



THEORIZING PEACE EDUCATION

A THEORETICAL SURVEY OF THE PRACTICE OF
PEACE EDUCATION

Alberto Valiente Thoresen

AUTHOR

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CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION. UNIVERSITY OF TROMSØ.

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“I have never let my schooling interfere with my education”
Mark Twain

“What does education often do?
It makes a straight-cut ditch of a free, meandering brook”

Henry David Thoreau

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ix

Preface 1

Introduction 3

Chapter 1: Theorizing Culture 5

Chapter 2: Reality, Intelligence and Culture 19

Chapter 3: Theorizing Peace 31

Chapter 4: Theorizing Education 41

Chapter 5: Back to Peace Education 45

Chapter 6: The Practice of Peace Education 59

Final Remarks 75

Appendix 77

References 81

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PREFACE

This theoretical investigation takes off by introducing Peace Education as a group of deliberate human activities that are based on a common world view and goals. The investigation continues in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 4 by abstracting some of the most relevant concepts that interact with each other to give form to Peace Education. Many of these conceptualizations are controversial issues on which theorists have not reached an agreement. Addressing such debates is basic to get a better understanding of Peace Education. Moreover, implementing Peace Education is not possible, unless some working synthetic solutions to those theoretical debates are suggested. Thus, although this theoretical work tries to assume a humble attitude toward the conceptual controversies it presents, it also proposes synthetic working conceptualizations of the building blocks of Peace Education. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 try to expose the structural and dynamic richness of the field and set the base for more practical considerations on how to exercise and practice Peace Education. Thereby it is until in Chapter 5 that a suggestion on how Peace Education should construct its pedagogical discourse is presented. Such suggestion raises questions on which pedagogical tools are more relevant for the pedagogical discourse that is proposed. Therefore, Chapter 6 deals with different examples of pedagogical tools and the way they might be effective in gaining the learners' interests and emotional engagement. This final chapter includes also some considerations on how the age and contexts in time and place define the different audiences that are addressed by the pedagogical discourse of Peace Education, and why it is important to distinguish between these audiences and the content that is presented to them.

Since this is a theoretical survey of relevant issues for Peace Education, rather than providing final answers to all the pressing issues in the field, it will on occasions raise questions. The conclusion of the work as a whole sums up such questions and points to further research on them.

Introduction

As a starting point, it can be stated that Peace Education refers to the activities of teaching and learning to reach and preserve peace. However tautological, this is a useful starting point, because it abstracts to the first level of elements that make up this field of human activity. Table 1 illustrates the former statement.

Table 1

Terms **Levels of Abstraction**

Peace Education			Concrete Field of Activity
Education	To reach & preserve	Peace	First Level of Abstraction
Teaching			Second Level of Abstraction
Learning			

A thorough rational treatment of the issue implies to continue abstracting to even more specific components that make out the basics of Peace Education and how they relate with each other. The establishment of the relationships between these elements exposes the structures that give form to the field. Therefore, the next step in this extensive intellectual process consists in proposing *working conceptualizations* of the term *peace*, a task that is tightly related to hard-to-define concepts as *culture* and *non-violence*. Table 2 presents an illustration of the theoretical framework for this attempt without yet showing the specific relationships between the elements.

Table 2

Terms **Levels of Abstraction**

Peace Education			Concrete Field of Activity
Education	To reach & preserve	Peace	First Level of Abstraction
Teaching		A culture of non-violence	Second Level of Abstraction
Learning			

The expression *working conceptualizations* is used rather than *definitions*, because anyone familiar with this line of work is aware of the titanic challenges that

make it practically impossible to reach final definitions on peace, culture and non-violence that everyone agrees with. These are words that more often than not have various meanings, depending on the context and the texts in which they appear. The definitions of *peace*, *culture* and *non-violence* proposed are to be seen as one of the many tries to synthesize contending abstract notions of the terms¹. Marx referred to this method of abstraction and synthesis as a process that takes off in the concrete experience of reality and continues by “attenua(ing) meaningful images to abstract definitions”. Then these images are used to “lead from abstract definitions by way of reasoning to reproducing the concrete situation”². In the end of this process, the version of the resulting concrete situation is richer than the original one, because the most meaningful elements and their relationships have exposed the structures and dynamism of the reality in question. According to Marx, this new understanding that results from moving from reality to abstraction and back to reality

“...is concrete because it is a synthesis of many definitions, thus representing the unity of diverse aspects. It appears therefore in reasoning as a summing-up, a result, and not as the starting point, although it is the real point of origin, and thus also the point of origin of perception and imagination.”³

For methodological reasons, the reality-abstraction-synthesizing process will start with the notion that is harder to define: *culture*. The other terms will be dealt with by relating them to this main conception.

¹ Bencivenga, Ermano, 2000, *Hegel's Dialectic Logic*, London: Oxford University Press

² Marx, Karl, 1977, Introduction to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, in p. 206 <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/> (04.30.2005)

³ Ibid.

1

Theorizing Culture

1.1 A Brief Historical Account of the Term

According to Raymond Williams (1958) there are several key English words for contemporary life (found in many other languages as well) that have adopted new meanings throughout history. Terms like democracy, industry, class, art and *culture* are used many times differently today than they were three centuries ago. These semantic phenomena have to do with modifications in the ways of thinking about common life. According to Williams, the most relevant changes in how these words were used in Britain occurred at the turn of the eighteenth century; a time that was characterized by accelerated industrialization and urbanization of life. For Williams the transformations of the meanings of the word culture are the most striking of all the ones he analyzes in his milestone work *Culture and Society 1780-1950*.⁴

Before the period analyzed by Williams, the notion of culture referred to “tending of natural growth” or the central human activity of the times: *agriculture*. Logically this extended to tending the growth of humans, who are a part of that nature. But later, during the nineteenth century, culture became a word in its own. It was no longer an activity, but “a thing in itself”. Originally this thing meant “a general state or habit of the mind” which later was extended to “the general state of intellectual development, in a society as a whole”. This was an idea that was proposed in other places of the time, like Jena in Prussia, by authors as Hegel (1807) who worked extensively with the notion of spirit estranged in time, *Zeitgeist* or spirit of the times of a social group⁵. Later the word culture would appear in the German language again as the intellectual development of a society in Jacob Burckhardt’s (1860) work *Der Kultur der Renaissance in Italien*⁶. Williams adds that after the transformations in

⁴ Williams, Raymond, 1982 (1958), *Culture and Society 1780-1950*, London: The Hogarth Press

⁵ Redding, Paul, 2002, *The Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Georg Wilhelm Friederich Hegel* <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hegel> (04.30.2005) and Hegel, G. W. F., Baillie, J.B. (tr.), 1910 (1807), *Phenomenology of the Mind*, Moscow, Idaho: University of Idaho, <http://gyral.blackshell.com/hegel/heghist.html> (04.30.2005)

⁶ Burckhardt, Jacob (a.), Murray, Peter, Burke, Peter (Intr.), Middelmores, S.G.C (tr.), 1990 (1860), *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, London: Penguin.

that century, culture started to mean “the general body of the arts” and later it came to mean “a whole way of life, material, intellectual and spiritual”⁷.

Because of these observations made by Williams, it is easy to explain why the word culture has so many meanings and uses in our time. This situation only illustrates how when a word acquires new meanings this does not mean that the old meanings or uses of the term disappear. The old meanings can coexist with the new meanings, and each of them arises depending on how well they apply to each context in which the terms are used⁸.

1.2 Paradigms of Culture

The contemporary academic world is not free from these semantic puzzles. To illustrate how the word *culture* is dealt with differently in the social sciences; all we have to do is to take a look to Hervé Varenne’s (2002) collection of meanings of the term used by well known rather recent researchers⁹. He groups some of the different conceptions of the word in the following categories: original, pragmatic, Weberian, classic attempts of integration, structuralist, at anthropological fringes, cognitive, symbolic, psychological and structural interactionist. Surely the list could go on or take another form, but what it shows is the plurality of points of view from which the same word is conceived.

To have a working conceptualization of the term, a good way to go ahead is to abstract the most relevant aspects of Varenne’s categories and try to develop a synthetic theoretical proposition that is not in conflict with each of the different perspectives. The first step in this process is decomposing each of the categories in keywords that can be summed up in an all inclusive conceptualization. This is done in Table 3.

⁷ Williams, Raymond, Op. Cit.

⁸ For example when a man says that he is dedicated to the *culture* of strawberries, it means he grows strawberries; but when someone calls another *cultivated*, she means that the person she refers to is well-educated. When a person utters “she comes from another *culture*” he means “she comes from another social group”. It is also valid for a newspaper to have a *culture* section, and here the word generally defines a section for articles referring to the body of arts. And finally, when someone says that they are proud of their *culture*, it means that they are proud of their role in society and their way of life.

⁹ Varenne, Herve, 2002, *The Culture of Culture*,
http://varenne.tc.columbia.edu/hv/clt/and/culture_def.html (04.30.2005)

Table 3

Summary of Varenne's (2002) Paradigmatic Categories of Culture	Keywords
Original: Culture is a complex whole of capabilities and knowledge acquired by human beings. (Taylor 1871) ¹⁰	Knowledge and skills
Pragmatic: Culture is the characteristics of behavior of human beings and social groups. (Boaz 1911, Mead 1937) ¹¹	Behavior
Weberian: Culture is the values that guide human reality. (Weber 1904) ¹²	Values
Combined: Patterns for behavior transmitted and acquired through symbols. (Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952) ¹³	Symbolic patterns
Structuralist: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Culture is a synthesis between human beings' nature and their conditions. (Levi Strauss 1949)¹⁴ - Culture is messages and modulated systems of messages. (Bateson 1972)¹⁵ 	Synthesis between nature and conditions. Systems of messages
Quasi Anthropological: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Culture is the human possibility of expanding the range and accuracy of perception and meanings. (Dewey 1916)¹⁶ - Culture is ideology. (Gramsci 1932)¹⁷ - Pieties, duties, rituals and art that individuals and groups use (and sometimes struggle against) to confront the terrors of the inner and outer world and lead a coherent life. (Lionel Trilling 1955)¹⁸. - "Un système d'exclusion". (Foucault 1971)¹⁹ 	Possibilities of learning. Ideology. Rules and rituals. System of definition

¹⁰ Taylor, E.B., 1871 in Murphy, Robert, 1986, *Culture and Social Anthropology: An Overture*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall

¹¹ Boaz, Franz, 1965 (1911), *The Mind of Primitive Man*, New York: The Free Press and Mead, Margaret, 1961 (1937), *Cooperation and Competition Among Primitive Peoples*, Boston : Beacon Press

¹² Weber, Max, 2001 (1904), *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, London: Routledge

¹³ Kroeber, A.L., Kluckhohn, Clyde, 1985 (1952), *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*, Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

¹⁴ Levi-Strauss, Claude, 1969 (1949), *The Elementary Structures of Kinship*, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode

¹⁵ Bateson, Gregory, 2000 (1972), *Steps to an Ecology of Mind*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

¹⁶ Dewey, John, 1997 (1916), *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, New York: Free Press/ Simon & Schuster

¹⁷ Crehan, Kate, 2002, *Gramsci, Culture and Anthropology*, London: Pluto Press

Cognitive: Culture is everything that is learned to meet the standards of others. (Goodenough 1971) ²⁰	Organizes life with others
<p>Symbolic:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The hypothesis of cognitive culture is a good notion for promoting cultural understanding. But pretending that culture can be a final definition of humanity is narrow and one sided. (Singer 1968)²¹ - Culture is a pattern of symbols transmitted historically from generation to generation that makes, communicates, perpetuates, and develops knowledge, and attitudes about life. (Geertz 1966)²² 	Culture facilitates understanding. Human beings are more than culture. They are relatively independent from it. Patterns of symbols transmitted through generations. Develops knowledge and attitudes.
Psychological: People that live in the world differently, live in different worlds. Psyche refers to the intentional person while culture refers to the intentional world. Intentional world and intentional persons are constructed interdependently. (Schweder 1991) ²³	Synthesis of groups of humans and their worlds
Structural Interactionist: Culture is a system that enables human interaction. John Dewey once said social life is identical with communication. (Dewey 1916) ²⁴	Communication

1.3 An attempt to synthesize

By writing down and making sense of the elements in the right hand column of the chart, we get more or less that culture can be conceived as knowledge and capabilities of human beings that are manifested as systems of messages that can be sent, received and remembered, consciously and unconsciously. The meanings of these messages are constantly being created as syntheses between nature and the

¹⁸ Trilling, Lionel 1955, *The Opposing Self: Nine Essays in Criticism*, London: Secker and Warburg

¹⁹ Foucault, Michel, 1971, *L'ordre du discours*, Paris: Gallimard

²⁰ Goodenough, Ward, H., 1971, *Culture, Language and Society*, Reading Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley

²¹ Singer, Milton, 1968, *The Concept of Culture in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* 3: 527-543.

²² Geertz, Clifford, 1973 (1966), *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books

²³ Schweder, Richard, 1991, *Thinking Through Cultures: Expeditions in Cultural Psychology*, Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press

²⁴ Dewey, John, Op. Cit. 4-5

conditions of the humans that express and get them in time and place. The resulting inter-subjectively acceptable meanings of those messages prescribe the doctrinal values, rules, rituals and duties by constituting ideologies and systems of definition and exclusion, while they empower the human capabilities for learning, ease communication and in the end, organize human interaction.

A much simpler way of stating the former working conceptualization without it being in conflict with the last paragraph, could be that culture is a socially constructed system²⁵ of symbols and messages that organize the lives of human beings. A system is a group of elements in interaction with one another²⁶. For detailing more how this system gives order to the lives of people we can say that it is roughly composed by four interdependent socially constructed subsystems:


1) *Technology* or subsystems of roles that define acceptable ways of doing things or *behaving*. 2) Subsystem of *attitudes* that define an acceptable role and behavioral pattern. Attitudes are “complex mental states that traduce in predispositions to respond evaluatively, favourably or unfavourably to aspects of one’s environment or self”²⁷. This means attitudes influence behaviors though they don’t cause them on their own. 3) Subsystem of *values* and beliefs used to judge and understand the world. 4) *Language*. A system of socially constructed symbolic conventions for communication. These ideas are presented graphically in Figure 1.

²⁵ Socially constructed realities are accounts of the world which are experienced as existing things by individuals in social interaction. These realities influence the ways human beings behave. They take shape through communication and habituation. Ultimately, they become institutions which are reinforced through socialization and social interaction. This habituation and reinforcement process happens with the intervention of the material environment and previously existing social realities. (Berger, Peter, Luckman, Thomas, 1966, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, New York: Anchor Books).

²⁶ WordNet 2.0, *A lexical database for the English Language*, Princeton University <http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/webwn?stage=1&word=system>, (02.03.2005)

²⁷ Deutsch, Morton, Coleman, Peter (eds.), *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, San Francisco: Jossey Bass. p. 23

Figure 1.
Culture: A socially constructed system.



Elaboration of a figure taken from Bror Olsen's lectures in 'Culture Conflict and Society', Autumn 2003, University of Tromsø.

The figure shows how socially constructed messages are organized in subsystems of *attitudes*, *language*, *technology* and *values*. The meanings of these messages are interpreted individually and according to *context in time and space* in relation to the inter-subjectively acceptable norms. These subsystems are in *constant interaction* with each other, with nature and this way they influence each other. This idea is illustrated by the lines in the center of the figure, which make out a rhombus with an 'x' inside. There will be different octagons of culture for different contexts in time and space, which most likely involve different combinations of human individuals.

1.4 Process, Tradition and Diversity

The meanings that make up a culture are not a unanimous synthesis of the world and humans. Rather, they should be seen as a plurality of human interpretations about the messages of the world, perceived by individuals through their senses in

different positions in time and place. The cultural messages about the world can be of two sorts:

- 1) Current human reactions to existing things from the world, or
- 2) Collective memories transmitted from generation to generation, about reactions to things that existed in past worlds


For example, some of the cultural messages that constitute the building blocks of current Western European culture come from human reactions to a natural environment with four seasons in a year and collective memories of ancient Greek (Roman) culture, Judaism and Christianity.

Within a cultural group, there are different interpretations about these messages. So traditions in a system coexist in tension with other meanings that oppose or are unlike them in one way or another. Janet Maybin (2001) used an analogy to a physical phenomenon to say the same when referring to Bakhtin and Volosinov's (1929) findings in linguistics. In her words; there are always centrifugal drives (or forces to the limits) and centripetal drives (or forces that pull to the center) in tension within linguistic systems²⁸. So there are doctrinal forms of conveying meaning, interacting through symbols and variations to these doctrines. Extended to the whole cultural system, this abstract idea says that uttering and interpreting cultural messages generates forces to the doctrine and forces that repel the core of the message. In other words, human elucidation can either pull to the doctrine or to the alternatives to the rules. So there will always be contending ways of organizing social life, even in the same surroundings²⁹. Figure 2 illustrates this point, where a cultural message is represented as the black center of a disc. The reason a cultural prescription is represented this way is that a circular figure illustrates best the analogy to a body moving in circles that generates centripetal and centrifugal forces to the core, just as a message in a culture does.

²⁸ Maybin, Janet (2001) *Language Struggle and Voice: The Bakhtin & Volosinov Writings*, in Margaret Wetherell (ed.) et. al. (2001), *Discourse Theory and Practice. A Reader*, London: Sage. p. 64-71

²⁹ For example, in Northern Norway one can identify two different cultural systems; Samis and Norwegians.

Figure 2 Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in Culture




This analogy exposes how cultural messages prescribe the doctrines of roles, behaviors, attitudes and values; ways of communicating, the way these elements interact with one another and with context. These doctrines, rules or traditions can be seen as the cores or centers of a culture. But no culture can be seen as a unanimous body of doctrines. Therefore, besides the doctrine, there will always be heterodox interpretations and versions of the roles, behaviors, attitudes, values; ways of communicating, manners of relating all these elements with each other and with circumstance. These diverse elements of culture will at least be different from the doctrine and in other cases, they will oppose the doctrine. Doctrine pulls to the center of a culture and diversity pulls away from it. Centripetal forces intend order, certainty, unanimity and unity; while centrifugal forces pull outwards from a cultural system, rendering the possibility for disorder, uncertainty, disagreement and disunity. Nonetheless, and although ironical, doctrine cannot exist without the opposition of diversity. As Schmitt (1933) put it, the doctrine or rule only exists as an exception to everything else that is neither doctrine nor rule. In other words when the exception disappears, so does the rule³⁰.

Presenting the tension in culture between tradition and variation as an analogy to dynamic centrifugal and centripetal forces in a body in circular movement is convenient, because cultures are always being regenerated by humans. They are not

³⁰ Schmitt, Carl, Schwab, George (tr.) 1985 (1933), *Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press

static realities. In the words of Clayton Robarcheck (1989) cultures are continuous processes rather than static essences³¹. So doctrine and diversity are *forces* or *tendencies of human interpretation of messages* in movement rather than stationary facts of life. This thought can be illustrated in Figure 3, which conceptually is just Figure 2 rotated more or less seventy five degrees in its horizontal axis and tilted vertically more or less forty five degrees. The reason this is conceived in this way, is that Figure 2 represents a static picture of the tension between doctrine and diversity in a cultural subsystem, while Figure 3 aims to show how time affects this tension and uncover the dynamism in which Figure 2 is immersed.

Figure 3
Regenerating Cultural Messages Through Interpretation



This figure shows a graphic conceptualization of how messages that make out culture evolve through time. Each disc represents a cultural message and its respective doctrinal core and heterodox crust; which are just simple representations of the rule and the consequent myriads of interpretations of the message by different individuals at a specific point in time. The discs in the figure are only pictures of instants from the

³¹ "...human action as the outcome of choices made by people actively in pursuit of particular purposes and goals, choices made and enacted within particular psychological and culturally constituted realities which they themselves are actively constructing". Robacheck, Clayton, in Howell, S. (ed.), *Societies at Peace*, London: Routledge, p. 32.

real world. In practice, there should be an infinite flow of these imaginary discs, and it would be impossible to draw them all. It is *human intelligence*³² of individuals in social groups that utters and interprets the cultural messages or symbols, and metaphorically in the graphical conceptualization this is the same as saying that it is collective intelligence that makes the imaginary messages go round and that generates centripetal and centrifugal forces. The disc's shape is then determined by the intensity of these forces, which is decided by the interaction of peoples' intelligence. In this case we have drawn perfect circles, but their form could be less familiar. This imaginary exercise aims to represent how human beings decide what will be the core and what will be the crust of a culture.

Particular cultural messages tend to remain the basic elements of the cultures of specific human groups and their descendants for long periods of time, unless things from the worlds that are the source of those cultures are changed or the collective memories from the past are modified. In the example of Western European culture, it is visible that the same natural environment and collective memories of the ancient Greeks, Judaism and Christianity have been the sources of some central cultural messages that have ordered the lives of people in Europe for many centuries. Only if weather suddenly changed and Europe became a tropical place, or if the records and memories of ancient Greek culture, the Roman Empire, Judaism or Christianity were modified or destroyed, would it be possible for us to talk about substantially different cultural messages as the building blocks of Western European culture.

From this, it follows that there are four sorts of cultural change:


- 1) **Material:** Cultural change that is explained by modifications of the messages that come from the material realities experienced by humans.
- 2) **Narrative:** Cultural change that has its origin in new messages that constitute different ways of narrating the past.
- 3) **Interpretational:** Cultural change that arises from different ways of interpreting the same cultural messages.
- 4) **Structural:** Cultural change that arises from different ways of relating cultural messages or cultural subsystems to each other.

³² Section 2.4 deals with this crucial human capability.

1.5 Conclusion


The notion of culture is hard to define and people are unlikely to reach an agreement on a final and all inclusive definition. But it is possible to elaborate working conceptualizations of the term, which pinpoint key elements that are needed for the purposes of our theoretical issues. This has been tried in this chapter and has rendered certain conceptual considerations of culture. Combining these considerations we can draw a new static version of culture. This is done in Figure 4. This figure should be interpreted as a static picture (or a slice) of a dynamic process similar to the one illustrated in figure 3. This dynamic process is illustrated fully further in Figure 5. It is not pretended that the figure exhausts cultural reality. It should be taken as a graphic representation of *some* concepts that help illustrate *some* interesting social structures for Peace Education.

Figure 4.
Culture. Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces.



In this figure, the cultural subsystems are represented by the four big circles titled T for technology, A for attitudes, L for language and V for values. The other smaller circles represent some cultural messages and the respective dynamics of human interpretation inside them. As it can be seen, just as cultural messages have a core, centripetal and centrifugal forces; so do cultural subsystems and the cultural system as a whole. These cores are represented as black circles in the middle of the messages, cultural subsystems and the cultural system. To represent the process that is set on by human intelligence of individuals interacting with each other, we imagine the discs rotate creating thus centripetal and centrifugal forces to the core. This influences the ways the elements in each of them relate to each other. The messages interrelate with each other inside the subsystems and are positioned close or far away from the subsystem's core. Likewise the subsystems interrelate with each other and are positioned far away or close to the systems center. But unlike the messages, where the core represents an identifiable rule or doctrine, like for instance *say hi when you meet someone*; the core in the cultural subsystems and system cannot be recognized so easily. More than a doctrine, the subsystems' and system's core should be seen as a center with the meaningful characteristics of a cultural (sub) system. Like for instance, the (sub) system's core could serve to categorize a culture as individualistic, expressive, hospitable, and so forth. There is no objective way of determining these central characteristics of a culture. This exercise is influenced by the viewpoint of the observer and his or her intentions when analyzing culture. The closest thing to objectivity in finding out the characteristic of this core will be the explicitness and awareness about these perspectives and intentions in time and place. When doing this, care should be taken not to fall uncritically into cultural essentialism (or the intellectual search for static essences of a culture). Our characterizations of culture can merely be valuations of specific moments in time and place of a dynamic process, in which culture is constantly re-making itself; reason for which it is always subject to change. So a central characteristic need not be a fixed essence. The dynamic process of the reproduction of culture is determined by context in time and place and human intelligence. Collective interpretations of context result in discourses that are spread to society through communication. Figure 5 represents the process of regeneration of culture in time. There are different octagons for different time periods (because of cultural change) and different sequences for different points in space.

Figure 5. The Regeneration of a Cultural System in Time.



Since each octagon of culture in Figure 5 is a synthesis of human collectives and their worlds, it is necessary to say something about how humans experience the world and how they continue creating those syntheses. In other words, we must explain how reality affects humans and how this relationship is the basis for culture. This is done in the next chapter.

2

Reality, Intelligence And Culture

2.1 A Philosophical Approach

Culture is the result of human experience of reality, interaction between individuals and what is learned from this to create syntheses of the world and human nature. For Dewey (1938), learning from the world is a process that comprises three stages: a) “Observation of surrounding conditions, b) knowledge of what has happened in similar situations before, a knowledge obtained partly by recollection and partly from the information, advice, and warning of those who have had a wider experience and c) judgment which puts together what is observed and what is recalled to see what they signify.”³³ These three stages imply sensual perception of reality, discernment, the establishment of logical connections between phenomena and finally explanations of what things are and why they are. Xavier Zubiri’s (1980) trilogy on *Sentient Intelligence* provides a good starting point for theoretical discussions on these issues. According to Castro (1986), Zubiri’s work provides new ideas on intellection, reality and truth, which constitute the central aspect of the books³⁴. These *new ideas* belong to a life time attempt of reviving the concern for metaphysics in the twentieth century, a time in which this area of philosophical activity was declared officially dead³⁵. According to González (2004), this effort was not at the height of the intellectual fashions of the time, but it was at the height of the science and the ethics of the times and it is here that we can find it relevant³⁶. He adds:

“It is a metaphysics founded in the observational and theoretical conceptualizations of physics in the twentieth century, supported on the revolutions in biology and a thorough knowledge of the conceptual bases of modern mathematics. Thus,

³³ Dewey, John, 1938, *Experience and Education*, New York: Collier, p. 69 in Marsick, Victoria J., Sauquet, Alfonso, *Learning Through Reflection*, in Deutsch, Morton, Coleman, Peter, (eds.), *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass, p. 383

³⁴ Castro, Carmen, 1986, *Xavier Zubiri: Breve Recorrido de Una Vida, Amigos de la Cultura Científica*, Santander. p. 112- 113. In González de Posada, Francisco, 2004, Introduction to *Xavier Zubiri, Inteligencia Sentiente, Edición Abreviada*, Madrid: Editorial Tecnos. p. 60

³⁵ Ayer, Alfred, 1952 (1936), Chapter 1, *Language, Truth and Logic*, New York: Dover Publications

³⁶ González, Op. Cit. 78

Zubiri's metaphysics is constructed in critical dialogue with philosophers as Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibinz, Kant, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger; but also great scientists as Galileo, Newton, Maxwell, Einstein, Heisenberg, Schrödinger...³⁷

For González, Zubiri's thought can be positioned as a specific phase within a continuum that sums up briefly the chronological order of the main philosophers that influenced Zubiri and their main objects of study. González acknowledges that this exercise oversimplifies because it turns out to be exaggeratedly concise, but it can anyways serve as a starting point for our purposes. The chart proposed by González is presented in Table 3.

Table 3. Zubiri's Philosophy in Time

Thinkers	Formal Object of Philosophical Activity
Aristotle	The entity
Kant	The phenomenological object
Comte	The scientific fact
Bergson	The immediate data to the conscience
Dilthey	Life
Husserl	The phenomenological essence (The pure essence of conscience)
Heidegger	Pure Being (What is presented to my bodily existence)
Zubiri	Reality

We can say intuitively that for Zubiri reality is everything we experience in life: contexts in time and place, ourselves as individuals, other living beings that are a part of those contexts and the realities postulated by those living beings³⁸. For Zubiri, reality emanates from the source of *Being* or as Heidegger called it: *Dasein*³⁹ or *being there* in the world.

³⁷ Op. Cit. 33

³⁸ For a presentation of reality by postulation see Fowler, Thomas, 2002, *A Framework for Political Theory Based on Zubiri's Concept of Reality*, The Xavier Zubiri Reivew, Vol 4, 109- 132. http://www.zubiri.org/general/xzreview/2002/web/Fowler_XZR2002.htm (04.30.2005)


³⁹ Heidegger, Martin, Stambaugh, Joan (tr.), 1996, *Being and Time: a translation of Sein und Zeit*, SUNY, Series in Contemporary Continental Philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press.

2.1.1 Zubiri's Notion of Reality. An abstract Introduction

According to Ellacuria (1970, 1981) following Xavier Zubiri's (1968) *The Dynamic Structure of Reality*⁴⁰, *existing things* are to be seen as the result of *structures of notes* that are intrinsically in action. The respective character between these *notes* and their connections are responsible for putting in motion this intrinsic activity. *Notes* are particular forms of materiality that in becoming *existing things* don't stop being something material. These *existing things* are connected with each other in activity, which prolongs to them the dynamism the *systems of notes* are in and of themselves. But it is not that *existing things* have dynamism or that *existing things* are in dynamism. *Existing things* are dynamical. Since *existing things*' dynamism consists in a going from *notes*, to *systems of notes* and finally to *things*, it is a dynamism that can be defined as a constitutive and continuous structure that "gives of itself"⁴¹ moving from *inferior* to *superior forms of reality*. Where *inferior forms of reality*, without stopping to be what they are, become something else. They become a unity that is a part of a greater whole. *Superior forms of reality* include *inferior forms of reality*. But *inferior forms of reality* do not reflect the *superior forms* of reality alone. So we cannot say what reality is until it has given everything of itself and we cannot say what a *superior form of reality* is by reducing it to the *inferior forms of reality* from which it comes from. *Existing things* are then to be seen as *superior forms of reality* than the *notes* that constitute them. These *existing things* are only *dynamic moments*, which are the qualitative manifestations of the *dynamic notes* that constitute their *substance* through their interaction. *Existing things* are like pictures of the intrinsic activity that is going on. They manifest themselves with different qualities that are given by the configuration and ways of interaction of the *systems of notes*. Since these *dynamic things* include the *dynamic notes* that constitute them, and these *notes* are forms of *materiality*, *existing things* are also *material*. They are just a different form of materiality than the *notes* that constitute them. This is illustrated in Figure 6.

⁴⁰ The English translation was made by Orringer, Nelson R., 2003, *The Dynamic Structure of Reality*, Chicago: University of Illinois Press.


⁴¹ Martin Heidegger used the expression "giving of itself" in order to refer to Being as the source of everything. In Orringer, Nelson, *The Idea of Dynamism in The Dynamic Structure of Reality*, The Xavier Zubiri Review, Volume 1, 1998, 23-29
<http://www.zubiri.org/general/xzreview/1998/conceptofdynamism.html> (04.30.2005)

Figure 6. Inferior and Superior Forms of Reality

Life is to be seen as a quality of the manifestation of *dynamic notes*. There are thus *existing things* that have the quality of *life*. Living things were referred by Dewey (1916) as *existing things* that “maintain themselves by renewal”⁴². Since *living things* come from material notes, they are also material. But they constitute a particular and *superior sort of materiality*.⁴³ This idea can be thought of as in Figure 7, as circles that keep remaking themselves in time.

⁴²Dewey, John, 1916, *Democracy and Education*, Chapter 1, *Education as a Necessity of Life*, <http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/publications/Projects/digitexts/dewey/dechapter01.html> (04.30.2005)

⁴³ Ellacuria, Ignacio, 1981, *El Objeto de la Filosofía*, p. 976 in *Escritos Filosóficos, Volumen I*, (1996), San Salvador: Universidad Centroamericana Jose Simeon Cañas. And Ellacuria, Ignacio, 1970, *La idea de filosofía en Xavier Zubiri* in, *Homenaje a Xavier Zubiri II*, Madrid: Editorial Moneda y Credito, p. 509-510. Quoted in Samour, Hector, 2003, *Voluntad de Liberación. La Filosofía de Ignacio Ellacuria*. Granada: Editorial Comares, Chapter III. Subtitle 2. <http://www.uca.edu.sv/facultad/chn/c1170/hsvoluntadliberacion3.html> (04.30.2005)

Figure 7. Life

There is a *totality*, which is the *most superior form of reality*. This totality comes from *materiality* as *structures* of inferior forms of reality that interact *dynamically*. The *totality of reality* has then material, structural and dynamical characters. This *reality* exists in its own right⁴⁴ and it includes *materiality* as it presents to human senses, *materiality* humans cannot directly perceive with their senses but can perhaps access through *thinking* and everything materiality has the possibility of giving of itself. That which is possible but has not yet given of itself is beyond *physics*. It can therefore only be addressed as a part of *metaphysics*. The *transcendental* and *dynamic* character of reality is what gives way to possibilities and constitutes then the *metaphysical character of reality*.

2.2 A Less Abstract Explanation

As it has been explained, Zubiri's *metaphysics* is thoroughly grounded in discoveries made in physics during the twentieth century. It shouldn't seem surprising then that much of what has been stated rather abstractly and which was not so well

⁴⁴Fowler, Thomas B., 1997, *Introduction to Sentient Intelligence* in his translation to Zubiri, Xavier, 1980, *Inteligencia Sentiente: Inteligencia y Realidad*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial. <http://www.zubiri.org/works/englishworks/si/SITOC.htm> (04.30.2005) An idea initially proposed by Kant, Immanuel, 1781, *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. by Pluha, Werner and Kitcher, Patricia (Hackett, 1996). For a definition of Kant's *Ding an sich* see <http://www.philosophypages.com/dy/t.htm#thing> (04.30.2005)


received in the anti-metaphysical academic circles of the twentieth century; has recently made its way convincingly to theoretical *physics*. A metaphor that considers reality as being material, structural and dynamic, has given way to a bulk of theories that try to overcome the deficiencies of Relativistic Quantum Field Theory and try to close the gap between the apparently contradictory approaches of the General Theory of Relativity and Quantum Mechanics. This synthetic lot of theoretical physics models is referred to as *String Theory*. According to String Theory, the “elementary particles” observed in accelerators should be interpreted as the “musical notes” of even more elementary “strings”, which are the most *inferior forms of reality* and constitute the basis of *matter*. These strings interact with each other at different tonalities to constitute *superior forms of reality*.

Oversimplifying, the process can be conceived to operate by the elementary strings “vibrating” in “keys” to create *superior forms of reality* called quarks, electrons and possibly also gravitons. Quarks relate with each other, electrons and gravitons to form even more *superior forms of reality* called neutrons and protons. These then interact with each other to constitute even more *superior forms of reality* called atoms, which interrelate to make up a *superior form of reality* called molecules, and so on, the process is thought of continuing to give of itself to create even more *superior forms of reality*. The *most superior form of reality* could be conceived to be that which includes everything. For many physicists this approach could be the basis for a successful *Theory of Everything* (or TOE) that would manage to combine the four basic forces of nature: gravity, strong nuclear force, weak nuclear force and electromagnetic force⁴⁵.

2.3 Human Reality

In light of this TOE, human beings are to be seen as a *superior form of reality* with the quality of *life* that *totality* has *given of itself* through the interaction of *inferior forms of reality* through evolution and conception-growth of an embryo. Throughout their lives human beings remain imbedded in this *totality*. But this human incrustation in *totality* goes on through biological, social and historical dimensions. This is shown in Figure 8.

⁴⁵ See, Greene, Brian, 1999, *The Elegant Universe*, New York: W.W. Norton and Co.

Figure 8. Human Reality.

2.3.1 Human Life as Dialectic Crash Between Humanity and Reality⁴⁶.

For many philosophers, despite being imbedded in it, human beings are constantly in contradiction with their reality. Ellacuria (1981) seems to support this view by having written, “human beings feel the world as something different to them because at every moment it offers resistance to their being”^{47, 48} Zubiri illustrated this idea by stating that human beings experience reality as: a) something that affects them; b) something that is *other* from them and consists of various *existing things* with *otherness*; and c) something that is imposed on them.⁴⁹ *Otherness*, for Zubiri according to Fowler (1997) consists of a *content* that is affecting human beings, and a *formality*, which is how that content is presented to living creatures. For most animals, *formality* is mere stimulation, but for humans, *formality* is what we call *reality*⁵⁰. The

⁴⁶ Samour, Hector, Op. Cit. Chapter II, Subtitle 3.2.2.

<http://www.uca.edu.sv/facultad/chn/c1170/hsvoluntadliberacion2.html> (04.30.2005)

⁴⁷ Ellacuria, Ignacio, *El Objeto de La Filosofía*, in Op. Cit. p 450

⁴⁸ A few examples illustrate this idea: An identity acquired from past experience might be in contradiction with a particular situation. A personal view of someone might be in opposition with that of a group of people that person cares about and needs from. The satisfaction of someone’s hunger implies a contradiction between the life of a plant and the life of the hungry person. The time employed in eating implies a trade off with time disposed for the satisfaction of self-actualizing needs. Being born leads to living which ends with dying, and so on.

⁴⁹ Fowler, Thomas B., *Introduction to Sentient Intelligence*, Op. Cit.

⁵⁰ Postman takes these ideas further by proposing a metaphor of human beings as *Fallen Angels*. What he means by this expression is that human beings are living creatures that manage to realize their otherness or the dialectics implied when encountering their surrounding world. This feeling of

connection between humans and reality is provided by human intelligence.

2.3.2 Intelligence: Gap & Bridge Between Humanity and Reality

For Zubiri, the faculty that allows human beings to connect to and reflect on their otherness and that has allowed them to go further in emancipating and dissociating themselves from the natural and social world is *intelligence*, which leads to *knowing*⁵¹. Zubiri (1980) neglected a *dualism* between *intellective knowing* and *sensing*. He wrote, “I believe that in (humans), sensing and intellective knowing are not two acts, each complete in its order; rather, they are two moments of a single act, of one unique impression, of the impression of reality”⁵². The basis for this argument was his theory of sentient intelligence.

2.4 Sentient Intelligence

Zubiri defined *intellection* as actualizing an *existing thing* as real in our brains. He conceived it as having three basic modalities:

- a) *Primordial apprehension* of an *existing thing*, b) *Logos* or the explanation of what an *existing thing* is in relation to other things, and c) *Reason* or methodological explanations of what *existing things* are and why they are⁵³. This last modality is

otherness may give people the sensation of having fallen to Earth from some other better place where there is no otherness but just oneness. Cultures of different parts of the world have throughout history shown a belief in such place of oneness where people will allegedly return to after their time in the contradictory passages of life.

(Postman, Neil, 1996, *The End of Education*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, p. 66.)

⁵¹ Zubiri (1980) suggests that for the ancient Greeks there were three forms of *knowing*. The first one, according to Parmenides, was *discerning* or to detect with the senses by not confusing one thing sensed with another. The second form, as identified by Plato, was *defining*, or the process of discerning in a more detailed and particular way. Aristotle, who admitted this conceptualization, took the previous ideas a bit further and proposed the third one. He suggested that *knowing* didn't only take the forms of *discerning* and *defining*, but also *demonstrating*, which etymological means “showing from where”. According to him, this showing from where implies a) reasoning, b) the recalling of particular already known principles and c) a sensible impression of the reality in question. Aristotle regards the first two as moments of *intellective knowing*, while considering the third a part of *sensing*. This view shows a *dualism between intellective knowing and sensing* that has been present in the course of the history of Western thought. (See Zubiri, Xavier, *Inteligencia Sentiente: Inteligencia y Realidad*. p. 349-350 Taken from the English translation by Fowler, Thomas B., 1997,


<http://www.zubiri.org/works/englishworks/si/SITOC.htm>) (04.30.2005)

⁵² Op. Cit. p. 81 <http://www.zubiri.org/works/englishworks/si/S11C4.htm> (04.30.2005)

⁵³ Fowler, Thomas B., 1998, *Introduction to the Philosophy of Xavier Zubiri*, The Xavier Zubiri Review, Volume 1, p. 5-16, <http://www.zubiri.org/general/xzreview/1998/introtozubiri.html> (04.30.2005)

what leads to *understanding*.⁵⁴ Figure 9 shows these ideas.

Figure 9. Sentient Intelligence.



Each of the modes includes the previous one and is in the beginning of the following one, causing it. This supports the view that there is no dualism between sensing and thinking in intellection and it is the reason why Zubiri calls it a sentient intelligence. Each of the different modalities of intelligence constitutes a different maturation of thought. More mature levels of thought don't imply *more* actualization of reality; they rather provide a *better* actualization of it. Retaining actualized reality in the brain is *intellective knowing*. Zubiri suggests *intellective knowing* and *understanding* are not the same things. *Knowing* is an intellective state that implies retention of real things in the brain which have been at least primarily apprehended, while *understanding* is a modality of *intellectual knowing* which is reached through the intellectual modalities of logos and reason that expose the structures and dynamism of reality. There are many things we know that we do not always understand fully⁵⁵. But understanding can be flawed as much as the other forms of

⁵⁴ "Understanding is also a richer and more complex process than heretofore assumed. Indeed, oversimplification of the process of understanding has led to major philosophical errors in the past. Understanding requires *both* apprehension of something as real, *and* knowing what that thing is with respect to other things (logos stage) and what it is in reality itself (reason stage). Traditionally only the latter is considered." Fowler, Thomas, 1998, Introduction to his translation of Zubiri, Xavier, 1980, *Sentient Intelligence*, <http://www.zubiri.org/works/englishworks/si/transintro.htm#R23> (04.30.2005)

⁵⁵ This can be implied from Zubiri, Xavier, Fowler, Thomas(tr.), Butler, Gary (critical reader), 1998 (1980), *Sentient Intelligence*, <http://www.zubiri.org/works/englishworks/si/conclusion.htm> p. 342

knowing. This is explained because of the fact that every single one of the modalities of sentient intelligence is subject to error. And as seen, logos is bounded by primordial apprehension as reason is bounded by logos and primordial apprehension⁵⁶. Thus as much as sentient intelligence can serve as a bridge between humanity and reality by re-actualizing reality in a person's brain in an appropriate way, it can also become the gap between a person and its reality if the re-actualization of reality in the brain is inappropriate, that is, if it doesn't acknowledge the human dimensions through which humans experience reality. However, there is not just one single correct re-actualization of reality. There are many different ways in which the biological, social and historical dimensions of humanity can be re-actualized in the brain, since there are different sorts of intelligence, which generate knowledge in different ways.

According to Mike Anderson (1992), intelligence is a synthesis of biological properties of the brain and knowledge systems that are culturally determined. This means that the faculty of sentient intelligence is influenced by knowledge, but at the same time, sentient intelligence is rather independent and responsible for generating that knowledge. In other words, different individuals will possess distinct sorts of intelligence, depending on biological-genetic characteristics and how these combine with the amount and sort of knowledge these individuals have gained in life through social and historical experience⁵⁷. These affirmations allow us to classify sentient intelligence into different sorts of intelligences, which individuals will have in different points in time and space. About this, Howard Gardner (1983) suggests that "...there is not, and there can never be, a single irrefutable and universally acceptable list of human intelligences."⁵⁸ So the structural unity of the three modalities of intelligence suggested by Zubiri will present itself in different ways and with different characteristics among individuals and contexts. Consequently, one intelligence can be more linguistic than others; another can be more logical-mathematical, while others will be more musical, emotional or social. The list can go

(04.30.2005)

⁵⁶ This approach has its parallels in recent psychological research for which Daniel Kahneman received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002. See Kahneman, Daniel, 2002, *Maps of Bounded Rationality*, Nobel Prize Lecture, <http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2002/kahneman-lecture.html>

(04.30.2005)


⁵⁷ Anderson, Mike, 1992, *Intelligence and Development. A Cognitive Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell

⁵⁸ Gardner, Howard, 1985 (1983), *Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences*, London: Harper Collins, p. 60

on depending on special interests and abilities of the individuals in question. But the *different sorts* of human intelligence all have in common that they are the structural unity between sentient apprehension, logos and reason. They can serve to re-actualize the historical realities that are necessary to satisfy biological and social needs of humans.

As suggested in Chapter 1, intelligence is in charge of setting in motion the message interpretation processes that creates knowledge as syntheses of human beings and their specific situations in the totality of reality. When this knowledge becomes discourses that are spread through the activities of education and are used to give order to groups of people, they influence *cultures*. This is illustrated in Figure 10, which is a graph that omits some relationships, but tries to highlight the most relevant for education.

Figure 10. Sentient Intelligence and Culture.



2.5 Relation to Peace Education

Peace Education's discourse should be constructed with knowledge that comes from reason, which means *understanding* that comes from explanations of the world; as in the knowledge generated by the sciences and philosophy. Reason allows us to uncover the structures and dynamisms of reality. Just as well, reason gives way to well-founded imagination which allows us to foresee that which reality has not given of itself, but which is possible. Global positive peace is one of these unrealized

possibilities of reality. It is therefore a sort of knowledge that seems unthinkable, if we base ourselves only on past experience. However, it becomes thinkable if we acknowledge the historical dimension of humans, that is, their possibility to affect the course of history, through activities like education.

2.6 Conclusion

Human beings are biological, social and historical beings, incrued in a totality of existence in its own right. In other words, we have biological needs, instincts and intelligence. We satisfy these needs better when doing things in groups and this social interaction also guarantees our reproduction as a species. All this happens in contexts in time and space that determine human lives. But people can relatively liberate themselves from the constraints imposed by context. People can imagine new worlds and make them real, transcending the boundaries that have been reached by history. The faculty that allows this is human sentient intelligence. This capability reached through evolution allows people to find their place in reality and helps them decide how they want to realize themselves as individuals. It is a sentient faculty, because it cannot be divorced from the senses that allow us to experience the world. According to Zubiri, intelligence has the three modalities of sensual apprehension, logos and reason, which are not stages of thought; rather they are to be seen as levels of actualization of reality. Reason gives also the possibility to imagine new possible realities. Global positive peace is one of these unrealized possibilities that can be imagined once the structures and dynamisms of society are understood. Retaining the actualization of reality in the brain is knowledge and when knowledge comes from reason, it is called understanding. Knowledge that is manifested in particular discourses can be spread through the activities of education, and this way it can affect culture, which again affects the real contexts human beings experience. Education is thus fundamental in affecting people's lives. To be successful, Peace Education's discourse should be the result of understanding the structures and dynamisms of the social and natural contexts of totality in which it operates; an understanding that should be able to answer if the cores of the cultures as a whole, their subsystems and messages, prescribe the characteristic of violence or non-violence and how these cores can be changed to prescribe non-violence. Chapter 3 develops working conceptualizations on violence, non-violence and peace.

3

Theorizing Peace

The concept of peace is related to a non-violent state of culture. *Non-violence* is every behavior that is not *violence*. But by saying this, we are one more time left with a tautological starting point. We still have to try and synthesize the word *violence* to reach a working conceptualization of *non-violence*. This is not an easy task. Just as the word *culture* has many different meanings depending on context and historical moment, the word *violence* can be used in many different ways. Table 4 presents the conceptualizations that are found by making a search for the word on the Internet.

Table 4. Some conceptualizations of violence

Source	Concept of violence	Keywords
Princeton WordNet 2.0 ⁵⁹	An act of aggression (as one against a person who resists); "he may accomplish by craft in the long run what he cannot do by force and violence in the short one"	Forcing one who resists.
	Ferocity: the property of being wild or turbulent; "the storm's violence"	Wild and turbulent.
	A turbulent state resulting in injuries and destruction	Turbulent and destructive.
The Albert Einstein Institution ⁶⁰	The infliction on people of physical injury or death, or the threat to do so. All behaviour cannot be neatly classified as either "violence" or "non-violence," and several categories fall between these two extremes, including "destruction of property."	Infliction of injury or death. Difficult to classify behaviour in extremes.
Californians for Drug Free Youth ⁶¹	Physical and non-physical harm that causes damage and pain. Injury or fear. It is a public health and safety condition that often results from individual, social, economic, political, and institutional disregard for basic human needs. Violence disrupts the school environment and results in a debilitation of personal development, which may lead to hopelessness and helplessness.	Harm. Injury. Pain. Disregarding human needs. Hindering human development.
Centre for Ethics University of Idaho ⁶²	Physical Force exerted for the purpose of injuring another	Physical force.

⁵⁹ <http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/webwn?stage=1&word=violence> (04.20.2005)

⁶⁰ <http://www.hermanos.org/nonviolence/jourglos.html> (04.20.2005)

⁶¹ http://www.cadfy.org/Getting_Results/Chapter_6c.html (04.20.2005)

⁶² <http://www.educ.uidaho.edu/stoll/glossary.htm> (04.20.2005)

Baron (1977)	“Any form of behavior directed towards the goal of harming or injuring (in other words destroying something in) another living being who is motivated to avoid such treatment” ⁶³ . Violence can be “concrete, evident and committed by and on particular people”. Indirect or structural violence is “gradual, imperceptible, and diffused in society as the way things are done, as a matter of whose voice is systematically heard or ignored, and who gets particular resources and who goes without. Structural violence is often hidden, chronic, and institutionalized” ⁶⁴ .	Intention of harming, injuring, someone that avoids that treatment. Direct or indirect.
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3.1 A Try to synthesize

Taking the keywords from the right column of Table 4 we have that violence is behaviour that forces another person who resists. Besides this, it can also be anything that is wild, turbulent and therefore destructive. Violence is a sort of behaviour that can cause pain, injury, harm or death. In this sense, violence is also to disregard human needs and it is a behaviour that hinders human development. However, it is hard to separate behaviours in a dichotomy of violence and non-violence, because human activities and the extent of their consequences are complicated and many times hard to identify in practice.

Of all the suggested definitions, Baron’s seems to be one that combines most of these elements in a better way. It also suggests two useful categories: *direct and structural or indirect violence*. It must only be observed that violence need not be intentional to be violence. Most of the structural violence undergoes unintentionally, because people that are imbedded in the structures of society are unaware of the final consequences of their behaviours. A social structure operates violently, when people think that there is no problem with the way things are done. The reason for this is that the complexity of the social structures makes it hard to establish logical connections and to point to responsible people whenever this sort of indirect violence occurs. Thus, not acknowledging the possibility of un-intentionality in violence could make the whole idea of structural violence invalid in certain cases where it is actually happening, and structures are forcing individuals to do behaviours they are inclined to avoid. Also, Baron’s concept only considers as violence those behaviours which *harm*


⁶³ Baron, R. A. *Human Aggression*, 1977, New York: Plenum, p. 7 in Opatow Susan, *Aggression and Violence*, in Deutsch, Morton, Coleman, Peter (eds.), *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, San Francisco: Jossey Bass, p. 404.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

or injure living beings motivated to avoid such treatment. For practical reasons, this could simply be said by stating that violence is behaviour that forces living beings to do things they are motivated to avoid. This would be a more comprehensive conceptualization, because if it is true that the living beings that are the objects of a behaviour are motivated to avoid the activities performed by the subject, *it is quite likely* that they will be *harmed or injured* psychologically, if not physically, because they will feel their integrity has been violated (thus the word violence).

With these modifications, Baron's conceptualization would look a bit like this: Violence is a form of intentional or unintentional behavior that forces another living being to behave in ways it is motivated to avoid. It is a behavior that disregards the needs of other living beings; therefore it destroys a part of them and hinders their development. Violence can be "concrete, evident and committed by and on particular people (beings)". Indirect or structural violence is "gradual, imperceptible, and diffused in society as the way things are done, as a matter of whose voice is systematically unheard or ignored... Structural violence is often hidden, chronic, and institutionalized"⁶⁵. Non-violence would be a sort of behaviour that cannot be characterized as violence. This is simply showed in figure 11⁶⁶.

Figure 11
Violence and Non-violence
BEHAVIOR




⁶⁵ Baron, Op. Cit.

⁶⁶ Note that the figure does not imply that all human behaviour can be classified in a dichotomy of violence or non-violence. This means that there could be other subsets included in the universal set of behaviour, which could even intersect with the subsets of violent and non-violent behaviour. This is not drawn in order to keep conciseness and illustrate the main point in question: the distinction between violence and non-violence.

3.2 Living, Motivation and Violence

The most crucial elements in the conceptualization of violence are *living beings* and *motivation*. These two terms decide the exceptions of what sort of behaviour is violence and what is not. Because, violence (or non-violence) is a characterization of the interactions between living beings, and in the end it depends on what motivations these living beings have⁶⁷. As it can be implied, this conceptualization does not provide easy answers to many real life situations, because some few special times it can be hard to find out living beings' motivation and this makes it hard to determine if an act is violence or not⁶⁸. Abraham Maslow's (1943) theory of human motivation decomposes some conceptual elements that show how this problem could be operating in human beings. According to him, people have a series of needs that range from physiological ones, to safety needs, social needs, esteem needs and self-realization needs. Being faithful to doctrine, Maslow's ideas are presented as a pyramid of needs that is illustrated in Figure 12.

Figure 12. Abraham Maslow's Pyramid of Needs⁶⁹




⁶⁷ As an example, conceive that I throw a dart to a pin board with all my might. According to our conceptualization this would not be an act of violence; first of all, because a pin board is not alive, secondly, because the pin board has no motivation; so it cannot be motivated to avoid my behaviour. However, if I throw the dart to a flying duck and hit, this would be considered violence, because the bird is a living being, and we assume it would be motivated to avoid the pain and injury caused by the dart.

⁶⁸ For instance, if I decide to make a hunger strike for a good cause, is this violence against myself? I might be motivated to avoid being hungry, but I am also motivated to practice a hunger strike. As it is evident, the complication of the problem is greater in living beings that have blurrier direct logical connections between needs and motivation.

⁶⁹ Maslow, Abraham, 1943, *A Theory of Human Motivation*, Psychological Review 50, 370-396

Although it might seem something obvious that the physiological needs are paramount and that all the other ones come after these sorts of needs, in some cases there is no mechanic order in which humans are motivated to satisfy their needs. Needs could in some cases contradict each other rather than follow a harmonic logical progression. A good example of this is the person that goes into a hunger strike. It is a case in which that person is satisfying self-actualization needs, before his or her physiological needs. Another case would be a suicide bomber, who is someone who believes to satisfy a social, esteem and what he regards as a self-actualization need, and ignores his safety or physiological needs. In these cases the pyramid could look like Figure 13.

Figure 13. Maslow's pyramid inverted



Because of complications like these ones, non-violence or violence cannot be incontestably identified in reality. We can only approximate ourselves to the achievement of this goal. The reason for this is that non-violence or violence are characteristics of behaviour and how its consequences are interpreted by other living beings, and behaviour cannot be reduced to one defined characteristic nor can it be fully predicted how living beings (especially humans) will respond to it. Freud (1932) made a similar claim when he wrote,

“When humans are encouraged to war, such an encouragement can stem from many different motivations in the person in question, both noble and pitiable

ones; those of which are mentioned as well as those that are kept secret. We have no possibility of uncovering all of them”⁷⁰.

However, although problematic at times, this does not mean that intellectual inquiries about violence or non-violence should not be tried, nor does this say that violence and non-violence cannot be convincingly identified in certain obvious cases.

3.3 Conclusion. Putting it all together

As suggested in the beginning of this chapter, peace is a concept related to the concepts of *culture* and *non-violence*. However, it is defined differently depending on context, point of view and intentions. Our best shot at generating a synthetic working conceptualization is to follow the same methodology than with the previous concepts we have dealt with. Table 5 shows the first step in this process.

Table 5. Some Conceptualizations of Peace.

Source	Concept of Peace	Keywords
Princeton WordNet 2.0 http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/webwn?stage=1&word=peace	State prevailing during the absence of war	A social state. No war.
	Harmonious relations. Freedom from dispute.	Harmony, no conflict.
	Absence of mental stress or anxiety	Relaxation.
	Public security	Security.
	A treaty to cease hostilities	Treaty or compromise.

Summing up, peace is the social reality experienced by a human group in which there is harmony, relaxation, security and conflicts are not visible. Deutsch (2000) defined conflicts as incompatible goals for two or more interdependent parties⁷¹. As Hugh Miall (1999) put it, these incompatibilities of goals are “an intrinsic and inevitable aspect of social change”⁷². Thus, when there is peace in the dynamism of social reality, it is not that there are no conflicts; it is just that they are less visible because society has efficient doctrinal prescriptions of mechanisms of


⁷⁰ Freud, Sigmund, Einstein Albert, Asimov, Isaac (Intr.), Coelho, Paulo (Preface), Lie, Kåre A. (tr.) 2003 (1932), *Albert Einstein, Sigmund Freud, Hvorfor Krig?: En Brevveksling*, Kolbotn: Bazar Forlag. Personal translation from Norwegian to English.

⁷¹ Deutsch, Morton, Coleman, Peter (eds.), 2000, *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution. Theory and Practice*, San Francisco: Jossey Bass. p. 22

⁷² Miall, Hugh, et. al., 1999, *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*, Cambridge: Polity Press. p. 5

avoidance, compromise and transformation of the conflicts, something that increases harmony and reduces stress. According to Galtung (1996), these ways of dealing with conflict lead to *symmetric outcomes of conflicts* which implies that none of the contending goals have been disregarded, or in other words, no one has been forced to nothing, and therefore these ways of handling conflict represent non-violent conflict resolution⁷³. These cultural mechanisms that allow conflict avoidance, compromise and transformation are the mere interpretations of messages human beings use to order their interactions with each other, and they are part of culture. A situation of peace is therefore one in which the central cultural aspects of culture can be regarded to be non-violent in that they contribute to avoid, reach compromise or transform conflicts. Such a cultural situation, in which force is considered a centrifugal force, recognizes the individuals' right to *voluntarily* realize in their own way their biological, social and historical dimensions, and it is therefore an emancipating culture. Retaking the figure that illustrates culture as a system and adapting these considerations we get Figure 14:

Figure 14. Peace, a culture that furthers non-violence (culture of emancipation)



⁷³ Galtung, Johan, 1996, *Peace By Peaceful Means: Peace, Development and Civilization*. London: SAGE Publications, p. 96

In opposition to peace, war would be a situation in which the central aspects of the culture that orders the life of a group of human beings can be characterized as violent. This is also illustrated in Figure 14. Note that so much in peace as in war; there is no one-sided form of culture. As we have explained, cultural messages generate a myriad of human interpretations that can pull to the message's core or withdraw from it. Thus, even though peace is a cultural situation that is centrally non-violent; this does not mean that there are not voices that might interpret and advocate violence within a peaceful situation. The same goes for war, which although is a cultural situation with the predominance of violence, does not exclude the possibility of voices advocating for non-violence⁷⁴.

Galtung (1996) introduced two notions of peace: *negative* and *positive peace*⁷⁵. Negative peace is the absence of war while positive peace implies the centrality of non-violence in cultural life of a society. The notion of peace described in Figure 14 represents positive peace. Negative peace would be a cultural situation in between war and positive peace, where the central aspects of culture can neither be characterized as violent nor as non-violent. In positive peace the central elements of culture are non-violent; in war they are violent, while in negative peace there is a mixture of violent and non-violent characteristics that makes it hard to typify the whole cultural situation⁷⁶.

⁷⁴ For example a peaceful society in which there are sporadic acts of violent criminality and there are voices advocating that security forces use violence occasionally in order to contain it. And when it comes to war, for example, think about fraternal feelings amongst soldiers in war.

⁷⁵ Galtung, Johan, 1996, Op. Cit., p. 31 The typology is borrowed by Galtung, but the definition of the terms is modified.

⁷⁶ Examples of war would be: a couple whose culture for interacting with each other is characterized by reciprocal hate, therefore, they are about to split up and only try to hurt each other; a relationship between two gangs that organize themselves with the purpose of damaging or destroying each other; firms that operate with the intention of destroying other firms; or, governments that organize themselves to destroy each other. Examples of positive peace could be the opposite of the examples of war, namely; a couple whose culture for interacting with each other is based on reciprocal love, therefore they want to be with each other and try to help each other grow as individuals; a relationship between two gangs that organize themselves to bridge the gaps between each other and foster friendship; firms that operate with the intention of developing products that can complement the work each of them do, so that none of them has to disappear in a context of a limited market space; or, governments that organize themselves to strengthen their bonds and contribute to their well-being. Examples of negative peace would be undefined situations, like for example, a couple with a love-hate relationship, that is not in war but neither in harmony with each other; gangs that have superficially friendly relationships, but prepare in secret for violent acts against each other; companies that cooperate with each other in certain areas but compete violently in others; and finally, governments that are not attacking each other with violence, but that maintain a skeptical attitude to each other and consequently prepare for the outbreak of war.


As it might be implied from a realistic perspective, negative peace seems to describe better most of the social situations of everyday life, which tend to be intricate and far from one-sided. But the conceptualizations we have proposed for positive peace and war are also realistic in this sense, because they are not narrow. They acknowledge the possibility that voices for violence can coexist with voices for non-violence, as it often happens in the real world. The difference is that in the notions of positive peace and war, one of the types of voices (either non-violence or violence) has become a central aspect of culture.

With a working conceptualization of peace, it is appropriate to move on to formulate one for education. Then we will be able to move from the abstract, back to dealing theoretically with the concrete activity of Peace Education, having a deeper understanding of its elements, structures and dynamisms.

4 Theorizing Education

Although societies change a lot according to historical and spatial context, every human group needs mechanisms for creating knowledge that regenerates culture in time. Education regenerates culture and it covers the activities of teaching and learning. Figure 15 shows these ideas:

Figure 15. Education as Regenerator of Culture.



As explained in section 1.4, human intelligence interprets and creates patterns of messages. When doing this, it faces the tension between centrifugal and centripetal forces to the core or doctrine of the messages. Graphically this is represented in the figure like the messages were spinning, generating the forces. Teaching and learning have the power of influencing this process that decides what sort of messages will form culture; because these two activities are based on the generation of cultural

messages, the interpretation of their meanings and the transmission of the resulting discourse to other people. These activities can drive people to change their material world, elaborate alternative accounts of history, help people interpret cultural messages in a particular way and they can establish alternative structural relationships between the elements that constitute a culture. Thereby, they can serve to bring about material, narrative, interpretational and structural cultural changes.

To teach implies to facilitate learning and it comprehends (though does not limit itself to) two basic activities. These two activities are part of one same discourse and they determine one another⁷⁷. They are:

- 1) To accustom individuals to the acceptance of value defined attitudes. For example one can teach others to accept that *reading a book is a good thing to do* or that *to swear is a bad thing to do*.
- 2) To transmit descriptive information and skills. For example, one can teach others to know that *Baotou lies west from Beijing* and one can teach others *to tie their shoe laces*.

A good teacher must understand the different steps for learning to intervene appropriately in the different phases of the process, helping people reflect on cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions⁷⁸ of the skills and attitudinal changes to be generated. Learning could be roughly defined as teaching oneself. It implies becoming accustomed to attitudes and to acquire and interpret through logos and reason information that was received by the senses. Learning is to a great degree dependent of social interaction, but to a great extent, learning also happens individually. When this is so, it means that there are no other teachers intervening in the process.

Dewey (1938) summed up learning from experience as involving: 1) "Observation of surrounding conditions (perception), 2) Knowledge of what has happened in similar situations before, a knowledge obtained partly by recollection and partly from the information, advice, and warning of those who have had a wider experience (the teachers), and 3) Judgment (logos and reasoning) which puts together what is observed and what is recalled to see what they signify (understanding)"⁷⁹

⁷⁷ Bernstein, Basil, 1994, *Pedagogizing Knowledge. A Social Grammar*, in Amundsen, I. (ed): *Knowledge and Development*, NFU Conference Proceedings, UiT 1994, p. 124


⁷⁸ Marsick, Victoria J., Sauquet, Alfonso, *Learning Through Reflection*, in Deutsch, Morton, Coleman, Peter, *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, San Francisco: Jossey Bass, p. 396

⁷⁹ Dewey, J, 1938, *Experience and Education*, New York: Collier, p. 69 in Marsick, Victoria J., Sauquet, Alfonso, *Learning Through Reflection*, in Deutsch, Morton, Coleman, Peter, (eds.) *Op. Cit.* p. 383

4.1 Conclusion

All these activities of the learning experience affect to some degree one another in a circular way. Information gotten through perception, logos and reason leads to acquiring knowledge about past behaviors, language, attitudes and values. Knowledge affects the cultural subsystem of beliefs and values used to judge, learn and explain about the world. And if this knowledge has engaged the learners' emotions, it may end up affecting the central attitudes in a culture⁸⁰. At the same time, the central attitudes in a culture affect the way learners see the world and acquire descriptive information⁸¹. All this circularity of the process can be seen in Figure 16.

Figure 16. Teaching, Learning and Culture



⁸⁰ The Institute of Education in Hamburg found out that to raise the level of knowledge obtained without the interaction of cooperative learning strategies did not have any significant effect on the social attitudes and values of school children. See Samhällkunskap och Samhällssyn. En Internationell Studie. (Knowledge about attitudes to social questions. An international study) 1976.

Skolöverstyrelsen. Stockholm: Utbildningsförlaget. In Brock-Utne, Brigit, 1995, *Peace Education at the End of a Millennium*, in Löfgren H. (ed.): *Peace Education and Human Development*, Department of Educational and Psychological Research, Malmö School of Education, Lund University. p. 61

⁸¹ In our example of descriptive information it was stated that "Baotou lies west from Beijing" but not "Beijing lies east from Baotou", which shows Beijing is taken as a reference point, because the value system regards it as being *more important* than Baotou. Likewise, our example on skills, mentioned teaching others to tie their shoes, and not teaching others to put on their sandals, because shoes were regarded as *more important* than sandals.

5

Back to Peace Education

The expression *Peace Education* should be read as *education for and about* cultural change (reproduction) that leads to (preserves) *positive peace*. Care has to be taken in acknowledging the wide array of modalities Peace Education can adopt according to the immediate contexts where it happens⁸². But in the end, since Peace Education is directed to the group of humanity, there will be some abstract and philosophical considerations common to every sort of Peace Education⁸³. This will mean, activities encompassing teaching and learning, aimed at developing knowledge and skills in a way that preserves and makes non-violence a central characteristic in the culture that orders the life of a society or human group. This sort of culture sees force as an unwanted characteristic of behavior, thus it furthers voluntary self-realization of the human dimensions, and it is therefore an emancipating culture.

The activities of Peace Education are constructed around a series of interrelated tools that are rationally organized for its purpose, and therefore, they constitute a system. According to Foucault (1971) “every education system is a political means of maintaining or modifying the appropriateness of discourses with the knowledge and power they bring with them”⁸⁴. This recognition makes it necessary to say more about the proper discourse for Peace Education

5.1 The Pedagogical Discourse of Peace Education

Looking at the pedagogical discourse of Peace Education allows us to see two issues and the measures needed to successfully address them:

- 1) “What is taught as Peace Education? And this should be coherent with

⁸² For an extension of this idea see Salomon, Gavriel, Nevo, Baruch, 2002, *Peace Education: The Concept, Principles and Practices Around the World*, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, <http://www.peaceed.org/what/whatgs.htm> (04.30.2004)

⁸³ For illustrations of how important it is for the purposes of Peace Education to conceive the human world population as one cultural group see Evan, William, *Identification with the Human Species: A Challenge for the Twenty First Century*, Human Relations, vol. 50, 8, 1997, p 987-1014 and Spink, Peter, *Paths to Solidarity: Some Comments on “Identification with the Human Species”*, Human Relations. 50,8, 1997, p. 1005-1014

⁸⁴ Foucault, M., Swyer, R. (tr.), 1971, *Orders of Discourse*. Social Science Information, 10 (2), p. 7-30

2) How is it taught?”⁸⁵

5.1.1 What is taught as Peace Education?

Pedagogics is defined as the science and art of teaching. According to Basil Bernstein (1994) there are *distributive rules*, *re-contextualizing rules* and *evaluative rules* that a pedagogical device uses to provide the “intrinsic grammar of pedagogic discourse”⁸⁶. Understanding these rules is needed to generate an effective content of Peace Education.


Distributive rules

These rules difference between *thinkable (possible)* and *unthinkable (apparently impossible)* knowledge and decide the contexts in which these sorts of knowledge are to be learned. There is a gap between the two sorts of knowledge, and that gap is a bridge between order and disorder. The gap has the possibility of an alternative order of things, an alternative society and alternative power relations⁸⁷. This can be seen in Figure 17:

⁸⁵ Brock-Utne, Brigit, 1995, *Peace Education at the End of a Millennium*, in Löfgren H. (ed.): *Peace Education and Human Development*, Department of Educational and Psychological Research, Malmö School of Education, Lund University p. 55

⁸⁶ Bernstein, Basil, 1994, *Pedagogizing Knowledge. A Social Grammar*, in Amundsen, I. (ed): *Knowledge and Development*, NFU Conference Proceedings, University of Tromsø, p. 119.

⁸⁷ For example, before pregnancy prevention means were discovered, teachers could have taught that sex was quite likely to induce pregnancy. This was knowledge in the field of the thinkable. And then, someone thought the unthinkable. Perhaps people could have sex and still irrevocably prevent pregnancy. The meeting point of these two sorts of knowledge, that is, when the unthinkable starts becoming thinkable and vice-versa, allowed alternative power relations between the social groups of males and females, altering their consciousness and providing an alternative society.

Figure 17. The thinkable and the unthinkable in modern societies

In modern society “the control and management of the unthinkable is carried out by the higher agencies of education. But the thinkable in modern complex societies is (mostly) managed by secondary and primary school systems”⁸⁸. This does not mean that there are not other actors that participate as facilitators of learning. The media is in many ways a teacher, and so are scientists, parents, peers and practically anyone with invested legitimacy. Legitimacy is given through authority. The distributive rules decide how power (which can for instance emanate from authority⁸⁹ or the control of resources) social groups, consciousness and knowledge are to interact with each other to decide “who may transmit what to whom and under what conditions and attempt to set our limits of legitimate discourse”⁹⁰.

In the modern world, the state has controlled increasingly these distributive rules, and with it, the production of pedagogical discourse. Marginson (1997), Readings (1997), Postman (1995) and Spring (1998) have claimed that in a world where global market relations are growingly important, it is the leaders of big

⁸⁸ Op. Cit. p. 121

⁸⁹ According to Weber, authority could be a result of tradition, charisma or legal-rational legitimacy. In Weber, Max, *The Types of Legitimate Domination* in *Economy and Society*, Guenther, Roth, Wittich, Claus (eds.), 1978, Berkeley: University of California Press.

⁹⁰ Bernstein, Basil, Op. Cit. p. 123

business that are pressing more influence over these distributive rules⁹¹ and therefore the main deciders of what is legitimate and what is not.

Re-contextualizing rules

The principle of the pedagogical discourse is re-contextualizing. This includes the activities of writing textbooks, articles, journals, studies, newspaper articles, or anything that transmits legitimate information. It implies moving from the everyday world to the realm of ideas⁹².

The pedagogical discourse includes an *instructional discourse* and a *regulative discourse*. The first one is a discourse of descriptive information and skills, while the second is a moral attitudinal discourse that creates order, relations and identity. As suggested in Chapter 4, both of these discourses determine each other. The *regulative discourse* norms the way re-contextualizing is done, while the instructional discourse is itself commanded by the cultural subsystem of values and beliefs used to judge, learn and explain about the world.

Evaluative Rules

The key to pedagogic practice is continuous evaluation⁹³. Evaluation condenses the pedagogic device into content, to provide knowledge and produce a modification of attitudes. Every pedagogic discourse distinguishes between *time*, *text* and *space*. This is traduced in discourses for different *ages*, with different *content* and for different *contexts*. Evaluation is a step between acquiring a re-contextualized *text* through perception and transmitting it to other people, it occurs with the intervention of *logos* and *reason* and it determines the way something is taught.

The mainstream modalities of evaluation are defined by culture. But, the relationship between evaluation and the condensed pedagogic device is not deterministic, because cultures include various contending sets of centrifugal and

⁹¹ See Marginson, Simon, 1997, *Markets in Education*, St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin; Readings, Bill, 1997, *The University in Ruins*, Harvard University Press; Postman, Neil, 1995, *The End of Education: Redefining the Value of School*, New York: Knopf; and Spring, Joel H., 1998, *Education and The Rise of the Global Economy, Sociocultural, Political, and Historical Studies in Education*, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates

⁹² That does not mean that the everyday world does not imply itself the realm of ideas.


⁹³ Bernstein, Basil, Op. Cit. 129

centripetal voices in tension. Thus there will also be a variety of *contents* and modalities of evaluation.

Output

The output of a pedagogical device implies learning. In other words, it leads to creating some sort of competence that comprises knowledge, descriptive information, skills and possibly attitudinal changes. Bernstein’s model of a pedagogical discourse is presented in Figure 18.

Figure 18. The pedagogical Discourse



Some Distributive & Re-contextualizing Rules for Peace Education

Acknowledging that we do not live in a global society in a situation of positive peace entails recognizing that the content of education for *global positive peace* lies in the field of unthinkable knowledge, in other words, something apparently impossible. Modern mentality would confine this sort of content to institutions of higher education, but because of the importance of starting Peace Education at an early age,

such conception should be rejected⁹⁴. Furthermore, the areas of action of Peace Education should be all those transmitting some sort of legitimate information to the members of world society. There are two activities implied in this: a) Creating knowledge and b) Re-contextualizing already existing instructional discourses in schools, universities, Internet and the media. These activities should be determined by the regulative discourse that has the purpose of making and preserving mainstream attitudes that do not accept any sort of violence as a ways to face conflict.

There should be different instructional discourses according to the different ages and the different social groups addressed in various contexts, thereby guaranteeing that it is an attractive and appealing discourse. If it is not attractive, it means it will be even harder to find willing people to finance Peace Education. This recognition cannot be overseen, since one of the biggest challenges Peace Education faces globally is the fact that the financers of education are at times market oriented social groups, special interest parties and national states that are not so often concerned about modifying inflexible attitudes that accept structural and direct violence. To overcome this challenge, the re-contextualizers have to find intelligent and creative ways of proving the need of Peace Education's discourse while making it interesting and legitimate. The authority of its discourse will in part determine Peace Education's legitimacy. This authority will stem from Peace Education's charisma and its rational coherency. Charisma is achieved through creative (for example artistic) ways of transmitting the discourse, while coherency will demand theory based on understanding and that there be concordance between the way peace is taught and its contents. This will guarantee effectiveness and render the desired pedagogical output. Only this way will Peace Education manage to influence cultural consciousness to change the social order.

Desired Output: Shared Competence and Mechanic Solidarity

The learning that results from the discourse of Peace Education should have as an aim to develop knowledge, attitudes and skills that lead to *global solidarity*, which is defined as the fellowship between people from all over the world in times of gain and loss.

⁹⁴ For an insight on the significance of childhood in social worlds see Eriksson, Erik H., 1995, *Childhood and Society*, Vintage.

According to Bernstein, the output of education can be either shared competence or specialized performance⁹⁵. Shared competence leads more likely to what Durkheim called, “mechanic solidarity”⁹⁶ (or *Gemeinschaft*⁹⁷). This is a sort of solidarity or cooperation that happens because of identification between individuals and is irrespective of need. *Gemeinschaft* is association between individuals that give as much or more importance to the interests of the community than to their self interest. Bernstein identifies specialized performance as the opposition of shared competence, and suggests that it leads to stressing the differences between people. Bernstein adds that when the output of a pedagogical discourse renders specialized performance, solidarity will only happen if it is needed⁹⁸. When this is so, Durkheim suggested solidarity should be called “organic solidarity” (or according to Tönnies 1887, *Gesellschaft*⁹⁹). *Gesellschaft* is association based on individuals’ self interest and therefore is based on pure necessity.

Bernstein shows worries for that deciding oneself for shared competence and the stressing of *Gemeinschaft* could affect the possibilities for a system of differenced competences and division of labor and thus diminish the productivity of the economy¹⁰⁰. According to Bernstein then, there is a trade-off between cooperation and productivity, and one of the two must be sacrificed.

According to Deutsch (1985, 2000) this would mean that economic productivity would undermine the possibilities for peace or vice versa. The explanation for this is that solidarity or cooperative attitudes, irrespective of the sort, foster creativity in the face of conflict and further constructiveness and nonviolence, whereas self-interested attitudes foster destructive or violent attitudes for facing conflict¹⁰¹. Then, if a pedagogical discourse leads us to choose *only* in favor of specialized performance and doesn’t manage to prove the need for solidarity, it will most likely lead to attitudes favorable to destructive conflict resolution and therefore not to positive peace.

⁹⁵ Bernstein, Basil, Op. Cit. 132-133.

⁹⁶ Op. Cit. 132

⁹⁷ See footnote 97

⁹⁸ Bernstein, Op. Cit. 132

⁹⁹ Terms identified by Tönnies, Ferdinand, *Community and Civil Society*, ed. Jose Harris, 2001, Cambridge University Press

¹⁰⁰ Bernstein, Op. Cit. p. 133

¹⁰¹ Deutsch, Morton, 1985, *Distributive Justice*, New Haven: Yale University Press. p. 246 and Deutsch, Morton, Coleman, Peter, (eds.), *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, Chapter 1: *Cooperation and Competition*, p. 21-39

But Deutsch's work also serves to demonstrate Bernstein's worries are unfounded. Shared competence (or the feeling of equality with others) need not be in contradiction with specialized performance. Meaning, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* are not always mutually exclusive categories. According to Deutsch, in some contexts, the individual's self interests are best served by the satisfaction of the common interests of a group. People can associate because of genuine interest in community values and still serve their self-interest. An overlapping of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* happens when "a cooperative community avoids invidious distinctions among its members even as it recognizes and responds to their individuality". Deutsch adds that "lack of distinctions, as well as (the presence of) invidious ones, lead to alienation and the breakdown of cooperation"¹⁰² This recognition is important because it suggests that Peace Education can and must develop specialized performance without affecting the possibilities of developing a shared competence, maintaining this way *Gemeinschaft* and productivity, irrespective of necessity. Peace Education should not depend on *Gesellschaft*, since this sort of solidarity will only happen if needed. *Gesellschaft* can serve to legitimize structural violence by groups of people that are not affected or that benefit from the poverty of others. The world is one of the contexts that can become an effective cooperative community, organized by a culture that avoids making invidious distinctions while recognizing cultural and personal individuality. The central element of this global culture should be *Gemeinschaft*. Empirical examples of such large scale cooperative communities are contemporary *welfare states*¹⁰³.

Some Evaluative Rules: Space, Time and Peace Education's Content

In order to preserve individuality and division of labor without making invidious distinctions, the content of this shared competence should include two parts dependent on the spatial location. One part common for human beings around the world and another one specified for each of the local contexts in which Peace Education happens. The general part of the content of Peace Education should be the result of the findings of Åke Bjerstedt (1992) who sent out a questionnaire to

¹⁰² Deutsch, Morton, 1985, *Distributive Justice*, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 247

¹⁰³ Nicholas Barr has provided convincing arguments on that well administered welfare states do not only care for the unprivileged in society but also serve economic efficiency. See Barr, Nicholas, 2004 (1987), *The Economics of the Welfare State*, London: Oxford University Press

members of the Peace Education Commission (PEC) with the purpose of “eliciting the goals, challenges and the future of Peace Education”. The specific part of the content should be a continuous adaptation of the general content, paying attention to the changing roles of individuals and to each context of conflict in which Peace Education happens. This adaptation should be made remembering that the ultimate context is global society and that some comprehension of the systemic character of the world has to be considered. For an effective discourse of Peace Education, both of these components of content are needed, which means Peace Education discourses, while similar, will vary in their immediate goals and strategies in time, from one area of the world to another and according to the different audiences addressed.

The common aspects of specifically located Peace Education programs should be what respondents of Bjerstedt’s stressed as “global perspectives, ability to generate alternative visions, intercultural awareness, insight into present injustice, lack of equality in the world society and readiness to work for justice and more equal distribution”. According to Bjerstedt, these issues can be grouped in:

- 1) Cognitive components as knowledge about the other’s circumstances and flexibility to deal with difference. This can be facilitated by the possibilities new developments in communication and transportation technologies provide.
- 2) Value perspectives, that is, global ethics based on human rights; and
- 3) Readiness for action or readiness to work for justice and more equal distribution¹⁰⁴

By modifying cognition, values and readiness for action there will be education *for* peace and education *about* peace. The purpose of the global and specific contextual contents is to develop “identification with the Human Species”. This will render a community of people that though different are in fellowship in times of gain and of loss, which translates in mechanic cooperation and ultimately contributes to the achievement of positive peace¹⁰⁵.

¹⁰⁴ Brock-Utne, Brigit, Op. Cit. p. 56

¹⁰⁵ See Evan, William, *Identification with the Human Species: A Challenge for the Twenty First Century*, Human Relations, vol. 50, 8, 1997, p 987-1014 and Spink, Peter, *Paths to Solidarity: Some Comments on “Identification with the Human Species”*, Human Relations. 50,8, 1997, p. 1005-1014,

5.1.2 More Evaluative Rules: How to Teach Peace?

How Peace Education is taught has to be related to what is taught through the evaluative imperatives of non-violence. In this sense, the methods should correspond with the aims of Peace Education. “If the methods used to convey the subject matter are authoritarian, do not engage the students and do not appeal to their emotions”¹⁰⁶, Peace Education will not be effective.

All these actions should be guided by the notion of *constructive controversy* in opposition to *destructive debate*. “Constructive controversy occurs when one person’s ideas, information, conclusions, theories and opinions are incompatible with those of another, and the two seek to reach agreement. Constructive controversy involves what Aristotle called *deliberative discourse* (discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of proposed actions) aimed at synthesizing novel solutions (creative problem solving)”¹⁰⁷. This sort of conflict contrasts with competitive discussion that promotes individualistic learning.

By teaching through constructive controversy, no apparent actor of the process of education is above the other. There are no losers. All the participants are just trying to find the best synthetic solution to a problem and therefore *share the concern of education*¹⁰⁸. In other words, Peace Education implies “democratic education”¹⁰⁹.

The ultimate result of constructive controversy is a synthesized perspective that is better than the initial positions of parties in opposition. In this sense, constructive controversy is creative and not destructive. This implies transcendence of differences, and although it might sometimes be an uncomfortable process, in the long run, if it really considers the standing points of its participants, it is nonviolent¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁶ Brock, Utne, Op. Cit. p. 62

¹⁰⁷ Johnson, David, W., Johnson, Roger, T., Tjosvold, Dean, *Constructive Controversy, The Value of Intellectual Opposition*, in Deutsch, Morton, Coleman, Peter (eds.) *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, San Francisco: Jossey Bass, p 65

¹⁰⁸ See also, Pikas, Anatol, 1995, *Therapeutic Mediation For Teenagers: ACBM—All in The Class Become Mediators*, Uppsala. <http://www.bahnhof.se~annalepikas/scm/ACBM> (04.04.2004)

¹⁰⁹ Johnson, David, Johnson, Roger, & Tjosvold, Dean, equate the idea of constructive controversy to Thomas Jefferson’s definition of democracy. In Deutsch, Morton, Coleman, Peter (eds.), Op. Cit. p. 83

¹¹⁰ For a similar approach see Juergensmeyer, Mark, 2002, *Gandhi’s Way: A Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, Berkely: University of California Press

Peace Education: A Process of Constructive Controversy

Johnson (2000) suggests that the constructive controversy process should comprise: research, organizing the information into a persuasive argument, planning how to advocate the assigned position effectively, present and advocate the position, engage in an open discussion, reverse perspectives and finally synthesize¹¹¹. This process implies that peace educators, when trying to teach people to deal non-violently with conflict, should personally deal with the inherent controversies of the matters in question with a non-violent attitude. Teachers and learners should be allowed to enter open informed discussion while respecting their individual integrity.

This method should be able to *convince* individuals about the value of becoming a *creative person*. Constructive controversy can imaginatively appeal to emotions by allowing its instruments to be actors. It is quite likely to succeed in bringing about attitudinal changes that will even affect the unconscious, especially if Peace Education is started at an early stage in life.

This pedagogic method parallels Paulo Freire's (1972) suggestions to democratize education in his landmark work *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. In this work, Freire identifies two sorts of conceptions of pedagogy: a *banking method* and a *dialogical one*.

On the one hand, in the banking approach to education: pupils are seen as mere objects; the teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with its own professional authority; the teacher chooses the program content and the students adapt to it; the teacher acts and the students only have the illusion of acting through the teacher; the teacher chooses and enforces his choice and the students comply; the teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined; the teacher talks and the students listen – in submission; the teacher thinks and the students are thought about; the teacher knows everything and the students know nothing; the teacher teaches and the students are taught. The banking approach to education is based on violent regulative and evaluative discourses that support an instructional discourse that can render a pedagogical output that legitimizes existing structures. In these discourses the only ones allowed to have initiative are the ones that have authority. This contributes to reproduce (oppressive or violent) structures found in society that disregard the needs

¹¹¹ Op. Cit. p. 81-82

of the weak. In a banking educational context the weak are the students. They are seen as adaptable and manageable spectators. It is an approach that annuls creative power and stimulates credulity in order to avoid the transformation of society. Under this perspective people are not taught to transform but to fit in to the world they encounter¹¹².

On the other hand, in the dialogical approach to education, teachers and learners meet each other more as equals through the *word* based on *praxis* and *reflection* about this practice. The purpose of this meeting is to give a name to the existing things of totality. If these new names (and their relationships) given to totality are based on understanding and they manage to generate *conscientization*, they can help individuals *submerged* in the structures of society *emerge* in order to *intervene* in order to transform reality.¹¹³ This is pedagogy with non-violent regulative and evaluative discourses, because it respects the individuality of all the participants of the education process. Such rules support an instructional discourse that aims to render an output of understanding, conscience, initiative, innovation and the transformation of society. If it is accepted that the totality we experience has to be transformed in order to become positive peace, it is not hard to see why such an approach to education is the appropriate one for Peace Education.

5.2 Conclusion


Peace Education's final aim is to generate worldwide a shared competence of knowledge and skills that make non-violence a mainstream characteristic of culture. The step between the development of a shared competence and positive peace is the establishment of worldwide mechanic solidarity between persons that manage to preserve their individuality. To achieve this, Peace Education must pay attention to the specific contexts where it happens and the audiences it is directed to, so that it can use the most appropriate strategies to transcend the immediate challenges it faces in each situation. The strategies used in the different contexts cannot even remotely be based on degrading a human being's conscious identity. Otherwise Peace Education would abuse its power, lose its legitimacy and risk teaching to hate and destroy, but not to create.

¹¹² Freire, Paulo, 1990 (1972), *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, London: Penguin Books, p. 46-60

¹¹³ Op. Cit. p. 60-95

Peace Education can only reach its final goal if it attracts, appeals to people’s emotions and it ingeniously *convinces* individuals to support and participate in constructive and informed controversy about Peace Education’s content. This controversy should lead people to feel they belong to the fraternity of humanity. A fraternity of cooperating individuals that with creativity and flexibility, manage to transform history and tradition, to transcend disagreement and move on to preferred contexts of coexistence. Figure 19 shows these conclusions graphically.

Figure 19. Peace Education



6

The Practice of Peace Education

6.1 Education: The Way to Something Else

We have theorized about education roughly as the deliberate activities that generate culture. It has been proposed that education is a word that sums up the activities of teaching and learning, operations that constitute a process that influences the re-actualization of reality in the brains of the actors of the educational process. This process depends greatly on human intelligence, which consists on perceiving reality to generate knowledge, producing a discourse and transmitting the discourse.

Once we accept that education consists in this process that draws out from experiencing reality to guide the future syntheses of individuals and their contexts, it is easy to agree with the way the Romans understood the activities of teaching and learning. The etymological origins of the word *education*¹¹⁴ are found in the Latin verb *ex ducere* which means to draw out or lead out¹¹⁵. This Latin expression is also the origin of the verb to *educate*, which literally means to develop, to draw out or to evolve from a latent or potential state¹¹⁶.

According to our dynamic theorization of reality, totality has always the potential to become something else. For the ancient Romans then, the activities of education constituted the efforts to draw out from the current reality, to lead the way to developments that permitted *something else*; or a potential state of things to be realized in human beings. In this sense, considerations on human nature decide which things are to be *drawn out* from a person through education. T. W. Moore (1982) wrote:

“In the past, assumptions of a substantial nature about children were often derived, supposedly, from metaphysical or religious views of the nature of (humans), and were seldom based on any systematic examination of actual (humans). It was

¹¹⁴ A word that has Latin roots in important world languages as English, Spanish, French and Italian

¹¹⁵ University of Notre Dame, *Latin Dictionary and Grammar Aid*, <http://www.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/lookup.pl?stem=edu&ending=> (04.04.2005)

¹¹⁶ WordNet 2.0, *A Lexical Database for the English Language*, Princeton University <http://www.cogsci.princeton.edu/cgi-bin/webwn?stage=1&word=educate> (04.04.2005)

sometimes assumed, for example, that (human) nature was essentially sinful and that this fact of original sin had to be provided against when dealing with children. The Calvinist notion of 'driving out the old Adam/(Eve)' was considered to have significant practical implications for schoolmasters. Rousseau, by contrast, rejected entirely the belief in (human beings') original sinfulness and held that children, although not born morally good, were nonetheless essentially good in that they were wholly lacking in original corruption... Another celebrated assumption about children was Locke's contention that they are born *tabula rasa*, cognitively empty. This could be true in fact, although modern linguistics theorists like Chomsky question it."¹¹⁷

For Calvin, there was an original evil in human beings that had to be driven out before the process of drawing out a new person could begin. For Rousseau, children had innate goodness that could be drawn out through teaching and learning. However, for Locke, there was complete freedom when it came to drawing out a human being from the biological potentials of the body, since children were cognitively empty. Locke felt that educating a child was similar to writing on an empty blackboard.

However important, Moore believes that such philosophical disagreements on human nature lead no where, because they are based on *a priori* considerations, that is, they are arguments that are made irrespectively of any possible empirical verification. He writes,

"A child of angelic disposition would not falsify the Calvinistic assumption, since it would be assumed that his wickedness had been driven out, not that he was originally free from it. A thoroughly vicious child would not falsify Rousseau's assumption, since Rousseau was wont to explain vice as the result of corruption by society... What is needed in an educational theory is an accurate factual picture of human nature, especially of child nature, and this can come only from studies which set out deliberately to discover what children are like... If we want to discover some truth about the world, about what exists in it or what is likely to happen in it, we have to begin by examining the world, by observation and experiment."¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ Moore, T.W., Peters, R.S., 1982 (1986), *Philosophy of Education: An Introduction*, London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, p. 31

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*


This means that education should take a starting point from the experience of specific realities in order to know what can be drawn from human beings in particular contexts. This starting point has to be based in scientific research and philosophical understanding that draw out knowledge from reality¹¹⁹.

Drawing out from current reality implies at least perceiving, at times discerning and others rationalizing. These three intellectual activities that draw out from reality will contribute to construct pedagogical discourses that establish particular considerations about the audiences of learners that are addressed, their contexts and the aims of the activities of education.

These discourses constitute the basis for re-contextualizing, which literally means to take a starting point in a *context* mediated by a discourse, to create a *text* that is a rationalized version of that original *context* when interpreted by a discourse. When this text is learned by others it means that their social reality has been changed according to the version of the context presented by the text. Their reality has therefore become something else.

A series of texts form part of a pedagogical discourse. These texts can transport the knowledge that stems from the original context to other contexts where education happens. Texts can be books, magazines, articles, songs, poems, paintings, plays, pictures, moving pictures, sound recordings, and so on. All these constitute themselves as pedagogical tools that transmit a discourse of education. This is illustrated in Figure 20. This figure is an oversimplification, since it omits some circular relations between the elements presented. But it is appropriate enough for presenting the ideas expressed in the last paragraph.

Figure 20. Re-contextualizing Tools.




¹¹⁹ A good compendium on educational research is Cohen, Louis, Manion, Lawrence, 1994 (1980), *Research Methods in Education*, London: Routledge

Each of these tools reproduces the realities of the original contexts to different extents. They are more likely to be powerful in affecting culture if they are effective in engaging people's emotions. Engagement is something that affects strongly motivation, a crucial element for learning. According to Noel Entwistle (1987),

“Motivation is a concept which has been used by both psychologists and educationists to explain differences among learners in the amount of effort they put into their learning. In everyday usage the term is linked to the underlying motives and goals of the learner on the one hand, and to the interest generated by the teacher and to the rewards provided by the system on the other”¹²⁰

Motivation is therefore determined by reason and interest. Such an idea is illustrated in Figure 21.

Figure 21. Intelligence and Motivation



In Chapter 2 we theorized about reason, the sort of knowledge that results from reason (understanding) and how Peace Education's content should be based on this sort of knowledge. It is therefore convenient to theorize about re-contextualizing tools in relation to the level of interest they can awaken in learners, and this has to take in consideration the different sorts of learners that are addressed according to location in time, space and society. The focus of the following section is set on the aspects of Figure 21 that have not been addressed by this theoretical survey, namely: how perception affects interest.

¹²⁰ Entwistle, Noel, 1987, *Motivation to Learn: Conceptualizations and Practicalities*, *British Journal of Educational Studies*, Vol. XXXV No. 2 June 1987, 0007-1005, p. 129

6.2 Pedagogical tools, reproduction of reality, interest and Peace Education

Figure 20 shows how re-contextualizing tools are a product of the re-actualization of reality in the brains of individuals. Re-actualization of reality starts in sensual apprehension, therefore, re-contextualizing tools can be classified according to particular sorts of sensual apprehension that people use the most to relate to those tools. In practice, sensual apprehension is the result of a combined operation of several faculties of the body and brain. However, we can conceive different ideal groups of sensual apprehension according to the weigh assigned to each of the broad categories of human *senses: sight, hearing, smell, touch, taste* and the *sense of movement*. Attention should be paid to the fact that these types of *primordial intelligence* are very simple categorizations. Neurophysiology and psychology have developed more specific classifications of human intelligence (considered as a unity of its three modalities of sensual apprehension, logos and reason)¹²¹. Also, the idea of five senses¹²² in human beings has been greatly discredited by progresses in areas as sensory psychology. For instance, the sense of touch alone is said to be partitioned into various sensory systems (haptic form, pressure, temperature, and so on)¹²³. With these ideas in mind we can continue to Table 6.

¹²¹ See for example Gardner, Howard, 1985 (1983), *Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences*, London: Harper Collins. In this book the author proposes eight types of intelligence: verbal-linguistic, logical-mathematical, visual-spatial, musical, kinaesthetic, intrapersonal, interpersonal and naturalistic.

¹²² Six if the sense of movement is considered.

¹²³ Scheer, Eckart, 1995, "Die Sinne", in J. Ritter and K. Gründer (eds.), *Historisches Wörterbruch der Philosophie*, Band 9: Se-Sp. Basel: Scwabe, 824-829 in Hatfield, Gary, 2000, *The Brain's New Science: Psychology, Neurophysiology and Constraint*, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 67, Supplement, Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers, S397

Table 6
Sensual Apprehension, Intelligence and Pedagogical Tools

Most important sort of sensual apprehension	Type of Primordial Intelligence	Examples of Pedagogical Tools (Re-contextualizing tools)		
		Engaging	More Engaging	Most Engaging
Sight	Visual Intelligence	Writings, pictures	Film	Roleplays, Workshops, Learning by doing.
Sense of Movement	Kinetic Intelligence	Animations		
Hearing	Auditory Intelligence	Music, voice recordings		
Smell	Olfactory Intelligence	Conserved scents, perfumes	Smell as test	
Touch	Tactile Intelligence	Physical exercises, Writings in Braille alphabet	Mutual teaching	
Taste	Gustatory Intelligence	Food	Tasting as test	

The categories in this classification are by no means mutually exclusive. It is also a biased classification, because it does not pay attention to other important aspects of intelligence that could also serve to classify re-contextualizing tools according other aspects of intelligence. Such other features of intelligence are logos, rationality, and abilities that arise from the structural unity of certain modalities of intelligence, like for example intuition and imagination. But such a biased classification is necessary, because it can help us find out about the effectiveness of a pedagogical tool as an instrument for attracting or stimulating the learners' primordial senses.

There are different intensities of interest with which people engage their intelligences to realities. When it combines with the operation of logos and reason, interest determines partly *motivation*¹²⁴, which can be defined as the motive for which a person engages in an activity. Interest can be *individual* or *situational*. Individual interest is a characteristic of the person while situational interest depends on the context in which the individual operates¹²⁵. Educators have direct control over the context in which learning goes on. Thus, they can directly influence the situational

¹²⁴ "Although interest is a powerful motivator, Deci (1992) noted that not all motivated behaviour reflects interest. Individuals often do things that are not necessarily of interest to them, but have other purposes..." Wigfield, Allan, et. al., 1998, *The Development of Children's Motivation in School Contexts*, Review of Research in Education, Vol. 23 (1998), 73-118, p. 78.

¹²⁵ Op. Cit. p. 77.

interest of individuals so that indirectly they can affect the personal characteristics of the learners. In this sense, we should expect *a positive correlation between types of sensual experience affected by a re-contextualizing tool and the attraction of a person to that re-contextualizing tool*. For example, it is more likely that a colour picture of an orange engages a person's senses easier than the word *orange* written on a piece of paper with a pen. Also, a moving picture engages more than a still picture; a film with audio attracts more than a mute film and a roleplay more demands more sensual involvement than a film. This intuitive hypothesis becomes more likely when Brodmann's map of cytoarchitectonics is considered¹²⁶. This map is presented in the Appendix, which shows a graphic version of the cerebral cortex, divided in lobes and regions of activity.

The table in the appendix shows how mere visual apprehension activates the occipital lobe and the temporal lobe. Besides this, reading would call for activity in Wernicke's area, or 42, in the temporal lobe, and likely also activity in the motor cortex, Broca's area or number 44 in the figure, which is responsible for producing speech. Associations to memories aroused by visual apprehension and reading activate the hippocampus, the cortex and frontal cortex. A moving picture produces activity in all such regions of the brain. But to be able to interpret the moving picture there has to be activity in the frontal lobe which is needed for awareness and consciousness. If this moving picture has sound, it raises the activity in the temporal lobe. If it is a film that manages to engage in the viewers, emotions like happiness, disgust and sadness, it strengthens the operation of the frontal lobe and activates the amygdala. A role play is likely to achieve all the mentioned above. If it is well prepared logically and rationally, it will be a re-contextualizing tool founded in well documented information to be read. Such a tool also permits educators to use music or theater, discussion and interpersonal interaction. Also, a role play or workshop can be made to enable learners to use smell, taste and touch, sensual apprehension that activates the limbic system, several regions of the cerebral cortex and the sensory cortex respectively.¹²⁷ For these reasons, a role play and workshops (or learning by doing in general) were suggested as the most attractive of pedagogical tools. When

¹²⁶ Brodmann assigned numbers to diverse regions of the cerebral cortex and analyzed their cellular structure to determine the role each region played in the performance of different activities. Garey, Laurence, 1994, *Brodmann's Localisation in the Cerebral Cortex*, London: Smith-Gordon and Company Ltd.

¹²⁷ BBC Science and Nature, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/science/humanbody/body/interactives/organs/brainmap/> (04.18.2005)

these re-contextualizing instruments result from the combination of a series of other pedagogical tools and they are based on understanding the realities that are dealt with, they can be powerful in motivating learners and thereby they can be effective in shaping the identities of the participants of Peace Education.

Another argument that favours role plays, workshops or excersises of learning by doing in Peace Education is the positive relationships that have been established between social activities and motivation. Birch and Ladd (1996) have done research on how educators and peers can increase or decrease the motivation of the receivers of education. According to them, close relations between teachers and students raise involvement of the students¹²⁸, something that can be closely related to the greater activity of the limbic system and emotions in general when learning is based on relationships with others. Friendship with peers can also fulfill students' needs for relatedness and therefore raises motivation¹²⁹.

Having a clearer insight on the efficacy of certain re-contextualizing tools to engage learners, we can turn to the question of the role of Peace Education according to the different audiences that are addressed in particular contexts in time and space.

6.3 Time, Space, Audiences and Peace Education

The contexts for Peace Education can be many and varied, depending on historical setting and geographical location. Likewise, audiences vary depending on the age of the participants of Peace Education and their spatial and social location.

6.3.1 Age and Peace Education

According to age, audiences can be divided in the groups of pshychosocial development suggested by Erik Erikson (1968)¹³⁰. This classification moves from lower to higher stages in time, as the individual manages to confront and master conflicts in life. If struggles are not resolved in each of the stages, they reappear later in life. Thus, in practice, not everyone follows a perfect progression of Erikson's model during their lives. The psychosocial stages of development need not correspond to specific ages either. But Erikson's suggestion serves as an ideal structure, which

¹²⁸ While dependency to the teacher and conflict with the teacher, reduce it.

¹²⁹ Wigfield, Allan, Op. Cit. p. 97 and 99.

¹³⁰ Erikson, Erik H., 1968, *Childhood and Society*, New York: Vintage Books

pinpoints critical issues that the deliberate activities of Peace Education have to develop. The pedagogical tools that are used in peace have to pay close attention to the development or stagnation in psychic struggles showed by the individuals that are addressed. Erikson's model adapted to Peace Education is presented in Table 7¹³¹.

Table 7. Erikson's stages of development adapted to Peace Education

Stage	Age	Basic Conflict	Fundamental Concern
Infancy	Birth- 12 to 18 months	Trust vs. mistrust	Educate parents to be reliable for their children, so that they can develop a relationship of trust.
Early Childhood	18 months to 3 years	Autonomy vs. shame and doubt	Educate parents and care-takers to encourage the child's balance between assertive autonomy and non-violent sociability.
Play Age	3 to 6 years	Initiative vs. guilt	Engage in games with the children, where they are encouraged and praised for creating things.
School Age	6 to 12 years	Industry vs. inferiority	Help children develop their unique intelligence, interests and motivations.
Adolescence	12 to 18 years	Identity vs. identity diffusion	Guide the adolescents search for a place in a non-violent society.
Young Adulthood	19 to 40 years	Intimacy vs. isolation	Be the source of activities where intimate friendship can flourish.
Middle adulthood	40 to 65 years	Generativity vs. self-absorption	Provide spaces so that this generation can relate to the younger ones and transmitt knowledge that reproduces non-violence.
Maturity	65 years to death	Integrity vs. disgust and dispair.	Provide spaces for the ones in this stage to reflect and rationalize about their lives and the benefits of non-violence.

The *Age* column should not be interpreted as an essentialist view on human psychosocial development that corresponds to typically Western standards. It is merely a suggestion that has to be adapted to each particular cultural situation addressed. Moreover, the stages of psychosocial development need not refer exculsively to personality development in a whole lifetime. They could be referring to the way individuals develop psychosocial maturity throughout the different contexts they face in life. For example, in the Western world, an individual goes through the

¹³¹ The framework of Table 8 is borrowed from McGraw Hill, 1998, <http://www.psy.pdx.edu/PsiCafe/Overheads/Erikson'sStages.htm> (04.18.2005)

stages in primary school and somehow starts the whole process again in junior high school and high school. The stages can continue repeating themselves every time the person meets conditions that make him or her experience re-birth in *new* contexts to which he or she is not used to. So Peace Education should keep in mind these stages and concerns at all times to adapt them to particular circumstances.

6.3.2 Context and Peace Education

According to Gavriel Salomon (2002) “too many profoundly different kinds of activities taking place in an exceedingly wide array of contexts are all lumped under the same category label of ‘Peace Education’ as if they belong together”¹³². In other words, Salomon says that there are different contexts in which Peace Education happens, and therefore the objectives and the form Peace Education takes will be different in each of these contexts. This point is important, but it should not be exaggerated. In the end, the world is the environment where all these other contexts take place, so having a systemic understanding of the global setting will unavoidably yield it necessary to make certain global generalizations about Peace Education. The ultimate social group organized by a culture is the world population. So Peace Education should somehow try to relate to this global culture.

Salomon goes further to propose a typology, according to “a) the challenges faced by Peace Education, b) its goals, c) and its ways of treating the different sub-groups of participants”¹³³ in each of the contexts. He then classifies Peace Education in:

- 1) Peace Education in intractable regions or areas of intractable conflict,
- 2) Peace Education in regions of inter-ethnic tension, and
- 3) Peace Education in regions of experienced tranquility

These are characterizations of cultural situations which could be represented as Figure 4. Just by taking a look at that figure and conceiving the infinite cultural contexts that could arise by combining messages in differently arranged cultural subsystems, it is evident that Salomon’s list could be extended indefinitely in more detailed conceptual terms. But in pragmatic terms, his list is convenient because each conceptual class

¹³² Salomon, Gavriel, Nevo, Baruch, 2002, *Peace Education: The Concept, Principles and Practices Around the World*, New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, <http://www.peaceed.org/what/whatgs.htm> (04.30.2005)

¹³³ Ibid.

includes a series of varied cultural situations. For example, Peace Education in Palestine and Israel would form a part of group one, and so would Peace Education in Aceh. Israel and Palestine and Aceh are two cultural situations that are unlike each other in many ways, yet they share the characteristic of apparent intractability.

When accepting Salomon's *ideal types*¹³⁴ a generalization to be made is that all the types should share the ultimate goal of trying to reach positive peace. But this definitive end will be most likely finished gradually and only as the succession of immediate goals that differ for each category.

Peace Education in Areas of Intractable Conflict

In the first context, the challenges tend to be higher and they can be summed up in that Peace Education often "a) faces a conflict that is between collectives, not between individuals; b) faces a conflict which is deeply rooted in collective narratives that entail a long and painful shared memory of the past; and c) faces a conflict that entails grave inequalities"¹³⁵. According to Coleman (2000) intractable conflicts generate a "complex web of latent and manifest issues that are difficult to understand, analyze and respond to"¹³⁶. This makes such challenges greater.

The immediate goals are to transcend these questions, something that should be done through training in providing information about "anti racism, conflict resolution, multiculturalism, cross-cultural knowledge and cultivating a general peaceful outlook"¹³⁷. But the strategies cannot stop there. This should be accompanied by practical activities, like role plays, because they engage participant's emotions and enable attitudinal changes like: "a) legitimating of the others narrative, b) getting parties to make a critical examination of all parties' contribution to the conflict, c) developing in all groups empathy for the other group's suffering, d) and engaging parties from the conflicting groups in nonviolent activities"¹³⁸.

¹³⁴ Weber defined ideal types as "the comparison (of different situations of) empirical reality in order to establish its divergences or similarities to describe them with the most unambiguous intelligible concepts and to explain them causally" in Ritzer, George, 2000, *Sociological Theory*, New York: McGraw Hill, Education. p. 223 It should be remembered that ideal types can overlap each other in practice.

¹³⁵ Salomon, Gavriel, Nevo, Baruch, Op. Cit.

¹³⁶ Coleman, Peter, in Deutsch, Morton, Coleman, Peter (eds.), *The Handbook of Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, San Francisco: Jossey Bass, p.432

¹³⁷ Salomon, Gavriel, Nevo, Baruch, Op. Cit.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

Coleman (2000) also suggests that to be effective, the facilitators of the education must be themselves educated in:

- 1) Systems thinking and analysis: To better understand the complex situations intractable conflicts represent.
- 2) Coordination of complex activities: To develop skills in working with “multitask, multimethod approaches that manage to combine multidisciplinary perspectives”
- 3) Creating of ripeness: To learn when to intervene by introducing change forces into a conflict process.
- 4) Working with crisis and trauma¹³⁹: To know how to deal with the parties in an intractable conflict.
- 5) Facilitating constructive conflict processes: Including collaborative negotiation, mediation, reflexivity and other forms of third party intervention. And sixth,
- 6) Creativity, innovation and artistry: To achieve social imaging and to develop alternatives to the existing realities.¹⁴⁰

Peace Education in Areas of Interethnic Tensions

According to Salomon, contexts of interethnic tension are defined as situations “characterized by inter-ethnic, racial or tribal tension between a majority and a minority without entailing either overt acts of aggression or collective memories of a long history of hostilities, humiliation, conquest or dispossession”¹⁴¹. The immediate goal of Peace Education is to transcend the interethnic tensions.

The difference between this sort of context and the ones of intractable conflicts is that the ethnic problems do not represent such a complex web of issues loaded with trauma and emotionality that are difficult to understand and respond to. Thus, the challenges might be easier to overcome. This could be done through educating about antiracism and multiculturalism accompanied by education for greater contact between antagonist ethnic groups, with activities in which both share a goal and get to

¹³⁹ Or what Salomon calls “excessive emotionality” in Salomon, Gavriel, 2003, *Does Peace Education Make a Difference?*, Haifa: Center for Research on Peace Education.
<http://construct.haifa.ac.il/english/peaceeducation.pdf> (04.30.2005)

¹⁴⁰ Coleman, Peter, in Op. Cit. p. 448

¹⁴¹ Salomon, Gavriel, Nevo, Baruch, Op. Cit.

cooperate with each other¹⁴².

But it must be pointed out that many situations that are apparently only “interethnic tensions” are actually the manifestation of other harder to see latent conflicts “over resources, values or power”¹⁴³. When this is the case, such “interethnic tensions” may face such high challenges as Peace Education does in contexts of intractability. Peace Education’s task is to expose these hard to see conflicts and the strategies to transcend them peacefully. In these cases the methods should not differ so much from the ones of the first category of conflict outlined above.

Peace Education in Areas of Experienced Tranquility

According to Salomon, Peace Education in contexts of “experienced tranquility” calls just for education *about* peace, since “there is no specifically identified adversary with whom peace, reconciliation or co-existence is desired”. “In this respect” Salomon says, “education about peace can play a crucial role in cultivating a bystander’s concern for peace such that past indifference for violent acts carried out in other regions of the world does not repeat itself”¹⁴⁴.

This statement underestimates the role of Peace Education in a context of tranquility. Peace Education’s role should not limit itself to educate *about* peace, not even in the “tranquil parts of the world”. Peace Education should also educate *for* positive peace¹⁴⁵.

Education *about* peace implies generating knowledge about positive peace, without necessarily affecting the attitudinal subsystem of a culture. Educating *for* peace implies modifying the attitudes of a group of people, and therefore affects their

¹⁴²Salomon refers to collective memories’ role here, despite the “objective history” of the groups in conflict. It might be the explanation for which he chooses to include interethnic conflicts between Blacks and Whites in the USA as mere interethnic tensions, despite the fact that there is an objective history in which Whites have humiliated and dispossessed Blacks. Perhaps he regards the collective memory of Blacks is not so decisive in the tensions. That fact is highly controversial, since many would not regard the Blacks collective memory as unimportant. However, that does not make Salomon’s theoretical classification wrong. There are actually situations in which interethnic conflicts present themselves as milder tensions, like for instance between the Flemish and French speaking groups in Belgium.

¹⁴³Fisher, Roland J., 2000, *Intergroup Conflict*, in Deutsch, Morton, Coleman, Peter, (eds.) Op. Cit. p. 169

¹⁴⁴Salomon, Gavriel, Nevo, Baruch, Op. Cit.

¹⁴⁵Brock-Utne, Brigit, *Peace Education at the End of a Millennium*, in Löfgren H. (ed.): *Peace Education and Human Development, Department of Educational and Psychological Research*, Malmö School of Education, Lund University p. 56

predispositions to respond favorably or unfavorably to particular actions. Educating *for* peace provides motivation to act in order to achieve peace.

This distinction is important because in the borders of some countries of “the developed world”¹⁴⁶ there might be social situations that approximate themselves to positive peace, but despite this, many relations of those countries to the rest of the world are characterized by acceptance of situations of structural violence or outright direct violence. It is then evident then that those tranquil parts of the world from within live anything but positive peace with the rest of the world. Some of the same methods used in regions of intractable and interethnic tensions are needed in areas of tranquility, if it is recognized that the world as a whole as we experience it, lives itself a context of apparent intractability and that all parts have some responsibility for it. Even if Peace Education in “areas of experienced tranquility” is just to be concerned with preserving the positive peace from inside, Salomon’s observation is not enough. Because the centrifugal voices advocating violence need to be contested even in those positively peaceful places if the positive peace is to be regenerated. Therefore it is necessary to educate *about* just as well as *for* peace everywhere in the world.

Moreover, if the tranquil parts of the world are observed not just as bystanders but also as occasional perpetrators of acts of global structural violence and direct violence, the strategies of Peace Education in contexts of intractability and interethnic conflicts apply to them as well. Many complex interstate conflicts that are in part a consequence of global phenomena like colonialism are still dealt with intractability and are part of the explanation of much of the inter and intra-state structural violence¹⁴⁷. This structural violence might be partly motivating some forms of direct violence. Such situations can only be transcended if everyone’s responsibilities in “areas of tranquility” and outside are exposed and people learn about their own role in it through education.

¹⁴⁶ The developed world could be the list of 20 countries UNDP considers as having the highest human development index as of 2003. These countries are: Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Australia, Netherlands, Belgium, United States, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Finland, Luxembourg, Austria, France, Germany, Spain and New Zealand

¹⁴⁷ See Wallerstein, Immanuel, 1980, *The Modern World System*, Vol. I, II & III. London, New York and San Diego: Academic Press.

Peace Education in a Global Context of Positive Peace

Finally, if it were possible to make all forms of structural and direct violence between people unacceptable to the mainstream aspects and the centripetal forces in culture, it could be said that a state of positive peace is achieved worldwide. But this fact will not guarantee the perpetuity of the social reality experienced. Peace is not perpetual by decree. As pointed out above, every culture has within itself voices that oppose its doctrine, and there will most likely always be voices advocating violence. Peace Education's never ending task will be just as important and it should continue educating *about* and *for* peace even when peace has come. Only that can guarantee its perpetuity. Peace Education's role in a context of positive peace would be to continue reproducing non-violence as a doctrine. For this, Peace Education needs to know how to construct its discourse taking as a starting point the social contexts in which it operates.

6.4 Conclusion

Peace Education is drawing out in the minds of individuals the cultural conditions that are centrally characterized by non-violence. In this process, peace educators need to employ tools that can help learners imagine how reality can successfully operate peacefully. These tools are known as re-contextualizing tools, because they condensate a reality or context in a text that can be transported to other locations in time and place. This text can create modifications to the reality from where it comes from and it can be interpreted in a variety of ways.

A series of texts can share a world vision and goals. When this is so the texts are said to belong to a discourse. These texts can take several forms, depending on the messages that are employed to construct them. So they can be a series of writings, photographs, pictures, moving pictures, sound recordings, musical notes, lyrics, and so on. Each of the different sorts of re-contextualizing tools affects human sensual apprehension in different ways. It is natural to expect that those tools that affect more dimensions of human sensual apprehension will be more successful in creating involvement of the learners. This is relevant because greater engagement increases motivation, learning and it is more likely to modify the attitudes of the participants of the educational process.

Roleplays are a pedagogical tool that can be powerful in creating engagement of the learners, because they imply the combination of a series of re-contextualizing tools. Roleplays are also a social activity that can raise motivation, friendship and feelings of solidarity. But care has to be taken in employing role plays that are grounded on a thorough understanding of the realities that are addressed and the ones learners are encouraged to imagine.

However, these considerations are not enough for Peace Education to be successful. Peace educators also have to pay attention to the audiences they direct their activities to. Learners will have to be addressed differently depending on their psychosocial development and the contexts in time and place in which they live.

FINAL REMARKS

This investigation has addressed issues concerning the structures and dynamisms of Peace Education. It started by proposing a working conceptualization of culture as a socially constructed system for organizing the lives of human beings. This system is re-generated through informal as well as formal education, which includes the activities of teaching and learning. The knowledge transmitted through education is extracted from experience through collective and individual intelligence and the consequent interpretation of the messages from the world. This human intelligence cannot be considered as something separate from sensing, because sensing is a precondition for intelligence and a permanent influence on it. The notion of sentient intelligence was introduced, as a structural unity of the three modalities of sensual apprehension, logos and reason. The activity of these modalities leads to the generating of knowledge, and ultimately to understanding, which makes it possible for individuals to explain the different elements that compose real things and their dynamism. This allows individuals to imagine new realities that are possible. Global positive peace is one of these unrealized possibilities of the social world. Positive peace was defined as a cultural situation characterized by its non-violent central aspects. It is a cultural situation of emancipation, because by categorizing force as an unwanted aspect of culture, positive peace furthers voluntary self-realization of the biological, social and historical dimensions of humanity. In direct opposition to positive peace, war is a cultural situation with violent central characteristics. Negative peace is a situation in between war and positive peace that cannot be identified with these two ideal categories. Peace Education is the field of activity that consists of teaching and learning about and for positive peace. It is a field of activity with its own discourse, something determined by its world view and goals for society. This discourse has to be rationally coherent and appealing in order to engage learners, teachers and financiers. For this, it has to find ways to legitimize and stress the importance of innovation in all spheres of social life. The final aim of this innovation should be to bring about mechanic solidarity on a global level (based on the principle of identification of the human species)¹⁴⁸ at the same time it allows specialization without invidious

¹⁴⁸ Evan, William, *Identification with the Human Species: A Challenge for the Twenty First Century*, Human Relations, vol. 50, 8, 1997, p 987-1014

distinctions between different groups of individuals. A prerequisite for this is that the discourse is based on the promotion of non-violence, multi-culturalism and discussion about ethical issues. There are different sorts of pedagogical tools that can be employed in carrying about the tasks of Peace Education. These tools can be grouped according to the most important sorts of sensual apprehension they affect in the learners that come in contact with them. This classification is oversimplifying, but important, because the way a pedagogical tool affects the sensual apprehension of an individual is likely positively related to the level of interest and emotional engagement it generates in that individual. If this hypothesis is true, role plays constitute the strongest pedagogical tool for generating interest and involvement of the learners, since each role play can encompass a combination of other pedagogical tools. Therefore, these sorts of tools maximize the chances of engaging and catching a learner's interest, something necessary for bringing about cultural changes. The teaching method employed in roleplays should be well-informed constructive controversy.

Such a theoretical survey touches upon many different fields of natural and social scientific activity and raises important questions for further empirical research. Some of the most important are the following:

- 1) Which are the central characteristics of the systems of values, attitudes, technologies and languages of specific cultures? Can these be characterized as violent or non-violent?
- 2) Is there a global culture? What are the subsystems of this global culture and what characterizes them: violence or non-violence?
- 3) Compare levels of violence in societies that conjugate mechanic and organic solidarity, those characterized by mechanic solidarity and the ones mostly determined by organic solidarity.
- 4) How to design pedagogical tools that address the issues of Peace Education, taking in consideration the different modalities of intelligence?
- 5) Is there a relationship between the level of sensual apprehension produced by a pedagogical tool and the interest or motivation of learners? How does this play a role in choosing the most effective tools for Peace Education?
- 6) Which is the most effective tool for Peace Education?

APPENDIX

Figure 21. Cerebral Cortex and Brodmann's Regions¹⁴⁹




Figure 22. The Location of the Limbic System. Processor of Emotions¹⁵⁰




Table 7 shows how different human activities imply the intervention of different functional areas of the human brain. More activities imply greater mental activity. Greater mental activity shows greater engagement in a reality.

¹⁴⁹ University of Michigan, <http://www.umich.edu/~cogneuro/jpg/Brodman.html> (04.18.2005)

¹⁵⁰ Boeree, George, C., 2002, *General Psychology, The Emotional Nervous System*, <http://www.ship.edu/~cgboeree/limbicsystem.html> (04.18.2005)

Table X¹⁵¹**Functional Areas of the Human Brain**

Vision	
- Primary	17
- Secondary	18, 19, 20, 21, 37
Audition	
- Primary	41
- Secondary	22, 42
Body Sensation	
- Primary	1, 2, 3
- Secondary	5, 7
Sensation, tertiary	7, 22, 37, 39, 40
Motor	
- Primary	4
- Secondary	6
- Eye movement	8
- Speech	44
Motor, Tertiary	9, 10, 11, 45, 46, 47

¹⁵¹ <http://www.umich.edu/~cogneuro/jpg/Brodmann.html> (04.18.2005)

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