that price should be borne by all, not the Somalis alone” (standardmedia.co.ke).

While refugee stereotyping and xenophobia are not new issues in refugee studies, this research wants to study it from a different perspective whereby the refugees own ethnic group are citizens of the host state that wants to repatriate them. Their say in the manner in which their ‘brothers’ are returned might not be very significant considering that they themselves don’t even have “full citizenship” as well as being politically weak, but we have seen that they can engage and counter the narratives. Departing from these events of forceful, uninformed and prompt form of repatriation, this research, wants to explore whether increased ethnic consciousness can create an unexpected course of action that might question the status quo as well as provoke violent response. The researcher cannot think of similar case of repatriations that have the same characteristics, making this one quite unique in the repatriation literature, thus giving future similar research some insight.

1.6 Thesis structure

This thesis is divided into six main chapters. The first chapter is the introduction of the thesis explaining the background of the thesis and the introduction of the main themes of the study. The second chapter gives an outline of the methodological framework. It explains the main methods used in the data collection as well as the main consideration made. The third chapter gives a brief history of Somalia. This is to enable the reader to understand the background of the reason for the existence of the refugees. It

starts with its pre-colonial history, its colonial history and how it was partitioned and finally its disintegration. It also gives a picture of the current situation on the ground now. The fourth chapter discusses the theoretical framework and other relevant concepts used in this study. The literatures of post-colonial writers such as Frantz Fanon, Edward Said, Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak are explained which would later be used in the discussion section. Likewise the relevance of the theory and the concepts used is explained. The fifth chapter presents the findings of the data collected and the discussion. The findings of the three research questions are presented systematically and followed with their discussion sections. The themes of the findings are used as the titles. The sixth chapter is a short conclusion summarizing the findings of the study.

1.7 Summary

The above chapter has provided an introduction of the study and a short background of what the thesis is about. It has also introduced the research questions, as well highlighting the relevance of the study to peace studies. A short literature review is also presented, followed by the motivation of the study subject. Finally, the thesis structure is outlined. In the following chapter the methodological framework is presented.

Chapter 2: Methodological Framework

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this research is to uncover what repatriation really means in a post-colonial context where the state borders are not in line with the ethnic boundaries of the society prior to the colonization of the people concerned. After many African states got their independence from the colonial powers mostly in the mid 20th century, many states boundaries that were previously demarcated by the ethnic groups affiliation were abruptly changed. This led to tensions between some states, that either did not want their territories to be lost to rival neighbors or disapproved the fact that their kinsmen were to be ruled by others. In order to find out if repatriation has a real meaning in such a context whereby people are being repatriated from their “own homelands” the researcher, has opted to use qualitative research practice such as in-depth interviewing, direct observation, narratives, group discussions and document analysis to review this issue.

The chapter will begin by giving a detailed analysis of the area of study in order to give the reader an overview of where the study is focusing on. It will be followed by a discussion of the different research methods chosen, highlighting why the researcher has opted for those particular methods. Reflections on my role as a researcher are also highlighted. It will be followed by the mechanism used to select the informants, while at the same time highlighting the shortcomings and challenges faced by the researcher.

2.2 Study area

Dadaab is located in the Garissa district in the North Eastern Province of Kenya and is home to approximately 300,000 refugees, primarily from Somalia. The refugee complex has a population of 272,764 refugees and asylum seekers (31/12/2016) and consists of five camps. 95.3% of the refugees are from Somalia. The first camp was established in 1991, when refugees fleeing the civil war in Somalia started to cross the border into Kenya. A second large influx occurred in 2011, when some 130,000 refugees arrived, fleeing drought and famine in southern Somalia. The camp sometimes referred to as Dadaab refugee complex is a combination of five camps that include, Dagahaley, Ifo,

Ifo 2, Hagadera and Kambios. The first three are located in Lagdera (Dadaab) district while Hagadera and Kambios are located in the neighboring Fafi district (UNHCR.org). It is worth noting that there is a considerable difference between the old camps, established 1991 and 1992, and the new camps, established in 2011. A large part of the residents in the old camps (Ifo, Dagahaley, Hagadera) arrived in Dadaab in the 1990s and have children and grandchildren born in the camps. The old camps resemble naturally grown towns and have developed into commercial hubs connecting North-Eastern Kenya and southern Somalia. In contrast, most of the residents in the new camps (Ifo 2 and Kambios) came during the 2011 famine (UNHCR.org).



Retrieved on 02feb 2017 <https://ed.psu.edu/news/2016-10-12-news/women-refugees-education>

The main reason Dadaab was chosen as a refugee camp for the Somali refugees can be attributed to its geographical proximity to the Somali boarder, considering that the refugees fleeing would easily return home once their home areas stabilized. It is also

worth putting into consideration that the area is located in a predominantly Somali region, thus making the cultural and religious shock less for the refugees who were fleeing. The researcher chose to study this area not only because of the presence of the refugees which is an important part of this study but because of its distinct social grouping that have been assembled within the confines of artificial colonial borders. Part of the research was also conducted in Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya where most of the administrative headquarters of the international organizations are based.

2.3 Research methodology

Sahu explains, that research methodology “generally encompasses various steps followed by researchers in studying research problems adopting logical sequences. Whereas research method is mainly concerned with the collection and analysis of information generated in answering the research problem that researchers have in mind”. Therefore if we are to follow the above definition of the two concepts we can conclude that, “research methodology is a multidimensional concept in which research method constitutes a part” (Sahu, K. P. 2013:3). Likewise as mentioned by Snape and Spencer, it is important to recognize that there is no single, accepted way of doing research. The researcher can be influenced by a field of elements that include the purposes and the goals of the research, the personality and tendency of the research participants, the audience for the research, and the position and the environment of the researchers themselves (Ritchie & Lewis 2003: 1).

Depending on what problems the researcher wants to solve they can either choose quantitative or qualitative methods. Qualitative method is mainly concerned with the subjective assessment of the informants whereas in quantitative approach researchers undertake generations of information in quantitative form, which are subjected to almost precise quantitative analysis afterwards (Sahu, K. P. 2013:4).

Likewise qualitative data are defined by Patton 1990 as “Detailed descriptions of situations, events, people, interactions, observed behaviors, direct quotations from people about their experiences, attitudes, beliefs, and thoughts and excerpts or entire passages from documents, correspondence, records, and case histories” (Newman, I. & Benz, C.R. 1998:16).

In this case the researcher has opted to use the qualitative research methods in this research considering the above-mentioned factors. In consideration of the research questions the researchers deemed fit that the best option of getting the right answers was applying a qualitative method. The research relied interviewing and observation as its main sources of getting information, hence choosing qualitative method. The following qualitative research methods were used, in-depth qualitative interviewing, observational methods, group discussions, narratives and the analysis of secondary data.

2.3.1 In-depth qualitative interviews

Legard et. al explains that in-depth qualitative interviews are one of the main methods of data collection used in qualitative research, sometimes described as a form of conversation. “But that there are some obvious differences between normal conversation and in-depth interviews- their objectives and, the roles of the researcher and participant are quiet different” (Ritchie & Lewis 2003:138).

During the data collection of this research, the majority of the data was collected through conversation based and clinical interviews. In conversation-based interview “the interviewer concentrates in getting information from the respondents about the subject in which the respondent has enough experience, whereas in clinical interview is concerned with the recording of information about the feelings and opinions of individuals about their experiences in their own lives” (Sahu, K. P. 2013:65).

Clinical interview was mostly used in this research since most of the people interviewed were residents of the refugee camp who did not have much expertise or knowledge about the topic of discussion. Most of the questions started with “what do you think” or “what is your opinion” “what will happen”. Conversation-based interview was used when experts were interviewed. An interview guide was used, however it was not strictly followed sequentially as some of the next questions were determined by the responses of the respondents. This helped the researcher to gain some more in-depth information that otherwise would not have been gotten. The respondents opened up as the interview progressed and became more engaged especially those interviewed in Dadaab.

In contrast most of the international organizations staff and government officials interviewed became less responsive when they were asked leading questions prompting the researcher to stage-manage the interview so as to meet the purposes of the research. Approximately 17 interviews were conducted in different settings. Some interviews were one on one whereas others were conducted in groups. Most of the interviews with the refugees in Dadaab were conducted in groups in order to cover the broad opinions and perceptions of the majority. The duration of the interviews varied from 45 minutes to one and a half hours. The purpose and motive of the research was clearly explained to the respondents before the interviews commenced. Ritchie and Lewis explains, “This is the stage at which business begins. The researcher starts to direct the interaction by introducing the research topic. This involves providing a clear reiteration of the nature and purpose of the research, reaffirming confidentiality, and seeking the permission to record the interview” (Ritchie & Lewis 2003:145).

The initial plan of the researcher was to record the interviews, however, due to the perceived sensitivity of the topic almost all of the respondents chose not to be recorded in the interviews thus causing the researcher to conduct only hand written notes. In addition, all of the respondents except one chose to remain anonymous for fear of being identified while responding to sensitive questions. Therefore in the discussion part of the thesis later, there will be no mention of names but rather only titles, which will be named in manner that the respondent will not be identifiable. As for the refugees since they do not have official titles, their titles will be the area of stay in the camp, gender and family structure.

The interviews were conducted in Somali and English languages. For the native Somali speakers Somali was the best suited language, whereas English was the default language for other non-Somali speakers. None of the informants interviewed was a minor under the age of eighteen.

2.3.2 Observation

“Observation offers the opportunity to record and analyze behavior and interactions as they occur, although not as a member of the study population. This allows events, actions and experiences, and so on to be ‘seen’ through the eyes of the researcher,

often without any construction on the part of those involved” (Ritchie & Lewis 2003:35). According to Stake Robert, “the eye sees a lot (and misses a lot), simultaneously noting who, what, when, where, and why and particularly relating to them to the story, or the assertions forthcoming to the research questions” (Stake, R.E. 2010:90).

Sahu explains, that observation can be divided into participant and non-participant. In a participant method of observation, the observer i.e. the researcher acts as a member of group in which he/she shares their experiences. This has the advantage of extracting information, which were not thought of earlier but may be found suitable while discussing. Non-participant observation method leads the observer to record the experiences of others without disclosing their identity in a disguised manner. In this method there is no any interaction between the researcher and the subjects observed. The weakness is that the researcher would not be in a position to ask more questions for clarification of situations that may not be clear at that moment (Sahu, K. P. 2013)

In this research the researcher was able to use both participant and non-participant observation. In Dadaab the observation included both methods. The researcher was able to converse with some of the subjects of the research by introducing himself formally but not as detailed as it would have been in a formal interview situation. The introduction was enough to make the participants comfortable sharing information with the researcher. Trust was built between the researcher and the participants by sharing meals and drinks together and conversing casually. The interviews were of spontaneous nature and not pre-planned. Everything said by the participants had to be memorized, as there was no any possibility of writing it down. This is because when something is not pre-arranged and the topic is not a common daily subject then suspicion could arise which most likely leads to getting poor information. The information was later written down. The researcher at times directed the conversation towards the subject of the research and information was extracted through the opinions of the participants.

Likewise the researcher used non-participant observation by going around the refugee camp and observing the process at first hand without much interaction with the participants. Through this method the researcher observed for example how the initial interview process of return was carried out by the relevant agencies and those ruled not to be fit to travel were sent to the medical office for further follow up whereas, those that

were cleared were sent to a transit camp. Through that, the structure and sequence of the process from point A to B was well observed to the researcher.

2.3.3 Document review and analysis

Ritchie & Lewis 2013 explains that, document analysis involves the scrutiny of existing documents on the research area, either to understand their content or to lighten up deeper meanings which may be revealed by their analysis (Ritchie & Lewis 2003:35). These materials can be found in books, relevant journals, government archives and private research. Reports and documents prepared by different research scholars, universities, and establishments also serve as good sources of secondary data (Sahu, K. P. 2013:72).

Lindsay Prior explains, “most organizations, especially bureaucratic ones are awash with documentation. Forms, memos, monthly and annual reports, procedure manuals, spreadsheets and record, are just a few examples of the documentation that can be found routinely in organizational settings. She further explains that most instances researchers focus on the content of these documents, and use the data as a resource that tell us about what is going on in an organization” (Silverman, D. 2011:96). In this research, text books, journals and organizational reports as well as media reports that have been written about refugees and durable solutions. Documents were mostly obtained from the University of Tromsø and University of Oslo library databases. UNHCR reports on repatriation have been extensively used to understand how the process of the repatriation is carried out, its history, challenges, and success of recent repatriation around the world.

2.3.4 Conversation analysis

Conversational analysis involves a detailed scrutiny of conversations to determine the narrative of a given topic or subject. “The aim is to investigate social intercourse, as it occurs in natural settings, in an attempt to describe people’s methods for producing orderly social interaction” (Ritchie & Lewis 2003:36). “*Fadhi ku dirir*” is a Somali word meaning “fighting while sited” which loosely translates to conversing while sited. Somali men are famous for conversing in coffee and tea bars in groups discussing all current

issues ranging from politics to economics and clan politics. It is a very ideal place to get all the latest gossip in town, and as long as one is recognized as an insider, the probability of getting involved in local conversations is high.

During the researchers stay in Dadaab, the local “five star” restaurant was the perfect place to catch up with the daily happenings in the town. The background of the people who frequented the place was surprisingly diverse ranging from the local youth, donor organizations employees to local politicians. Once one is allowed into the inner circles of these gatherings siphoning information is easier. The researcher got important information regarding the opinions of the local people as well as the refugees who frequented this place by casually conversing with them in the coffee bar of the local restaurant. The researcher had to identify himself in order to get inside information and perceptions of the concerned people regarding the repatriation of the refugees. Being conversant with the local language, and culture, as well as being recognized as a native helped the researcher get the trust of the locals in order to be included in conversations.

2.4 Reflexivity

According to Cui “the concept of reflexivity is considered as a means of enhancing credibility in the qualitative research. The researcher cannot avoid bringing individual experience, personal background, and pre-existing understanding of a phenomenon into the research process. Reflexivity is defined as a thoughtful conscious self-awareness of the roles that qualitative research plays. It stresses the ability of a researcher to distance him/herself from the researcher process and critically reflect on that process” (Cui, K. 2015:357).

This research mostly focused on a Somali population and according to the Somali culture one can be an outsider as well as an insider. The clan is a major defining factor in determining one being labeled either an insider or an outsider, considering one is a Somali. However, if the subject of the discussion is not about local clan dynamics and politics, one is most likely to be considered as an insider.

In this study the researcher was considered both an insider and an outsider. Being a Somali, the researcher was considered as an insider by the Somali respondents since the topic of discussion was not considered to be contentious or polarizing from a political

perspective. This is because based on various social identifiers such as culture, language and ethnicity, the researcher shared almost all of them with the Somali respondents. The ability to speak Somali language opened numerous opportunities for the researcher during the data collection process. In addition being identified as not a local or being perceived to be an NGO worker by the refugee population gave the researcher more room to be accommodated. This is linked to power wielded by humanitarian and NGO workers.

However, the non-Somali respondents considered the researcher as an outsider.

My gender as a male partially made me an insider especially when it came to conversations with males who spend hours in coffee and tea bars where it is perceived to be place to get the latest gossip and happenings in town. Sitting and casually chatting with men in a relaxed atmosphere gives one access to a lot of information that a female researcher would not get access to. However, it is worth reflecting that one also misses out on information from the female gender.

When it came to Kenyan government authorities and international organizations there was no advantage being a male, in fact there were more disadvantages. Male, youth and Somali were not good combinations in Kenya at that moment given that it was in an active war with the militant group Al-Shabaab in Somalia. This made the researcher a complete outsider. This played a major role in the application of the research permit that took over four weeks which otherwise would not take long.

2.5 Informants selection

The majority of the empirical data collected was collected from the informants in Dadaab camp. Before arrival in Kenya the main method planned for the informants selection was by snowball sampling. The plan was that once the researcher got in touch with one of the main organizations like UNHCR since they were the main organization in this field, it would be easier to be connected with other relevant organization. In addition, other organizations that worked on the field directly with the refugees would be able to recommend the right informants for interviews. First emails were sent to some organizations that the researcher was certain had direct contact with refugees and involved in the process of repatriation upon arrival. However, this proved to be partially

successful as these organizations took a long time to answer the emails and most of them demanded that the researcher had to be connected as an intern to accredited organizations in order to get access to them.

Actors from the government of Kenya in charge of refugee affairs were contacted first who gave a procedural hierarchy of how the relevant documents for the research were to be acquired and gave recommendations of organizations that were actively involved in the process. However, they declined to be interviewed themselves. A sneak preview of the organizations involved in the repatriation process was also searched on the Internet and contacted through emails and telephone calls. Upon coming into contact with these organizations they also recommended others, as well as providing the contacts and persons in charge of the repatriation process in that organization.

On the field the informants were selected by age, gender and the amount of time they stayed in the refugee camp.

The Somali embassy in Nairobi was also contacted to get relevant informants since it was an active player in the repatriation process. Its diplomatic ties and direct engagement with the main organizations was fruitful as well as recommending and sending advance emails to these organizations.

2.5.1 Nairobi informants

It was quite challenging getting access to the Nairobi informants as most of them would be actors of international organizations that had to adhere to the bureaucracy of their agencies. Hence getting interview scheduling took quite some time. Some strictly adhered to official communication channels like emails that sometimes took quite a long time to get replies. In Nairobi interviews were conducted with the officials of UNHCR, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), the Somali Embassy Nairobi, a Jubaland federal regional government of Somalia minister and an urban refugees activist residing in Eastleigh, a predominantly Somali suburb in Nairobi. Getting any interviews from the Kenyan government representative agencies was fruitless. This was attributed to the sensitivity of the matter and all government officials were reluctant to talk or give an insight about it.

2.5.2 Dadaab informants

Prior to arriving Dadaab several logistical paperwork had to be completed in Nairobi in order to get access to the camp complex from the Kenyan government. This was the most challenging part in the researchers stay in Kenya. This will be discussed in the challenges and limitations section below.

Upon arriving Dadaab, the researcher had to report to the camp manager, a representative from the Kenyan government who gives access to visitors who channel their request officially through the government agencies in Nairobi. For researchers who are connected or are interns in organizations they normally report to the field offices of those organizations in Dadaab. The camp manager who wanted to be identified only with his title was very helpful and swift. Emails and telephone calls were made to the representatives of the five camps of Dadaab complex and after a few days, the researcher was provided with a schedule of when the different camps could be visited. The following days the researcher made contact with 4 out of the 5 camps, leaving out the fifth camp because of lack of time at the end. A total of ten interviews were conducted out of which nine were the refugees residing in the camps (ranging from one to 6 persons). Some of the interviews were conducted as groups whereas some were one on one. One UNHCR field officer in one of the camps, who chose to be anonymous was the tenth person interviewed in Dadaab. There was a balance of gender and age among the respondents interviewed in Dadaab. The period of stay in the refugee camp was also a factor considered. This was in consideration of the research questions in order to get a broad perspective in the perception and opinion of the refugees.

Table 1: Key Informants profile

Organization	Respondents Profile	Location
UNHCR	Head office staff member	Nairobi Head Office
Somali Embassy	Liasson officer-National Commission for refugees	Nairobi

	and IDPS	
Danish Refugee Council(DRC)	Nairobi Head Office staff member	Nairobi Head Office
Jubbaland Regional government of Somalia	Minister of Gender, Family Affairs & Human Rights	Nairobi South C Estate
Urban Refugee (Eastleigh Nairobi)	Refugee Activist	Eastleigh Suburb Nairobi
UNHCR	Field Officer	Dadaab Hagadhera Camp
Father of 5 residing since 1992	Refugee	Ifo Camp
Mother of 9	Refugee	Ifo Camp
A group of 6 residents (3men & 3 Women)	Refugees	Ifo Camp
Mother of 5	Refugee	Ifo Camp
Father of 10	Refugee	Ifo Camp
Father of 9	Refugee	Ifo Camp
A group of 6 residents	Refugees	Ifo 2 Camp
A group of 5 youth (18-25yrs)	Refugees	Dhagahleey Camp
A group of 6 residents	Refugees	Hagadhera Camp

2.6 Methodological Challenges and limitations

There were quite a number of challenges and limitations some of which the researcher could not do much about changing them. Prior to travelling to Kenya, the researcher was not aware that a research permit was required in Kenya, before undertaking any research in Kenya. The information came when the researcher requested for an interview with the Kenya Refugee Affairs Department and was asked to produce the right documents before proceeding. As a result the researcher had to apply for the permit that was quite expensive and took over 4 weeks to get it. Among the requirements

needed were a letter of affiliation that was challenging as well to get in order to be issued with the permit. The letter could only be obtained from accredited institutions, which the researcher finally got it from United States International University (USIU) after being introduced to one of the professors there.

Other challenges included requests for interviews not being replied on time or clashing with the respondents work schedules as some already had long planned schedules in advance.

2.7 Summary

This chapter explains the methodology used in this research, as well as discussing the different data collection methods used. The informants selection method is also discussed, as well as the challenges experienced to get access to them highlighted. Likewise the researcher individual experience and personal background is explained giving an insight into the positionality of the researcher as an insider or outsider. In the following chapter, a historical review of the Somali state is presented. That's helps us to understand the historical background of the state before colonial intrusion and the results of the colonial occupation. In addition it highlights the reasons behind the influx of refugees.

Chapter 3: Somalia Historical Review

3.1 Introduction

In order to understand the protracted Somali refugees' issue one has to know the background of the conflict that led to the refugees problem and how it has evolved over the years. It is important to understand this in order to determine if repatriation is the right solution at this moment or not. Therefore a brief history of Somalia and a short study of the conflict and its effects are essential. As we cannot review the entire history of Somalia, while at the same time acknowledging that it is not relevant for this research, this section will confine itself only to a study on the colonial history and the partition of the Somali peninsula. It will then look into the modern history of Somalia and the civil war that resulted the outflow of hundreds of thousands of its citizens as refugees in other countries. Finally the situation in Somalia today will be discussed in review of the ongoing repatriation of its refugees.

3.2 Colonial intrusion, partition

Britain settled in Aden in 1839 using it as a supply station for the route to the Far East and upon seeing the strategic importance provided by the Somali coast as well, it took interest. It was also important for its provision of fresh meat and vegetables for her Aden Garrison. In addition, the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 created a geopolitical situation which increased, the competition for the control of coast along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean among the European colonial powers of Britain, France, Italy, Germany as well as Abyssinia (former name of present Ethiopia) (Issa-Salwe, A. M. 1996:13). These two names Abyssinia and Ethiopia will be interchangeably used later, but refer to the same state.

The three years between 1885 and 1889 can be said to have sealed the fate of the Somali territory for the years to come. The British and the French recognized each other's claims to their protectorate on the west and east respectively of the Zeyla to Harar caravan route. This annoyed the Italians who thought had the only custodial rights within the Somali coast and territory at large after their signing of the Ucciali treaty with Abyssinia, who undercut them by agreeing with the French as well. This led to a

confrontation between Italy and Abyssinia, resulting not only the defeat and humiliation of Italy, becoming the first colonial power to lose a war. This not only resulted a complete victory for Abyssinia but as well forced the other European powers to recognize its full sovereignty and independence (ibid: 16). Thus, 1897 remains the crucial year in the imperial history of the Horn of Africa as a result of the boundary agreements made then. These agreements left a legacy of indeterminacy and confusion that still plagues the relations between Ethiopia and Somalia (Lewis, I.M. 2002:62).

It is said that the first Italian efforts in East Africa and Somalia date from 1885, however, it was not until 1905 that Italian government assumed direct administration of Southern Somalia out of the wreckage of two experiments in government by chartered company (Hess, R.L. 1966:101). This was to change when the Mercatelli regulations found a fuller development in the basic law in April 1908, which united all the areas of Southern Somalia into a single administration under the name *Somalia Italiana* (ibid: 102).

Contrary to the southern part of Somalia, on the North-Eastern part, there existed two effective sultanates. The sultanates of Majeerteen/Mijjertein and the Hobyo/Obbia developed a very effective political organization with diversified measures of centralized authority over relatively large territories. Italy, Britain, France had been trying to solicit them to bring them into their influence since the early days of their competition for the Somali peninsula (Issa-Salwe, A. M. 1996:34). In a realist world, they both saw that it was a necessity to make alliance with stronger powers who they underestimated their long-term stay and intentions. Another possible scenario was to avoid direct occupation of their territories by force, but little did they know that they were slowly ceasing their sovereignty and the elimination of their sultanates into colonial subjects. In order to have a counterbalance of power of the two sultanates the Italians made sure that both were of equal strength at all times to avoid the use of a lot of resources and minimize rebellions against them.

The southern part of today modern Somalia known as Jubaland ended up as a British colonial administration following the withdrawal of the Germans. In 1895 the British Foreign Office visited the 'province' and proclaimed the establishment of British colonial rule. From this period Britain created another area out of the Jubaland, a territory

that was later to be known as the NFD (ibid: 15). But, Jubaland province (12,000 square miles) was later to be transferred back under Italian rule in 1925 in conformity with the 1915 Treaty of London, in which Britain promised to ‘compensate’ Italy for her participation in World War I. However, Britain chose to keep the N.F.D under her rule. According to Castagno (1964), the main reason why Britain extended her domain over the N.F.D was that she wished to create a buffer zone between Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia on the one side and, and the East African railway and the white settlers in the highlands on the other. This, like in other parts of colonial Africa, resulted the superimposition of relatively fixed linear European boundaries over the traditional and more flexible patterns of African ethnic groups (Castagno, A. A. 1964:168).

Somaliland was officially partitioned into five different regions and the Somali people became the subjects of four different states, three colonial Europeans and their old enemy Ethiopia thus putting the fate of the Somalis in the mercy of colonial powers.

3.3 Colonial resistance

According to Issa-Salwe, Somali resistance to foreign interference in their affairs can be dated back to the years between 1528 and 1535 under the command of Imam Ahmed (Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim al-Ghazi), also known as Ahmed ‘Gurey’ (the left-handed), the Somalis defeated and managed to push back the Abyssinian empire. During the colonial time Sayyid Mahamed Abdulle Hassan, led the foreign resistance campaign and inspired the Somalis in a way not seen before since the Ahmed Gurey era motivated by religious and cultural principles (Issa-Salwe, A. M, 1996:21).

In the next two decades the Sayid and his followers fought against the British, Ethiopians and Italian colonizers who had so recently established themselves in the Somali territory. By 1904 the strength and morale of the Sayid was reduced who eventually agreed to peace, tactically relocating to the Italian Majertejn protectorate (Lewis, I.M. 2002:70-72). After four years of fighting the British were likewise compelled to change tactics and make peace with him through the Italians who had not been in military conflict with him. In 1905 they signed the Ilig Treaty which recognized Sayid Mahamed as leader of mini state in the Nugaal valley, under the protection of Italy.

After the establishment of his protectorate and the Italians recognition of Muhammad Abdullah Hassan as its ruler, his prestige rose throughout Somalia, and became a symbol of political rebellion against foreign domination.

Italy conquered Ethiopia in May 1936 and consequently enlarged the Somali territory by the addition of Ogaden and the regions occupied by the Somalis on the upper parts of the Shebelle and Juba rivers. This brought together the Somali territory and its clansmen together who had hitherto been arbitrarily separated by Somalia-Ethiopia false boundary (ibid: 110).

Meanwhile on the southern Italian occupied territory excluding the two northern sultanates, by and large Somali opposition to the Italians was local and no time were the Italians pitted against all Somali tribes. The Somali tribes in this region were pre-occupied by local feuds and had not developed any deep sentiments towards the Italian colonial regime. On the Northern Sultanates, though they resisted the Italians at times and on occasions defeated them, their deep rooted factionalism which was worsened by a disputed territory hindered them from presenting a united front (Hess, R.L. 1966:182).

In the N.F.D region, which was administered by the British, the Somalis used tactics such as tax evasion to circumvent the colonial government implementation of the poll-tax ordinances, and often, whole Somali sub-clans such as the Degodia and Gurreh moved across the frontier into Ethiopia where administration was almost non-existent. Some requested for special status arguing that they were not natives to imply that they were different from the rest of the Kenyan population, thus being given the title 'tribesmen' instead of 'natives', however, there were no any known benefits they got from being given this special title Kenya (Castagno, A.A. 1964:173).

3.4 Independence and self-rule

In 1936 Somalia became part of the Italian East Africa Empire following Mussolini conquest. In 1941, during the Second World War, the allies occupied the whole Italian Empire, and Somalia was placed under British military administration. Luckily for the Somalis, as the egos and political ambitions of the allies could not all be accommodated in one place, after disagreements the United Nations (UN), recommended

that Somalia should become independent after ten-year trusteeship under Italian Administration (Contini, F.C. 1969:1).

This stirred nationalism among the Somalis leading to the formation of the Somalis first modern political platform, the Somali Youth Club, founded on 15 May 1943 in Mogadishu. In the British Somaliland, the Somali National League (SNL) was formed in 1951 and its main political programme was the independence and unification of the Somali people under one political unit (Issa-Salwe, A. M, 1996:55).

Political activities in the French Somaliland was very much muted compared to the rest of the Somali regions and it was attributed to the rivalry between the Somalis and the Afar population thus being left behind from the momentous tide of events which characterized the decade in the area as a whole. (Lewis, I.M. 2002:136).

In the N.F.D., despite the pan-Somali wave, which reached these parts at the end of the 1940s, political activities remained dormant until the 1960s when the British colonial administration lifted the ban on political organization of the Somalis in this region. The Somalis expressed their open desire to join their Somali kinsmen upon independence to be part of the greater Somalia (Issa-Salwe, A. M, 1996:61).

But since the British priorities lay more with a safe exit strategy from a crumbling empire, principles of self-determination were given less priorities and the N.F.D. became part of the Kenyan state upon independence (Lochery, E. 2012:620).

On June 26, 1960, the British Protectorate of Somaliland became the independent state of Somaliland, and five days later it joined with the neighboring Somalia, a UN Trust Territory under Italian administration, which achieved independence on July 1, 1960. Together they formed a unitary state called the Somali republic (Contini, P. 1969:Vii).

3.5 The military government (1969-1991)

The horn of Africa's strategic location near the oil-rich Middle East was of great value to the superpowers. Both the United States and the Soviet Union poured a great amount of military and economic assistance to Somalia and Ethiopia, reawakening their territorial dispute. In July 1977 Somalia, taking advantage of political turmoil in Ethiopia decided to go to war and retake its missing territory. The Ethiopian military regime

declared itself as a Marxist-Leninist state as a tactical move and Soviet allegiance shifted immediately from Somalia to Ethiopia. (Issa-Salwe, A. M, 1996:92). The Somali forces were defeated, and more than a million Somali refugees fled from Ogadeen to Somalia, placing an enormous burden on its already weaker economy. (Shay, S. 2008:4).

Thereafter an era of defiance and challenges to the rule of General Barre began, a trend that was to transform Somalia. Issa-Salwe (1996) perfectly sums up the unfortunate political confusion that engulfed Somalia as he states that, “a state is a carrier of a set of coercive and integrative functions executed by an array of institutions that can be called government. In contrast to what was supposed to be state responsibility, here was a regime whose policies contradicted the state’s duties to maintain order” (Issa-Salwe, A. M, 1996:106).

At the end of 1990 and the beginning of 1991, there was widespread insurrection initiated by the clans and powerbrokers against the government of General Barre who was forced to flee Somalia and exiled in Nigeria. The collapse of Barre’s government ushered in political struggles that erupted over the control of Mogadishu in particular and over the entire country. (Shay, S. 2008:8). Somalia was in a big mess and turmoil with very few friends internationally that would come to its aid and save it from devouring itself, and thus its total disintegration was imminent.

3.6 The civil war & restoration attempts

In the anarchical situation that ensued after the ouster of the ‘strong man’, traditional clan hostility that had been extinguished was reignited. In the wake of the breakdown of law and order, power-thirsty warlords aggravated an already tense situation (Issa-Salwe, A.M. 1996:141). Warlordism became the order of the day and every clan sought protection under their own chief warlord who centered their war against opposing clans in a struggle for dominance and survival. (Emathe, F.E: 2006:21).

By the summer of 1992, the situation had reached a peak chaos, rendering over one and a half million Somalis displaced, either as Internally Displaced People (IDPs) or external refugees into foreign countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Yemen, and in the case of the wealthiest ones in Europe and North America. (Prunier, G. 1996:61).

The UN decided to act after aid agencies began to publicize Somalia's plight and in February 1993, 'Operation Restore Hope' was launched accompanied by a heavily armed U.S army (Lewis, I.M. 2002:209). It is estimated that, 500 000 non-combatants died of starvation, disease and violence during this struggle. The following decade was characterized by 14 failed reconciliations and peace conferences, continuous tribal and gang-related violence, and the solidification of multiple Somali proto-states organized along clan-based lines (Roitsch, P.E 2014:4).

Djibouti, the former French Somaliland protectorate now a sovereign country of its own tried to salvage her brethren from complete destruction while taking advantage of the goodwill and the good relations between it and many of the warlords who assumed power. In 2000, the Transitional National Government (TNG) emerged from peace talks in Arta, Djibouti and for a short time appeared promising.

The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) states convened another reconciliation conference, this time in Kenya with the warlords dominating the debate again. The outcome of the long reconciliation conference that lasted for almost 2 years saw the formation of the Somalia TFG headed by the pro-Ethiopia faction.

3.7 Extremist groups and proxy war

By the 1980s, the Somali religious movements had grown considerably. However, it was the collapse of Barre regime that gave a major boost to Islamic associations and organizations (Shay, S. 2008:37). In September 2004, the TFG was chartered, though it was unable to govern any significant territory outside of its provisional capital of Baidoa, a town south of Mogadishu. A broad-based alliance of warlords, radical Jihadists, moderate Islamists and businessmen, formed the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) who served as 'judges' in the interpretation and enforcement of Sharia law in their respective localities (Roitsch, P.E 2014:4). Although they managed to impose a degree of order in most of Mogadishu and surrounding towns, their existence didn't go down well with U.S which was in midst of its 'global war on terror', gave the green light to Ethiopia or 'subcontracted' to fight a proxy war on its behalf. This set the stage for the next violent episode and quickly forced the ICU into disarray but a splinter group calling itself Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, commonly known as al-Shabaab emerged. With

historical adversary occupying Somali soil, recruiting fighters was very easy for al-Shabaab. This plunged the country into more intractable and dangerous levels of crisis and conflict, adding new layers of grievances, hardening divisions, increased mistrust and fostering radicalization that came to shape Somalia in the next decade (Menkhaus, K. 2007:388). This escalating conflict led to the influx of thousands of refugees into Kenya, and according to UNHCR, as of August 2007, three camps in Dadaab were hosting a total of some 177,000 refugees, mainly from south and central Somalia (<http://www.unhcr.org/publications/fundraising/474ac8ce0/unhcr-global-appeal-2008-2009->). This forced Kenya to seal its border with Somalia for fear of the conflict spreading over to its side and at the same time wanting to keep the level of refugees within its country to a manageable size.

3.8 Current situation

The conflict in Somalia has dragged on for over two decades and consequently gained the many titles of ‘failed’, ‘collapsed’ and ‘fragile’ state to name but a few. It has become a cautionary signal for other nations who whenever they are on the verge of a conflict quickly forewarn each other that they risk being like Somalia. Many political pundits gave Syria a cautious advice not to go down the same road as Somalia during the start of its conflict. According to Mary Harper the Somali conflict became complex and long because of many foreign interventions. This has left many within and outside the country confused and unable to judge or give a reasonable projection as to where Somalia might be headed for the foreseeable future. As a result many policy-makers have concluded that Somalia represents a threat to global security. (Harper, M. 2012:197). Consequently the European Union (EU) and the US in order to curb the growth of militancy in Somalia, prosecuted a plan of a proxy war in order to avoid own casualties as well give the mission legitimacy by pushing for an African led mission. The US military strategy stressed the importance of establishing partnerships between the US and African governments in order to help facilitate the African Union (AU) many security challenges. According to Olsen 2014, an example of such partnership is the AU’s mission AMISOM, in Somalia, which was launched in 2007 that so far has spent hundreds of millions of dollars for training and supplying a strong force of over 20000 African

soldiers (Olsen, G.M. 2014:297). Its area of operations has also grown from a few districts of Mogadishu to the whole of south-central Somalia, evolving from a VIP protection unit and guarding institutions into a broader counter-insurgency and stabilization force (Williams P.D. 2016:40).

Currently AMISOM is planning an exit strategy that will enable the Somali military to take charge of their security apparatus, but it is clear that Somalia faces an uphill task to take full responsibility politically and militarily. Al-shabaab has lost political significance as well as large swathes of territory but still remains deadly and able to conduct operations cheaply and effectively. (Williams P.D. 2016:45). It is therefore quite easily predictable that unless there will be fundamental changes both politically and militarily in the Somali administration AMISOM and al-Shabaab will still be the two main visible actors at least for another decade.

Taking advantage of the improved security situation, UNHCR in conjunction with the Kenyan and Somali authorities devised a detailed plan on how to safely repatriate Somali refugees that have been living in Kenya since 1991. However, that return has been hampered by constantly changing security environment inside the country caused by militant groups as well as by lack of economic opportunities for those wishing to return. Without a proper structure of return most of those returned end up being internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a result of too long exposure to city life which made them lose in touch with their rural life such as farming and pastoralism. According to Hammond Laura, it is estimated that 1.1 million IDPs are living within Somalia living in inhospitable conditions mostly on the outskirts of major cities becoming victims of looting, theft and grave sexual violations (Hammond, L. 2014:13). However, the current Somali government, which was popularly voted in February 2017, is receiving a lot of praise from within and outside and many Somalis and the international community are very optimistic about the change of prospects that this government might bring.

3.9 Summary

This chapter has looked into the history of the state of Somalia, starting from its pre-colonial history, where it was little known to the rest of the world, as well as not

close to anything being a fully functioning state apart from a few sultanates spread across. It was later invaded by the colonial powers, with its strategic position on the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean being the enviable prize for their geopolitics. We have seen the results of its partition into five administrative regions by three powerful European colonial powers led to the loss of some of its territory to its neighboring states upon gaining independence as a result of that partitioning.

We have also seen that the modern Somali state that emerged has ever since been obsessed with the idea of reclaiming its lost territory, diplomatically and militarily. This exhausted its resources meant for development and eventually led to its disintegration. It also led to its neighboring states of Ethiopia and Kenya being very alert of what they termed Somali irredentism. This historical background was important in order to give an insight as to why there is existence of refugees, and how and what led to their flight from their home country. It also makes us to understand the politics that surrounds the repatriation of the same refugees back to Somalia and why it might be different from other types of repatriation process where there was no historical connection between the refugees and the host state. This will give us a more understanding of the notion of 'home' and belonging.

Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework & Concepts

4.1 Introduction

While there are many other theories that could fit repatriation and its related subjects such as migration and integration, I have chosen to use post-colonial theory together with other related concepts as the theoretical framework of this thesis. I have chosen post colonial theory to give an understanding of the background of the problem that is indirectly connected to colonialism and then back it up with related concept that have come into prominence as a result of the political systems that came after colonialism. These concepts include nationalism, identity, language, and ethnicity. But, first the main themes of the thesis will be introduced. The concept of repatriation and the meaning of 'home', as well as definition of refugees will be presented.

4.2 Definition of refugee

According to UNHCR handbook on voluntary repatriation, the term 'refugee' refers to all persons outside their country of origin for reasons of feared persecution, armed conflict, or gross violation of human rights, and who as a result, need international protection. The refugee status necessitates that a person may enter the territory of another state, without being subjected to the usual laws of the state that decides who may or may not enter its territory. The states where these refugees seek refuge are obliged not to send a person back to a state where there is a risk of persecution. Instead they are to give them certain fundamental rights and protection, until the conditions of the country of origin have changed to a degree where protection is no longer necessary (Naqvi, Y. 2004:81). During the Cold War for example, when the stakes were high between the West and the Soviet bloc, refugees who mostly came from the Soviet bloc were regarded to be highly valuable to the Western states. This was because of the valuable intelligence and propaganda resources that they provided. Most importantly they were relatively skilled and educated (Toft, M.D. 2007:143).

After the Cold War, things changed as the number of refugees increased and the political benefits host states got in return from them decreased. In recent decades the vast

majority of refugees have come from Africa with their root cause of movements being complex and varied from region to region. However, the vast majorities are fleeing from civil wars in their home countries. Somali refugees' influx to Kenya started in the early 1990s, followed by another influx in 2011 during the height of the drought. The first influx was mainly due to the civil war, which broke out in the early 1990s, whereas the second one was a combination of war and natural catastrophes. Kenya has allowed Somali refugees sanctuary and relative safety for some decades but Kenya has lately compiled evidence that militant groups such as Al-shabaab use Dadaab refugee camp as a base to launch attacks in Kenya. This has led to Kenya calling for the repatriation of all Somali refugees. In April 2016, the Kenyan government announced its intention to close Dadaab with the majority of the refugees being Somalis. A tripartite agreement between Kenya, Somalia, and UNHCR was signed in November 2013 to facilitate the repatriation of Somali refugees (Crisp, J. 2016:141).

4.3 Repatriation

In the UN resolutions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the right of return has not featured highly in the general discussions of the refugee rights but the major drive of these discussions has been quite the opposite on the right not to be returned. In contrast, the UNHCR statute identifies the enablement of repatriation as one of the organization's principal functions and calls on the high commissioner to provide assistance to governmental and NGOs in the efforts to promote voluntary repatriation (Bradley, M. 2013:2).

During the Cold War, return was not highly promoted by Western powers that favored other solutions that best served their political interests and influencing UNHCR principle along the way, however, that changed after the Cold War and repatriation suddenly became a leading answer to displacement. Ever since then in the refugee research literature repatriation has been one of the preferred durable solutions to the question of refugee problem with local integration and resettlement to a third country of permanent asylum being the other two preferred. According to Allen and Morsink, throughout history most of refugee movements have resulted their permanent exile, but, that changed since the Second World War (Allen & Morsink, 1994:21).

This led to UNHCR declaring the 1990s as the ‘decade of repatriation’, and during this period return programs expanded extensively, promoted as a contribution to regional stability and international security. At the same time the other two durable solutions were slowly drained out by the concerned states who either hosted or received refugees as a third country that sighted issues of burden sharing among others. Of the three durable solutions mentioned above repatriation is the least researched one and this is attributed to the fact that many have assumed that repatriation is the most desired solution in the view of refugees hence attracting less attention. Previously many refugee hosting states considered the options of locally integrating refugees given the number of refugees was manageable but that has changed of late and many states are increasingly turning down this option. Some of the reasons attributed to this include, high number of refugees that deplete the local resources and an increasing displeasure towards refugees because of political and social reasons. Thus, the pressures to repatriate refugees are building up in many areas as their numbers swell. Allen and Morsink caution that there is a risk of making repatriations less than completely voluntary and returning refugees to the same areas where they fled while the threats still linger or their governments are ill equipped to receive them (Allen & Morsink 1994:20). Gold and Nawyn attribute this haste of repatriating refugees to the erosion of sentiments of compassion in recent times because of the depiction of refugees and asylum seekers as not legitimate but rather disparaging economic migrants, pitilessly manipulating the governments and populations of host (Gold & Nawyn 2013:103).

The most common types of repatriations are self-repatriation and assisted repatriation, and they usually occur under different settings. Refugee self-repatriation also known as spontaneous is a decision solely based on the refugees own evaluation of the situation after assessing the pros and cons of their current condition. On the other hand assisted repatriation also known as voluntary repatriation occurs after protracted negotiations between different actors, of which the refugee is one of the four (Bariagaber A. 2006:121).

4.3.1 Spontaneous repatriation

In simple terms spontaneous repatriation generally means the absence of international agencies such as UNHCR and concerned governments in the process of return of refugees to their previous homeland. The refugee returns based on the information at their disposal and they reach an informed decision based on that gathered information sometimes self and at other times through kin left behind. However, it is important not to categorize all unassisted return as self-repatriation since it can sometimes be prompted by another conflict in their host nation. For example, Ethiopian Ogadeni refugees returned back to Ethiopia after the collapse of the Somali state and therefore their return was as a result of the relapse of security conditions in their country of asylum and not self-decision (Bariagaber, A. 2006:124).

4.3.2 Voluntary repatriation

The cornerstone of refugee protection is the norm of *non-refoulement*, codified in the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. It obliges that no member state shall dismiss or return refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where their lives or freedom would be threatened. This is also covered in the OAU 1969 refugee convention, which states that the voluntary character of repatriation shall be respected in all cases and no refugee shall be repatriated against their will. It instead constrains the country of asylum in partnership with the country of origin, to make acceptable arrangements for the safe return of refugees who wish repatriation. UNHCR in its 1996 *voluntary repatriation handbook* expresses voluntariness as the absence of any physical, psychological or material pressure that might push the refugee to repatriate (Crisp, J. & Long, K. 2016:142).

Voluntary repatriation can be categorized into two, voluntary organized and voluntary spontaneous. The first happens when it is organized by UNHCR, which is the international recognized refugee agency that can undertake such projects. Voluntary spontaneous, happens without the assistance of UNHCR and simply means when refugee pack up and return to their country of origin by choice. Likewise there is involuntary organized and involuntary spontaneous. The first involves assistance from certain authorities as the word ‘organized’ suggests but there is coercion and force involved. The

refugees are not given any choice but rather rounded up and returned. A good example of this is the repatriation of Burundian refugees from Tanzania in 1997, where they were rounded up by the Tanzanian army and returned. Such repatriations are prohibited in international law but host countries involved in such moves mostly justify their action for security reasons. Involuntary spontaneous occurs when refugees flee from their host state to their area of origin without any form of organized assistance. The flight of ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe into West Germany between 1945 and 1948 is a good example (Toft, M.D. 2007:147).

In simple terms UNHCR definition of voluntariness depends on the consent of the refugee meaning that the repatriating agencies have the consent of the refugee to return. Other actors and refugee advocates go further and argue that a voluntary repatriation requires not just the absence of coercion but also the provision of choice or other genuine alternatives.

According to Serena Olsaretti, voluntariness is profoundly connected to choice, meaning that a voluntary choice must not only be one which an individual is free to make, but one which is measured against an acceptable alternative (Long, K. 2013:160). This emphasizes that if refugees are to be returned back to their country of origin, then, they should be given the sovereignty to choose their return, thus making their consent a fundamental element in determining the voluntariness of their action. Likewise Ullom Vic, reasons that voluntary repatriation transpires when an individual, who fled from his/her country of origin under circumstances making them refugees chooses from free will and without coercion, to return to their country of origin (Ullom, V. 2001:139).

On the contrary Robert Nozick judgment of 'voluntariness' is reduced to the non-infringement of rights. He argues that provided that the state concerned does not violate the basic rights of life, liberty and property, then other rewards or bonuses that the refugee loses as a result of repatriation, do not amount to refolement of their basic human rights (Long, K. 2013:159).

4.4 The meaning of 'home'

When returning refugees 'home' offers the international community with a means of equating repatriation as the natural solution to exile while concurrently underlining national-state based order and the association between people and place. It is worth mentioning that the notion of home is used only in repatriation, unlike local integration and resettlement in a third country. This emphasizes the international community interest in restraining populations into the logic of nation-state forms (Long, K. 2013:23). In political terms, states seek to equate a return to a state of origin or nationality in order to pursue their political objectives in seeking to associate understanding of 'home' with national and territorial boundaries, whereas for the refugee a 'home' is to a longed peaceful domestic life. Hammond, argues that, 'home' as used in most scholarly research on repatriation and return is bound by Western notions that may not be easily applicable to certain non-western contexts. The Tigrayan people of Ethiopia for example refer 'home' to their place of birth or family's place, as well as the country or region from which they originate from, which gives them the sense of personal and collective identity (Markowitz, F. & Stefansson, A. H. 2004:41).

According to Daniel Warner, the concept of home and community in the country of origin is most frequently related to two elements, namely, the association of the refugees with those that are similar with them and the association of the refugees with a specific place. His conclusion is that, home, is the association of an individual within a homogeneous group and the association of that group with a particular physical place. Coles, an author of UNHCR study on voluntary repatriation agrees with Warner's theory and settles on that, 'home' is the need to be with one's own. According to him a 'people' is formed by a physical proximity, a native soil and a shared history that has formed common beliefs and values, thus making the link between people and a land a deep one (Warner, D. 1994:163). However, what Cole and the likes haven't dug deeper is the association of 'home' across different territorial boundaries which simultaneously lack meaning and have great meaning. In many ordinary African citizens views, territorial boundaries have little meaning because they were carved out by colonial powers without regard for existing patterns of group identification. On the contrary, for the states, especially the ones that have benefitted from the 'artificial' borders, boundaries are

geopolitically and socio-politically necessary for building state institutions such as the military and police. Going by this argument, it is possible to argue that refugees who find themselves exiled in another state with an artificial territory carved out from their own state might still feel at 'home' despite being in an internationally recognized foreign territory. In addition the feeling of 'home' might be stronger if they are living amongst their own ethnic group, though officially belonging to two different states. Gottlieb explains that, a national home is a concept that has its roots in history, culture and myth, and the limits of a national or historical motherland often do not coincide with a state's boundaries (Gottlieb, G. 1994:106).

Furthermore, there are generational differences in ideas about home between the young and the elderly. Hammond, on her findings of the Tigrayan people of Ethiopia explains that, older people are more likely to think of their birthplaces or ancestral homes of their families in an active sense and express their desire to return. On the contrary younger adults who have started their new lives, the idea of going back to a life they had once known, or have never known can be unpractical or unthinkable (Markowitz, F. & Stefansson, A. H. 2004:48).

In the above explanation, the author is describing empirical findings of a group that have no historical or ethnical connection with the place that they are repatriating from thus making their return less politically charged. But there is little research done if any at all about people who have either historical or ancestral relation with the place from where they are being repatriated. There has been increased politicization of ethnic identity evident in much of post-colonial states especially in Africa, which was vastly affected by the colonial partition.

4.5 Post-colonial theory

Post-colonial theory in simple terms is referred to a critical body of knowledge that questions the dominant ways through which the world is known and how this knowledge is defined. It is not only trying to give an alternative but challenges what is seen as Western hegemony of intellectualism and expertise. According to Iwowo it is rejecting what it believes recognized agendas that advance a world-view to the exclusion

of the 'other', non-Western views that are profoundly unrecognizing the values of other non-Western cultures (Iwowo, V. 2014:2). As a result post-colonial theory was born in order to counter the narrative of dominance, which was not only instigated through physical military power but intellectually as well. It is a proactive movement against any kind of injustice, depravity and distinction. In order to empower the colonized people and somewhat give them back their dignity, it has developed the literature which has given them the platform to view the relationship between the Western and non-Western world from a different point of view.

According to Ashcroft, the term post-colonial had a chronological meaning when it was first used after the Second World War. However, from the late 1970s literary critics adopted it to discuss the various cultural effects of colonization to contend with the various forms of colonial oppression. He upholds that "words such as post-colonial do not describe essential forms of experience but forms of talk about experience" (Ashcroft, B. 2001:12). Ahluwalia explains that experience in the case of Africa, does not mean the time after independence, but rather a concept, which takes into account the historical realities of the European imperial incursions into Africa from the fifteenth century onwards (Ahluwalia, P. 2001:14).

Post-colonial theory best known authors and theorists of anti-colonialism or decolonization include writers such as Amilcar Cabral, Frantz Fanon and Albert Memmi. It also includes recent authors such as Edward Said, Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha just to name but a few among many others. Hicks explains that these authors demonstrated how colonialism could be aggressive through wars and invasions, as well as passive through what he calls assimilative influence. They warn that the result is equally detrimental in the sense that both the aggressiveness and the influence erode the culture of the social group being colonized. Cabral argues that culture is the main trait upon which a threatened social group can base its resistance. He adds "to defend culture is to defend the unity of purpose and interests of the social group. Without culture there is no social group" On the same topic of culture Fanon explains that a colonizing social group that wants to usurp power will attempt to initiate its cultural values on another social group, whereas the colonized social group will resist by bolstering its cultural difference in order to survive (Hicks, M. 1998:21).

While culture is not the topic of concern of thesis, aspects related to it will be discussed in relation to the repatriation of refugees. In the following sections I will discuss what the aforementioned writers wrote about post-colonialism, focusing only on the work of Fanon, Said, Spivak and Bhabha. Choosing this authors work does not mean their work is more relevant than the rest but because of space I choose to limit it only to these four authors.

4.5.1 Frantz Fanon

Frantz Fanon, was a Martiniquan born French who grew up in Martinique thinking that he was French but that changed after the end of the Second World War when he returned back home with serious doubts about his identity as a Frenchman. This is as a result of the serious racism he faced in the French army as well as the general French population. This compelled him to write in order to highlight the brutality of colonialism, as well as encourage the colonized people to fight for their liberation. His writing includes; *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952), *the Wretched of the Earth* (1961) *A Dying Colonialism* (1959) and *Toward the African Revolution* (1964).

Black Skin White Masks was his first book and his idea was to investigate the psychological implications of colonialism. He argues due to colonial subjugation the black people see themselves inferior to their colonial oppressors and end up emulating them. The reasons for that are many but one aspect that he points clearly is language and acquisition of knowledge. Fanon explains that the black people have acquired the colonizers language as their main mode of communication as well as acquiring knowledge from colonial learning institutions thus making it difficult for them to develop their own self-definition by using the tools and instruments of Western civilization (Fanon, F. 1952:xv).

The Wretched of the Earth, This is a series of four different essays touching on diverse topics. The first essay “*Concerning Violence*” is dedicated to decolonization which he calls it a violent phenomenon. He argues that the colonized people will get back their power only through violent struggle just like the colonizers maintained and used violence or the threat of violence to keep the status quo. It will take violence to reverse

these power relationships. Another plan the colonizers have used to subjugate their colonies is through structural violence with great inequalities in all measures of human development. This inequality is maintained by the use of force, by the denial of educational opportunity and by the forced segregation of living arrangements. He terms this as a planned psychological depreciation of the African self-worth of the Africans' culture and history (Fairchild, H.H. 1994:192). Another issue that Fanon takes up is the commitment of the bourgeoisie, who unlike the peasants seek to compromise with the colonial system and may secretly condemn the peasants' use of violence. He cautions that it is only through fighting that decolonization will be realized (ibid: 194).

In the second essay "*spontaneity: its Strengths and weakness*" Fanon picks up from where he left in the first essay, questioning the commitment of the elites of the struggle. The elites tend to think like the colonizers as their mentality has been compromised and are suspicious of the peasants' intentions. Fanon claims that this wedge between the elites and the majority peasants is a strategy used by the colonial systems to create dissension and competition (ibid: 195).

In the third essay "*the Pitfalls of National Consciousness*" Fanon reiterates the in-built conflict between the upcoming leaders and the majority of the population. He points out that these leaders are embracing the values and ideologies of the colonial system and after assuming power at the end of the colonial regime will not be able to achieve any meaningful development and thus still be dependent on their colonial masters as intended. "Business agents" of the Western bourgeoisie is the title he brands them (ibid: 196).

In the fourth essay "*on National Culture*" he looks into the problem of reclaiming national history and culture as a process of liberation and as an aftermath of decolonization. He calls for the research of ancient African civilizations in order to revive the dignity and glory of past generations. Not only have the colonizers distorted the national origin or the tribal identification of Africans but the whole of Africa. Thus Fanon sees cultural nationalism as a prerequisite to national liberation and the liberation of the nation as necessary for the renewal of culture (ibid:198).

In the fifth essay “*Colonial war and mental disorders*” he writes about a series of mental disorders that come as a result of the struggle for liberation.

A Dying Colonialism, in this book he harshly criticizes the merciless brutality of imperialism which their main instruments are violence and terror. To remedy he stresses that the revolutionary resistance frees the conscious of the oppressed people from fear and gives them new hope of getting back their dignity and respect as human beings.

4.5.2 Edward Said

Although he has written many books and articles, the one book that his name is over associated with is undoubtedly *orientalism* that has contributed to the discourse of post-colonial theory. His other works include *The World, the text and the critic*, and *culture and imperialism*, and the *Question of Palestine, Covering Islam*, among many others.

According to Childs & Williams, a fundamental part of Said’s orientalism is concerned about the way the West has not only constructed the orient but also portrayed it as the ‘other’ with negative associations (Childs, P. & Williams P. 1997:98).

In addition Seidman argues that still there exists a condition of Western imperialism in the representational division between the “occident” and the “orient” whereby the orient is portrayed as the inferior and in need of supervision and dominion by the occident whose democratic and rational essence marks its superiority. Said argues that this depiction has been entrenched through modern Western knowledge and in particular in the discipline of “oriental studies” (Seidman S. 1996:314).

To counter this he argues that there is a necessity to resist and recreate this knowledge. He suggests that in order to turn the tide, the power of the orientalist lie in knowing about the orient. This will create resistance in twofold, to know the knowledge of the orient outside the discourse of orientalism, and to represent and present this knowledge to the orientalist themselves. For him an alternative, non-coercive knowledge, which counters the dominant narrative, is what is essential (Ahluwalia, P. 2001:43).

4.5.3 Homi Bhabha

Homi Bhabha is one of the chief pioneering characters of post-colonial theory. His writings include *mimicry*, *ambiguity* and *hybridity* in post-colonial contexts. His concept of mimicry is one often discussed in post-colonial studies. Writing about this, he intended to highlight how colonial mimicry influences the spirit of an individual. In his essay “*of mimicry and man: the ambivalence of colonial discourse*” Bhabha investigates the psychic mechanisms of the colonized subject and his desire to imitate the colonizer. He further claims that this mimicry exonerates the wrong doings of the colonizer and portrays their power and knowledge as good. Mimicry in colonial and post-colonial discourse is defined when ‘subjects’ of the colonized countries start imitating not only the language and culture of the colonizers but their behavior and attitudes as well. The colonial master is perceived to be superior by the colonized people and in order to reach that superiority they tend to mimic them to reach that level of power. However, that imitation can never be complete according to Bhabha, “*the menace of mimicry is its double vision*” because of other factors such as cultural, historical and racial differences that impede one’s complete makeover into someone new (Bhabha, H. 1984:129). For Bhabha mimicry is the effect of the doubling that takes place when one culture dominates the other. Some of those dominated will attempt to mimic those in the dominant culture and the dominant ones will encourage mimicry among those they dominate. They want the subject to mimic in order to fail and make mistakes to their satisfaction.

4.5.4 Gayatri Spivak

Like Bhabha, Spivak has written no book on one single issue of post-colonialism instead she has published many interviews, a dozen of which have been collected as *the Post-Colonial Critic*. One of her most renowned articles includes “*Can the Subaltern speak*”. The term subaltern in the English dictionary is a synonym for subordinate, but it can also mean a lower ranking officer in the army. The Italian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci also used the word subaltern to refer to the subordinate groups such as the rural peasantry in Southern Italy, whose achievement of social and political consciousness was limited and their political unity weak. According to Gramsci the subaltern, in comparison

with the industrial class were economically and socially oppressed group. Similarly the subaltern studies historians engaged themselves in the social and political practices of those groups who were unable to represent themselves as a class or social group as a result of domination by an elite group (Morton, S. 2007:97).

For Spivak, the most important thing is representation and specifically she is more concerned about who is representing whom, and how? Her question revolves around representation in terms of political representation and in academia. This is key in post-colonial theory because all the academic literature in the post-colonial era has been either written by the colonizers themselves or the elites that took over power after them. Then who represents the interests, ideas, and thoughts as well as the political agency of the underprivileged majority?

Maggio, argues, “Like Said, Spivak wants to expose the complicit nature of literature and the intellectual elite which often appears innocent in the political realm of oppression. The intellectual elite of the Western (and sub-Western) academy pretends to be blameless in the arena of colonialism” (Maggio, J. 2007:420). Spivak’s essay has been interpreted in different ways, however, her main message in reference to the *sati* ritual practiced by pre-colonial Indians revolves around whether the women who practice it can speak for themselves or they are represented by the males around them. The English understood the *sati* as a slaughter of innocent women whereas the male Hindus who spoke for the female Indians interpreted it as a voluntary act. She concludes that in this case the subaltern, who is the Indian women, have no voice and thus cannot represent themselves. In addition the agents who act as “native informants” for the elites and could speak on their behalf and enlighten the other about them has also a distorted view of the subaltern. Maggio, J. argues that the “native informant though useful, offers only a dead end”. The reason being that they are equally seen to a certain extent as the exotic other as well, thus keeping the subaltern in an inaccessible darkness (ibid: 427).

In a broader context the subaltern refers to the least powerful in society who cannot express their concerns to the powerful. These are the ones with lower economic and cultural status and make up the majority who exist outside the circles of power. Many

factors such as culture, language or power hierarchy hinder them from being heard. If they are able to speak or communicate their concerns, would they be heard? Spivak's answer is negative and adds that often times they are constructed as resisters, criminals or mutineers. This is the case in modern world politics as well where the poor nations voices are overshadowed by the powerful leading states economically, diplomatically, culturally as well as militarily. Their voices like the subaltern are hardly heard, and if they do, they are heard through gatekeepers and agents.

In summary these four authors ideas and message is shaped by the experiences of colonialism. Not necessarily what they experienced themselves personally but they are trying to give a picture of the feelings of the societies of that time and how they were affected. The relationships were shaped by imperial conquests and the odds were by far skewed in favor of the colonizers. They also give a detailed explanation of how that could be remedied and counter the colonial narrative. Their main themes revolve around how the dominated people could get back their power through producing their own knowledge in order to represent themselves. By representing yourself you bypass the gatekeepers and the elites who represent only their interests and not that of the majority. In order to create a space for oneself, Fanon for example suggest that the colonized people need to stop emulating their oppressors and produce their own knowledge in their own language to get back their respect and dignity. Through that they achieve self-definition.

Edward Said message in *orientalism* is not far from what Fanon suggest as he argues that the colonized people are still dominated because the colonizers still produce what would be their knowledge. The people of the orient, i.e. the East are referred to as the 'other' to show that they are different from the West through images and writings. Through that, they are presented to be inferior to the colonizers race and as result there is still need for supervision. Said therefore argues that the only way to counter that false narrative is by producing their own knowledge that needs to reach not only the outside world, that they are competing with, but most importantly their own populations. By acknowledging that they have the capability to produce their own expertise and know-how the colonial subjects will be freed from the yokes of colonialism. In short knowledge leads to power and frees one from the control of others.

Spivak theory revolves around representation as well. Through the Subaltern, which refers to the least powerful in society she presents how they are subjugated economically and socially through layers of representation. In her essay *can the subaltern speak*, she highlights the issue of the Indian women who are the lowest in rank after the colonizers and the Indian men. Her question therefore means, can the weaker persons in society present their problems to the powerful and propose a negotiation with them? Do they have the means to present their grievances?

Bhabha theory of mimicry is about the influence of the colonizers on the colonized people. Years of domination and cultural decay has made the colonized to believe that only by behaving and carrying themselves like their colonial masters will they be seen as civilized. The colonized are encourage to assimilate to the dominant colonial culture. This also applies to the post-colonial context as well, as we have seen the minority groups being forced to follow the dominant majority culture.

4.6 Other relevant post-colonial concepts

Colonialism in Africa as a historical and ideological phenomenon has been interpreted in different ways, but to many subjects it has meant humiliation, oppression, degradation, alienation and economic exploitation. Many states that have experienced colonialism believe that it had a profound and ever lasting effects on its development both in positive and negative terms, but most importantly negatively on their political affairs. One of the most profound legacies of colonial period has been ethnic conflict that was mostly caused by imposed formal territorial boundaries. The boundaries were drawn with little or no consideration to the actual distribution of indigenous ethno-cultural groups. With the end of colonialism, the newly formed states especially those that benefited from the land grab did all that was in their power to keep their frontiers intact, creating some of the most ethnically fragmented states in the world (Blanton, R. et.al. 2001:473).

As a result, from the onset of many African states independence, coincided with conflicts such as territorial disputes and nationalism that put a big question mark on the relationship between the different ethnic groups and their states. Language, ethnicity,

nationalism, blood and belonging, and the politics of differences among others were drummed up to push for independence and self-determination. To date Africa is still reeling from these infirmities. In the following sub-sections the thesis wants to look at how these concepts are relevant and might have an influence on the discourse of repatriation of refugees.

4.6.1 Nationalism

Muller, (2008) argues that there are two major opinions about national identity. The first one is that all people who live within a country's borders are part of the nation, regardless of their ethnic, racial or religious origins. This type of nationalism is classified as liberal nationalism. The other is ethno-nationalism that mostly people associate with. The underlying appreciation of this nationalism is that nations are defined by a shared heritage, including sharing a common language, faith and ethnic ancestry. It draws its strength from the notion that members of a nation are connected like an extended family, eventually unified by bonds of blood (Muller, J. Z. 2008:20). Most of African nationalism is linked to the latter because of the strong lineage ties that at times require the memorization of the family genealogy.

As elsewhere in Africa, colonialism instinctively provided the frame in which modern Somali nationalism sprouted. Prior to colonialism Somalis traversed the land with their herds and traded with their neighbors in Ethiopia and Arabs on the east. According to Lewis these interactions with foreigners refined Somali self-awareness and their sense of the distinctiveness of their culture, language and religion and most importantly involvement in the medieval religious wars in Ethiopia between Christians and Muslims (Lewis, I.M. 2004:496).

After gaining independence most of the developing world states came into creation, with their borders cutting across ethnic boundaries and as anticipated generated ethnic disaggregation and communal conflict. Muller believes that, partition may thus be the most benevolent lasting resolution to such deep and passionate communal conflicts. However, not all states that have benefited in one way or the other in seizing their neighbors lands are willing to give it back without putting up a fight legally or militarily as experienced in Africa after colonialism. Kenya for example made it clear that the NFD

was an inalienable part of Kenya despite the Somali government clear mandate that it was part and parcel of the 'Greater Somalia'. This agenda was enforced and instigated by the SYL, apolitical party initiated in Mogadishu in 1943, which later organized party branches in the NFD. The focal aim of the party was the unity of all the Somalis in East Africa within an independent Somalia or 'Greater Somalia'. That strengthened the will of the NFD Somalis in their hope of joining Somalia as was put by one Somali Legislative Council representative, Ahmed Farah that;

“Sometimes the people of the NFD think of the rest of Kenya as quite a foreign country. They have little in common with the rest of Kenya... I had better say what will happen if the administration of the Northern province is not changed. I foresee that the Somali and the Boran and the Galla and the Turkana... will break away in different directions” (Castagno, A.A. 1964:175).

From the above excerpt we get the impression that the flame kindled by the Sayyid during his struggle against colonialism and his dream of keeping the Somali territory as one, still remains with many Somalis to this day. He was universally regarded as the true Somali nationalist leader of the modern era, and those that intend to galvanize the Somalis today tend to appeal to them in the name of their culture and common creed (Abdi, A.S. 1977:659).

With independence, most states in Africa, which were multiethnic sought to abandon the ethnic discord of the colonial state through various ways such as redrawing internal lines and banning ethnic organizations. Tribalism was denounced, however, ethnicity was by no means ignored in political practice and was temporarily subdued by including political figures from most major groups in the cabinet positions. Territorial nation was promoted as a solidarity standing above cultural composition of its populace to prevail the ethnic nature of the state. But, it was not easy to erase the ethnic nature of the citizens as much as the new states tried to promote that new concept. Consequently as it was experienced in many African states the nation-building project failed to erase ethnicity, nor confine it to the private realm, and the more it was suppressed, the more it yielded strong resistance and even separatist movements. In Africa, Sudan faced the fiercest resistance as its non-Arab population resisted Arabization and Islamization promoted by the state.

4.6.2 Ethnicity

There are many definitions of the term ethnicity but in short, Barth has summarized it as a group that is biologically self-preserving, and, shares central cultural values. This group has a membership, which identifies itself, as well as identified by others, as constituting a classification distinct from other categories of same order. He further explains that the group keeps its social boundaries by maintaining its identity when other groups interact with them. As a result certain codes of conduct are followed that blends one with its group while keeping ‘others’ out (Barth, F. 1969:15).

From the above definition we find that ethnicity appears in many facades, but of late it is its political expression that has gained it prominence. Ethnicity has proved to be an effective means of political mobilization for those who seek access to state power in order to change the existing pattern of resource distribution. The historical point of reference for contemporary ethnicity in Africa is the colonial period which forged new ethnic identities and the dissolution of old ones, as well as the change in the functions that ethnicity was required to perform. One negative change in the use of ethnicity inherited from colonialism is the politicization of ethnicity (Yeros, P. 1999:73).

Africa’s recent political development has been stalled by the use of ethnicity for the purpose of group mobilization in ascension to power as well as defying state authority when one’s own ethnic group is not in power. Today, many ethnic groups within the post-colonial states of Africa have reverted to ethno-nationalism due to alienation from the central government, especially minority groups who are marginalized in the economic and the political sectors of the state. They view the state to be the source of their constant misery and therefore irrelevant to their common interest. In Africa, ethnicity itself has not threatened the co-existence of people, however, it’s meaning and difference is felt in the context of state letdown and the search for adjustment in a complex and difficult political environment (Udogu, E. I. 2001:21).

4.6.3 Relationship between ethnicity and the state

One thing that has been fiercely guarded in many African states that comprise of multiple ethnic groups straddling across borders is citizenship. In many parts of Africa it remains fundamentally tied to tribal and ethnic identity and the bureaucratic process

based on these categories. By virtue of being part of a political state one should qualify to get the legal documents automatically but because these documents carry significant power and influence like choosing leaders in elections, controlling their issuance to rival ethnic groups will dispose them freedom of movement, economic development and most importantly political power.

For example, that type of politics has been perfected by Kenya on its Somali population despite being acknowledged being part and parcel of Kenya. Lochery explains the case of the 1989 Somali screening (issuance of special identification cards) demonstrates how precarious citizenship status of Kenyan Somalis is rooted in the institutionalization of state power in Kenya and the ways in which social relations have mediated that power. The government of Kenya decided to give Somalis special IDs to make them easily identifiable by its security forces. (Lochery, E. 2012:619). It is believed that the special IDs program for the Somali Kenyans antagonized them as well as affected their sense of belonging further. A belonging that they had always questioned. The relationship between the state and its ethnic Somalis became even worse when it was confirmed that people with Kenyan identity documents were detained and deported to Somalia simply because their lineage was not from lineage 'indigenous' to Kenya. This elicited protests from sections of the Somali community who accused the government of Kenya of selective aggression and humiliation against a particular section of the 'Kenya community' (ibid: 631).

What became clear in Africa after colonialism was the struggle of the state to build the nation-state, construct identities and build new platforms of inclusion and exclusion like the above example. Local elites who became the de-facto leaders of their ethnic groups used ethnicity as the persuasive force in their competition for privileged positions and used ethnicity just like religion as a tool to drum up support in the struggles to win access to the state. Consequently, the inevitable result in post-colonial Africa, where the state has failed to offer optimism, support and directions to the masses, ethnic relations have tended to succeed (Udogu, E. I. 2001:73).

According to Ndegwa, in post-colonial Kenya, the socially enacted relationship between ethnic identity, authority, and legitimacy competes with the legally sanctioned membership, authority, and legitimacy of the nation-state. Consequently the state and the

ethnic group compete for allegiance and as a result most individuals assume contingent and hierarchical allegiances subject to the arena of contest in which they find themselves. He further adds that individuals participate in two central publics and submit to two central authorities, the ethnic group and the nation-state (Ndegwa, S.N. 1997:602). In post-colonial Africa the majority or dominant ethnic group tend to be loyal both to the state and its institutions as they enhance their ethnic influence, whereas the minority are excluded from state power often as a result of lack of numbers in elections. This widens the rift and the trust level between these ethnic groups and no matter how genuine a state venture or development agenda is, it will always be viewed with ethnic lenses and if approved it would most likely happen with the blessing of local elites. Lewis explains “ethnicity is essentially a form of materially and visibly distinctive communal identity providing a ready basis for solidarity for those who, in its name, distinguishes themselves from others” (Lewis, I.M. 2004:490).

4.6.4 Language and identity

Language is one of the first and the most important ways in which people come into contact with each other. It is through language that members of a community identify themselves and are identified by others, thus making language a powerful instrument of identity and belonging. Isaacs explains the equation nation-homeland-language is the foundation of modern nationalist ideology, and forms an image of citizen that, is deeply rooted in an ethnic belonging that has its essential element in language (Isaacs, A. K. 2005:7).

Joshua Fishman explains how language serves as an important instrument for protecting collective identity and communal cohesion. It is significant because it creates the “at-homeness” of a people threatened by cultural homogenization. Examples where language has helped to preserve the identity of people include, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Turks in Cyprus, and, the Quebecois in Canada. He however, cautions that variance in language does not always interpret into separation of ethnic groups but acknowledges that language is important as an instrument for mobilizing large number of people around symbols and values with a high emotional potential (Fishman, J. A. 1999:80). Similarly allegiance to sub-ethnic group or clan may be a stronger force than identification with

other speakers of the same essential language. Hence in Somalia, clan loyalties are noted to interfere in the construction of a broader national identity among speakers of Somali (Simpson, A. 2008:13).

I.M. Lewis however claims that, despite clan disagreement, speaking Somali provided its speakers with a basis of an identity and national consciousness that separated them from the other inhabitants of the Horn of Africa who speak related Cushitic languages (Lewis, I.M. 1983:31). It is because of sharing common language that Somali refugees have decided that it was safe for them to cluster around other Somalis in Kenya. As Jaji explains that Somali re-territorialization in Dadaab and Eastleigh enables them to construct a counter stereotypical narrative, which transcends political divisions in Somalia and among the Somalis in Kenya to present a unitary Somali identity (Jaji, R. 2013:646).

4.7 Applicability of the theory

In this section, the focus will be given on how the post-colonial theory is relevant in this study and how it could shade some light on these questions. Likewise the other relevant post-colonial concepts will be discussed as well and their importance in this study analyzed.

As explained in the introduction of this chapter, post-colonial theory is a literary theory or a critical approach that deals with the knowledge produced in the countries that were once, or are still colonies of other countries. More often the history of colonized states has been portrayed to start with colonialism and their way of living, culture, political lives and nation-state structure were non-existent prior to colonialism. After colonialism those who were favored by that distorted history and political arrangements have seen it fit to keep the status quo whereas the marginalized ones started a campaign of undoing what they saw as injustice. In Africa for example, one of the main issues that was the bone of contention after colonialism was that many ethnic groups in the new free states did not identify with the new state borders that were created. As a result, many African states became composed of a variety of ethnic groups, which often straddled across neighboring states. The knowledge and academic work that was produced by the colonial powers during this time was offered to be genuine and some new states applied

the same impunity thus becoming the new colonizers of their subjects. With that in mind it becomes easier to analyze what the perspective of Somali refugees in Dadaab is towards repatriation and how they interact with the Kenyan state, viewing it with the lens of post-colonial theory. Can the aforementioned partition history of Somalia negatively influence the repatriation decision by creating a polarization between the refugees and the host state Kenya?

In his book *Wretched of the earth*, in the second and the third essays Fanon writes about something that resembles with many African states today. Referring to the behavior of the emerging local elites who have developed the same attitude as the colonizers and view the rest of the population with an eye of contempt. He adds that they will not do any meaningful improvement to their population but would become the new gatekeepers for the colonial powers, referring to them as “business agents”. In Dadaab and the wider region, normally politicians are the de facto leaders of the population and carry the title elites. Just like other politicians they will do what is for their best political interest and see refugees as a threat to their tight grip on power for fear that if refugees are allowed to stay they might change the clan and tribal demographic of the region. The elites also have to prove their loyalty to their national leaders and by doing that, exaggerate the alienation of the Dadaab refugees and sometimes get into conflicts with the locals. This can be related to what Fanon referred to as emulating the colonizers. By and large the majority of the population of NEP see that they are under colonial occupation from the Kenyan state. Many local people and the refugees have a perception that some local elites of NEP are emulating the policy of the national government of Kenya only to safeguard their positions thus not protecting the interest of refugees. Recalling his fourth essay on the national culture, Fanon sees culture as a way of reviving past history of distorted African national and tribal identification. Sharing the same culture, belief and language has made many refugees feel at home in Dadaab and as a result has greatly changed their assessments about repatriation to Somalia.

Coming to Edward Said’s *orientalism*, he writes about how the orient has been referred to as the other and associated with all negative connotations. The orient is deprived all positive aspects of man, and instead referred to as irrational and barbaric thus need for them to be dominated. This has been created through inaccurate knowledge and

to undo that there is need to produce own to counter that storyline. Much has been written about refugees and their global migration. Just like the orient refugees and immigrants have been displayed with the image of the 'other' that is dangerous, inferior and that needs their actions to be closely supervised. However, we have seen that refugees can be resilient and can shape the narrative by giving their side of the story, their history and expertise. This has allowed them to change the viewpoint held about them and changed the meaning to not only themselves but also the outside world. In that way they are able to represent themselves and give their take on issues affecting them, their wellbeing and existence.

On Gayatri Spivak's essay of the Subaltern, she refers to the subaltern as a least powerful in society who cannot represent themselves and say their views. By the subaltern she referred to the Indian women who practiced the sati ritual who could not say their meaning on the practice of widow burning. For the Indian men who often spoke on the women behalf, the ritual was an old tradition that could not be abolished and meant sacrifice. Whereas on the other hand the British colonial masters saw it as a barbaric and brutal ritual which had to be stopped. In between these two voices was the voiceless Indian woman who could not represent herself and say her views on the practice. Replacing the subaltern with the refugees, we see there is lots of resemblance. More often we see people speaking on behalf of refugees and stating what is best for them without consulting them first. Refugees and migrants without a doubt flee from persecution, abuse of their basic human rights, and threats to their lives and families and seek protection to wherever they escape to. Because of their status and position in society they don't get the chance to state their needs or their opinions regarding their situations. Replacing the subaltern with the refugees we can analyze if the refugees can be given the chance to be heard or if some agents will have to represent them just like the subaltern. Often times in cases such as repatriation and many other cases, refugees are hardly given the chance to enter into negotiations with the concerned authorities. Just like the Subaltern they are hardly heard.

4.8 Applicability of the Concepts

As we have discussed in the theoretical framework chapter, the concepts of nationalism, ethnicity, language and identity play an important role in how they define people and their culture. They allow us to analyze how refugees' perceptions and perspectives are shaped towards repatriation, as well as define their meaning of home. Nationalism can be categorized into liberal and ethno-nationalism. Though many states in the developed world have to some extent adopted the first one, it is true that many developing states belong to the latter. What bonds nations is their shared heritage, language, faith and ancestry. Members of the same nation often see themselves as an extended family joined by bonds of blood. For the Somali refugees in Dadaab, sharing same nationhood, culture, language, faith and most importantly blood relation with the local population can shape their opinion towards Dadaab.

Much like nationalism, ethnicity also is a weighty divide. Barth has defined an ethnic group as people that are biologically self-preserving, and share central cultural values. These groups often create boundaries to preserve their unique identity. In many places of the world and in particular in Africa, ethnicity has an exceptional allegiance and a lot is done with the blessing of the ethnic group. Most important politics is loyal to ethnicity. For the Dadaab refugees living amongst their ethnic Somalis we can compare how that could have been different had they been living in a place with a different ethnic setup? Having the same ethnic affiliation hinders certain social impediments such as discrimination or cultural clash and thus makes interaction with the locals much easier than it would have been with other ethnic groups that might have treated them with suspicion. That allows them to integrate fairly with the local population. Likewise, land in many places is believed to be communal and wherever one's ethnic group lives is regarded to be home despite belonging to different states. The states in some instances completes with ethnic groups for allegiance and at times the ethnic group gets more allegiance than the state. Consequently people will seek protection in the ethnic group than the state, which they have allegiance to.

Lastly language is one of the main ways people identify themselves from others. Speaking the same language gives speakers a sense of oneness. Whereas identity can be defined, as how people understand their relationship to the world, how that relationship is

constructed across time and space, and how people understand their possibilities for the future (Norton, B. 1997:410). Through language, we can analyze how refugees can be able to identify themselves with the local population of that region and through it get recognition and affiliation. How language can enable them to construct a ‘we-ness’ atmosphere that can make them more acceptable and get access to spheres that would otherwise have been barred. How language can be a way to be trusted and do business and other important cultural links such as marriage for example.

4.9 Summary

By first giving a detailed explanation of the Post-colonial theory and showing how it has a lot of relevance in post-colonial states especially in African states, this chapter explains the theoretical framework that this study will use. A short summary of the main authors of post-colonial theory and their writings is presented and the main themes of their writings highlighted. Likewise other relevant post-colonial concepts are presented. These concepts are important because they resonate with the writings of the post-colonial theorists and give the post-colonial theory a broader understanding when combined. It has also shown how this theory and the relevant concepts apply to the question of refugees’ perception on repatriation and the notion of ‘home’. The applicability of the theory and the concepts is also explained to give an idea of how they fit with the thesis questions. In the following chapter the findings of the research questions and the discussion will be presented.

Chapter 5: Findings & Discussions

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the findings from the fieldwork provided by the Dadaab refugees and NGO actors through interviews. The research questions will be systematically answered. These findings will then be used to analyze what the perception of refugees is towards repatriation, what is ‘home’ in a post-colonial setup and then finally how repatriation might affect the security of the region.

5.2 Refugees’ perceptions and perspectives on repatriation

5.2.1 Informed choice

The first research question of this thesis looks to find out what the refugees perception is towards repatriating back to Somalia. The findings indicate that the vast majority of the refugees interviewed believe that they have not been given sufficient information individually regarding the repatriation process. Because of that they did not know what their rights are and how they would approach to get that. They indicated the only form of information they got was through brochures and a five-minute one on one interview with a UNHCR officer where they answer basic questions. The respondents also identified the higher rate of illiteracy among the elderly people in the refugee camp, who could not comprehend the content of the brochures and information posted on the notice boards. When asked whose responsibility it was to get the information, they stressed how difficult it was to access the UNHCR offices unless one had a specific appointment. At the time of the research the researcher can confirm how demanding it was to get through the big UNHCR gates unless one had prior arrangements or is able to communicate properly with the guards manning the gates.

The questionnaire filled at the UNHCR help desk comprises of around twenty questions, which are hastily filled, and the respondents are barely given enough time to reflect about the questions. This is the main individual information the refugees are given after queuing in scorching heat for hours.

The necessary guidance and advice needed to make a knowledgeable choice is therefore lacking. Cannon, B.J. & Fujibayashi, H. (2018) has indicated that it was only in

mid-2016 that the UN protection cluster, the body that coordinates the protection activities in Somalia, produced its first analytical report. That information was yet to be communicated to the refugees in Dadaab in late 2016, instead the UNHCR began giving the refugees US\$200 to those who voluntarily wanted to repatriate back to Somalia by road. This has created more confusion to the refugees (Cannon, B.J. & Fujibayashi H. 2018:8). Edward said mentions that the orient is represented as inferior in need of supervision and dominion. By not getting the right and correct information necessary to make the right judgment the refugees are rendered to be inferior and consequently dominated.

Cassarino (2008) states “free will is the act of deciding or choosing on one’s own initiative to return”. In order for one to have the free will to return then a proper information is necessary in order to make a choice of whether its time, whether it is right, or to choose not to return at all (Cassarino 2008).

Bariagaber (2006) explains that for any potential refugee who wants to repatriate, generally an informed decision is made based on the information they get and with that they weigh the pros and cons centered on that. Therefore, “in order to reach at an informed decision, the refugee relies on available information to help in the decision making” (Bariagaber A. 2006:122). Crisp, (1986) puts it bluntly and says information and consultation are paramount to a successful repatriation. He states unless refugees are given access to accurate information regarding conditions of their country of origin and fully consulted about any engagements made for their repatriation, their protection cannot be guaranteed (Crisp, J. 1986:179).

5.2.2 Voluntary repatriation or under duress

On the voluntariness of the repatriation process, the findings show that at least three quarters of the refugees interviewed believed that the repatriation process was not voluntary. They argue that even those who have decided to return are doing it because of fear of what might happen to them, sighting fears from the security agencies. Others are doing it because of the cash incentives. There was a lot of talk in the refugee complex about the Kenyan government announcement on the radio about the closure of the camp within 3 months. These made the refugees intimidated and scared citing previous

occasions when the Kenyan agencies used excessive force in the Somali inhabited region against the local Somali Kenyans. As mentioned in the theory chapter Kenyan-Somalis ethnic group and the state have not had good relations since Kenya gained its independence. The Somali refugees are likewise drawn into this difficult relationship thus viewing the repatriation process to be influenced by these bad relations, throwing its voluntariness into jeopardy.

On the contrary UNHCR confidently argues that the process is voluntary and conducted in a principled manner. The Officer interviewed in the main office in Nairobi stated “*the process is very much based on voluntariness, and some even walk-out in the 11th hour*”. UNHCR (1996) handbook on voluntary repatriation defined voluntariness as “the absence of any physical, psychological or material pressure which push the refugee to repatriate”(UNHCR, 1996). Though the concept of voluntary repatriation is not covered in the 1951 refugee convention it borrows from the principle of non-refoulement which prohibits the expulsion, deportation, or return of refugees to their state of origin or another state where there is a risk of threat to their lives. However, this is not the case in reality and that repatriation is more often dictated by political and security factors from both the host and origin states. In recent protracted refugee cases, there has been pressure exerted from the donor states as well.

In this kind of scenarios the only representative whose voice can represent the refugees is UNHCR, but the mandate of UNHCR is limited. Crisp (2016) states that UNHCR frequently plays an ambiguous role in negotiations between refugees and concerned states, seeking to uphold internationally recognized legal and ethical principles of which it is the custodian, while at the same time meeting the interests of the concerned stakeholders. He adds in some cases the agency has succumbed to the pressures and actively engaged in repatriation operations that are far from safe or voluntary (Crisp, J. 2016: 142).

In Dadaab the refugees are called to the UNHCR help desk and are informed that UNHCR will support their return to any part of Somalia provided their decision is made freely and voluntarily. After that the refugees complete and sign a voluntary Repatriation form and then immediately in the same compound sent over to the Kenyan government immigration officials where their refugee status is deactivated and hand over all legal

refugee papers. According to the UNHCR official in Nairobi the refugees can revoke the decision to return even in the last minute but in practice this is next to impossible. Once all their legal papers are taken over by the Kenyan government and deregistered as refugees, they are placed in an isolated compound and the next day loaded into buses to Somalia. The majority of the refugees in the help desk during the research period were from 2011 batch that came at the height of the Somalia drought. This is the most vulnerable group compared to the rest and feels threatened by any warnings from the Kenyan authorities not to return. The seasoned refugees know how to maneuver these threats due to their better social connections thus most opting not to repatriate. Kenya continues to pressure UNHCR to repatriate Somalia refugees at all cost despite the vast majority of them indicating that they were not ready for return. If it is allowed to continue then the meaning of the principle of voluntary repatriation will become meaningless and can no longer be termed as voluntary but rather forceful. Putting this in Bhabha's terms, mimicry influences the spirit of the individual, the Kenya state has been influenced by the colonial way of doing things. The refugees argue that the Kenyan state is mimicking the colonial masters by being brutal and tough towards them.

While voluntariness negates the subjective element in the well-founded fear of persecution, it needs to be equally verified by an objective assessment of the situation in the country of origin. The 1969 OAU Convention clearly indicates that repatriation should be voluntary, and that there should be verifiable changes in the country of origin. The 1984 Cartagena Declaration also recognizes the commitment of Central American States to ensure that any repatriation of refugees is voluntary, and is affirmed to be so, on an individual basis, and carried out with the supervision of UNHCR (Naqvi, Y. 2004:87).

5.2.3 Representation

Regarding the question of representation, the refugee respondents almost unanimously agreed that their views were not well represented. For them all the decision was made by the government of Kenya and UNHCR, and their views regarding on what was best for them was irrelevant to the authorities concerned. They felt decisions were made on their behalf without being included in the round table. However, those who have stayed longer in the camp because of their better connection and familiarity with the

camp bureaucracy, held the idea that they were better off than those who came recently. Language and personal connections helped them argue their cases to the concerned agencies. In Gayatri Spivak's essay "Can the Subaltern speak?" she highlights how the weak are deprived the ability to air their views of what concerns them. Others who purport to represent them speak on their behalf. In this case the refugees resemble the Subaltern, as they are not able to represent their opinions to neither the Kenyan state UNHCR.

5.2.4 The politics of repatriation

When asked about if the Kenyan authorities handled the repatriation process correctly, the reactions were mixed. Those who stayed the longest especially the 90s group believed the Kenyan authorities was doing the repatriation process for political reasons. For them the repatriation process was more politically motivated and the Kenyan government was vote hunting for the elections in the following year. Though refugees' issues was not very important to the electorate the government wanted to be visible. For the refugees who recently arrived in Dadaab, (this is the group that came after the 2011 drought in Somalia) were more philosophical and their answers were morally based arguing, that Kenyan had moral obligations not to return them to where their security was not guaranteed. The boldness of the first group is enhanced by their better economic and social connection as mentioned before.

I also put this question to the DRC officer, which is one of the affiliate organizations working closely with UNHCR, and was disappointed with the Kenyan authorities approach. His concern was that Somalia was not ready to take in so many people at once and that conditions of return were not conducive because of lack of many basic amenities. He summed it up by saying that there were more push factors than pull factors and that it was not true that there was amicable security in place for the returnees. However, he mentioned that there was the issue of fatigue by the Kenyan government and short change from the international community side. He mentioned how Turkey got a lot economic support from the European Union (EU) in a short period of time whereas Kenya, which has been hosting refugees for decades, was being sidelined. "*Lack of international burden sharing is the bone of contention*".

In contemporary world politics especially in the Western world, the issue of refugees is very important in electoral politics. Some parties' ideology is based solely on immigration and the reduction of refugees. In Kenya the repatriation of refugees is not a very politically charged affair that is pushed by the electorate. However, there are some underlying historical territorial issues between Kenya and Somalia that makes any Kenyan government of the day to pay close attention to its Somali populace, be it its citizens or refugees.

Otunnu (1992) argues that the Kenyan authorities inhumane treatment of Kenyan-Somalis and Somali refugees is because of a long standing perceived threat from the NEP. This long history of conflict and tension has created a distorted and hostile image of the Somalis as "enemies" of the Kenyan state. This image has continued to influence the Kenyan authorities behavior towards the Somalis, which has led to gross violations of human rights (Otunnu, O. 1992:21).

Jaji, (2014) states that trans nationalization of terrorism is characterized by the contradiction that it generates refugees who are dismissed as criminals and terrorists. They therefore find themselves entangled in the host country's perception of these conflicts. It was not a surprise therefore when the then Kenyan foreign affairs minister, Raphael Tuju responding to the international outcry on the refoulement of refugees, emphasized that Kenya did not have problems with refugees per se but with refugees who were Somali (Jaji, R. 2014:639-642).

Crisp, (1984) writing on the repatriation of Ethiopian refugees from Djibouti, states that the refugees were forcefully pushed out despite being clear that they were clearly against being repatriated. However, the internal politics of both Ethiopia and Djibouti had coincidentally wished the same solution, repatriation. Djibouti argued that due to spreading economic and the impossibility of the refugees assimilating with its population, that it was time for them to leave. For Ethiopia, the return of political refugees meant fewer headaches for them and improved international image (Crisp, J. 1984).

As discussed in the theory chapter, ethnicity plays a major role in many African states political affairs. Political offices are gotten through the mobilization of ethnic groups. The increase of the Somali refugees' population in Kenya is seen to be indirectly

increasing the Somali Kenyans population. An increase in population means increase in influence and power, hence the refugee repatriation becomes a politically charged affair. While Kenya has shown a lot of hospitality and restraint in many occasions towards refugees, its exceptional emphasis of repatriating Somalis originates from its long frosty relations with Somalis in general. In its last population consensus in 2009, the Kenyan government rejected the increase of the Somali population claiming that they did not fit the expected population increase. There is a common belief that many Somali refugees have illegally gotten access to Kenyan legal documents thus becoming Kenyan citizens. The removal of Somali refugees has since become a priority to the Kenyan government.

5.2.5 Resettlement dreams (*Buufis*)

On the question of hope for resettlement in a third country and how it influenced the refugees' decision of repatriating back to Somalia, the answers were likewise divided. Resettlement to affluent European states and North America has been a dream to many refugees living in Dadaab. The decision to return back and leave behind the processes that they have been waiting for years was a sour pill to swallow for some refugees. The findings of this study indicate that the majority of those who had begun a resettlement process before the repatriation process have opted for not returning. The majority of this group includes the long stayees who have been waiting for the conclusion of their processes for some years. For those who had no process in the pipeline, this subject had no influence on their decision. There was strong despair, hopelessness and distress on the faces of the refugees when this topic was brought up. Most of them have completed the final steps as well as health checks but were told their processes were on hold and have not gotten any final response. Many were perplexed and caught up in a limbo due to the unpredictability of their future. Some complained that their 'bufis' (Somali word meaning a longing to leave) had reached fever pitch but would stay until they were certainly clear there was no otherwise. Given the choice between staying in Dadaab, repatriating to Somalia or resettlement in a third country, which in this case is normally understood as Western states, the majority preferred resettlement.

UNHCR, though acknowledged that there were people who had been waiting for the completion of their process for long, was cautious about the outcome of any of these

dreams of resettlement. The officer interviewed cautiously replied that it would depend on the future foreign policies of the concerned states and that those who wished not to return until their cases were finalized would definitely not be forced as the whole process was voluntary any way.

However, the refugees Liaison officer interviewed in the Somali embassy in Kenya was very pessimistic regarding resettlement that many have depended on for so long. He said *“The world has been helping Somali refugees for quite a while now, but there are worse places than Somalia at the moment that need prioritization. I am therefore sorry to say that resettlement is very difficult to foresee at the moment for Somali refugees”*.

Resettlement has been a durable solution for many Somali refugees for sometime since the collapse of the Somali central government. *Buufis* has become a common phenomenon among Somali refugees in Kenya who long to get resettled abroad. According to Cindy Horst this phenomenon was triggered by the transnational flow of remittances and information and as a result refugees in camps like Dadaab compare their lives in the camps with those of others elsewhere (Horst, C. 2006:144).

Many refugees in Dadaab and Nairobi have invested so much time and waited for decades to be resettled in prosperous Western countries. This has shaped their perception or opinion towards repatriation tremendously. For some even though their cases have stopped, they are still hopeful that they will be reopened and cling to their papers as passports out of Dadaab. Many blame UNHCR for taking so much time but what they do not understand is that, while UNHCR has an obligation to protect refugees, resettlement is not automatic and that there are some strict criteria to be fulfilled. In addition the main decision lies with the resettlement country. This has made them develop unrealistic expectations and their perspectives towards repatriation are negative.

5.2.6 Possible challenges in the area of return

The challenges the refugees might face upon repatriation were many but, the main ones included lack of education opportunity for their children, insecurity, bad economy and lack of reliable network back at home. The majority of the residents of Dadaab are youth under the age of 25, most of them born and raised there. Education is their first

priority, and according to many their only exit ticket out of the prolonged vicious refugee cycle. The results of this study show over 90 percent of the refugees interviewed including parents and youth, lack of education opportunity upon repatriating to Somalia was their main concern. The availability of free quality education in the refugee camp was seen as a privilege that would be lost upon repatriating back to Somalia. Though UNHCR and its affiliate agencies had an extensive plan in place to pay for private schools in Somalia for at least an year, it was not convincing enough for the parents and students. As a result many students had opted to stay behind in Dadaab even though their families were willing to repatriate. Furthermore, the vast majority of the ones sitting for their final exams in primary and secondary schools were categorical that they would not repatriate.

Threat to personal safety was also a key factor in the decision not to repatriate. Most of the refugee respondents identified persecution and threats to their personal security from militant groups such as Al-shabaab as one of the main impediment to repatriate. Others cited fears of residual political violence from the civil war that has not totally settled down.

Economic factors are also essential in the decision-making process to repatriate. The respondents cited lack of proper functioning markets and weak unregulated monetary system in Somalia compared to Kenya as a challenge upon repatriation. It is worth noting contrary to common belief that refugees in encampments do work and some earn a decent living and do not depend only on handouts. The respondents also cited lack of capital and land where they could carry out their business. Change of lifestyle from farmers or pastoralists to urban dwellers was also mentioned as an impediment. Another challenge highlighted by the refugee respondents upon repatriating included the lack of reliable network back at home. The majority of these refugees have been living in Dadaab since the early 1990s, and most of their social networks be it family, relatives or friends are dispersed around the world. Lack of family members or friends to reunify with upon returning was some of the challenges cited by some respondents. At least one of the respondents was married to a local man from Dadaab but lack of legal papers in Kenya made her an alien. This respondent and many others in her category are torn between

leaving behind their families or live in a legal limbo. The respondent revealed that many like her opted for the latter.

5.3 Notions of ‘home’: place attachment, belonging and identity

On the second research question, the meaning of ‘home’ for Dadaab refugees was addressed. Before going into detail about their opinions about ‘home’ the researcher started off by asking the respondents about the duration of their stay in Dadaab in order to see if that had an impact on their responses. The findings showed that over three quarters of the refugees interviewed in Dadaab have stayed since the early 1990s. When asked further if that had any influence on their views towards repatriating to Somalia, the respondents pointed out that the amount of time they had spent in Dadaab had a huge effect on their decision but that was not the main reason.

In responding to the question about opinions regarding what was ‘home’? The majority agreed that ‘home’ was a multi-faceted and complex and it was impossible for it to be summed up in one single sentence. However, the majority cited language, familial/kinship ties, blood and historical connections, and community and ethnicity as their definitions of their notions of ‘home’. For some respondents ‘home’ was where they could find their kinsmen who they shared blood relations. Others called ‘home’ a place where one has historical connections with and inhabited by their ancestors and their ethnic groups. Other respondents who neither had any kinship or ethnic relations with Dadaab, language was the factor that influenced their definition of ‘home’. As one male respondent said *“I don’t have any ethnic affiliation to this region, however, speaking the same language and sharing same values with the locals, I feel at home”*

However, there were some respondents who referred ‘home’ only to their place of origin despite having a lot of common social aspects with the local people of Dadaab. One respondent attributed this to the Somalis pastoral background and stated *“Somalis in nature are very territorial and that is because of their pastoral upbringing which dictates that you only share your pastoral lands with your clansmen. Had Dadaab not become an*

urban town many refugees who are calling it home now would have had a different opinion”

For the females, majority of the respondents ‘home’ was where their male partners would inhabit and their husbands’ choice determined their definition of ‘home’. However, it would have been interesting to know if that was the same case for the local females who have intermarried with refugee males. Would Somalia be ‘home’ for them if their husbands’ decided to return? Unfortunately the research did not cover that aspect.

For the youth interviewed whom either grew up or were born in Dadaab camp, ‘home’ meant only where they knew best and that was Dadaab. They did not have the same connection with their place of origin as their parents did and they attributed that to the lack of personal experience or contact with it. Some stated the childhood memories they created in Dadaab made them choose it as their ‘home’. Likewise ‘home’ meant opportunity for them, despite being a sprawling refugee camp, they believed they had better chances of succeeding in Dadaab than returning back to an unknown place. It was interesting to note that unlike their parents, there was minimal community attachment and knew little about ethnicity and the prospects of making ‘home’ through that. They lacked the sociopolitical experiences and social bondedness that is often associated with the creation and definition of ‘home’. Furthermore, the negativity such as war and conflict that had become a synonym for Somalia had some bearing on their opinion as well.

Despite acknowledging that Dadaab was a Kenyan territory now, many appeared to know the history of the place and blamed colonialists for dividing Somalis land. Though there were no direct claims of trying to reclaim their past, the association of the place through the above-mentioned social aspects created nostalgia and remembrance despite not living the place before. But the fact that communal land belongs to the whole community creates such kind of feelings. As Ahmed et.al, (2003) puts that ‘homing’ depends on the reclaiming and reprocessing of habits, objects, names and histories that have been uprooted in migration, displacement and colonization. Making ‘home’ is about creating both pasts and futures through inhabiting the grounds of the present (Ahmed, S. et.al. 2003:9).

Brun & Fabos (2015) define ‘home’ as “a significantly kind of a place with which, and within which, we experience strong social, psychological and emotive

attachements”. This attachment is not only connected to the physical structure, but may refer to community or nation thus making its confines penetrable and may be defined in relation to broader social and political settings (Brun, C. & Fabos, A. 2015:7). Other scholars who have their focus on transnational and diaspora studies, understand ‘home’ as a process marked by openness and change focusing more on the relational and emotional perspectives of home, rather than the territorial connections to home. For them neither the place of origin nor the place of displacement may fully qualify as ‘home, but rather ‘home’ is where normal life can be lived, provide economic security, social connections and a sense of belonging (ibid: 8). This resonates with the feelings of the youth in Dadaab who did not define ‘home’ in the territorial context but rather with memory and opportunity, two common aspects of living a normal life.

As mentioned before in the theory chapter 4.6.4, members of a community can identify themselves with language, as well as identified by others through it. Language has traditionally been a cultural core value for the Somalis who predominantly speak the same language in all the Somali regions. It has been the main unifying factor for the Somalis who at many times are divided on clan lineages. The strengthening of the Somali identity has become visible through language and the link between identity, politics, and showcase of the Somali culture. In Africa, like in many other places there is a strong emotional attachment to language. Ethnicity and language are seen as the storehouse of culture. Each ethnic group expresses and identifies itself by the language it speaks and its culture shaped by its language. The common language and ethnicity creates a bond of acceptance and provides a basis for togetherness, for separateness, for solidarity, and for brotherhood and kinship. Furthermore, this feeling of solidarity is much stronger when members of the same group meet one another in foreign land (Fishman, J. A. 1999:353).

In Dadaab, the refugees used language as the main connection between them and the locals who they share the same language. This gave them a sense of belonging and solidarity and bolstered their attachment to the place. Speaking the same language as the local people of that area gave them a feeling of ‘we-ness’ which also increased the sense of being at ‘home’. This would have been different had they been living within a different ethnic group that spoke different language. Some refugees expressed that they did not

have the same feeling of being at ‘home’ when they were living in Kakuma (a camp on the northern part of Kenya bordering South Sudan).

Likewise as shown in the theory chapter, shared heritage, faith and common ancestry creates a deep sense of nationalism by connecting members of a nation like an extended family unified by blood. The refugees and the local people of Dadaab share the same ethno-nationality despite officially belonging to two different states. The Dadaab and the wider NEP locals have an anti-state nationalism against the state of Kenya. It is an ever-present dormant anti-state nationalism that is awakened due to occasional grievances, but has its roots to belonging and ethnicity. The grievance this time was the repatriation of refugees from their ‘homeland’ as both the locals and the refugees felt that in essence they were ‘refugees at home’. Breuilly, makes a distinction between state-led nationalism and anti-state nationalism and argues that if nationalism rejects one state, it is only for the sake of another, real or imagined (Yeros, P. 1999:71). This is exacerbated by the bad relationship between the Kenyan state and the its Somali ethnic group who have been marginalized for decades. In Fanon’s book of *wretched of the earth* he explains how the colonizers have subjugated their colonies through structural violence leading to massive inequalities in all ways of human development. The people of the NEP still suffer this colonial tactics in the hands of the Kenyan state, making it to be perceived as the neo-colonizer. This creates anti Kenyan state nationalism making them welcome the refugees as their own. Through that the refugees’ sense of ‘home’ is created.

Ethnicity is also another way of creating belonging to a place. Throughout the African society and especially in the rural areas, the ethnic structure continues to provide the individual’s primary identity and political loyalties. In Somalia it is the clan structure that continue to provide this identity and protection. The refugees in Dadaab who have their clans residing in the NEP have a better chance of integrating into the society and get better protection compared to those who do not have clan affiliation in this region. However, when the local authorities of the region are perceived to be ‘enemies’ the protection net is widened and the protection is no longer reduced to clan but rather wider Somali. Clan identities are flexible, changeable and situational adaptive. The transfer of allegiance from the family to the clan, from the clan to the village and from the village to the ethnic group is secured by privileges of belonging to the larger community. Through

observation the researcher found that the local Somalis and the refugees were perceived to be the same people by other Kenyan ethnic groups and there was no any differentiating between them. For the refugees the construction of 'home' and sense of belonging has been eased by this and do not feel like people out of place.

5.4 Impact of en-mass repatriation on security

The third research question wants to find out the impact of en-mass repatriation on the security of the region. By region, the research is referring to only Kenya and Somalia and not the broad region of East Africa, as that is not the scope of this study. The respondents were asked if they thought an en-mass repatriation process could have an impact on the fragile security of Somalia. The refugee respondents were quiet pessimistic on the impact en-mass repatriation could have on the security of Somalia citing lack total government control on the areas of return. The majority agreed that it could derail the unstable security achieved by the Somali government with the help of African peacekeeping forces. They were also concerned about the youth becoming easy recruits for militant groups as a result of lack of activities for them in Somalia, unlike the array of programs at their disposal in Dadaab. Another issue that was in their concerns included the communal frictions that could arise as a result of repatriating a lot of people in areas, which are not their areas of origin. According to the statistics of UNHCR, at least half of the refugees who are in the process for repatriation are returning to areas, which are not their places of origin. This led to the partial stop of the repatriation process by the Somali regional authorities at the time of the research.

When the question of security was put to the UNHCR officer, her response was upbeat and argued that they had foreseen such a scenario and prioritized the youth once they are repatriated to Somalia. Their plans included counseling and regular home visits to deter the youth from engaging in criminal activities. The refugee respondents agreed as well that UNHCR in conjunction with other agencies had identified a lot of security gaps that needed enhancement before the refugees were returned. Yet these measures only existed on paper and their implementation on the ground was lacking, according to their cross-border informants.

On the other question regarding impact on the security of Kenya, the refugee respondents agreed that there was no much direct threat on the security of Kenya in comparison to their own. However, they agreed that if Kenya did the repatriation forcefully and not voluntary then there was a high likelihood that the disenfranchised youth could aid militant group to carry out attacks in Kenya. Sympathy for militant groups to carry out attacks in Kenya could grow.

5.4.1 Security uncertainties

The impact of mass repatriation on the security of the region is something that has not been closely followed up by the concerned authorities and agencies. The majority of the areas designated for return of refugees are areas, which are partially controlled by the Somali government apart from the city of Kismayo. The Somali state authorities do not have firm grip in these areas and the return of large number of refugees at once could expose the returnees to both social and personal security challenges. There is also limited presence and capacities of government institutions. The refugees interviewed were concerned about the prospects of youth being easy recruits for militant groups if there are no recreational activities like in Dadaab. This could be a vacuum that in which violent extremist groups could exploit. Al-shabaab has built a highly effective clandestine support network in the southern Somali region, which it uses to recruit youth and enact lethal attacks. There is also the issue of communal friction, which could result from the sharing of meager resources between the returnees and the locals. Though there is no direct threat to their safety from the locals, the lack of rule of law and police presence in most of these towns could be a challenge. In Dadaab, though the refugees are living in a place, which they are not originally from, the steady presence of the Kenyan police, and huge international NGOs on the ground, reduces these tensions between the local communities and the refugees. In exile Somalis have a tendency of being sympathetic and accommodating to each other according to the refugees interviewed in Dadaab.

According to UNHCR there are a number of issues that could overshadow large-scale repatriation in Somalia. They include lack of basic amenities such as health and education facilities, poor infrastructure and low levels of international funding focused on early recovery and development (UNHCR 2015). While refugees get a lot of help in the

host countries from INGOs, UNHCR and other agencies should build their capacity in the area of return in order to reintegrate them into the society easily back in Somalia. They should enhance the efforts in developing and improving the basic services of these areas of return in order to dissuade the youth and vulnerable people into falling into the hands of militant groups. Furthermore, lack of decent housing has created the refugees to resort to stay in makeshift dwellings creating an IDP camp in the city of Kismayo according to the regional minister interviewed in Nairobi. This has the potential of creating increase in urban criminality and small gangs emergence. If these basic requirements are not put in place, and the Somali federal government is by and large absent in the periphery towns and the 'clan based' regional governments are likewise weak and at the behest of AMISOM forces, then there is a higher probability that the poor returnees would easily fall prey to militant groups. This was the main concern for the regional minister of Jubaland interviewed in Nairobi who said, *"We are afraid that the youth might end up with militant groups. The regional government of Jubaland capacity is low and most of the districts where the people would return are not safe. We do not have the capacity to follow up in large scale"*. This will allow Al-shabaab the main protagonist militant group to be relevant and be more appealing at the expense of the weak Somali authorities, be it local or at federal levels. "The strength of Al-shabaab lies in the weakness of its main local enemy, the federal government" (Ingiriis, M.H. 2018:3). The level of entrenchment and efficiency by this militant group on the ground in rural areas is common knowledge, and the presence of a large number of people with no much alternative could be the new catalyst they need.

The threat posed by Al-Shabaab militants is no longer directed to Somalia alone, but it also affects the East Africa region, Kenya being the most affected. Could the repatriation of so many refugees and the inability of the Somali government to accommodate them become a security threat to Kenya? Already there has been continued insecurity and sporadic terror attacks by Al-shabaab in major cities of Kenya as well as NEP and Dadaab environs. Kenya has for a long time now insisted that refugee camps are being used as bases for insurgent and terrorist activities and that armed groups hide behind the humanitarian atmosphere of refugee settlements where they use them to recruit disenfranchised refugee population. It also argues because of the transnational

nature of the population in Dadaab, it is easy to incite and influence the locals to join unlawful activities. Loeschner, & Milner (2018) state that the long history of irredentism with its own ethnic population, the government of Kenya now view Somali refugees on its territory almost exclusively through the security prism (Loeschner G. & Milner, J. 2018:32). As a result Kenya has carried out many of what it calls counter insurgency undertakings in Dadaab and urban cities like Nairobi and Mombasa to flush out terrorist hiding in the midst of refugees. To some extent it has managed to arrest and prosecuted some, but it has also carried out quite a number of extra-judicial killings, which has been questioned by human rights organizations. In Fanon's book of *Black skin white masks* he highlights psychological implications of colonialism to the colonized people. He concludes that the subjects would emulate the colonizer and become equally fierce and ruthless. In my conversation with the local Somali residents of Dadaab, there were talks of Kenya state becoming the new colonial ruler by using the same tactics used by the colonial powers. Kenyan government associates Somalis with a radical religious ideology and its concerned that the growing presence of Somalis could inspire and radicalize its own relatively small Muslim population (Jaji R.2013)

Some local Kenyan-Somalis I met in Dadaab were confounded by Kenya's inability to differentiate between refugees' issues and its counter terrorist undertakings and the mixing of the two. There were allegations of abductions and killing of suspects in NEP including even elderly people who would be labeled as foreigners despite being locals. This has put a lot of mistrust between the Kenyan authorities and its own Somali population and, cooperation between them has become almost non-existent. Subjugation, marginalization and the complete disregard of their rights have been blamed on this. They are the new orient and are often portrayed as the 'other' and labeled with connotations such as foreign and terrorist. Such deterioration of trust between a state and its population could have serious security implications in the long run and could face a back clash.

Based on the current Somalia situation, it is highly unlikely that Al-shabaab would be defeated soon unless there is some new resolute effort from AMISOM and Somalia. This study has found out that the majority of the population of the refugees in the area is youth with an average age of around 20-25 years. This was confirmed through observation where it was clearly evident. The majority of them came at a very young age

whereas others were born and raised in Dadaab. If these youth are forcefully pushed out of Dadaab involuntarily and have nothing to fall back to in Somalia as discussed above then chances of being recruited by militant groups are highly likely either voluntarily or forcefully. They bring back a new dimension to Kenya's security challenges because they know the place inside out, they the local language and they have the backing of local Somali population which are equally alienated and marginalized and get almost the same blame whenever there are terror attacks. Finally, the Kenyan military incursion of southern Somalia and the subsequent merger with AMISOM, adds another layer of complexity as many see it as an invasion force. Unless Al-shabaab and other militant groups are totally eliminated from Somalia, repatriating thousands of frustrated youth could bolster their numbers. As much as Somalia will bear the brunt of most their atrocities, Kenya will also most likely suffer.

5.5 Limitations

There are certain limitations in this thesis that should be highlighted. The thesis main approach and concern is based on refugees' viewpoints on repatriation to Somalia. However, some experiences of the local Somali population of NEP are sometimes mentioned in the thesis, something that could blur the reader's understanding of the topic. The reason why the local population experiences is mentioned is simply because there are many similarities they share with the refugees and because they live together their mention could not be avoided. Secondly, the thesis might appear to be one sided as the views of the host state Kenya are not covered. This is not by design but the lack of access to the relevant authorities that took caution due to the sensitivity of the topic at that time is to blame. Many government agencies approached declined to be interviewed stating they were not the right persons to give an insight on this topic. Thirdly, the findings of the thesis is limited only in Kenya, this is due to the fact that time and other considerations prevented the collection of data in the area of return in Somalia that could definitely further enrich the findings of this thesis. Finally, the author's background might be interpreted with some bias regarding this topic and its findings.

5.6 Summary

In this chapter, I have presented and analyzed the findings of the research questions. Detailed findings of each research question are presented systematically before analyzing it in order to provide a complete picture of that question. In the first question where the respondents' perception on repatriation is covered, many seem to agree that the timing of the process is not right. Issues such as lack of proper information, political motives from the Kenyan government are cited, putting a question mark on the voluntariness of the process. However, the refugees' response might be biased by their longing for resettlement in a third country in the Western world where they believe they would have better lives. Furthermore, they highlight an array of challenges that they might face in Somalia further making their perception on repatriation negative. On the notion of 'home', there is a strong connection to Dadaab due to historical connection and other factors such as language and ethnicity among others. On the final question of security the findings indicate that there are more challenges in Somalia than in Kenya, however Kenya might be affected indirectly. Finally the limitations of the research are highlighted.

Chapter 6: Conclusions

This thesis pursued to investigate opinions and perceptions that Somali refugees living in Dadaab had towards repatriation to Somalia. Likewise it sought to scrutinize the notion of home, looking into how Dadaab was viewed by the refugees bearing in mind the history of the region. Finally the study wanted to look into the security implications of repatriation in the region, i.e. Kenya and Somalia. The study found there was wide spread negative perceptions towards repatriation to Somalia that was influenced by a variety of issues. The majority of the refugees stated lack of enough information on the repatriation process. This can be attributed to two issues that were observed. There was an evident logistical deficit of the concerned agencies responsible for the process and mainly UNHCR. The ratio of refugees to UNHCR staff was huge which resulted to many refugees not getting enough credible information regarding their options for staying and what to expect in the area of return. Secondly, the high level of illiteracy among the refugees especially the elderly hindered their ability to read forms and information on brochures. Refugee hosting states have pressing issues that include preservation of state sovereignty and the control of their borders. Some therefore see the removal of refugees as exercising these rights. However, there was a perception that, the decision of Kenyan government to repatriate Somali refugees was influenced by the larger historical conflicts between Somalia and Kenya, thus some refugees perceiving the whole process as politically motivated. This put a lot of doubt on the voluntariness of the process, which is an important pillar in this process. As many as three quarters of the refugees interviewed stated, that the process was not voluntary. It is worth noting as well that their negative perspectives towards the idea of repatriating to Somalia was overshadowed by their hopes of resettling in affluent Western countries. Many have invested a lot of time in this prospect and it was evident that the majority of those who categorically decided not to repatriate were the ones who stayed the longest. Most of this batch have started resettling process but have since stopped. Nevertheless that has not stopped them from dreaming.

As for how the idea of ‘home’ was expressed, the results were more decisive but didn’t cut across the board. For those who claimed strong connection with Dadaab and confidently called it ‘home’, mentioned blood relations, ethnicity and historical relations to the place as being the decisive reason to their opinions. Land and ‘home’ are

synonymous in many African cultures, thus where your ethnic group resides is predominantly referred to as 'home'. For others only language was enough to call a place 'home', common language with the local residents gave them a sense of belonging. On the contrary, for others 'home' was only their place of origin and the above mentioned aspects had no much influence on their definition of 'home'. What was interesting however, was the female definition of 'home'. For them 'home' would be where their husbands would settle for to call 'home'. This is influenced by the patriarchal nature of the society. As for the youth, for those who either grew up or born in Dadaab 'home' was related to opportunity and childhood memories. Where they made their childhood memories, as well as a place that could offer them an opportunity in life such as education and work prospects was 'home'. Both were non-existent in Somalia hence they settled for Dadaab to be 'home'.

On the study of repatriation, researchers have concentrated their attention on the voluntariness, safety and dignity and other socio-economic factors that the refugees need upon returning to their areas of origin. It is normally assumed that if refugees are to be repatriated then, the major insecurity issue that led to their fleeing is no longer a threat. On the question of the impact of en-mass repatriation on the security of the region the majority were concerned about their safety upon returning. Lack of government control on the areas of return was the main concern to the majority of the refugees, which translated to the possibility of militant groups gaining contact to a lot of returning youth. The lack of rule of law exacerbated by absence of police on the ground could create a vacuum that could aid militant groups in recruiting the youth into their ranks whether voluntary or by force. As for security on the Kenyan side, the study found that there were no direct threats on Kenya's security. However, the ripple effects from Somalia could affect it. In addition there was a high likelihood of disenfranchised youth or adults for that matter turning against Kenya for what they might term eviction from their 'homeland'.

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