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Prevention of Violent Extremism's (PVE) 'mission creep' into the Peacebuilding Dispositif:
A Case Study of PBF Funded Peacebuilding Projects in Kyrgyzstan

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Abstract

This thesis explores the shift of focus in peacebuilding projects that has been funded by UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) in Kyrgyzstan. After the ethnic violence in 2010, UN was invited to perform peacebuilding in the country. This was funded through the PBF, a branch of the so-called UN Peacebuilding Architecture. However, in 2017 the peacebuilding projects shifted focus and started doing Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE). The problem in Kyrgyzstan was now represented as violent extremism. Fionnuala Ní Aoláin (2016:290) has described the inclusion of anti-terrorism into peacebuilding and security debates as a "classic 'mission creep'". I found a development of this 'mission creep' in the peacebuilding projects in Kyrgyzstan.

By applying the *What is the Problem Represented to Be?* method, the representation of what was presented as 'unpeaceful', 'the road to peace' and 'peace' was analyzed in two Peacebuilding Priority Plans (PPP). Then the genealogy of these representations was traced through 34 project description documents, spanning over eight years. Moreover, I argued that the peacebuilding could be viewed as a dispositif (apparatus) that was responding to an "urgent need" in Kyrgyzstan.

I found that the 'urgent need' shifts from ethnic violence to violent extremism, yet much of the rationale stay the same. The 'unpeaceful' described, is fundamentally Kyrgyzstan's failure to be a liberal democratic state with liberal institutions, citizens, and values. There is also a strong theme of describing a lack of 'civic-ness' as the problem in Kyrgyzstan. This 'civic-ness' has a soviet tradition in Kyrgyzstan but shows signs in my data of being reinterpreted into a liberal framework. However, the inclusion of PVE into the peacebuilding dispositif has gradually led to an inclusion of security concerns that is in a tension with human rights. Moreover, the inclusion of PVE introduced a high level of ambiguity and uncertainty that affects the legitimacy of the activities. I conclude that the 'mission creep' of PVE into the peacebuilding dispositif is problematic. This is especially true in a sensitive context like in Kyrgyzstan, where the marginalized minority is now being pointed out by the state as making up the larger part of Foreign Terrorist Fighters.

Keywords: Kyrgyzstan, Peacebuilding, PBF, PVE, FTF.

- The question that preoccupies me in the light of recent global violence is,

  Who counts as human? Whose lives count as lives?

  And, finally, what makes for a grievable life?

  Judith Butler (2006:20)

Acknowledgements

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Abbreviations

ANF	Al Nusrah Front
CSC	Country Specific Configurations
CTC	Counter-Terrorism Commission
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
ECOSOC	The United Nations Economic and Social Council
FTF	Foreign Terrorist Fighters
GYPI	Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative
IRF	Immediate Response Facility
ISIL	The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
JSC	Joint Steering Commission
KIC	Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission
LSG	Local Self-Governing body
MDTF	UNDP's Multi-Donor Trust Fund
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PBA	The United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture
PBC	The United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
PBF	The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
PBSO	The United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office
PPP	Peacebuilding Priority Plan
PRF	Peace and Recovery Facility
PVE	Prevention of Violent Extremism
RUNO	Recipient United Nations Organizations
UN	The United Nations
UNSCR	The United Nations Security Council Resolution
WGLL	Working Group on Lesson Learned
WPR	What is the Problem Represented to Be?
WPS	Women, Peace and Security Agenda

1 Introduction

Between 10-14 June 2010, inter-ethnic violence took place in Kyrgyzstan. This resulted in property damages, approximately 400,000 displaced, and an estimated 400-500 deaths (Baruch Wachtel, 2013; Kutmanaliev, 2015; Hanks, 2011). After the violence ended, the interim government invited the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) to perform peacebuilding projects. Initially, PBF's work focused on addressing the ethnic violence but the 2017-19 Peacebuilding Priority Plan (hereafter PPP) focused on the Prevention of Violent Extremism (hereafter PVE). Fionnuala Ní Aoláin (2016:290) has reffered to the inclusion of anti-terrorism into peacebuilding and security debates as a "classic 'mission creep'"[1]. This introduction of PVE into peacebuilding in Kyrgyzstan is the focus of this project.

In April 2010, the president of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Bakiev, was ousted as a result of large-scale protests in the capital. Two months after the events, which are sometimes referred to as the 'April Revolution', a dispute between a group of Kyrgyz and Uzbeks took place outside a casino in the city of Osh (Hanks, 2011). The conflict escalated and is seen by some researchers as the spark that ignited the ethnic conflict that took place the following days.

According to Philipp Lottholz (2018), the Kyrgyz government has tried to declare the ethnic violence of 2010 as addressed and closed. He notes that journalists and researchers trying to gather information tied to ethnic violence have been targeted by state security. He argues that the state is attempting to 'sanitize' the public discourse around identity conflicts. This sanitation has, in turn, made it difficult to talk about marginalization in the public space (Lottholz, 2018). Some researchers have argued that Kyrgyzstan is in the process of nationalization, moving toward the creation of a nation-state. This process has led to a dual discourse, on one side emphasis on the unity within Kyrgyzstan but on the other side a strong retelling of Kyrgyzstan as the state (and the land) belonging to the Kyrgyz, including the parts of the south where the majority of the population is Uzbeks (Baruch Wachel, 2013).

Lately, Kyrgyzstan has been a focus within violent extremism discussions. Individuals with Kyrgyz nationality or Uzbek nationality/ethnicity have been linked to multiple terrorist attacks outside of Kyrgyzstan. According to the Kyrgyz government, approximately 800 nationals have left the county as Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs)[2]. The government claim that individuals with Uzbek ethnicity are overrepresented in the data, the largest minority in the country (Tricot

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[1] Mission creep is a military term referring to when an objective is introduced to a mission and slowly takes over the mission, or when a job or objective becomes bigger the initially intended.
[2] Numbers from 2017

O'Farelle & Street, 2019; United States Department of State, 2017). Uzbeks were reportedly disproportionally affected by the ethnic violence in 2010 and the following judicial proceedings (Human Rights Watch, 2011). Therefore, many pointed them out as the main victims in 2010. However, now they are pointed out as a source of security threats. The majority of those suspected of extremism are ethnic Uzbeks (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Over 60 % of those convicted of extremism or terrorism are members of ethnic minorities (Human Rights Council, 2019). Human Rights Watch (2018) reports that many of the suspects' families believe they are being targeted based on their ethnicity. There are some theories that this has developed as a result of state and nation-building in Kyrgyzstan. From this perspective, the marginalization and subsequent grievances have alienated members of the Uzbek community. It has been suggested that one of the push factors is the ethnic violence that took place in 2010, and the way it was dealt with by the states (Matveeva & Giustozzi, 2018).

In the west, there has been a mistrust toward the data on violent extremism provided by Central Asian states. Most of the data on violent extremism in or from Kyrgyzstan comes from the government and should be understood in its political context. Observers have pointed out the political incentives for framing or exaggerating the problem in the region. There has also been a fear of extremism laws and policies being used to legitimize targeting social groups for political reasons (Matveeva & Giustozzi, 2018).

This worry is not without a basis in the case of Kyrgyzstan. According to Human Rights Watch (2019), the Kyrgyz laws have a broad and vague definition of violent extremism. They point out that the cases of violent extremism conviction are increasing, and in many of these cases there is no evidence of planed or performed violence. Instead, they are convicted for possession of material that is perceived as extremist. In connection to this there have been allegations of abuse, planting of evidence, forced confession, and payoffs. There have also been allegations of torture. The United Nations Committee Against Torture and Kyrgyzstan's National Center for the Prevention of Torture both confirm that Kyrgyz law enforcers have used torture. However, it was described as a minimal problem (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

Chuck Theissen (2019b) notes that the ambiguity of the concept of violent extremism in UN PBF's projects in Kyrgyzstan has made it possible to legitimize actions that threaten human rights by referring to security. Similarly, the Universal Periodic Review (2019) noted that the vague definition of extremism and terrorism had detrimental effects in the country and that harsh criminal prosecution may contradict freedom of expression, religion, and association. Moreover, it expressed concern over the lack of implementation of the Torture Convention. It noted an estimated 400 torture allegations annually, of which only 10% are open as criminal

cases, and less than 1% have gone to court. Moreover, an estimated 90% of the cases of torture were done with the intent to extract a confession (Human Rights Council, 2019).

However, Anna Matveeva and Antonio Giustozzi (2018) argue that we should not ignore the trend of so-called Central Asian militants because of mistrust toward the government's data. They claim that turning toward violent extremism is an emerging trend in the region. It should be noted that the alleged misconduct and political benefits of the state do not mean that there is no problem of violent extremism in the country. It does, however, indicate a complicated picture. It is in this highly sensitive context the PBF, as part of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture, developed its 2017-19 PPP that aim to prevent violent extremism under the banner of peacebuilding.

By representing Kyrgyzstan as having a problem with extremism, and this as being a threat to peace, prevention of violent extremism has entered the peacebuilding dispositif (apparatus) in Kyrgyzstan. The initial peacebuilding attempts of PBF were developed in response to ethnic violence. By 2017 discourses, theories, institutions, and practices had been developed. This can be considered as a dispositif. There is no indication of the ethnic violence being fueled by violent extremism. Despite this, PVE is now the focus of the peacebuilding project. It is possible that violent extremism is viewed as stemming from the same "root" as ethnic violence. However, the opposite is possible as well. Violent extremism can be represented as a separate problem that needs its own rationale. The underlying rationale shapes the legitimacy of the project, what the desired outcome is, and what peace is to be built. This in turn can justify what actions are taken, what practices are developed, and how people are treated on the road toward this peace.

The UN Resident Coordinator in Kyrgyzstan, Ozonnia Ojielo, has stated that there is no template for how to prevent violent extremism. Therefore, he encourages his colleagues in Kyrgyzstan not to be afraid of experimenting or making mistakes (Joint Steering Committee, 2018). This is echoed in Outcome 3 of the Annual Project Report (2018), where it is noted that this is the first time UN agencies in Kyrgyzstan are both implementing and testing the assumption behind PVE, at the same time. It has also been suggested that this project might help formulate other PVE projects. If there is no agreement on what violent extremism means, if UN agencies can choose from a "menu of possible drivers" (Thiessen, 2019a:10) of violent extremism and are encouraged to experiment, what have approximately 20 million dollars and three years been spent on and why?

1.2 Aim and Research Questions

This project aims to gain an in-depth understanding of the UN peacebuilding project in Kyrgyzstan and its focus on violent extremism. The objective is to analyze if the rationale changed when the focus shifted from ethnic violence to prevention of extremism. Based on this analysis, I wish to critically reflect on the effects of the inclusion of PVE into the peacebuilding dispositif. I have identified a shift in focus between two main discursive 'events' the 2013-16 PPP and the 2017-19 PPP for Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, my research question is:

Has there been a change in the rationale from the 2013-16 PPP to the 2017-19 PPP?

I make a distinction between the focus of the projects, which I connect to the term "urgent need" in my conceptual framework, and the projects' rationale. I have operationalized rationale as three main elements described in the document: the 'unpeaceful', which is what is referred to as a problem to peace; the suggested activities, 'the road to peace'; and the desired outcome, 'peace'. The rationale consists of these three elements, as well as binds them together and makes them appear logical. Therefore, the operational research questions I ask my data is:

1. *What is represented as 'unpeaceful' i.e., the conflict/problem?*
2. *What is represented as 'the road to peace' i.e., what is suggested to be done about the problem?*
3. *What is represented as 'peace' i.e., what is the desired outcome?*

I place emphasis on the way problems are described, as it is often explicitly described with my data and indicates what the desired outcome is. I rely on Carol Bacchi's (2009) conceptualization of 'problem-representation' and her method, *What is the problem represented to be?* Moreover, I will trace the genealogy of the problem representations I find in the two PPPs within a set of 'cluster documents' of previous PBF's peacebuilding project description in Kyrgyzstan.

1.3 Delimitations

This project has several delimitations. The unit of analysis is a discourse. This means I will not be researching the ethnic conflict nor the violence that took place in 2010 as such. Neither will I attempt to do any empirical research on terrorism or violent extremism. Instead, I am analyzing the representation of elements as 'unpeaceful' within a specific discourse. Moreover, I have delimited this discourse to mean documents, project descriptions, produced to gain funding by the institution PBF to perform peacebuilding activities in Kyrgyzstan. I do relate these documents to other relevant discourses, for example, academic ones. However, it falls outside the scope of this project to conduct an in-depth analysis of these. It is important to note

that I make no claim of any individual's opinion or intention. I look at representations with texts. Many of the project descriptions are also developed by a multitude of actors and institutions.

1.4 Relevance for Peace Studies

International peacebuilding attempts have traditionally been built on an assumption of states with an immobile population. However, today peacebuilding attempts must adopt a world increasingly characterized by mobility. This includes the mobility of people and ideologies that has negative and positive effects on peace. Oliver P Richmond and Roger MacGinty (2019:8) has pointed out that this "hyper-mobility" is challenging the previous peacebuilding structure. The peacebuilding project in Kyrgyzstan focusing on FTFs can be seen as an attempt to deal with an 'unpeaceful' element that is mobile. However, as Richmond and MacGinty (2019) have noted, the current peacebuilding apparatus may not be equipped to deal with mobility. As described above, PVE's conceptual ambiguity and its focus on security have been linked to violations of human rights. Moreover, tensions and contradiction may arise as ideas of PVE enters the peacebuilding dispositif. If the Kyrgyz state is targeting minorities using PVE, what does it mean that now the UN is actively engaging in PVE under the banner of peacebuilding? This project cannot answer this question in total, but it gives important insight into some issues that have arisen.

In addition, the UN PBF as an institution is developing into an important entity for peace. In November 2019, the Secretary-General, António Guterres, once again urged the member states to increase their contribution to PBF by a "quantum leap" (United Nations Secretary-General, 2019). In the year before, 135,337,235 dollars were pledged to the PBF (Gateway, n.d.,). The so-called Peacebuilding Architecture, including the PBF, are important tools through which peacebuilding is conceptualized and acted out. Moreover, it has the capacity to circumventing the political branch, the peacebuilding commission where different groups are represented. PBF engagement can be decided by the Secretary-General, and the activities can be shaped by donors. We need more research looking at this branch and what peacebuilding it attempts to perform. The peacebuilding projects in Kyrgyzstan are funded by PBF, monitored by the peacebuilding support office under the Secretary-General's office. Kyrgyzstan is currently not on the Peacebuilding Commissions agenda.

1.5 Outline of the thesis

This thesis consists of six chapters. The first one is the above introduction; here the topic was briefly introduced, the research problem was outlined as well as research question and aim. The

delimitations were discussed. Chapter two provides the background. To give an adequate background to the context, it includes both history of Kyrgyzstan and that of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture. In the third chapter, the conceptual framework is presented, consisting mainly of the concepts of genealogy and dispositif. In the fourth chapter, the methodology is presented. The chapter has six different sections. In the first section, the design and epistemological positioning of the research project will be briefly discussed. In the second section, the method for analyzing the two PPP's is explained. In the third section, the data is presented. This is followed by section four, where the researcher's positionality is briefly discussed. In the fifth, challenges and limitations are reflected upon. In the last section of the chapter a brief summery is given. In chapter five, the analysis is presented. The chapter is divided into two sections. First, the themes of the problem representation found in the 2013-2016 PPP is presented. Second, the themes of the problem representation found in the 2017-2019 PPP is presented. In chapter sixth, the problem representation and the rationale behind the two PPP's are compared and discussed. In the seventh and last chapter, the conclusion is presented.

2   Contextual Background

The context of this research project is not solely geographical. The peacebuilding projects are shaped by the geographic context of the conflict: Kyrgyzstan. However, it is also shaped by the organizational context where the peacebuilding attempts have been conceptualized and formed into a strategy: the UN Peacebuilding Architecture. Together these aspects make up the primary context for this research project.

This chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, I will trace the history of Kyrgyzstan up to the present day. I will focus on the debate about the Kyrgyz nation and the development of the Kyrgyz state. In the second section, I will describe the evolution of peacebuilding in the UN by focusing on the so-called UN 'Peacebuilding Architecture' (PBA).

2.1   Tracing the Development of Kyrgyzstan

The retelling of history is an inherently political act, especially in the case of national history. This is undoubtedly the case of Kyrgyz history. In the last 100 years Kyrgyzstan and the world have experienced a significant change in the political structure. This has affected the retelling of the history of Kyrgyz. Some historical claims that were made during the Soviet period are refuted, and the opposite is now being claimed. It is worth keeping in mind that historical claims are being made in a political context today, just as they were during the Soviet times. In this section, I will pay attention to the debate of a Kyrgyz nation and state because it ties into today's peacebuilding attempts.

2.1.1   Early history

It is believed that people started to populate the area of Kyrgyzstan approximately one million years ago (Chotaeva, 2016). The origin of the Kyrgyz people is debated, and Saul Matveevich Abramzon claims that a Kyrgyz nation is one of the most complex and controversial questions among the different ethnic groups in Central Asia (cited in Lowe, 2003). Some scholars have claimed that a Kyrgyz state existed during the 3000-2000 B.C.E., while others suggest that the first time we can place Kyrgyz in the present-day territory of Kyrgyzstan is in 900-1000 C.E (Lowe, 2003). According to the Kyrgyz-based anthropologist Cholpon Chotaeva (2016), Kyrgyz people have a long history and is the first ethnic/social group in the Central Asian regions to be mentioned in historical books. Generally, it is believed that the social group today, referred to as Kyrgyz, came from the upper Yenisei River in Siberia.

Based on Chinese historical documents, it is believed a existed a Kyrgyz state in the first century B.C.E., located east of today's Kyrgyzstan. It is in these documents the name

Kyrgyzstan is first found. The state was conquered by the Hunnu that later appointed a Chinese, Li Lin, to rule over the state. The time between 500-1200 C.E. is known in Central Asia as the Turkic era because of the Turkish influence. It is believed a Kyrgyz Kaganate state developed at the Yenisei river in the 7th century but was attacked by the Turks. There were fighting among several social groups, and in the 9-10th century the Kyrgyz established what has been referred to as the great Kyrgyz Empire. During this time, the name Kyrgyz took on a political meaning as non-Kyrgyz tribes where joined under the name. After the Kyrgyz empire, many Kyrgyz migrated (back) to the Yenisei region while some stayed and were later pushed toward Central Tien Shan. During this time, they assimilated with the local population and developed what is today seen as the Kyrgyz ethnicity (Chotaeva, 2016).

Chotaeva (2016) writes that during the 14-15th century, the Kyrgyz transitioned from consisting of multiple fragmented tribes to becoming united as an ethnopolitical group with two wings, albiet without an independent state. The leaders of the Kyrgyz tribes had unsuccessfully tried to establish a Kyrgyz state (Chotaeva, 2016). This may be interpreted as a sense of nationhood, at least among the elite. According to Robert Lowe (2003), Kyrgyz identity started to consolidate during this time, but he sees this as an ethnic identity, not a national one. He claims that until the Soviet era, there was no strong sense of national self-identity among the Kyrgyz.

2.1.2 Russian and Soviet Rule

In 1840, the Russian empire had taken large parts of Central Asia, including the area of Kyrgyz. Northern tribes sent embassies to the Russian empire and accepted the vassalhood of the empire. The vassalhood quickly turned in to a colonial relationship. The southern tribes tried to resist foreign rule, but in 1876 the Russian empire had conquered the southern region. The area was ruled as the Turkestan Governorate-General and divided into oblasts (Haugen, 2003). The Russian empire extracted natural recourse from Central Asia, taxed the population, and placed Ukrainian and Russian settlements on the most fertile lands. The land seizer and colonial policy sparked rebellions. One of these was the Andijan rebellion in 1898, which Chotaeva (2016:75) describe it as having an "anti-Russian, National-liberation character".

Arne Haugen (2003) means that there is a general consensus that the Russian empire did not want to change Central Asia fundamentally, but to control what was already there. It was believed that humanity was divided into people or nationalities. It was the task of Russian ethnographers to go to Central Asia and "find" and map these. This was not an easy task. The local population would often not participate, and if they did, they would sometimes give

answers that the Russian ethnographers considered wrong. The ethnographers tried to divide the local population into Turkic or Iranian groups. But as Haugen (2003) points out, communities tended to be multiethnic and cut across linguistic boundaries. Many times, the national identities were not the most salient or important ones. The Russian empire would interact with tribes on an individual basis, a stark contrast to the Bolshevik approach.

When the Bolsheviks came to power and won over the Mensheviks, they attempted to transform Central Asia (Loring, 2008). During the Russian empire, Turkestan had been colonized and ruled similar to how European power ruled parts of Africa (Loring, 2008). To show that the Bolshevik was not like their predecessor, the European colonizers, they initiated land and water reforms in 1920. This policy reallocated land and from ethnic Europeans to indigenous communities (Loring, 2008). This is important as it shows an idea of autochthones[3] and is tied to land rights.

The Bolshevik adhered to a Marxist historical theory of progression. Based on this, they viewed people of Central Asia as historically "backward". The Bolshevik's stance toward the national question was characterized by contradictions. Nations and nationalism were seen as a stage in history on the way toward a socialistic society, something to pass through and leave behind. This idea of history as a predetermined progression led the Bolshevik to believe that communities that did not have a sense of nationalism were less progressive than the European parts of soviet. On the other hand, the Bolshevik stood for the equality of workers all around the world and behaving as an oppressive colonizer was therefore (initially) unacceptable. The Bolshevik developed oblasts and titular nations that were not independent, yet promoted the titular nations. The Bolshevik believed they were destroying a "true" nationality, Turkistan nationalism, and replaced it with artificial nationalisms like Kyrgyz nationalism (Hauge, 2003). However, this presented the Bolshevik with a problem: defining and delimiting nation groups.

Kyrgyzstan was first made into a state in 1924. After the October revolution, the Bolsheviks renamed the Turkestan Krai to the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1924 the Kara-Kyrgyz autonomous oblast was established, and in 1926 renamed to Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. By doing so, they recognized a distinct Kyrgyz ethnic identity (judge according to Stalin's criteria) and gave them an amount of self-rule. Kyrgyzstan gained more independence when it was made a soviet republic in 1936 (Marat, 2012).

Daniel Prior (2006) suggests that ideas of pre-nationhood can be found in the indigenous elites (*Manaps*) oral poetry. Igmen (2012) similarly notes that decade before the Bolshevik

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[3] Means 'people sprung from the earth' and refence to indigenes people of a land and is often used in opposition to settlers.

revolution poets connected to trial chieftains expressed a cohesive sense of Kyrgyz identity. According to Benjamin Loring (2008), there was no strong national social intelligentsia nor a national elite or stable ethnic identity in Kyrgyzstan at the time of the Bolshevik revolution. He considers it remarkable that despite this, Kyrgyzstan gained an autonomous territory merely seven years after the Bolshevik revolution. Hauge (2003) argues that struggles for national political entities that took place in 1920 (in connection with the national delimitation debates) existed before this. Hauge (2003) view the political use of nationality as novel in Central Asian, but there was still a continuation of how national identities were conceptualized. Moreover, when nationality became institutionalized in the 1920s, nationality became more important for the Central Asian communists, but we should not assume that this was the case for the general population. Ali Igmen (2012) means that locals learned how they could gain positions by claiming ethnic identities. Despite this, what it meant to be Kyrgyz was still largely undefined. A new definition of being Kyrgyz developed from the socialist system, but Igmen notes that this definition was unstable and contested.

2.1.3 An Autonomous Kyrgyz State

In June 1990, there was inter-ethnic violence between the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. It started in the Osh Oblast in the south but spread to other regions (Tishkov, 1995). Within a week, it is estimated that 170 people were killed and 5000 crimes committed before a state of emergency was announced, and the army was used to stop the violence. One of the reasons the violence spread so fast was rumors and fears of retaliation. When Askar Akayev won the election in October 1990, he tried to deal with the issue of rising nationalism (Laruelle, 2012). He attempted to promote a civic identity similar to the rhetoric of Boris Yeltsin, by balancing the ethnic nationalism (Kyrgyz) with that of civic nationalism (Marat, 2012; Gullette & Heathershaw, 2015). He also included citizenship in the discourse. Akayev's view on ethnicity was more along the line of primordialism than of modernity (Marat, 2012). Akayev introduced the slogan "Kyrgyzstan, our common home", created the People's assembly which works as a cultural center for minorities, and recognized Russian as a second language. After gaining independence, it became increasingly important for the political elite to construct a sense of belonging felt by the citizens. This, in form of a unifying national ideology that would keep the country together. It also gave the ruling elite a broad support base (Marat, 2012).

Akayev's push for liberalism and multiculturalism led to backlashes from nationalistic groups and fractions within the politics. To pacify them, Akayev focused on the famous Epic of Manas (Marat, 2012). Parts of Manas was made into a state ideology. It became the central

node of Kyrgyzness and was used to tell a Kyrgyz "code of conduct", ideals of how to be Kyrgyz (Gullette, 2010). Akayev highlighted historical figures based on their devotion toward independence and urged people to look toward the past for guidance (Gullette, 2010). Erica Marat (2012) notes that by doing this, Akayev abandoned his previous focus and distinction of citizenship and moved toward ethnogenesis, similar to the soviet. He now claimed that every nation had developed its specific genetic code thousand years ago. Marlene Laurelle (2012) points out that there is a view that the more Kyrgyz Kyrgyzstan becomes, the more it will succeed in becoming a state. And reversed, the state-failure is understood as *nation*-building failure. According to Laurelle (2012), there has been an ethnicization of the state structure in Kyrgyzstan.

There was a sense of marginalization in the southern region of Kyrgyzstan, where most Uzbeks in the country live (Gullette 2010). Yet, one of the most significant controversies leading up to the 2005 parliamentary election was that Bermet Akayev, the president daughter, was running[4]. It was not only Akayev's daughter that was running, Akayev also indorsed his son Aidar Akayev and two sisters-in-law. This reinforced the perception of nepotism the government was accused of, which led to an intensification of the protests. On the 4th of March, protesters took control of the administrative buildings in Jalalabad. Kyrgyzstan had a two-round parliamentary electoral system. After the second round, many of the main opposition formed a party and announced their own government (Gullette, 2012).

Jenishbek Nazaraliev was a controversial medical practitioner that had been outspoken against the government. On 24 March, ca 7,000 protesters gathered outside his office. Nazaraliev, who ran a drug rehabilitation center, urged the crowd to be sober and calm. During the day, more people had started protesting on Ala-too Square before moving toward the white house where the president's office was located. The anti-government protesters clashed with pro-government protesters later the same day. President Akayev left the building as the protesters stormed the white house; he and his family flew to Moscow (Gullette, 2010).

After the revolutions, the opposition government was quick to appoint an interim president, Kurmanbek Bakiev, and already the next day several of the minister posts had been filled. They also launched an investigation into the Akayev's family's business dealings. The revolution upheaved the political order, and many players wanted a position of power. David Gullette

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[4] She announced her campaign after Roza Otunbaeva, a well-respected politician, had not been allowed to run. The ground for refusal was that Otunbaeva had not lived the last 5 consecutive years in Kyrgyzstan. Many viewed this as a wrong, as the reason she had lived outside Kyrgyzstan was that she had been an ambassador for the Kyrgyz republic.

(2010) notes that there several assassinations. The party that the opposition had formed before the revolution was dissolved. In the following period, national elections were held that is considered free and fair. The hopes for Kyrgyzstan where high. Kyrgyzstan has somewhat optimistically been referred to as "Asia's island of democracy" (Anderson, 2013).

This optimism seems to have curtailed after the 2010 events. The national identity Kyrgyz is a powerful discursive tool that is being used and felt by both politicians and 'the people' in modern-day Kyrgyzstan. The first president Askar Akayev initially attempted to balance the ethno-nationalism with that of civic nationalism but after backlashes from nationalistic groups he started to promote more Kyrgyz national state ideology (Marat, 2012; Gullette & Heathershaw, 2015). Even with Akayev ousted in 2005, it seems that Kyrgyzstan is moving toward an ethno-nationalization of the state (Baruch Wachel, 2013; Laurelle, 2012). In a country with a tense majority-minority relationship, this is highly troubling.

2.2 The Evolution of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture

In this section, I will first present the evolution of the Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) from an organizational and a conceptual point of view. Then I will present the entities that make up the PBA. I will briefly outline how the UN PBA started to perform peacebuilding in Kyrgyzstan.

The United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia was the first peacekeeping operation with a mandate for peacebuilding (1989-1990). It was followed by more robust projects like interventions[5]. In the field, the UN was represented by, among others, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations Development Program, and the Department of Political Affairs (Ponzio, 2007). This led to concerns about the coordination between the different branches and actors. Based on the so-called Brahimi rapport, efforts were made to work more integrated. While the coordination improved, the UN still had low success-rates of their peacebuilding operations. Therefore, the Secretary-General convened a High-Level Panel in 2003, who were to suggest reforms of UN institutions who were working on peace and security. The panel recommended establishing a Peacebuilding Unit consisting of two branches, the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office. The main objectives of the two branches would be to prevent state collapse and facilitate joint planning within the UN system (Ponzio, 2007). This recommendation was then reaffirmed by the Secretary-General in the report *In Larger Freedom* (2005). In late 2005 the Security Council

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[5] For example: Kosovo (UNMIK), Timor-Leste (UNTAET), and Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

adopted UNSCR 1645 and 1646 unanimously, the General Assembly adopted the A/res/60-180, establishing the new Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) consisting of Peacebuilding commissions (PBC), The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) and the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF).

Fernando Cavalcant (2019) traces the conceptual development of peacebuilding within the UN milieu. The previous Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, advanced an understanding of peacebuilding in his *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992, which was influenced by scholarly conceptualization. Yet Boutros-Ghali's conceptualization is significantly different from the peace scholar Johan Galtung. Galtung is often credited with first using the concept peacebuilding and he initially related peace to violence, not exclusively to war (Cavalcant 2019). Galtung believes that violence is that which hinders people from fulfilling their potentials[6]. Peace, according to this perspective, is the lack of violence and the possibility of fulfilling one's potential. This can be called a broad understanding of peace as it encompasses a multitude of causes, scenarios, and peacebuilding tools (Cavalcant 2019).

Boutros-Ghali, on the other hand, understood peacebuilding in a narrower sense. He argued that peacebuilding is a post-conflict activity that seeks to identify and strengthen structures that would consolidate peace. While Cavalcant (2019) found documents showing that Boutros-Ghali and his group were aware of Galtung's writings, it seems that they were more influenced by writings on the democratic peace theory. They ended up putting forth a politicized and simplified version of the liberal democratic peace theory.

The liberal peacebuilding theory argues that liberal democracies rarely go to war against one another. This line of thinking also builds on a Kantian understanding of the will of the people and the hypothesis that the masses are less likely to want to go to war than the ruling elites because they are the ones on the frontlines. Boutros-Ghali argued that democracy was implied in the UN charter and discursively linked peace to democracy (Cavalcant 2019). Boutros-Ghali argued that development and democratic institutions are essential parts of sustainable peace. While promoting liberal democratic peacebuilding, he publicly claimed on multiple occasions that democracies rarely fight one another (see Cavalcant 2019:108-109 for excerpts). The liberal democratic peace theory became a sort of dogma in the UN milieu (Cavalcant 2019).

Cavalcant (2019) argues that the establishment of UN PBA was driven partly by a need to address problems with the liberal peace theory. The Liberal peace paradigm has become increasingly criticized. It has been accused of being imperialistic or colonial (Bellamy &

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[6] At this stage direct and structural violence right, he later added cultural violence

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Williams; Jabri, 2013), top-down and elite focused (Mac Ginty, 2008) as well as using a one size fits all (Call, 2008:1210). Perhaps most damaging, it been accused of simply not working (for discussion see Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2015).

According to Robert Jenkins (2013:136), the creation of PBA is influenced by the decade before 2005, in the form of cold-war ideas of the superiority of market-economy and the post-9/11 fear of "ungoverned spaces". Cedric de Coning and Eli Stamnes (2016) have pointed out the PBA has led to an increased awareness of peacebuilding within the UN. Yet research critical of liberal peace has engaged very little with these branches. And the research that does focus on these branches tends to be about technical and procedural issues (Cavalcant 2019).

2.2.1 The Peacebuilding Commission

The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is tasked with developing peacebuilding objectives and plans, formulate best practices, and give advice on institutional reforms internally (Ponzi, 2007). PBC has been off to a debatably rocky start and appears to be the most criticized part of the PBA. When the PBA was created, there was a division between the north-south divide. Many Northern donors wanted to keep some control over the funds. On the other hand, the G77 countries were afraid that the PBC would become another forum where northern donors would dominate. Some saw it as a chance to limit the Security Council's power and argued that the PBC would be reporting to the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) (Williams & Bailey 2016). These and other discussions shaped the organizational structure of the PBA.

The PBC has a two-tier reporting structure, it reports to the Security Council and to the General Assembly (see appendix 3). The PBC consist of the Organizational Committee, Country Specific Configurations, and the Working group on Lesson Learned.

The Organizational Committee consists of 31 members and reflects the previous discussion along the north-south divide. Seven members are from the Security Council, seven from the general assembly, seven are from the ECOSOC, five are from the top ten UN donors, five are from the top troops contributing countries (Tschirgi & Ponzio, 2016).

The Country Specific Configurations (CSC) are groups that are working and monitoring the peacebuilding projects in a specific country. Every country that is on the PBC's agenda has a CSC group; the chair tends to be the key donors (Tschirgi & Ponzio, 2016). It is the CSC, together with the PBSO and the host country, who writes the Integrated Peacebuilding Strategy. This document maps out the PBC mandate and objectives in the host country. However, in some cases Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper has been used instead (Jenkins 2013).

The Working Group on Lesson Learned (WGLL) was formed to be a knowledge hub, where the countries on the PBC agenda shared information and lessens on peacebuilding (Tschirgi & Ponzio, 2016). According to Necla Tschirgi and Richard Ponzio (2016), the WGLL initially suffered from weak leadership, lack of political interest from the permanent five, and unclear aim. Because the WGLL is not seen as having produced sufficient knowledge to help with the PBC aim, its value has been doubted and by some is seen as a lost cause (van Beijnum, 2016).

2.2.2   The Peacebuilding Support Office

The Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) is meant to support the PBC by collecting country specific information, helping organize the inter-cooperation and coherence of UN agencies, and manage the Peacebuilding Fund (Ponzi, 2007). The PBSO functions as a secretariat for the PBC and as a knowledge hub for UN members and agencies as well as managing PBF (Tschirgi & Ponzio, 2016). PBSO was initially organized into four configurations, but today is organized into three groups: Financing Peacebuilding Branch, PBC Support Branch, and Policy Planning and Application Branch. The Financing Peacebuilding Branch oversees the PBF. The PBSO is part of the Secretary-General office. PBF's 2009 Terms of Reference (ToR) states that the PBSO should determine and review the priorities of PBF peace projects (Cavalcant, 2019). PBSO has the responsibility of monitoring the peacebuilding activities, including the implementation of the Woman Peace and Security agenda. Some have interpreted this as PBF moving away from the authority of the PBC and toward that of the Secretary-General (through the Assistance Secretary-General) (Jenkins, 2013; Cavalcant, 2019). This has increased the number of countries the UN could implement peacebuilding activities in. It also offered a potentially faster process of initiating peacebuilding programs, by circumventing the political branch (PBC) and going through the secretariat.

It is the PBSO that initiated peacebuilding assessments in Kyrgyzstan after the invitation by the government. It has signed off on the peacebuilding projects, monitors, and rapports on them.

2.2.3   The Peacebuilding Fund

The PBF, in turn, was created to enable the UN to develop and implement peace projects faster by having a standing monetary reserve. This meant the UN did not need to appeal to funds from the member states for a specific project before they start peacebuilding (Ponzi, 2007; Cavalcant, 2019). The PBF is also supposed to ensure that funding does not run out while a project is active. The member states pledge contributions annually but also have the possibility to fund specific parts of peacebuilding projects. This has offered member states a chance to do targeted funding. The southern countries tended to want PBF organized under PBC, to gain more control

over what projects where funded while northern states tended to want to have the PBF under the Secretary-General. This offered a chance for the northern states, who tended to be big donors, to steer the peace projected through funding (Jenkins, 2013).

The PBF term of reference was amended in 2009, stating that the fund went from three funding channels to two. Today the PBF can direct funds in two manners. Either through Immediate Response Facility (IRF), which is project-based or through Peace and Recovery Facility (PRF), which is program-based (Cavalcant, 2019). The IRF Projects are supposed to be immediate and short-term, spanning a maximum of 18 months (Gateway, n.d.). PRF are long-term programs and projects are based on peacebuilding priority plans that are formulated between the national officials and UN officials (see appendix 1). In effect, it means that PBF can fund projects that are not on the PBC's agenda if the Secretary-General declares eligibility (Gateway, n.d.). Currently (2020) on the UN's Peacebuilding website (United Nations Peacebuilding, n.d.), the PBF is referred to as "the Secretary-General's Peacebuilding Fund".

PBF has funded peacebuilding projects in Kyrgyzstan for 10 years now, through both IRF and PRF. There have been four different clusters of short-time projects funded through IRF. There have been two PRF-funded programs that have been guided by two respective Peacebuilding Priority Plans. See appendix 4 for specifics on how the process of formulating a Peacebuilding Priority Plan is made.

2.3 Summary

In this chapter, I have accounted for the contextual background of this research project. The peacebuilding projects that this thesis focuses on is shaped by two main contexts: Kyrgyzstan and the UN Peacebuilding Architecture. In the first section, I have traced the development and discussion of a Kyrgyz nation and state. In modern times, Kyrgyz leaders have attempted to create a state ideology built on a balance between ethnic identities and civic identities. The nationalism and state-building present in the country can be seen as one of the factors that caused the ethnic violence that took place in 2010. This conflict that was the reason UN PBA was invited to perform peacebuilding activities

In the second section, I discussed the development of the Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA) and presented the three branches PBC, PBSO, and PBF. The Secretary-General's office initiated the peacebuilding projects in Kyrgyzstan, after an invitation from the Kyrgyz state. PBSO monitors and assesses the peacebuilding project. PBF is t responsible for the funding of the projects. The two channels of funding, IRF and PRF, have shaped the timeframe of the project in Kyrgyzstan, as well as enabled targeted funding by other states.

3 Conceptual Framework

In this chapter, the main concepts will be presented. For this project, I utilize concepts in two main ways. This research is conducted from a social constructivist point of view, meaning that terms are seen as socially constructed and susceptible to change. This means I am searching for in my data is conceptualizations, specifically of 'unpeaceful', 'road to peace', and 'peace'. What I mean by these terms will be described in the first section of this chapter.

The other way I use concepts is to describe what I am researching and to help explain why it looks the way it does: fragmented yet cohesive. The chosen method for analyzing my data, WPR, hinges on Foucauldian concepts of history and governing. While there are multiple relevant concepts, only the ones most central to this project will be discussed: *genealogy* and *dispositif*. In the second section, the concept of genealogy is presented, and a brief outline of the genealogy of peacebuilding is given. In the third section, the concept of dispositif is presented. Then, dispositif is related to peacebuilding and the case of Kyrgyzstan.

3.1 'Unpeaceful', 'the Road to Peace' and 'Peace'

In my operational research questions, I use the terms 'unpeaceful', 'the road to peace', and 'peace'. These refer to how these aspects are constructed in the documents I analyze. As such, they are empty terms to be filled by my data, albeit critically reflected on. This assumes that peacebuilding activities aim to build peace, so the desired outcome they describe is what I refer to as their conceptualization of 'peace'. Similarly, what is described as hindering or in opposition to peace is what I refer to as their conceptualization of 'unpeaceful'. The activities or non-activities that are claimed to address the 'unpeaceful' and lead to 'peace', is what I refer to as "the road to peace". In other words, I will not define these concepts. Yet, this does not mean I accept my data's conceptualization of these concepts as true or unproblematic.

3.2 The Concept of Genealogy

In Michael Foucault's later work, he adopted a methodology based on the concept of genealogy. He describes the process of genealogy as: *"it must record the singularity of events outside of any monotonous finality; it must seek them in the most unpromising places, in what we tend to feel is without history-in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts; it must be sensitive to their recurrence, not in order to trace the gradual curve of their evolution, but to isolate the different scenes where they engaged in different roles. Finally, genealogy must define even those instances when they are absent, the moment when they remained unrealized"* (Foucault, 1977:76)

Foucault is believed to have developed his genealogy approach after being critiqued for his archeology approach. The critique involved how the archeological approach assumed a researcher that could analyze history from "the outside" (Bonditti et al., 2015:164). His understanding of genealogy contains several philosophical assertions. While Foucault is difficult to fit into one paradigm squarely, he can be understood as placing genealogy within a constructivist perspective by refuting objective truths when he claims that by conducting a genealogy of phenomenon one discovers "the secret that they have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms" (Foucault, 1977:78). Foucault was inspired by Nietzsche's distinction between origin (Ursprung) and descent (Herkunft). Origin is tied to ideas of an objective history that can be objectively told within a delimited discipline, while descent pays attention to the plurality of histories that made it possible for a phenomenon to develop. This means that instead of looking for a moment when a phenomenon came into existence, genealogy looks at the phenomenon as historically contingent on multiple moments, both of happenings and non-happenings. Personally, I visualize a sea of domino pieces. Genealogy is then how the previous dominos have fallen, which piece hit which piece, and which did not, that made it possible for this piece I am looking at to fall. A genealogy looks for *"passing events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations – or conversely, the complete reversals – the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things"* (Foucault 1977:81). Foucault here refutes claims of history following any logic and progression history. Instead, he argues that by conducting a genealogy (Herkunft), we are able to question things that were previously thought of as dogmas, by looking for 'accidents' within history (Foucault, 1977).

Philippe Bonditti, Andrew Neal, Sven Opitz, and Chris Zebrowski (2015) argues that by labeling a social phenomenon as a problem, it is made a governable entity. Moreover, that by conducting a genealogy, the researcher refutes the statues of the topic or the belief of it being static and 'natural'. Instead, the researcher attempts to trace "battles" through the topic's history. The full account of these battles, small and big, are too many to cover fully. However, the purpose of a genealogy is not to attempt to give an objective historical account, it is to highlight the role of power in shaping the representation of a topic (Bonditti et al., 2015).

3.2.1 The Genealogy of Peacebuilding

"Peace is rarely conceptualised, even by those who often allude to it."

Richmond, O.P. 2005:2

The concept of peace and peacebuilding can, and have, been understood in a variety of ways. However, in the international structure we live in today, peace-making is largely derived from western philosophical ideas (Richmond, 2005). Richmond (2010) has, in his work, attempted to trace a genealogy of the concept of peace within the international structure. Within this genealogy, Richmond has been four main generations of thinking within the peace and conflict field. First was conflict management, which consists of high-level diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, etc. The second was conflict resolution, which focused on understanding the root causes of conflict and the effects on human needs.

The third generations were liberal peacebuilding and state-building. Peacebuilding from this perspective was a larger enterprise that required a peacebuilding consensus from a large set of international organizations and actors. This kind of peacebuilding focused on human rights, democracy, development, and economic reform. These values were proclaimed as universal and cosmopolitan. Therefore, it was also a multilevel approach, performing peacebuilding on multiple levels as international, national, and local (Richmond, 2010). This approach also focuses on civil society, as the liberal idea of peace hinges one not only a functioning state but also a civil society. While this approach contains both top-down and bottom-up visions, it emphasizes top-down thinking of peace (Richmond, 2010). Richmond means that external intervener utilizes the 'bottom' or local to build a peace/society according to their preferences. He argues that this form of liberal peacebuilding has turned into a system of governance.

The heavy criticism of this approach has led to the development of the fourth generation: local liberal hybridity (Richmond, 2010). Some of the critiques focused on the assumption of liberal values as universal, the top-down institutional approach, and neocolonialism. This approach focuses on 'everyday, post-Westphalian peace' which means it shifts much of its focus from state to the everyday of local populations. It pays special attention to how peace is experienced by the locals and relates to peace on other levels. In the local liberal hybridity approach, human security has been incorporated, and the security referent has been moved from state to individual, incorporating aspects of social welfare into the liberal peace. This approach is not completely homogenous and includes different strains of thought, like critical theories and post-structuralisms. Richmond argues that the difference between dogmatic liberal position and that of critical and reflective position is how they view the 'local' and 'everyday' within

peacebuilding. The critical and reflexive position puts more emphasis on these two aspects, according to Richmond (2010).

I understand the genealogy of peacebuilding as the history of a process that has created a specific understanding of what the concept peace means. This conceptualization exists in but is not contained within, the UN peacebuilding structure. While there exists a conceptualization of peacebuilding that is expressed within high-level of the UN, that does not mean that every peacebuilding attempt corresponds to this rationale. Today, peacebuilding projects are supposedly context-sensitive, meaning that peacebuilding projects will be different in different contexts and can understand what peace means differently. The rationale behind the peacebuilding projects in Kyrgyzstan may be different from the one discursively expressed by UN high officials or that of other peace projects. The data for this research consists of a "cluster of documents" through which I am able to trace a genealogy, albeit a short one, of the problem representation of Kyrgyzstan and how this is supported by a rationale that enables a form of governing. It is important to point out that this is a limited genealogy of a specific problem and not an attempt at discovering an origin. Nevertheless, this short genealogy can offer us important insight into what kind of peace is being built in Kyrgyzstan, why, and if this changed when PVE was introduced. Moreover, in my discussion, I will relate my findings to the genealogy of peace sketched out by Richmond.

3.3 The Concept of Dispositif

> "The reason for this is that we have to use discourse to render meaningful every aspect of our social, cultural, political environment: an event becomes 'a problem' as soon as it is being recognised as such by people, and discursive work is crucial to this; a mountain becomes a 'beautiful' mountain as soon as someone singles it out, identifies it and comments on it to someone else."
> Blommaert, J. (2005:4)

Another concept used by Foucault is dispositif (sometimes translated to apparatus, device, or deployment). When Foucault was asked what he meant by the concept dispositif, he answered in three points. Firstly, he described the elements of a dispositif: "*a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical and moral proposition*" (Foucault cited in Dumez & Jeunemaitre, 2010:30). Secondly, Foucault described the relation between these elements as constituting a system, and it is this that is the apparatuses. He was particularly interested in how these non-homogenous elements were made cohesive in this system. Thirdly, he described the process of a dispositif, first the formation of elements that is responding to an urgent need, which develop into a system (where practices create knowledge at the same time

as knowledge creates practices) that creates both "functional over-determination" and "strategic elaborations" (Foucault cited in Dumez & Jeunemaitre, 2010:30). Meaning that once stabilized, the system ensures its own survival through knowledge production and practices, and at the same time as the strategies to deal with the "urgent need" are expanded.

Ramon Blanco points out that dispositif can be understood as that which holds together these elements, the glue if you so will, as well as "the process of handling this urgent need" (Blanco, 2020:12). Tom Frost (2019) describes dispositif as a manifestation of power, made up of a network of power relations, through which people are constructed as subjects, objects, and power relations. According to Frost (2019), Foucault made a distinction between 'appareil', which refers to a state mechanism of power, and dispositif, which is a power that is not based on state sovereignty. This power is exercised through a net-like manner and exists once it responds to objects. From Foucault's view dispositif are a way to govern, exercise bio-power[7], and create subjects (Frost, 2019). If genealogy refers to the decent or development of a phenomenon, then dispositif is the apparatuses through which governing over urgent needs is performed.

3.3.1   The Dispositif of Peacebuilding

Blanco (2020) has argued that peace operations can be understood as a dispositif that reacts to an urgent need and attempts to normalize the situation in a state (state to society) as well as between states (international society). This normalization is done through attempts to discipline the state and exercising bio-power over the population. Moreover, he argues that the norm is liberal democratic market-oriented states (Blanco, 2020), centered around the concepts of failed state, sovereignty, and good governance. This leads to peace operations being focused on state-building (Blanco, 2012).

In this project, I view peacebuilding as a dispositif. In other words, peacebuilding can be understood as an apparatus. This apparatus is made up of discourses, institutions, philosophical ideas, policies, laws, and much more, which in turn forms a network of power-relations. Through these power-relations, subjects are both constructed and governed. This dispositif contains elements like practices of policing and discourses of micro-loans that are held together by the rationale and knowledge of peacebuilding. The dispositif of peacebuilding responds to the object of 'unpeaceful'; it is developed in response to this urgent need that sometimes seems

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[7] Bio-power is a form of power that regulates a population 'body' and 'life' rather the individual, which Foucault argued is common form of governing in modern nation states.

ever-expanding. Yet, peacebuilding is also maintained by the institutions, practices, and knowledges it consists of.

While the peacebuilding dispositif is bigger than what can be analyzed in this project, I am looking at the peacebuilding project in Kyrgyzstan as a visible 'playing out' of this peacebuilding dispositif in a concrete context. The coming together of knowledges, practices, actors, institutions, and techniques to address the 'unpeaceful' element identified in Kyrgyzstan. Through this, the dispositif power is exercise in a netlike manner through a variety of actors (mainly RUNO's in this case) in order to bring about a state of 'peace'. I view the documents I have analyzed as part of a discourse where a phenomenon is contracted as a problem that urgently needs to be dealt with. As these documents are also prescriptive and practical, they contain the 'glue' between this discourse and peacebuilding practices.

In this thesis, I also use the term rationale frequently. Rationale means the system of claims that make something appear logic from that system's rules. For example, from a neoliberal worldview, it would be logical to develop a free market. From a Marxist worldview, it would not. There exist multiple rationales, that appear logic when they adhere to the rules of the system, they are located in. In relation to dispositif, I view rationale as consisting of, among other things, philosophical assertions, knowledge claims, and subject constructions. One way to describe it is that the dispositif produces and reproduces (a) worldview(s) that describe, explain, and make prescription for the world. This is what I refer to as rationale and connect to the terms 'unpeaceful', 'road to peace', and 'peace'. It is the reasoning behind the content of the terms, the why, in why the terms are filled with the content they are. Why is peace understood to mean a certain thing and not another? For example, the liberal peacebuilding paradigm tends to describe peace as democracy, partly because of their view of human nature. It is important to point out that this rationale is not always cohesive; it can be contradictory and break the rules of its own system.

It is also from this point of view of peacebuilding as a dispositif that the case of Kyrgyzstan becomes interesting in another aspect. The identified 'urgent need' that activated this peacebuilding dispositif in Kyrgyzstan was ethnic violence, but now this dispositif is used to address another 'urgent need', namely violent extremism.

3.4 Summary

In this chapter, I have presented my understanding of this project's key concepts. First, I described the terms that are used in my operational research questions, 'unpeaceful', "road to peace', and "peace', as empty terms. What I mean by this is that I am searching in my data for

how these concepts are understood, and therefore, I am not offering a set definition of them. The 'unpeaceful' is what in my document is described as in opposition to peace or as a problem. The 'road to peace' is what the document describes as the activities that need to be done to 'fix' the problem and bring peace. 'Peace' is what is described in the document as the desired outcome.

Then I presented two main concepts that shape my understanding of my data: genealogy and dispositif. Both of these are derived from Foucault's conceptualization. Genealogy attempts to trace the descent of a phenomenon through time, analyzing both the happenings and non-happenings, the mistakes, and battles. Genealogy, therefore, implies an ontological theory of history as well as a methodology. I related this to Oliver P. Richmond's description of a genealogy of peace, within which he has identified four phases of conceptualization of peace. I argued that within the documents of UN PBF's engagement in Kyrgyzstan, a genealogy of problem-representation of what is 'unpeaceful' in Kyrgyzstan could be found. In other words, the concept of genealogy helps me 'bind' my case and explain the relationship between the analyzed document.

The second concept, dispositif, can be explained as a form of apparatus. This apparatus consists of discourses, institutions, administration, knowledge claims, etc., which develops in response to an 'urgent need'. Through this development, several non-homogenous elements are bound together in a system, 'held' together by the dispositif. The dispositif consists of, and creates, practices and knowledges. Through this dispositif, governing is conducted in a netlike manor. I argued that peacebuilding could be understood as having a dispositif and that in the case of Kyrgyzstan, we can see this dispositif responding to an 'urgent need'. A specific dispositif was developed to address specifically Kyrgyzstan's 'urgent need'. The dispositif in Kyrgyzstan consists of fragmented elements of actors, administration, philosophical assertions, ect., that are bound under the term peacebuilding in order to normalize the situation. However, this 'urgent need' that the dispositif initially responded to in Kyrgyzstan seems to have changed from ethnic violence to violent extremism. The question is: did the dispositif change, and if so, what parts?

4 Methodological Framework

As previously mentioned, the research question this project aims to answer is: *Has there been a change in the rationale behind the UN's 2013-16 PPP compared to the 2017-19 PPP?* In this chapter, how I will present how I will go about answering my research question. This will be presented in six different sections. In the first section, the research design will be discussed. In the second section, the method for analyzing the documents is explained. Because my methodology is directly connected to the concept presented in the previous chapter, there will be a slight repetition in this section. In the third section, the data is presented and discussed. This is followed by section four, where my positionality is briefly outlined. In section five, two challenges that has shaped the project are described. In the last section, a brief summary of the chapter is given.

4.1 Single Case Study Design

The aim of this qualitative study is to gain an in-depth understanding of the specific peacebuilding project in Kyrgyzstan funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and how it has changed. A case study design has been employed for this research. As Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack (2008:545) describes it, a case is the research project unit of analysis: that which you want to study. Moreover, the case is a phenomenon within a bounded system. Putting 'borders' on the phenomenon of study helps the researcher from having too broad questions. The borders of one's case help determine what is to be studied and what is not. Baxter and Jack (2008:146) suggest that the researcher can 'bind' a case by, among other things defining time, place, activity, and context. The case in this project is understood to be the UN PBF peacebuilding projects in Kyrgyzstan between 2010-2019.

According to Robert K. Yin (2003), a case study design can be employed when three conditions are present in the project: the project contains an *exploratory* research question, deals with a *contemporary phenomenon*, and the researcher has little or no *control* over this phenomenon. Further, Yin (2003) describes a case study design as an empirical investigation of a contemporary phenomenon in its situated context, when the delimitation between context and phenomenon is unclear. This project deals with an exploratory question by asking what the rationale behind the peace projects is and if it has changed. It deals with a phenomenon that is contemporary, and the researcher has no control over it. While Kyrgyzstan is a big part of the context, this project is not a research project on Kyrgyzstan per se. Kyrgyzstan is the geographical place where the peacebuilding projects in question are played out. It is however, not the only 'location' of such the projects. The peacebuilding projects that are analyzed are

shaped by the Kyrgyz context as well as the UN organizational context. Neither of which can be detached from the phenomena, yet neither is the sole location of it either.

For this project, the function of the single case study design is to delimit the scope of the project. As will be expanded below, the method for analyzing the documents is a policy analysis based on Foucauldian discourse analysis. Delimiting a discourse is notoriously tricky. By employing a case study design, the frame (time, place, and actor) of the project will help decide the 'cut off point' of the discourse. This is an artificial limitation of a discourse that cannot actually be contained. However, it will limit the data scope and subsequentially the discourse. By limiting what is to be analyzed, a case study design helped make the project feasible. It should be noted that this project deviates from a more traditional approach of case study design by not using several types (levels) of data. Instead, the data selection has been informed by the chosen method of analysis and the theoretical underpinnings that shapes it. I also do not employ any of the five analysis techniques suggested by Yin (2003), but instead employ the What is the problem represented to be? (WPR) method. It is the methodology behind the WPR that has to a larger degree than single case study design shaped my understanding of the object of study. This can be seen in my formulation of the research question. The method of WPR will be presented in the following section, before moving on to discuss the data of this research.

4.2   What is the Problem Represented to Be?

The method used for analyzing the documents is *What is the problem represented to be?* (WPR) method. It is a policy analysis that incorporates elements from discourse analysis and post-structuralist theory (Bacchi, 2016). It consists of six questions that can be used for either singular steps in the analysis or for integrated analysis (see appendix 2). The method is developed by Carol Bacchi, a researcher working within feminist research and policy theory (Bacchi, n.d.) She takes a critical stance toward traditional policy analysis methods and considers these methods as problem-solving. Problem-solving is problematic because if we attempt to solve a problem, we have already accepted the status of the object as a problem. Instead, Bacchi (2009) means we need to question the status of something as a problem and the particular form of that problem. She takes a social constructivist approach to problems, arguing that problems are socially produced, as opposed to objectively "discovered". Through using WPR, the researcher is asked to pay attention to how governments and other actors are actively shaping particular understandings of problems and what effect this might have (Bacchi, 2009).

The first question to answer when doing WPR is for clarification: *what is the problem represented to be in the policy?* Bacchi (2009) points out that discourses produce knowledges

that shape and limit what we can think, speak, or write about a subject or object. She also notes that some discourses have higher statutes than others, and these tend to be produced or sustained by institutions. Discourse is here understood according to Foucault's conceptualization: discourse is a practice of socially produced forms of knowledge(s), with its own sequences and successions, which shapes understandings of a particular subject/object (Bacchi, 2016). It is important to note that the topic of the policy might not necessarily be the problem. Policies can also contain multiple problem representations that are sometimes contradictory. This is one of the reasons why we need to start with a question of clarification. Moreover, Bacchi argues that policies are prescriptive by their nature by their aiming to 'fix' something. This, in turn, requires a problem to have been identified. Furthermore, how we suggested to address something can reveal how we view the problem is understood. Bacchi means that every policy creation is a problematizing-activity that produces a problem representation. Because policies are a tool for governing utilized by states and other actors, Bacchi argues that we as populations are governed through problematizations. She describes problematizations as a framing mechanism, that is shaping what is seen as significant and insignificant (Bacchi, 2009).

The second question when doing a WPR is: *what presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the problem?* With this question, the truth-claim of the problem is questioned, as well as the conceptual logic behind the representation of it. As part of this question, Bacchi (2009) suggests that the researcher, in particular, pays particular attention to binaries, key concepts, and categories. These are part of what makes a representation accepted or employed. Bacchi (2009) bases part of her theory on Foucault's work. Foucault suggested that there are different modes of ruling, what he referred to governmentalities. He also uses the term to signify a specific style of rule in Europe during the late eighteenth century. This form of rule focused on ruling the population often through regulatory and disciplinary tools like policies. How problems are perceived is often similar across different policy areas. In other words, they often share the same conceptual logic, which scholars like Rose and Dean have called governmental or political rationalities (Bacchi 2009). Bacchi argues that when it comes to policies, we should study the problem representation, the rationality behind them, and the effects these representations have. Furthermore, she argues that we need to assess these representations critically and how they were made possible.

The third question in WPR is: *How has this representation of the 'problem' come about?* (Bacchi, 2009:10). While question two is close to Foucault's (1970) concept of archeology, the third question is a form of genealogy. According to Bacchi (2009), the goal of a genealogy is to question assumptions of natural evolution and instead investigate what could have developed

and why it did not happen. From a social constructivist approach, subjects' status as problems are not given, they are constructed as such. Hence, Bacchi (2009) argues that we need to pay attention to the process that made this construction possible and dominant. By doing this, we also learn about alternative problem-representations.

Question four in a WPR is: *What is left unproblematic in this representation of the problem? Where are the silences? Can the problem be thought about differently?* (Bacchi, 2009:12). This question builds on the previous, where the researcher, through conducting genealogical analysis notes the "countless lost events". Problem-representations functions as a form of framing, and therefore some things will inevitably fall outside the frame, can be overlooked or simplified. The policy process shape not only what governments or other actors do, but also what they do not do, so-called non-decisions.

The fifth question of a WPR asks: *What effects are produced by this representation of the problem?* (Bacchi, 2009:15). As mentioned, discourses can shape our perceptions and, in turn, our actions. Another way to put this is; how we speak and think about things or people have real lived consequences. Moreover, policies are prescriptive, meaning they tell what action the actors should take. The framing of policy discourses, therefore, has a direct impact on real-life actions. Bacchi (2009) claims that in order to assess policies critically, we need to ask what consequences they may have. She argues that problem representations disadvantage some and benefit others. Bacchi, therefore, ask the researcher to also reflect on both symbolic and material effects (in Bletsas & Beasley, 2012). She lists three different categories of effects to consider. Firstly, discursive effects, which are the limit of what can be thought caused by the discourse in the policy. Secondly, subjectification effects, which are the way subjects and subjectivities are constructed through the policy. Thirdly, lived effects, which is the material consequences of the policy on matter of life and death (Bacchi, 2009).

The last question of WPR is: *How/where is this representation of the problem produced, disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and replaced?* (Bacchi, 2009:19). The WPR is based in a poststructuralist philosophy. Poststructuralist theories argue that 'things' are not fixed but are maintained by heterogeneous practices and relations. This stems from a Foucauldian understanding of power as circular and productive. Foucault argues that power is not held by actors, instead subjects are constructed in discursive power and act in a context of power. Moreover, power is understood as something not only repressive but productive: power brings 'things' into being. From this perspective, what we should analyze is the power relations that bring something into being (Bacchi & Goodwin, 2016). The last

question does not only ask where and how a certain representation is upheld but also where there is 'space' for resistance (Bacchi, 2009).

Bacchi (2009) notes that 'policy' can be understood to mean a program or a course of action that seeks to resolve problems. I argue that the Practical Peacebuilding Plans (PPP) are similar to policies. It is a 'practical' text, prescribing actions aimed at providing a solution to an identified problem. It is a tool through which both UN actors and the Kyrgyz state is attempting to govern. Considering that the objectives in the PPP 2013-2016 and the PPP 2017-2019 differs, it is prudent to ask if the UN Peacebuilding Fund's (PBF) view of the problem has changed. Through using WPR as a method, I can describe *what* is seen as a problem, *how* this problem is represented, and how this particular presentation of a problem has come about. I am also able to "deconstruct" the problem representation by asking what assumptions are built into this representation, what effects the problem representation has, and how is this problem presentation produced? The problem here refers to whatever 'unpeaceful' (see the previous chapter for further explanation) the PPP's are trying to address. The description of the 'unpeaceful' also indicates the desired outcome, 'peace' and like versa. What activities the documents prescribe, what I have referred to as 'road to peace', can also highlight what is seen as 'unpeaceful' or 'peace'. The content and justification of these three concepts: 'unpeaceful', 'road to peace, and 'peace' is what I have referred to as the peacebuilding rationale (see the previous chapter). Because WPR helps me tease out what these three concepts are represented to be, I consider it a suitable method for answering my research questions.

4.3   Data Discussion

I have argued for the understanding of the UN PBF's peacebuilding projects in Kyrgyzstan as a single case and within this case, I have identified two main discursive 'events' as my analytical starting points. These two discursive events are the beginning of the two long-term (PRF) peacebuilding projects in Kyrgyzstan, and their text the PPP of 2013-16 and the PPP of 2017-19. It is between these two discursive events a shift in focus has happened. When formulating the aim and the objectives of the projects, a Joint Steering Commission (JSC) was established. The JSC consists of representatives from the Peacebuilding Support Office, UN agencies, the national government and agencies, as well as academic experts and civil society actors (for an example see appendix 4). The JSC commission formulates what is referred to as a Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP). According to Cedric de Coning and Eli Stamnes (2016), it is through the process of creating the PPP that the JSC develops what peacebuilding means in

the specific country context they are active. The PPP needs to be pass through several UN groups and be approved by the national government (see appendix 1).

The PPP is similar to a contract between the Peacebuilding Support Office, the Peacebuilding Fund and the national government. The PPP function as a mandate, describing the aim of the project, the activities, and the reasoning behind these, as well as the budget. To date (2020), two PPP's have been formulated, the PPP 2013-16 and the PPP 2017-19. These are the documents that sub-projects by RUNO's need to adhere to in order to get funded through the allocated PRF budget. Because of this, as well as the fact that a shift in objective is notable between the two documents, they were chosen as a starting point of my analysis. This means that I divided my analysis into two phases. The first phase starts at my first main discursive event, the first PPP, and stretch back in time to the first project funded by PBF in Kyrgyzstan in 2010. I also included the PPP's sub-projects, even if they were written after the PPP. The second phase of my analysis starts at my second main discursive 'event': the second PPP, and stretch back in time to the first PPP. Similarly, I included the second PPP's sub-projects in the second phase (see figure below).

First, the PPP 2013-16 was in-depth analyzed according to the six questions of WPR described above. By asking these questions, I found themes that together make up the problem representation. The themes were then traced through documents of previous peacebuilding projects funded through PBF, as well as the approved sub-project under the PPP. Ideally, when conducting a WPR not only the "policy" are studies but also a "cluster of related relevant documents" (Adelaide Graduate Centre, n.d.). I view the documents describing previous projects, as well as sub-project to the PPP's, as my cluster of relevant documents. Moreover, it is within these documents I am searching for the genealogy of the problem representation present in the PPPs. It was not feasible to analyze all my cluster documents by asking the six questions of WPR. Instead, I performed a limited analysis of these documents, where the main focus was to trace the themes found in the PPPs. Therefore, I analyzed three aspects of these documents: the occurrence of the themes, problem representations that were not found in the PPP (interdiscursivity) and the occurrence of intertextuality. The interdiscursivity shows me the 'lost battles', how the problem could have been understood. The intertextuality was included to see is I could see when themes of problem representations entered from outside texts. The intertextuality only helped highlight a few texts, although it also showed a lack of related research texts in some projects, which turn out to significant. The same process was then applied to the documents in my second phase of analysis. The project description documents of the short-term projects and the sub-projects of the PPPs were analyzed. Unfortunately, it falls

outside the scope of this project to analyze the entire project portfolios, as it amounts to over 300 documents[8].


Figure 1. Timeline of the UN PBF Peacebuilding Projects in Kyrgyzstan.

The documents are publicly published by the UN on Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office Database "Gateway"[9] and are open for download. The documents frequently have no name or title, but instead are filed under the project title. This means that several documents can be filed under the same name. In order to avoid confusion, I have named the documents (see the data reference list). In one case, the project description document was missing. Therefore, the first project report document was used instead. In two cases the project description document was the exact same as a previous project. The two first clusters of short-term (IRF) projects have a steering document similar to a PPP, these documents were also analyzed by looking for the themes, interdiscursivity and intertextuality. In total: two PPPs, two steering document, and 34 project description documents were analyzed. When the analysis of intertextuality showed a strong reoccurrence of some documents, these were read by looking only for the presence of the problem representation themes.

Initially, the documents were supposed to be supplemented with interviews of people working in the Recipient United Nations Organizations (RUNOs). However, only one interview was conducted due to problems with access. This point will be discussed in the subsection on challenges and limitations. While the interview offered additional insight into the projects, it will not be used as data since anonymity cannot be guaranteed.

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[8] Documents that were not analyzed include semi-annual and annual project reports as well as evaluations and budget extensions.
[9] Can be found here: http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/country/KGZ

4.4 Positionality of the Researcher

As a researcher positioned within social constructionism epistemology, it is important to reflect on what representations I contribute to. Self-reflexivity is an integrated part of doing a WPR analysis. Bacchi (2009) acknowledges scholars' role in producing, participating, and maintaining discourses by arguing that scholars do not stand outside their social context, but is they are integrated parts of both their society and governing. As such, it is prudent to reflect on my own positionality and relation to the context in question.

Six years ago, I would not have been able to place Kyrgyzstan on the map. I have never been particularly good at geography. However, in my bachelor program we were reading about cases that made it clear that geographical locations could be a vital aspect of understanding a conflict. In order to try to get better, I bought a big world map and put it on one of my walls. I would look at it as I read the news hoping that it would help me memorize the places. One day I was looking at Central Asia and realized I know almost nothing about these countries. I am ashamed to admit it, but I did not know that Kyrgyzstan was a real country. However, I am a student and trying to learn how I spend my days, so I decided to educate myself about Kyrgyzstan. As I was studying peace and conflict, I read about Kyrgyzstan first and foremost from these kinds of sources. I was fascinated. Kyrgyzstan has such an interesting history, is clearly a case relevant to peace and conflict studies. As we learned of theories, I could relate a lot of them to Kyrgyzstan, yet nobody seemed to be talking about Kyrgyzstan. I also learned that the UN was funding peace projects in Kyrgyzstan through the Peacebuilding Fund. This was five years ago, and I am by no means an expert on Kyrgyzstan, but I have "checked-in" every now and then, especially on the UN's work. When I saw that UN PBF decided to change direction and start doing Prevention of Violent Extremism (PVE), I was surprised and decided to study it. This is how I developed my interest in this issue.

As mentioned above, this project is based on a social constructivist world view. This has several consequences when it comes to reflexivity. Social constructivist approaches tend to acknowledge the subjectivity of the researcher. I view myself as a tool that directly shaped and influenced the project, and as such, some aspects of my background need to be presented.

My academic background is from Peace and Conflict Studies, both as my bachelor's and master's programs. Both of these have addressed Peace and Conflict Studies as a multidisciplinary field. In addition, I have taken courses in human rights, philosophy, and political science. As I was coding my data, my previous education was relevant in multiple ways. Clearly, having education in peace studies was relevant when analyzing peacebuilding documents. The practical and the academic sides of the peacebuilding field are not as

disconnected that many seem to believe. Many of the interdiscourses I found in my data echoed theories and researcher I had studied from academia. Without my background, I might not have seen how much of the language in the documents were derived from human rights discourse, for instance. However, just as my specific academic background enabled me to see some aspects of my data, it may also have blinded me from other aspects.

In some aspects, Kyrgyzstan is quite different from the land I call home, Sweden. I do not speak any of the local languages (mainly Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Russian). I am 'Western' and in Kyrgyzstan the "West" has played multiple roles. Right now, Western (among other) states are engaging in development, peacebuilding and PVE/counter-terrorism projects. This means that the West as an actor in Kyrgyzstan has been quite varied, but always as an outsider. However, it should be noted that I did not do research on the local population as such. I did research only on the UN PBF in the context of Kyrgyzstan. In the autumn of 2019, I had the opportunity to go to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, for study exchange. Not only did this offer me insight into the contextualization for my project, but I also attended a course that focused on the Soviet approach to "the national question". This helped to nuance my understandings of the ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan, and to see a continuation of a discourse (civic unity) that carried into the documents I analyze.

4.5 Challenges and Limitations

To some extent, the challenges have been addressed by the sections above. However, there were two points of difficulties I wish to expand on in this section. The first problem was with regard to access and time. The second problem was that an article had been published that was very similar to the original focus of this project, which led me to change mine slightly.

I started contacting people within the UN organization in Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 2019. Initially, the response was quick and positive. I was given the names of some people that fitted my initial criteria. After some weeks, I had made contact with some individuals that agreed to participate. As mentioned above, I had the opportunity to go to Kyrgyzstan as an exchange student. After settling in Bishkek, I re-contacted my prospective interviewees. I did not get many responses, thus throughout my time in Kyrgyzstan I managed to get only one interview. I am thankful for this person taking the time to talk to me. Some of my interviewees completely stopped responding to my emails. This may be due to a lack of interest in participating. Perhaps they felt they had to say yes to participating initially as their name was given to me by their boss. It is however, equally possible that they just did not have the time. The PPP 2017-2019 was coming to an end, meaning that the people in the RUNO's had to try to finish their project

and prepare or participate in evaluations. This was poor planning on my part. Perhaps they would have been more interested in talking to me in February 2020. In addition, I read an article about the same research case, which was my second problem.

At the beginning of 2020, I found an article by the professor Chuck Thiessen (2019a) titled "The Strategic Ambiguity of the United Nations Approach to Preventing Violent Extremism". He had conducted a research with a very similar focus I had originally planned for. He had researched the UN PBF's peace project that focused on PVE in Kyrgyzstan, the result of the PPP- 2017-2019. As I was having trouble getting interviews and Thiessen (2019a) had conducted 47 interviews with people working with the project, I decided to focus on the documents instead of the interviews.

4.6 Summary

In this chapter, the research design of single case study design was presented. The case design was utilized to 'bind' the project. The project delimitations are based on time, actor, and geographical place. This means that the case is the UN PBF's peacebuilding projects in Kyrgyzstan between 2010-2020. The method for analyzing the data, WPR was presented. WPR is a policy analysis based on Foucauldian discourse analysis that was developed by Carol Bacchi (2009). Through employing this method, the status of subject or object as a problem is questioned and the development of something as problematic is analyzed by using a genealogical approach. The method consists of six interlinked questions (see appendix 2). I addition, the data for the project was presented. Two discursive events, the PPP 2013-2016 and the PPP 2017-2019 were used as starting points for the WPR. The documents were analyzed and the themes that made up the problem representation were found. These themes were then searched for in previous project descriptions funded by the PBF. These documents were also analyzed for inter-textuality and inter-discursiveness. Then the position of the researcher was presented, including epistemological view, academic background, and social labels in relation to the project. In the last section, two main challenges were discussed relating to gaining access and previous research.

5 Analysis

In this chapter, the analysis will be presented in two sections. In the first section, the analysis of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan of 2013-16 (PPP1) will be presented. In the second section, the Peacebuilding Priority Plan of 2017-19 (PPP2) will be presented. The PPP's were written by the JSC, which consists of a multitude of different actors Kyrgyz state representatives and RUNO (see appendix 4 for example). In PPP1, six themes were found, while in the PPP2, five themes where found. These will be presented in respective subsections. These two sections contain subsections where the main themes of the problem representation will be presented, explained and related to theoretical discourse. The six questions of method WPR were applied to help deconstruct and analyze the documents. Bacchi has noted that the presentation of analysis does not have to be structured according to the six analytical questions (Bacchi, n.d.). Therefore, the problem representation will be presented thematically for readability.

5.1 The Peacebuilding Priority Plan of 2013-2016

The applied method, WPR, was used to analyze what is presented as a problem. This includes reflection of whether a phenomenon should be considered a problem, and if so in what form. In order to do that, we need first to describe how the problem is presented and what logic it is built on. By applying the WPR method to the Peacebuilding Priority Plan of 2013-2016 (PPP 1) I found six themes: (1) Three Kinds of Violence, (2) The Problem of a Weak State, (3) The Lack of Rule of Law, (4) Developing 'Civic-ness', (5) The Need for Closure, (6) Women and Youth. Question three of the WPR focus on the problem-representations genealogy and in order to answer this question, the themes were traced through previous project descriptions. These 'cluster' documents consist of the first two groups of short-term peacebuilding projects (IRF) from 2010 to 2012. In addition to these, the sub-projects of the PPP1 were analyzed. Moreover, connected texts and discourses were read to gain insight into the development of the themes. After the themes have been presented, a summary will be given at the end of the section where my three operational questions are answered directly.

5.1.1 Three Forms of Violence

This theme consists of violence represented as a problem in three different ways: the eruption of violence, Kyrgyz cultural acceptance of violence, and Gender Based Violence.

The starting point for the PPP1 is the events in 2010, which are described as "violence erupted" (PPP1:5). No explanation for the "eruption" is given except for noting a "social and political tension" (PPP1:5). This way of talking about the events of 2010 equates it with

violence, meaning other behaviors or expressions of conflict is not considered. It also presents the violence (and therefore the conflict) as something that did not happen before June the 10th and stopped after June the 14th. One aspect that is omitted, is that it happened between two ethnic groups and that these groups have been in conflict before. Subsequently, detaching the act of violence from its motivation. In a later section, the relationship between these ethnic groups Kyrgyz and Uzbeks are given as an example of mistrust. Most articles and reports I have read describe the conflict as being between these groups, including an earlier project description that notes a report that the violence against Uzbeks, "if proven beyond doubt, would qualify as crimes against humanity" (IRF/36-41:4). The PPP1 presents this as merely one relationship among others that is conflictual. By using "for example" (PPP1:5), the PPP1 soften the representation of the Kyrgyz-Uzbek relationship as *the* problem. This means that another silence is created, that of nation-building. When presenting the problem as Kyrgyz versus Uzbeks, it is often described in majority and minority terms. This, in turn, can be connected to nationalism and the discourse of a nation-state in Kyrgyzstan (see for example Laurelle, 2012; Baruch Wachtel, 2013; Marat, 2008).

While the first representation of violence as a problem described violence as an act or event. The second representation of violence describes violence as value, or rather the lack of 'correct' values. This is done by describing the use of violence as a now culturally accepted way to resolve conflicts: "violence is acceptable by some" (PPP1:6); "use of violence as a means to resolve disputes" (PPP1:7); "in which violence is viewed as acceptable undermines the creation of a favorable environment for peace " (PPP1:16). It also claims a "high prevalence of violence (particularly against women, and children and youth in families and school)" (PPP1:13). There are notes made on violence against children, but more focus is put on Gender Based Violence (GBV) against women. GBV is the third way that violence is described as a problem in the PPP1. The subjectification effects of the categories women and youth will be discussed in detail in the last theme.

The conflict is mainly described in terms of violence in the previous project descriptions as well. The first phase of short-term peacebuilding descriptions describes the conflict predominantly as "the violence in the south provinces" (IRF-22/3:3); "the 2010 violence" (IRF-22/2:4), without offering much explanation why the violence took place. However, the document IRF/36-41 offers context for the violence. It notes the "Grave political instability, longstanding ethnic and sub-regional tensions in Central Asia" and describing events of 2010, but still focused on "rising turbulence climaxed in June 2010 in violent inter-ethnic clashes"

(IRF/36-41). It does however, explicitly and repeatedly describe it as "ethnic-based violence" (PBFIRF/36-41) and presents "nationalistic political discourse" (PBF/IRF/36-41) as a problem.

This means that the second phase of short-term peacebuilding projects gave more contextual descriptions and explanations of the violence then the PPP1 does. One potential reason is that there has been a progressive sanitation of language concerning inter-ethnic violence. Lottholz (2018) has pointed out that since the 2010 events, the Kyrgyz state has attempted to silence issues of ethnic tension. This, in turn, enables peacebuilding projects to do state-building while not discussing the potential negative consequence this could have on inter-ethnic relationships.

The presentation of cultural acceptance of violence can also be found in previous project descriptions, albeit mainly as implied in the proposed solution: "Implementing a culture of peace" (IRF-22/2:18) and "culture of peace values" (IRF-39:3).

The focus on GBV is found in the first round of short time peacebuilding projects (IRF-22). Kyrgyzstan was at the time (2010) described as "a priority country for UN Women" (IRF-22/1:5), and because of the UN's Women Peace and Security agenda, there is a special focus on GBV. This was addressed by, among other things, giving legal support to Kyrgyz and Uzbeks women. Here gender becomes synonymous with women. In the second run of short time peacebuilding project (IRF/36-41) GBV is treated as a subsection of violence and it is discursively linked to the ethnic violence instead of a freestanding activity: "Allegations of gender based violence were also used to trigger hate and violence in June 2010" (IRF/36-41). And "gender inequalities" and "masculinities" are described as a part of the problem (IRF/36-41). This document exemplifies gender mainly in terms of women but does not conflate the two concepts. These nuances are not found in the PPP1.

5.1.2 The Problem of a Weak State

The second theme I found consists of representing the Kyrgyz state as weak and unable to keep order or provide social services.

One of the three key factors to building peace according to the PPP1 is "structure", along with "values" and "behavior" (PPP1:5). The structure they are referring to is the state structure, spanning from the national level down to 'local' level, generally referred to as local self-governing bodies (LSG). The section on structural factors include "weak state control and governance" as a problem and describes strengthening the state's capacity to deliver services as a solution (PPP1:6). Moreover, the document presents the lack of capacity of the state to provide social service as a source of grievances.

In addition, it states "the challenges facing state authorities to uphold the rule of law are significant" (PPP1:6). It exemplifies this with incidents of rallies, protests and demonstrations. In one of the examples the PPP1 gives, the protesters asked for better social services and nationalization of the mine. The opposition is also accused of trying to take power during these protests. Interestingly, the PPP1 notes "such events have significant impact on the country's economic stability" (PPP1:7), referring to the protests in connection to the gold mine run by a Canadian company. The document also claims that these events increase the "use of violence to resolve disputes". What is not included in the discussion is reflections on the poor working condition in the mine, the continued conflict between the company and the community, nor the tendency for that specific mine to be in the center of corruption accusations. In the PPP1, the problem is represented as the protest's effect on political and economic stability rather than the protesters' grievances.

The PPP1 notes a contextual factor connected to the state weakness that is presented: "border delimitation and demarcation" (PPP1:4), suggesting the state has not conciliated its borders. Moreover, there are several references to political instability. It notes "weak governance" is one of the things contributing to "the sense of human insecurity". At one point the PPP1 refers to the need for unity in order for "preserving statehood" (PPP1:10). Therefore, the PPP1 aims to "Strengthen capacity of state institutions to implement policies and deliver services" and to reach "successful development" (PPP1:10). The PPP1 makes clear what the Kyrgyz state should develop and be reformed into in one of its outcome areas: "democratic governance" (PPP1:12). It also calls for developing the "capacity of local self-government bodies" and "building up trust in these institutions" (PPP1:18). The "capacity building of the state institutions and mechanism for partnership" (PPP1:19) is one of the aims of the peacebuilding specified by the Kyrgyz president. This theme can be summed up as: the Kyrgyz state is expected to perform as a liberal state that has control over its population, has control over its territory, engages in the liberal market economy, and rules according to democratic values through institutions from national to local level. However, the Kyrgyz state is seen as failing at performing these things. This also prescribes a certain role of citizens; they are asked to act within these institutions, and not to threaten the stability of the state. The same goes for politicians. By not playing their part, the citizens and politicians are hindering the state from 'properly' functioning.

The theme of weak state can be found in previous project descriptions: "worst case scenarios warn of possible disintegration of the country or a fall into fundamentalist rule" (IRF-39:1),

"prevent a collapse" (IRF-39:1), "the situation in the south of Kyrgyzstan is very fragile" (IRF-40:16), "weak, local institutions and civil society" (IRF-37:2).

As noted above, at times it is not only the Kyrgyz state's function that is being questioned but also its survival. There are divergent ideas of what characterizes statehood but often it is centered around control over a territorially demarcated border, control over a permanent population, a government with the ability to speak on behalf of the state, capacity to enter into international treaties, recognition of autonomy by other states, and monopoly on violence (Knight, 1992; Blanco, 2012). Kyrgyzstan is described as failing some of these characteristics; it has not solidified its borders, it does not have a monopoly on violence, and it does not have control over its population (in relation to the two 'revolutions', riots, and protests). In addition, the state is failing at being the provider of social services.

According to Edward Newman (2009), the debate about state weakness started with Robert Jackson discussing negative sovereignty. A state with negative sovereignty was internationally treated as a state but lacked the internal capacity to function as a state, mainly provider of social services and order. The 'developing' African states were said to have negative sovereignty, while the European states were seen as having positive sovereignty. To be a state was defined in reference to the European political entities, and a state with negative sovereignty could, therefore, be seen as failing to function as the European states. Based on Jackson's idea of sovereignty, theories developed that tried to explain a 'new' form of conflict based on state weakness (Newman, 2009). This term gained traction within international relations in the 1990s but Newman (2009) points out that after 9/11, 'failed states' were seen as an existential threat. Therefore, the concept of failed or fragile states is discursively linked to international security. The stability and function of the Kyrgyzstan state are therefore potentially of self-interest to the international community. Within this discourse, rule of law and human rights are described as essential to statehood (Blanco, 2012; Richmond, 2010; Doyle, 2005; Huntley, 1996). This focus on the legal sphere in the PPP1 is the next theme I have found.

5.1.3 The Lack of Rule of Law
The third theme I found focuses on the judicial sphere in Kyrgyzstan: rule of law, human rights, and a culture of impunity.

Under the section values and behaviors, the document describes Kyrgyzstan as having both "inadequate legislation and partial implementation of laws and policies" (PPP1:6). This implies that the problem is how Kyrgyzstan does not have the right laws, and the ones they have are not followed well enough. The PPP1 refers to a previous document, the National Sustainable

Development Strategy (2013-2017), which "identifies the rule of law as a key factor for stability" (PPP1:10). The judicial system is presented as severely lacking. There are references to legal and law-enforcer reforms "law, policies, reforms and recommendation" (PPP1:21). In the evaluation section, it states that the PPP1 will aim "to adopt or amend at least 10 laws" (PPP1:21). There are also references to constitutional problems, "checks and balances mechanisms" (PPP1:6). Rule of law is tied to the liberal peace theory (Richmond, 2010; Blanco, 2012). Rule of law has been described as essential to ensure free-market and property rights (Doyle, 2005) as well as individual-based liberties (Huntley, 1996).

Human right is included in the first priority outcome, together with rule of law (PPP1:12). The assessment of a previous document, the PBNPA, is included in the PPP. In PBNPA, the need for implementing human rights is mentioned several times. Sometimes as explicitly "meet international human rights standards and commitments" (PPP1:9), "human rights" (PPP1:9), "religious freedom" (PPP1:9), "fair trial" (PPP1:9). When discussing the "Target Groups" of the activities, it used human rights-based language, referring to state institutions as "duty-bearers" and individuals as "rights-holders" (PPP1:12). This frames the relationship between individuals and state as one that should be understood according to human rights philosophy. According to Michael W. Doyle (2005), normative commitment to human rights is one of the characteristics of liberal peace. Human rights are also one of the main focus areas of liberal peacebuilding (Richmond 2010; Blanco 2012).

The PPP1 envisages peace in Kyrgyzstan as including a capable state that interacts with its now empowered citizens according to the rules laid out in human rights conventions. To get to this point, the PPP's seeks to capacitate the state institutions, empower vulnerable groups, and educate the society on human rights. The document also makes a point to say that there is "mutual accountability and responsibility between duty-bearers and rights-holders" (PPP1:18).

Within this theme, there is a recurring statement that claims that there is a "culture of impunity" and "lack of respect for the rule of law" in Kyrgyzstan. At the beginning of the document, the wording is 'softened'; "among sections of the population", and "among some officials" (PPP1:6). However, this statement is later repeated without the 'softening': "growing culture of impunity" (PPP1:6), there is "a growing sense of impunity" (PPP1:7), a "lack of respect for rule of law" (PPP1:8), and a need to "reduce levels of impunity" (PPP1:9). This theme can be found in the project descriptions of sub-project funded by the PPP1, some of which use notably stronger language: "public perceptions of an absence of rule-based public life" (PRF/A-2:3), "ultimately leading to anarchy" (PBF/A-2:3). As a solution to this, the PPPs seeks to "promote 'culture of lawfulness and justice'" (PPP1:17). The problem representation

of impunity in Kyrgyzstan can be found in earlier project descriptions as well: "culture of impunity" (IRF-41:7), "addressing existing impunity" (IRF-38:8). However, in earlier documents the word impunity was often accompanied or related to the word corruption: "rampant corruption" (IRF-41:6), "assess whether indeed corruption has been rooted out" (IRF-38:4), "anti-corruption" (IRF-36:10), "widely recognized pervasive corruption in the judiciary" (IRF-38:10). In PPP1 the word corruption is just used once. There seems to have been a gradual shift in the word preference toward impunity, which will be explored in a later section.

The project descriptions of IRF-38 refers to the Universal Periodic Review of Kyrgyzstan made in 2010 and noted that "In particular, Kyrgyzstan committed itself "to protect all human rights and respect democratic principles of the rule of law"". This shows that the interdiscursive linkage between human rights, democracy, and rule of law have been present in the genealogy at least since 2010. Within the PPP1, the Kyrgyzstani culture and people are presented as a problem, by not following a liberal idea of what justice is and how citizens are to govern themselves. The PPP1 expands on what should govern citizens and how they should behave in the Kyrgyz state. This is the next theme to be explored and perhaps the strongest: 'civic-ness'.

5.1.4 Developing 'Civic-ness'

The fourth theme I found is centered around the idea that Kyrgyzstan needs to develop 'civic-ness'. This is expressed in PPP1 in three main ways: identity, education, and values.

After Kyrgyzstan gained independence, it was seen as important to replace the soviet ideology by constructing a sense of belonging and unity in order to keep the country together. When Askar Akayev won the election in October 1990 attempted to deal with the issue of rising nationalism by promoting a civic identity (Laruelle, 2012) based on a unifying national ideology by balancing the ethnic nationalism (Kyrgyz) with that of civic nationalism (Marat, 2012; Gullette & Heathershaw, 2015). Attempting to strike a balance between civic and ethnic identity has been an issue for several post-soviet states.[10]

As part of the third priority outcome, the PPP1 seeks to "enable the further development of a common civic identity" (PPP1:15). This theme is strong and expressed throughout the document: "a common civic identity uniting Kyrgyz citizens needs to be developed further"

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[10] See for example: Hin, J., & Tielkes, O. K. (2003). *Ethnic and Civic Identity: Incompatible Loyalties?: The Case of Armenians in Post-Soviet Georgia*. Royal Dutch Geographical Soc..; Burkhanov, A., & Sharipova, D. (2014). Kazakhstan's Civic-National Identity. In *Nationalism and Identity Construction in Central Asia: Dimensions, Dynamics, and Directions*. Lexington Books Langham, MD. Blakkisrud, H. (2016). Blurring the boundary between civic and ethnic: The Kremlin's new approach to national identity under Putin's third term. *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000–2015*, 249-274; Buhr, R. L., Shadurski, V., & Hoffman, S. (2011). Belarus: an emerging civic nation?. *Nationalities Papers*, *39*(3), 425-440.

(PPP1:5), "lack of common civic identity" (PPP1:8), "unity of the nation as a strong perquisition for preserving statehood" (PPP1:10), "forming a civic nation (e.g., through civic education and awareness" (PPP1:10), "promotion of civic identity, multilingual and multicultural education" (PPP1:12). The Kyrgyz society is portrayed as lacking unity. The solution to this is to promote a "civic identity", which leads to loyalty towards a "civic nation". This is based on several assumptions. Firstly, that there is not already a developed civic identity. Secondly, that a civic identity can actively be developed, and that people will accept this identity and its content. Thirdly, that this civic identity will take primacy in a situation that might have otherwise led to (ethnic) conflict. Fourth, that UN actors can (help) develop this civic identity. And lastly, the actors are able to construct a civic identity in the context of Kyrgyzstan without the identity being conflated with ethnic identities.

Within the PPP1 it is claimed "the development of a civic education is important and ensuring its inclusivity and promotion of common values is essential to its success (PPP1:16). When it comes to what this civic education will teach, "common civic values" (PPP1:16), it is centered around language and multiculturalism. The PPP1 aims to promote the respect and value for multilingualism at the same time it seeks to promote the Kyrgyz as the state language "takes presence as the main language for the country" (PPP1:15). This presents a tension between getting more people to speak Kyrgyz (which has been tied to nationalism) and at the same time encouraging the usage of minority languages. This tension is acknowledged in the document, but nowhere does it account for how it will actually prevent language discrimination or nationalism. Kyrgyzstan is a post-soviet state and according to Joseph Stalin (1945), a nation is characterized by language, national character, territory, or economic conditions. This could be the reason why specifically language is promoted in the PPP1. Moreover, Lottholz (2018) has noted that peacebuilding in Kyrgyzstan has attempted to deal with the 'dilemma of differences' by relying on a discourse that has its roots in the "the peoples' friendship", a soviet slogan. The PPP1's emphasis on multiculturalism and multilingualism can be understood as stemming from this discourse. However, the PPP1 shows strong signs of reinterpreting these aspects as liberal values, especially when reading in the context of the other prescribed activities that rely on a liberal philosophy. This 'civic-ness' may, therefore, have a distinct soviet tradition (multi-culturalism and multilingualism) within Kyrgyzstan that is being shaped by the institutional context of the UN, in order to correspond with the overall liberal analysis of the 'unpeaceful' in Kyrgyzstan. The way it is represented in the PPP1, there is no room for Kyrgyzstan to develop into any other kind of state than one guided by liberal values and institutions, despite a soviet tradition of 'civic-ness'.

The PPP1 links 'civic-ness' to human rights, "civic- and human-rights based education" (PPP1:15), "respect for diversity and minority rights" (PPP1:16). This is discursively connected to the concept of human security, "human insecurity […] can contribute to weakening social cohesion. Human security is here understood as "freedom from want and from fear" (PPP1:5). Moreover, poverty, food insecurity, and migration are identified as causes of insecurity (PPP1:7). To address human insecurity, the PPP1 suggests developing a civic identity and making society more equitable. The activity that is prescribed to address this follows dialogue and platform logic partly. The PPP1 also prescribes "civic and human rights-based education," as well as "culture of lawfulness and justice" and minority rights. It is cleared that this 'civic-ness' is not an empty box to be filled; it already comes with content. Philosophical assumptions of the nature of the state and governance, what it means to be a citizen, what is to be valued (multiculturalism and multilingualism). The document states it will use the educational sector and "the power of media to promote unity" (PPP1:9).

The theme of 'civic-ness' can be found in previous project descriptions: "transition from ethnic identity to civil identity" (IRF-36), "constructive civic purpose and engagement" (IRF-38:2). Moreover, the intertextuality is particularly strong in this theme. There is one document that is constantly referred to, The Concept on Strengthening the People's Unity and Inter-Ethnic Relations in the Kyrgyz Republic (2013). This document is often referred to as simply "the concept". In the earliest project documents, the concept had not been written yet, but it is still being referred to as the policy discussion was ongoing (IRF-36:1; IRF-40:2; IRF-41:2). This debate seems to have been highly influential on the problem-representation of Kyrgyzstan, as the document is reference to in almost every analyzed document.

Civic identity is derived from the ancient Greek city-state system and was centered around public duties and public behavior (Sage Knowledge, n.d.). It is tied to individual rights and behavior, not only a feeling of belonging. There have been multiple research attempting to establish a causal link between civic culture and democracy[11]. Sidney Verba and Gabriel A. Almond (1963) argued that trust to each other and the state was essential to building democracy. However, Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson (1994) found that there was no causal link between trust. In other words, trust does not cause democracy. Despite this, trust is often the central nod in theories about civic culture's effect on democracy. This is based on the old

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[11] Verba, S., & Almond, G. (1963). *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.; Inglehart, R. (1988). The renaissance of political culture. *American political science review*, *82*(4), 1203-1230.; Muller, E. N., & Seligson, M. A. (1994). Civic culture and democracy: the question of causal relationships. *American political science review*, *88*(3), 635-652.

civic model, which argues that to become a stable democracy, the state needs subjects loyal to the democratic state not critical (Dalton & Chull Shin 2014). In research on civic identity, civic is sometimes assumed to mean liberal, and civic identity is taken to mean liberal democratic identity (see for example Macedo, 2000; Ipperciel 2007). This means that in this discourse, civic and democracy are no longer treated as two different categories.

The focus on trust (expanded below) in the PPP1 correspond to the old civic model. The citizens are to be active in their prescribed roles but not critical. They are to develop a feeling of belonging to a political community, loyalty to the state, engage in the public sphere according to liberal values. The content of the 'civic-ness' did not have to be liberal, but the way it is described here it is. What is to be taught to the citizens through so-called civic education that tends to be focused on democracy and human rights. This will create a civic culture that does not lead to ethnic conflict, resulting in Kyrgyzstan becoming a stable liberal democracy. This kind of reasoning can be seen as civic nationalism (Lecours, 2000; Ipperciel, 2007) or liberal nationalism (Tamir, 1995)

5.1.5 The Need for Closure

The fifth theme I found is centered around discourses of closure, reconciliation, and trust. It is described as a "lack of justice" (PPP1:5), "Memory of the conflict" (PPP1:8) "need of closure", "lack of reconciliation", "justice for the past" (PPP1:9), and "no widely accepted and recognized reconciliation process" (PPP1:5). This implies that the conflict has ended but has not been 'put to rest'. Reconciliation is also the third outcome area of the PPP1.

Moreover, there is a silence in this theme, as there are events that are not described that is connected to this problem representation. In the immediate aftermath, binary terms were used to describe the events. The international community largely described the Uzbek community as the victim and the Kyrgyz community as the perpetrator. Even with more nuanced descriptions, the statistics and reports show that the brunt of the violence was directed toward the Uzbeks (Galdini, 2014). However, it was also the Uzbek's who allegedly were involved in the conflict that were targeted by the state's legal institution, while Kyrgyz's were not. It appears that avoidance of framing the conflict as ethnic hides important background discourse of this theme related to the role state institutions has played in the conflict.

The representation of lack of reconciliation as a problem was established in the first short-time peacebuilding projects phase: "prepare the ground for long-term reconciliation" (IRF-22/3:2); "a special focus on reconciliation, reconstruction and peacebuilding, specifically" (IRF-22/1:4); "towards reconciliation" (IRF-22/2:4).

Reconciliation is believed to have gained recognition in the global discourse in the early 1990s coming from South Africa (Renner, 2018). Reconciliation has been promoted as an alternative to transitional justice (Renner, 2018). According to Judith Renner (2018), there are two ways that reconciliation was in an early stage presented in opposition to transitional justice, which was originally perceived as punitive justice. However, transitional justice has moved away from ideas of punitive justice, and today justice and reconciliation are often presented as parts of transitional justice. When reconciliation is talked about this way, impunity for human rights violations is generally the discursive "other" (Renner, 2018). The increased use of impunity in the PPP1 as oppose to the early documents noted above might indicate a move toward an increased focus on reconciliation.

This discourse has been incorporated into the UN structure, which proclaimed 2007 as the year of reconciliation. Since then, the inclusion of reconciliation into post-conflict projects has increased. According to Renner (2018), the discourse and practices of reconciliation, including institutions such as truth and reconciliation commission, have become a general standard that is often applied regardless of countries specific context. After the events in 2010, the group Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC) was tasked with a fact-finding mission. In the report, they recommended a truth a reconciliation commission. However, despite all discursive recognition for closure and reconciliation in the project description, there are few suggested activities of reconciliation. In the documents, reconciliation is rather talked about as the outcome of other peacebuilding activities, not as a specific set of activities.

One of these activities is trust-building. It is claimed that "The lack of trust prevails in all sectors of society"(PPP1:5), "often along ethnic lines" (PPP1:5) as well as toward the state institutions: "local authorities do not always enjoy the trust of the people" (PPP1:5), "mistrust of national authorities" (PPP1:14). The solution is then to "Improve trust of citizens in state institutions" (PPP1:9), by capacitate the state through activities that "improve rule of law, delivery of services, participation of citizens" (PPP1:9). Similarly, there is a need to "bridge division and reduce local tensions" (PPP1:3) and "build trust between ethnic groups and reduce segregation" (PPP1:9).

This representation of social tension and distrust is described in previous project descriptions as well: "rebuild trust and confidence" (IRF-22/3:5), "Lack of trust" (IRF-37:3), "re-establish trust between communities and between the communities and national institutions" (IRF-36:6), "profound distrust" (IRF-38:2). Explicit reference to social tensions entered the project descriptions in 2011: "inter-regional tension among Kyrgyz, and between other ethnic groups" (IRF-39:2) and "longstanding ethnic and sub-regional tensions" (IRF-40:4). In these earlier

documents, the tension is connected to ethnicity. This falls away in the PPP1. Reconciliation is mainly described between ethnic groups (though the mentioning of ethnic groups seems to disappear in the PPP1), while trust is both between groups, as well as groups/individuals and institutions (state and media). When introducing a lack of trust as a problem side by side with reconciliation, the affected group of actors increased. The relationship of two specific groups, women and children, to their society is the focus of the next theme.

5.1.6 … and Then the Women and the Youth

The sixth theme I found is centered around the subjectification (discursive making of subjects) of women and the youth. As will be discussed below, women are mainly described as bearing the consequence of the problems or as the solution to them. On the other hand, the youth is described as both a problem and a resource.

Kyrgyzstan was made a pilot country for the UN Seven-Point Action Plan, which was part of the UN Secretary-General's report on women's participation in peacebuilding (S/2010/466). The report was made in 2010, but I have been unable to find the exact time Kyrgyzstan was chosen as a pilot country. The action plan is part of the UN Women Peace and Security agenda and specifically responds to the resolution 1325 that seeks to increase women's participation in peacebuilding. This is also expressed in the PPP1 "highlight the important role of women in peacebuilding (PPP1:9). Women are also mentioned as a category often side by side with minorities and youth. These are described as disempowered (PPP1:12), excluded (PPP:6), marginalized (PPP1:13), vulnerable (PPP1:15), and victims of violence (PPP1:13). The proposed solution to this is to empower these groups to claim their rights and participate, especially in dialogue. Youth is described similarly to women but in addition, youth is described as having an additional vulnerability. The PPP1 notes, "Reduce involvement of vulnerable groups in protests and criminal activities" (PPP1:9) and read on its own this statement might be understood as the categories that are disempowered. Though, this vulnerability that is being referred to here, is for the youth to be manipulated. To understand why I claim this, we need to trace the genealogy of the categorization of these groups in the previous project descriptions.

Since the adoption of the UNSCR 1325 (2000) and the subsequent development of the Women Peace and Security agenda, the UN has had a discursive focus on women's participation in peace activities. This includes the aim of gender main streaming that all parts of UN peacebuilding will be sensitive to gender aspects. The Secretary-General has called for 15% of the budget to be allocated to projects focused on women (UN 7-Point Action Plan, 2010). As part of this, the PBSO gives peacebuilding projects a gender score between 0 and 3

based on how much they focus on women in the project. A project that focuses solely on women gets the highest score, 3. One consequence of this is that the easiest way to show that 15% of the budget has been put on women, is to do separate projects (or specific parts of a project) that focus only on women. This treats women as a side category, not as part of the mainstream projects. Here gender is treated as to mean women. We should not forget that gender is not an empty category to be filled. When mainstreaming gender, the UN is actively mainstreaming one understanding of gender identities. For example, in the case of Kyrgyzstan, gender is described as static and binary: women and men. In none of the project description is the queer community ever mentioned.

Audrey Reeves (2012) points out that within the Women Peace and Security agenda, conflict-affected women are generally described as peaceful and in need of protection. Within the previous project documents I have analyzed, two representations of women were found, the vulnerable women and the pacifying women. In one of the representations, women are described as victims of Gender Based Violence, vulnerable, and disempowered. To be empowered is to be given a voice (IRF-40:3), being able to claim rights (IRF-22/1:5), participating in peacebuilding (IRF-40:3), and public life (IRF-36:6). It also describes how women who have been supported and empowered are active agents in peacebuilding. However, it is important to note that the activity of those empowered women has already been determined. They are enabled to do the prescribed actives, not necessarily other ones. Empowerment is undeniably a buzzword (MacKenzie, 2009) and is especially used in connection with women. Zehra F. Kabasakal Arat (2015) argues that discourse about women within UN is still derived from liberal feminism and that this is especially visible in the discourse around empowerment. She notes that power is described as an individual property yet assumes that if a woman access power, the whole group feels empowered. Often there is a heavy focus on women's participation in traditionally male domains. This corresponds with the representation of women's empowerment described in PPP1.

The representation of women as vulnerable is the strongest one in the data, but there is a second one that is based on the assumption that women are inherently kind. This representation is mainly used when talking about the value of women and minority participation and is most visible in one of the sub-projects of the PPP1. The project seeks to increase the trust in police forces by increasing diversity. It states, "the additional benefit of the presence of more female police officers will be increase gender sensitivity and capacity to respond adequately to specific crime problems faced by women" (PRF/B-3:8). This assumes that women are by default, gender-sensitive, and will respond appropriately to crimes committed against other women,

simpley by being a woman. This approach fits with the findings of Olivera Simić (2010), who describes an "add-women-and-stir" approach. She describes how a call for greater inclusion of women into UN peacekeeping forces is based on an essentializing of women as peaceful and pacifying the man. She notes that this in fact, reinforces gender stereotypes. Reeves (2012) notes that the role of women in UN policing is described as similar to social workers performing tasks like communicating and be there for victims to confide in. In the subproject mentioned earlier, it is also the women that are singled out to be educated on how to handle victims (PRF/B-3:8).

Youth is described as in previous project descriptions as disempowered and as a resource: "the opportunities for capitalizing upon a significant youth "bulge."" (IRF-22/1:6); "Youth contributes to the confidence- and peacebuilding processes" (IRF-22/2:7). Moreover, in the second phase of short-time projects, the youth is described as a potential threat by arguing that a disorientated and unemployment youth may cause "more resistance against the government, destructive expression, civil disorder and possible violence" (IRF/36-41:9) therefore the youth needs "constructive civic purpose and engagement, participation in peace and tolerance initiatives, as well as skills training" (IRF/36-41:9). Moreover, it claims, "youth from the illegal sports clubs […] particularly vulnerable to be involved in violent demonstrations and criminal activities" (IRF/36-41:9) and to be "manipulated" (36-41:9). This problem representation is based in a report of Foundation for Tolerance International, which is referenced frequently. The suggested solution to this, is to "promote diversity and tolerance" in and out of school because "The older they get, the harder it becomes to influence and change their perceptions" (IRF/36-41:9). The youth vulnerability for manipulation is thus a problem as well as an opportunity.

Neither the subjectification of women nor that of the youth leads to a carte blanche empowerment to shape one's own life. Instead, it is centered around the creation of civic subjects. Women are to be participants in male domains while still acting according to their femininity. The assumption of women as peaceful means that women's potential as a threat is never considered. Youth potential as a threat is to be managed, by being taught liberal values of diversity, human rights, and 'civic-ness', as well as find employment so that they can become the new generation of Kyrgyz. Within the genealogy, I find that the UN is treating youth very similarly to how they have treated women within peacebuilding (except for the risk aspect). Youth can be seen as the new women discursively. For example, both have been referred to as the missing piece to peacebuilding. It seems that the WPS agenda is functioning as a template of how to incorporate sub-groups into peacebuilding. The youth in peacebuilding resolution is also very similar to the women in peacebuilding resolutions, and in 2015, a Youth, Peace, and

Security agenda was developed similar to that of the WPS agenda. However, Mayssoun Sukarieh and Stuart Tannock (2018) claims that within this agenda, there has been a securitization of youth, especially in connection to terrorism and extremism.

5.1.7 Summary

The research question of this project was, *Has there been a change in the rationale from the 2013-16 PPP to the 2017-19 PPP* I have described my findings from conducting the WPR on the 2013-2016 PPP as themes to offer a focused but in-depth description of the analysis, but I will now summarize this directly in relation to my three operational questions. My first operation question is *What is represented as 'unpeaceful' i.e., the conflict/problem?* In the PPP1, the wording of ethnic conflict was largely avoided. Instead, multiple aspects were pointed out as issues that together make up the problem representation: violence, weak state, lack of rule of law, and lack of 'civic-ness'. The violence of 2010 is described as erupting, but later the PPP1 makes claims of a cultural acceptance of violence in Kyrgyzstan. The Kyrgyz state is described as weak and failing, particularly in the area of providing social services. The criteria Kyrgyzstan is evaluated according to is democratic liberal state: western states. These are assumed to be strong, stable, and capable states. Kyrgyzstan was also described as lacking rule of law. The state was having trouble legislating and implementing the 'right' laws. In particular, there is an emphasis on Human Rights legislation and implementation. However, it is not only the state that is described as lacking adherence to rule of law. Initially, the PPP1 claim that "some" sections of the population have a culture of impunity. This is later expanded by claiming a lack of respect and impunity values in Kyrgyzstan and that need to be addressed. Once again, the Kyrgyz culture is pointed out as a problem. Kyrgyzstan is described as lacking 'civic-ness', in particular, civic identity and civic values. If developed, this identity is assumed to mitigate intra-group conflict in the country, as Kyrgyzstan citizens would be united as a civic nation. This civic nation would be based on so-called civic values that consist of liberal values such as: democracy, human rights, gender equality, rule of law. This 'civic-ness' also incorporates values culture with a soviet tradition in Kyrgyzstan: multiculturalism and multilingualism. These values are to be bounded in a culture that mange to balance Kyrgyz ethnic culture and multiculturalism, something that has not gone well in Kyrgyzstan up to date. At its most fundamental level, what is presented as 'unpeaceful' is that Kyrgyzstan is not functioning as a proper liberal democratic society. The PPP1 pays a special attention to the groups of women and youth. Women are described as either pacifying or victims. They are described as disempowered and vulnerable. Youth is described similarly but also as both a risk

and a recourse. Vulnerability in the case of youth rely on a discourse of youth as prone to violence and easily manipulated. Youth is to be empowered similarly to women, with an additional focus on proving jobs.

My second operational question is *What is represented as the road to peace i.e., what is suggested to be done about the problem?* The focus on building a civic/liberal society has led to activities aimed at reforming state institutions, especially in the justice sectors and the local governing institutions. The lack of 'civic-ness' also led to a strong focus on educating citizens into 'right' values and behavior by conducting human rights and civic education. In addition, the mistrust between the segments of the population as well as toward the state needed to address to develop civic unity. This is to be done by 'dialogue and platform' activities. Moreover, the PPP2 describes a need for "closure" of the 2010 events but it not actually related to any specific reconciliation activity in the PPP2. Instead, it is presented as an outcome of other activities. Activities aimed at women focused on educating and empowering them into becoming active liberal subjects.

My third operational question is *What is represented as peace i.e., what is the desired outcome?* The 'civic-ness' is the strongest theme and is put to explanatory use. The lack of 'civic-ness' is described as a cause of conflict, unity to a civic nation based on civic unity with civic subjects actively participating in the public sphere is the prescribed end result. The road there is partially through educating about 'civic-ness', with the assumption that if people learn about 'civic-ness', they will abandon previous values and identities to adhere to these civic ones. As noted above, the PPP1 describes state institutions organized according to liberal ideas as the way to mitigate conflict, including local state institutions. The justice sector is to be developed according to human rights principles and international norms.

5.2 The Peacebuilding Priority Plan of 2017-2019

The applied method, WPR, was used to analyze what is represented as a problem. This includes the reflection of whether a phenomenon should be considered a problem, and if so, in what form. To do that, we need first to describe how the problem is presented and what logic it is built on. In the Peacebuilding Priority Plan of 2017-19 (PPP2) I found five themes that make up the problem representation: (1) An Emerging Phenomena, (2) Building a House of Cards, (3) A Weak yet Heavy-Handed State, (4) Alienation and Civic Participation as The Antidote, (5) The Vulnerable Ones and the Recruiters. Question three of the WPR focus on the problem-representations genealogy and to answer this question, the themes were traced through previous project descriptions. These 'cluster' documents for the second phase on analysis consist of the third groups of short-term peacebuilding projects (IRF) from 2015 to 2017. In addition to these, the sub-projects of the PPP2 were analyzed. Moreover, connected texts and discourses were read to gain insight into the development of the themes. After the themes have been presented below, a summary will be given at the end of the section where my three operational questions are answered directly.

5.2.1 An Emerging Phenomena

The focus on the PPP2 is prevention of violent extremism (PVE). The first theme, perhaps unsurprisingly, is violent extremism. Violent extremism is presented as a "newly emerging phenomena [that] threatens to reverse the development gains" (PPP2:3). There is an emphasis on the newness: "emerged as a serious issue" (PPP2:3); "emerging challenges" (PPP2:3); "new peacebuilding challenges" (PPP2:3); "burgeoning phenomenon of radicalization" (PPP2:3); "emerging challenge" (PPP2:4); "the phenomenon of violent extremism is relatively new" (PPP1:4).

The actual definition of violent extremism is given in a footnote for "common understanding" (PPP2:5). Violent extremism is there defined as "believes or actions that support the use of violence to achieve ideological, religious or political goals" (PPP2:5). It should be noted how broad this definition is, for example, it covers cases of war and protests or election violence. This definition is close to other states' and UN agencies' definitions. It hinges on the concepts extreme or abnormal. The logic is that there is a normal, similar to a bell curve. The cluster in the center of the bell curve is where most people are placed based on their views and behaviors. This cluster has a span, that is what is referred to as normal. People who fall outside of this can, therefore, be called abnormal, and if they are placed even farther toward the sides, they can be

called extreme. This point, of course, is the same Foucault (2012) has made. Abnormal is relational and subjective; it is created in relation to normal. He refers to the attempt to discipline abnormal people into normality as Normalizing Judgement. When we label views, people or behavior as extreme, this is a normative judgment done from the perspective of normal. It should be acknowledged that the idea that ideologies that prescribe Islamic rules are extreme is rooted in western modernity. Islamic teaching has previously been an aspect of how several central Asian communities were "governed". Before Soviet, there were already a "degree-discussion" for example, the Jaddists (reformists) versus Ulama (traditionalists).

Thiessen (2019) describes how the UN agencies are reluctant to frame violent extremism as religious, while the Kyrgyz government aims to address Islamic extremism specifically. He argues that not defining these concepts helped multiple actors with different understandings of violent extremism to agree on the same project.

In the arena of international political, the focus on prevention of violent extremism started in 2001 and was further developed in 2014. In 2014 president Obama managed to push through UNSCR 2178, which tasks states with prevention of violent extremism in all forms. It builds on countering violent extremisms UNSCR 1373 that was adopted in 2001 as well as the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy adopted in 2006 (Subedi & Jenkins, 2016). While counter violent extremism (CVE) was introduced to the UN by the US it is very similar to the UK's prevention approach under the CONTEST counterterrorism strategy (Ucko, 2018). In 2016 Ban Ki-moon presented his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, subsequentially consolidating PVE as a concept in the UN. The PVE Action Plan suggested a holistic approach to PVE that included development and peacebuilding. The prevention of violent extremism is a somewhat dividing topic within the general assembly and to gain broad support for the action plan is was drafted in broad and vague terms (Ucko, 2018). There was no definition of violent extremism. Instead examples were given, nearly all cases were of groups self-identified as Islamic (Ucko, 2018). Conceptual ambiguity of concepts related to terrorism is nothing new within the UN milieu. Ní Aoláin (2016) has noted that the super-resolution UNSCR 1373 (2001) which made it mandatory for member states to implement anti-terrorism activities, contained no clear definition of terrorism. She also noted that the succeeding UNSCR 2242 (2015) left the scope of violent extremism and terrorism undefined.

Interestingly, the definition offered in the footnote in PPP2 is not used in the text body. Within the text, it is groups of extremists that are used to exemplify violent extremism. There are three categories described of violent extremists that are presented in the PPP2, which are

not mutually exclusive: banned religious groups, the terrorists that perform terror attacks in a foreign country, and FTFs.

There are several mentions of "banned religious organization" (PPP2:3). The use of the word banned indicates that extremism is a judicial matter; what is deemed abnormal is determined through legal channels. In 2017 there were 20 religious organizations[12] banned by the Kyrgyz state (Kudryavtseva, 2017). The earliest was in 2003 when four organizations were banned. Therefore, the phenomenon of banned extremist religious organizations was something Kyrgyzstan had attempted to manage for the last 15 years. Not to mention that some of the organizations, for example Hizb ut-Tahrir-al-Islami, have been active in Kyrgyzstan since the 1990s (crisisgroup.org). This category of extremism, therefore, does not appear to be the "new" phenomenon.

The second category of violent extremists are individuals labeled as having a Kyrgyz identity that (allegedly) perform terrorist attacks in other countries. Three incidents are mentioned, "recent attack in Russia" referring to the metro bombing in St. Petersburg. Two incidents in Turkey, referring to the Atatürk Airport attack in 2016 and the Istanbul nightclub shooting in 2017. Later in the document it is claimed: "a sharp trend of increase in the amount of violent extremist's attacks linked with the country" (PPP2:21). No source is given for this information and I have not been able to find statistical proof for this claim. Discursively there has been cases of terrorist attackers being labeled as Kyrgyz in media. For example, the Tsarnaev brother who was convicted for the Boston marathon bombing US in 2013 is sometimes called Chechen (Rogin, 2012), referring to his ethnicity, other times he is called Kyrgyz referring to his first nationality (Shishkin, 2013). To show that these kind of "terror are not simply foreign phenomena" (PPP2:4), the PPP2 mentions the attack against the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in 2016. I have tried to find information on previous terror attacks in Kyrgyzstan but only found a reference to two. The first one in 1998 took place in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. The second is in the Global Terrorism Index (2016) report, where they say that Kyrgyzstan had a spike in terror-related deaths in 2002. The only incident I found in 2002 is the Aksy tragedy, were police shot several protesters. However, the reason I was unable to find anything could be because of a language barrier. These events may not have been reported in English.

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[12]Al-Qaeda, The Taliban, East Turkistan Islamic Movement, Kurdistan People's Congress (Kongra-Gel), Eastern Turkestan Liberation Organization, Hizb ut-Tahrir-al-Islami (the Islamic party of liberation). Islamic Jihad Union (Islamic Jihad Group), Turkistan Islamic Party (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan). Unification Church (Moon's Church). Zhaishul Mahdi. Jund-al-Khalifa. Ansarullah (Ansar Allah), Takfir Wal-Hijra. Acromia/Akromiya Said Buryatsky. ISIL/ISIS, Jabhat an Nusra, Katibat al-Imam al-Bukhari (Imam Bukhari Battalion), Jannat Oshiklari, Jamaat at-Tawhid wal-Jihad.

The third category of violent extremism is Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). FTF's are also the main focus of the PPP2. It is the number of FTFs reported by the Kyrgyz state that makes violent extremism appear as a new and urgent problem. These individuals are described as a problem because they go to Syria or Iraq and join banned groups but also because they return "battle-hardened or traumatized" (PPP2:8). They are described as a security threat "extremist actors and battle-hardened returnees also pose a serious challenge to social cohesion and stability" (PPP2:4). It is claimed that 803 individuals have left Kyrgyzstan to "join radical groups fighting in Syria and Iraq" (PPP2:3). Initially, the PPP2 shows distancing toward the number by saying "according to the government" and "verifiable numbers […] are hard to come by" (PPP2:4) but later in the PPP2 argument is made based on the assumption that these numbers are right.

The term 'Foreign Terrorist fighter' is a recent development and is first mentioned in the UNSCR 2170 (UNODC, 2017), a resolution that condemns the acts of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Al Nusrah Front (ANF), and Al-Qaida in Syria and Iraq. The resolution calls on member states to suppress the flow of FTF to these groups and locations (SC/RES/2170 2014). A definition is later given in the UNSCR 2178 "individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict, and resolving to address this threat" (SC/RES/2178, 2014:2) this definition could apply to many groups recruiters, however only three groups are given as example: ISIL, ANF and Al Qaida. The term FTF is largely discursively linked to the middle east, particularly Syrian and Iraq (see for example Kopitzke, 2017; Schmid & Tinnes, 2015; Keatinge, 2015; Awan & Guru, 2017; Mehra, 2016; Karska & Karski, 2016).

The majority of groups banned by the Kyrgyzstan state are not actively performing attacks in Kyrgyzstan, though some are recruiting. Except for the example given of an attack toward the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, the terrorist attacks seem to rarely take place in Kyrgyzstan. Moreover, the FTFs are leaving Kyrgyzstan to perform violence elsewhere.

Activities and groups linked to violent extremism have been mentioned in earlier project description from phase one, "radical extremism" (IRF-22/2), "involvement of youth into radical extremist groups" (IRF-22/2), "fall into fundamentalist rule" (IRF-39), "nationalism and extremism" (IRF-41). However, it is in phase two it enters as a problem that the UN and the

Kyrgyz state need to do something about. In IRF-109 the risk of "so-called "OBON"[13] and radicalized religious women" (IRF-109) being part of violent election protests is noted. Yet, it is in the next project-description violent extremism as a problem is developed, noting that "many youths are turning to alternative routes of economic and social activities" (IRF-115:1) by joining radical religious groups. In addition, it notes "numerous reports of Kyrgyz women being trafficked for sexual and combat exploitation in violent conflicts" and "upon return these women are used as radical agents to destabilize the situation in the country" (IRF-115:8). This is the document I can see violent extremism enter the problem representation with activities tied to it, in the form of women as victims and a risk/threat. In the next short-term project violent extremism is not mentioned. However, in the one after that, IRF-150 "women and girls as drivers for peace and prevention of radicalization", it is the main focus and the term PVE is used for the first time in my data. Here it is claimed that "religious radicalization is on the rise across the country" (IRF-150:5), "the number of registered extremist offenses [..]increased threefold between 2010-2015" (IRF-150:5), "500 Kyrgyz has [..] reportedly joined rebel groups in Syria" (IRF-150:5). This is where the problem representation of violent extremism in Kyrgyzstan found in the PPP2, is cemented within my data.

As previously mentioned, Thiessen (2019a) has found that within the PBF's violent extremism project there exists a conceptual ambiguity, that was strategic. He notes that by not defining violent extremism, more actors could agree on the project. Thiessen (2019b:3) makes a distinction between ambiguity and uncertainty: "It is important to note that ambiguity is different from uncertainty. While uncertainty can be reduced by better and more information, ambiguity implies that there exist multiple and simultaneous ways to interpret a problem". As I have argued above, the PPP2 show signs of ambiguity in how violent extremism should be understood. In addition to this, there are signs of uncertainty. This uncertainty is the next theme found in the PPP2.

5.2.2 Building a House of Cards

Within the PPP2, violent extremism is claimed to be a new phenomenon. Because it is described as new, there is a claim of lack of knowledge about violent extremism. Amidst this uncertainty, the PPP2 presents an argumentation which creates a 'house of cards' where claims and choices about violent extremism are made largely on assumptions and half-knowledges. This is the next theme.

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[13] "OBON" is described as a Russian abbreviation of female "rent-a-mob".

The PPP2 claims that sometimes "pathways into extremism" happens in stages, first there is alienation and grievances that leads to radicalization, affected by individual "emotional and phycological factors" (PPP2:4) as well as socialization, this leads to the individual being vulnerable for "active recruitment" (PPP2:4) and lastly becomes a violent extremist. Initially the PPP2 says that there is "little tested guidance" (PPP2:4) for preventing violent extremism. Moreover, PPP2 describes stages as one way into radicalization yet note "these processes may not be linear" (PPP2:4) and that process leading to violent extremism have a "complex, inter-connectedness". Despite this uncertainty, this frame is adopted and used later in the PPP2 to argue for activities that prevent violent extremism.

Moreover, when describing radicalization, the claim of lack of knowledge returns: "there is no authoritative statistical data and proof on the pathways towards individual radicalization" (PPP2:5) and "the drivers of violent extremism are complex, multiple and interrelated, with political, economic, historical, ideological and religious dimensions" (PPP2:15). The PPP2 uses 'hedges', hedges are a linguistic way to show uncertainly of a statement (Farrokhi & Emami, 2008). Some of the hedges are "likely" (PPP2:5), "may" (PPP2:5), "could" (PPP2:5), "including" (PPP2:6), "not limited to" (PPP2:5), "presumed" (PPP2:5), "allegedly" (PPP2:8). However, later in the PPP2 some of these statements are taken as true in the following argumentation.

Despite this uncertainty that is described in the PPP2, it moves on and presents "the drivers of violent extremism" (PPP2:5). Initially it describes eight different structural drivers but then reformulate three of them that are presented as the main drivers. At this stage we are presented with the following reasoning: we do not know how a person becomes a violent extremist and we need more information, but we believe that one way is through this process we identified. In this process, we believe that there are stages. In the 'radicalization' stage, we believe that we have identified some factors effecting individuals. The next stage is of 'violent extremism', within which we have identified eight structural factors we believe affect individuals in a complex and interconnected way, out of these we believe that there are three main drivers for violent extremism". This argumentation is what I have referred to as a house of cards. The projects understanding of violent extremism is based on certain viewpoints or assumption, that shape the next step in the argumentation, the choices of viewpoints or assumptions in this stage shapes the next stage, and so it goes. If these viewpoints or assumptions are proven wrong on the first stage of the argumentation, it could affect the whole logic behind the project.

This uncertainty continues in the target groups section of the PPP2, "the available data on the social-economic backgrounds of Foreign Terrorist Fighters provide a mixed picture"

(PPP2:9), "it is presumed that youth from ethnic minorities are particularly vulnerable" (PPP2:7), "the situation is constantly evolving and highly dependent on context" (PPP2:17), "lack of access to information on violent extremist prisoners" (PPP2:22), "little concrete evidence of what works in terms of preventing violent extremism among various groups" (PPP2:19), "youth may follow different pathways in to radicalization" (PPP2:6).

This presentation of violent extremism, drivers, and subjects as unknown and uncertain performs a function. The representation of violent extremism as a new phenomenon allows for building an argumentation on assumptions and half-knowledges, that leads the reader to accept the activities presented in the end of the PPP2. While the PPP2 hedges shows the uncertainty of the claims, the activities that are claimed to prevent violent extremism are nevertheless based on those claims being accurate. It is essential to understand that when presented with a "menu of drivers", as Thiessen (2019a:10) calls it, the authors have had to make a choice of what to focus on and what not to focus on. In fact, several choices have been made of the presented stages, which shapes the representation of what violent extremism is and how it works. This in turn legitimize the chosen activities.

It is possible that this experiment and uncertainty is accepted because of the subject matter, terrorism. The word terrorism has a connotation or effect of fear and emergency (timewise). It is also "clouded in unknowns": we do not know who, when, what, or how they will "strike" ect,. Moreover, the fear might lead to a sense that action is needed now. Grounding the justification of actions in the sense of emergency rather their probable effects. The uncertainty is also why the PPP2 has knowledge producing activities "given the newness of the field of PVE, the PPP will also aim to maximize opportunities to capture lessons learned and generate knowledge" (PPP2:13) "to concentrate expertise and foster innovation" (PPP2:13). This also opens up for the question, among this supposed "newness" and uncertainty what has the choices of the activities been based on? The following themes will attempt to answer this question.

5.2.3   A Weak yet Heavy-Handed State

The third theme is the states as a source of grievances, that in turn can make individuals vulnerable to recruitment. The Kyrgyz state is described as weak and failing at providing social services and justice: "weak governance" (PPP2:16) "weakness in the state -society relation" (PPP2:4), "weak state capacity and failing security" (PPP2:5). The PPP2 also describes mistrust and corruption as a problem: need for "increase trust between state and population" (PPP2:6), "pervasive corruption and injustice" (PPP2:7).

The democratic institutions of Kyrgyzstan are described as "still maturing" (PPP2:5) and that "push factors are likely related failures in governance, violation of human rights and rule of law, rising inequality and lack of inclusive development" (PPP2:5). In some cases the failures of the states is described as having allowed religious organizations to grow stronger: "religious-based solutions to social challenges, bypassing extant [sic] institutions and political settlements" (PPP2:7), "the quality of standard secular education has encouraged some parents to turn to madrasas" (PPP2:17). Therefore, the state is prescribed to "improve quality of social services" (PPP2:17) and to "counter extremism and terrorism with principles of respect for rule of law, good governance and human rights, promotions of values of tolerance, intercultural, interreligious dialogues and conformity to international human rights obligations" (PPP2:10).

As described in previous chapter, the representation of the Kyrgyz state as weak and failing has been present for several years. This is not the first time the Kyrgyz state have been having trouble providing social services and the religious community has stepped in. Eric McGlinchey (2009) has noted that the Islamic revitalization in Kyrgyzstan is partly a result of state failure, particularly to provide social services. Some of her interviewees told her that the primary reason they joined the Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) was its capacity to mobilize for providing social services (McGlinchey, 2009).

However, the state is also described as misusing its power in the PPP2: "the secular state's repression, exclusion and marginalization of observant citizens contribute to religious radicalization" (PPP2:14), "the states sometime heavy-handed response" (PPP2:4), "the secular state's repression, exclusion and marginalization of observant citizens contribute to religious radicalization" (PPP2:14).

A similar description can be found in the earliest project descriptions after the 2010 events, where they note "allegation of ill treatment and torture" (IRF-38:2), "the imposition of the sociopathic priorities of power structures" (IRF-37:5). But this representation falls away and returns when violent extremism is claimed to be a problem that needs to be addressed "The secular state's exclusion and marginalization of Muslims causes religious radicalism" (IRF-150:5), "increasing state repression" (IRF-150:6), "[Uzbeks] continue to be marginalized by many in power, including the judiciary" (IRF-155:4), "the increased heavy-handed response from Kyrgyzstan's government and security forces" (IRF-155:6).

The proposed solution in the PPP2 on state level is "improved relationship between ethnic groups and various levels of state authority" (PPP2:9), and to build "a cohesive democratic society" (PPP2:12) that balances "effective security while respecting human rights" (PPP2:8) characterized by "compliances of laws and policies with international standard" (PPP2:9). To

be able to achieve this, Kyrgyzstan still needs to develop its 'civic-ness' identified in PPP1: "forming a civic nation" (PPP2:10), "national unity" (PPP2:11), "common civic identity", "the unity of the nation as a prerequisite for preserving statehood" (PPP2:10). It is the failure of liberalism in Kyrgyzstan that is described as causing the vulnerability to violent extremism and the "civic-ness" based in liberalism is described as a solution. The societal level of this representation is the next theme.

When UN adopted UNSCR 1373 it created the institution Counter-Terrorism Commission (CTC) who were to monitor states implementation of the resolution. According to Fionnuala Ní Aoláin (2016:285) "CTC has remained consistently hostile to mainstreaming human rights claims". The UN High Commissioner of Human Rights has noted human rights violations by states when implementing anti-terrorism policies under the resolution. Hence, the tension between security and human right in prevention of violent extremism is not new, and the focus in the PPP1 on human rights, can be an attempt to balance these. Moreover, Thiessen (2019b) has found that the conceptual ambiguity of violent extremism in the projects in Kyrgyzstan might negatively affect the promotion of human rights. Moreover, he argues that groups critical to the states may have their human right violated as a result of the ambiguity of PVE, possibly with the support of UN as security is prioritized. The PPP2 have activities aimed at "strengthen forensic services". The actual activities include "psycholinguistic and religious expertise"[14] these are expanded on in the subproject. This activity is presented as a way to balance human rights and security, by ensuring fair trial. That offenders are convicted on actual extremist material. However, it should be noted that while the PPP2 only describe this as a process of assessing evidence in court, the experts were also contracted to help develop software programs that software for linguistic "processing of texts" (UNODC, 2018). This kind of software is often developed for surveilles[15], not to just to be used in court.

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[14] According to UNODC in Kyrgyzstan "psycholinguistic expertise is a type of forensic examination, which uses psychology and psycholinguistics to determine the degree of reliability or credibility of the testimony of witnesses, victims or defendants. Religious expertise is conducted in order to determine the religious nature of an organization on the basis of its constituent documents; to check and assess the reliability of information contained in documents submitted by the religious organization regarding the basic tenets of its creed; to verify the compliance in practice with the forms and methods proclaimed as part of its state registration, as well as to examine imported and distributed documents for the presence of violent extremist and terrorist ideology." https://www.unodc.org/centralasia/en/news/unodc-supports-measures-to-improve-forensic-psycholinguistics-and-religious-expertise-in-kyrgyzstan.html

[15] See for example: Prentice, S., Rayson, P., & Taylor, P. J. (2012). The language of Islamic extremism: Towards an automated identification of beliefs, motivations and justifications. *International Journal of Corpus Linguistics*, *17*(2), 259-286.; Prentice, S., Taylor, P. J., Rayson, P., & Giebels, E. (2012). Differentiating act from ideology: Evidence from messages for and against violent extremism. *Negotiation and conflict management research*, *5*(3), 289-306.; Johansson, F., Kaati, L., & Sahlgren, M. (2017). Detecting linguistic markers of violent extremism in online environments. In *Artificial Intelligence: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications* (pp. 2847-2863). IGI Global.

According to Human Rights Watch (2018), the Kyrgyz law on PVE have a broad and vague definition of violent extremism. They point out that the cases of violent extremism conviction are increasing and in many of these cases there are no evidence of planed or performed violence, instead they are convicted for possession of material that is perceived as extremist. Human Rights Watch notes that Kyrgyzstan for example banned the video "I'm Gay and I'm Muslim" for being considered violent extremist material (Human Rights Watch, 2018). This law was overhauled in 2019 but some are still serving time due to these kinds of convictions with little chance of having their sentences reviewed (Human Rights Watch, 2020).

5.2.4 Alienation and 'Civic-ness' as The Antidote

The PPP2 describes many causes for vulnerability to recruitment. However, it can be summed up as a "sense of alienation" (PPP2:19), alienation from the state, one's community, and liberal values. This claim of alienation and its solution 'civic-ness' is the fourth theme I have found.

The PPP2 does note for example "the role and impact of global politics" (PPP2:5) and "a changing global culture and banalization of violence in media and entertainment" (PPP2:5). However, these are neither explained nor tied to any peacebuilding activity. The causes of vulnerability are believed to be found within Kyrgyzstan's borders. As mentioned above, the state, with its failure and heavy-handedness, is described as having caused grievances but it also causes alienation. The state's actions are described as causing some to feel "social and politically isolated" (PPP2:5), "political exclusion and shrinking civic space" (PPP2:5), and "economic exclusion and limited opportunities for upward mobility" (PPP2:5).

Individuals described as vulnerable because they are alienated from community and society. The PPP2 claims there is a "ideological and moral vacuum" (PPP2:7) in Kyrgyz culture and that "resorting to violent means of conflict resolution is a norm" with "ethnic division" (PPP2:16) and "persistence and growing inequalities" (PPP2:5). According to the PPP2 this has led to a society that some feel alienated from. Because of these some individuals "feel abandoned" (PPP2:16) and a lack of "belongingness" (PPP2:16), "sense of belonging" (PPP2:16), "experiences of discrimination, alienation and ill treatment, frustration and dissatisfaction" (PPP2:8) leading to an "identity crisis" (PPP2:16). This supposedly leads these individuals to "search for identity" (PPP2:7) and "sense of belonging and public recognition" (PPP2:7) elsewhere, making them vulnerable to recruiters. The PPP2 also notes that "structural conditions which feeds into radicalization" (PPP2:19) like "external factors- economic, ethnic, legal, religious or social deprivation" (PPP2:8), this forces some to "seek employment elsewhere, including in Syria" (PPP2:15).

The alienation from the state and community is described as leading to the alienation from liberal democratic values: "disenchantment with social-economic and political systems" (PPP2:5), "disillusioned with the secular state system" (PPP2:15), "rejection of growing diversity in society" (PPP2:5). This is important, because presenting it this way implies that if these individuals were immerged in a fully functioning liberal democratic state, they would not have become radicalized. And when proposing the solution, there is a strong focus on 'civic-ness': "civic competencies" (PPP2:20), "development of civic competence such as critical thinking, self-reflection, communication and peaceful conflict prevention" (PPP2:17), "promoting civic-identity" (PPP2:10), "civic engagement" (PPP2:16), "participate in social, economic and political life of the country" (PPP2:20). This representation of alienation is found in previous project descriptions from the thirds short-time cluster: "sense of alienation" (IRF-109:6), "face hurdles in accessing the state social safety net system" (IRF-150:7), "continue to be marginalized by many in power" (IRF-155:4), "isolate them self" (IRF-150:7), "social ostracism and domestic abuse" (IRF-150:8), "from excluded communities" (IRF-150:12), "disaffected youth" (IRF:155:7) ""rejection of secular order" (IRF-150:59).

According to the PPP2 this ideological and moral vacuum is to be field with the liberal values of 'civic-ness' and development of "skills of non-violent culture" (PPP2:20). This is to be done through "apply social inclusive approaches" (PPP1:20), "dialogue and exchange" (PPP2:20), "provide alternative and positive messages" (PPP2:20) and make sure vulnerable people can access "the state social safety net system" (PPP2:7). This proposed solution is also found in previous documents: "boost civic engagement" (IRF-155:11), "the shift of marginalized youth from a disempowered, victimized subject to an active citizen" (IRF-155:6).

Many preventions of violent extremism projects nowadays aim to build resilience on the individual and community level. In connection to this, William Stephens, Stijn Sieckelinck & Hans Boutellier (2019:10) point out that we need to be aware that projects of resilience against violent extremism is built on a normative base, and we need to ask ourselves who is being resilient, towards what and what the desired outcome is. In the PPP2 'civic-ness' is proposed as the solution to the vulnerability of risk groups. This is not unique to Kyrgyzstan. Niklas Aaltermark and Hampus Nilsson (2018) have noted that active-citizenship has been suggested as the solution to radicalism. They argue that these kinds of preventions are actively creating a particulate citizen, with prescribed behavior and relations. They point out that this process is "far from innocent and unpolitical" (Aaltermark & Nilsson, 2018:66). As already discussed, the 'civic-ness' promoted in PPP2 as well as previous document rests on a liberal democratic world view. The prescribed role in the PPP2 is a liberal active subject guided by their 'civic-

ness'. This 'civic-ness' is not a multitude of different cultures, it is *an* overarching culture that values multiculturalism. The PPP2 claims that those that are alienated are vulnerable to recruitment and "negative messages". This requires us to identify the vulnerable people, which is the focus of the next theme.

5.2.5 The Vulnerable Ones and the Recruiters

The fifth theme consists of the representation of the vulnerable ones. There are four main categories of people that are described as being vulnerable: the youth, the women, the returning migrants and the prisoners.

The youth is described as the group most vulnerable to radicalization because of "a sense of disenfranchisement and marginalization" (PPP2:6) and that "education and upbringing does little to safeguard youth" (PPP2:6). Similarly, to the representation in PPP1, the youth is described as "vulnerable to manipulation" (PPP2:6), "easy targets" (PPP2:17), "often instrumentalized" (PPP2:17), "easily influenced by biased narratives (PPP2:17). This 'weak-mindedness' is then described as something "recruiters utilize" (PPP2:5).

As mentioned, the representation of youth have been present in documents predating the PPP1. It is also present in the thirds short-time cluster document where it is directly related to violent extremism: "pushing youth into the hands of extremist recruiters" (IRF-155:4) "critical thinking" (IRF-155:13), "a new generation of ideas" (IRF-155:8). As Mayssoun Sukarieh and Stuart Tannock (2018) has noted the resolution 2250 that is the first of the Youth, Peace and Security agenda discursively links the inclusion of youth in peacebuilding as a way to stop radicalization and violent extremism. They note that "Radicalisation and violent extremism, moreover, are terms that only apply to opponents of western states and international organisations".

The youth is represented as "manipulated", "driven", "pushed", "diverted" because they lack critical thinking skills. This wording removes agency from the youth by implying that this is was not fully a choice and it was not made fully informed. While that may have the case for some individual it appears an overly simplistic and paternalistic explanation. Especially as the span for people considered young is quite large "young people 17-35-years old" (PPP2:14), "young males between 25-35 years old" (PPP2:4). This way of representing violent extremists means that no consideration of the content of the ideologies or legitimate grievances need to be considered. In other words, the PPP2 does not seriously engage with any pull factors, because it does not present them as actual causes.

By describing people who might join extremism groups as vulnerable, uneducated, victims, easily manipulated and non-critical thinkers the PPP2 represent extremism as apolitical. The PPP2 does not engage with political analysis and message of extremism groups that might be part of the motivation for performing violence. This representation does not leave room for acknowledging that some individuals, rationally and with full cognitive functions, agree with the political analysis of extremism. This way of representing violent extremists therefore allows for the project to ignore what the extremist groups themselves identifies as grievances, including global issues. In other words, when attempting to prevent violent extremist groups the project does not have to engage with the cause of these groups.

The PPP2 notes that "While women are a resource in PVE […] women too are caught up in radicalization and violent extremism" (PPP2:7), "women too [..] members of banned religious groups" (PPP2:15). The use of words like "too" and "also" can potentially be and reaction to the stereotype of women as pacifying and non-violent fond in previous documents. The PPP2 claims that "different push and pull factors contribute to female radicalization" (PPP2:15) and that there are two main causes of radicalization of "women in vulnerable conditions" (PPP2:7): "women are either forced or persuaded to join banned groups by their male relatives" (PPP2:15). Women are described as forced both physically and economically: "depends on material support from members of banned religiose groups" (PPP2:7), "depends on material support from members of banned religious groups" (PPP2:7). The PPP2 does note that: "ideological persuasion plays a role" (PPP2:15). However, it is not all women that is seen as vulnerable, it is those who are in the "socially marginalized/excluded category" (PPP2:7), by having husbands that are either in prison or has left as FTFs, who are isolated because of religiose (conservative) practices, have trouble accessing social services, suffers from social exclusion and domestic abuse. In other words, these women are victims. In this representation, there is no room for a woman to choose to join a extremists group based on political or ideological conviction. Despite the PPP2 briefly mentioning it happens, it is actually not a part of the problem-representation nor the activities.

This representation of women is present in some of the project description from the third short-term projects: "female extremists [..] many of whom are poor, uneducated, don't [sic] understand Islam and follow their radicalized husbands" (IRF-155:5), "women fall prey to radical group recruiters" (IRF-115:1), "women from low-income backgrounds are lured" (IRF-150:6) "pressure from family and peers appears to be primary factor" (IRF-150:7) "this category of women [from conservative religious families] is also easily manipulated" (IRF-150:7).

The third groups of people considered particularly vulnerable in the PPP2 is returning labor migrants, especially those who have been issued a re-entry ban from Russia. By spending a long time working abroad these individuals are described as lacking "networks which can act as a counter-balance to exploitation and radicalization" (PPP2:9). In other word these individuals are alienated from their communities and have trouble finding employments "leading to the loss of self-esteem, anxiety and finally resulting in a state of limbo" (PPP2:9) The "lack of official or unofficial platforms to channels their concerns" (PPP2:9) is described as a source of frustration towards society. They in turn "becomes subject to deception and manipulation by recruiters" (PPP2:9).

The fourth group described as particularly vulnerable are the "people in conflict with the law/security sector" (PPP2:7). These individuals are described as vulnerable because: they are confined with "violent extremism offenders", "deprivation of liberty" (PPP2:8), living in "poor prison conditions" (PPP2:8). In this section the PPP2 also notes a tension between human rights and security by claiming that Kyrgyzstan is "challenged to define and implement policies which promote effective security while respecting human rights" (PPP2:8). The Kyrgyz state have a list with at-risk men, and the PPP2 note that "these men come under intense pressure from law enforcement agencies" (PPP2:15) and they are subjected to "raid[s]" (PPP2:15) "interrogations" (PPP2:15), the police […] allegedly extort bribes" (PPP2:15). It also notes that there is a risk that some branches will use funding to "harass communities" and "scapegoating them" (PPP2:22). This is an example of the heavy-handedness of the state.

All four groups are described as a vulnerable to recruitment, this mean that their vulnerability is actually a risk or threat to security. The PPP2 does not refer to human security like the PPP1, instead it refers to traditional security tied to the state and physical security. The PPP2 includes activities aimed at "cross-border regional security" (PPP2:10) and "enhancing cybersecurity" (PPP2:10).

It is also the recruiters that are mainly described as the actors in many of the descriptions by manipulating, driving, diverting ect, yet they are not dealt with under this PPP2. The proposed solution is to "empowerment of women against violent extremism" (PPP2:12), "empowerment of youth against violent extremism" (PPP2:12) by them "taking a more critical stance on ideologies" (PPP2:20) and develop a "better sense of belonging" (PPP2:10).

It also seeks to "foster a cohesive, democratic society (PPP2:12) based on the 'civic-ness' described above and promoted as a "alternative positive and message" (PPP2:20). They will "increase their resilience by being equipped with tools and skills of non-violent culture and civic competences" (PPP2:20) and participation in "social, economic and political life"

(PPP2:20). In cased of PPP2, it is grounded in liberalism as when is building its 'civic-ness' in education of "civic educations guides [...] include human rights, media literacy, tolerance, state structures, violence and crime prevention ect" (A-7:6), "theoretical knowledge on state, law and democracy" (A-7:6). Moreover, the critical thinking is not presented as a skill but as a "changing attitudes of vulnerable groups" (A-6:10). The PPP2 uses the phrase 'resilient communities', but the activities are aimed at building individuals that are resilient by being liberal citizens. The prisoners' and the migrants' vulnerability will be addressed by offering reintegration services.

According to Stephens et. al. (2019:3) there are four main focus areas in the PVE literature: the resilient individual; identity; dialogue and action; connected or resilient communities. These four focus areas suggest different ways of preventing extremism.

To further resilient individuals the focus tends to be on developing cognitive resources, fostering character traits and promoting or strengthening values. Vicki Coppock and Mark McGovern (2014) has noted that ideas about radicalization has led to an increased focused on phycological factors of individuals as oppose to political contexts. As Arun Kundnani (2012) has noted that with in the vulnerability discourse, extremism ideas are sometimes described as a virus, and while it claims to able to predict the 'spread of the virus' it fails to answer why it exists. The idea is that this leads to an individual that is a critical thinker, empathic, adhering to "stronger" values especially human rights (Stephens et. al.2019:4). When PPP2 described groups as lacking critical thinking suggests reliance is built by participating in the civic/political actives that like human rights, democracy and gender equality gives resilience toward so-called manipulative ideologies, it is a sign of the resilient individual discourse. The focus of identity within academic literature, the focus is on identity as a reason for becoming extremism, either because of lack or loss of identity. Within this discourse the main group is youth and especially youth which is assumed to be seeking identity. This focus area is also visible in the PPP2, when risk groups are described as seeking identity or a sense of belong and the prescribed action is developed a civic identity.

The focus areas within PVE literature on dialogue and action tend to argue that extremism must be heard and challenged in the public space. Moreover, there needs to be a legitimate way to express grievances that reaches those power. Some have suggested different forms of civic protests or political engagement (Stephens et. al., 2019:7). Within the PPP2 there is no real engagement with the content of extremist ideologies and "safe-spaces" for discussing extremism. However, there is an assumption that if individuals were critical and had the right knowledge they would 'resist' becoming extremists. Moreover, when discussing the youth and

migrants they specifically mention that these groups need a platform and place to dialogue to expressing grievance for them not to be manipulated by recruiters.

The last theme of engaged, resilient communities focus on strengthening the relationship within communities, between communities, between communities and state institutions (Stephens et. al., 2019:8). It includes focusing on good relations between the police and the community. The PPP2 focus in removing the heavy-handedness of the state and its institution. But it does encourage parentship between state, civil society and religious leaders. As mentioned above the PPP2 uses the word "resilient community" but does not put it to work as a concept. Instead it focuses on individuals. Though the focus on alienation, trust, and the inclusion to society can be read as signs of this discourse, as is focus on strengthening social relations.

5.2.6 Summary

The research question of this project was *Has there been a change in the rationale from the 2013-16 PPP to the 2017-19 PPP?* I have described my findings from conducting the WPR on the 2013-2016 PPP as themes to offer a focused but in-depth description of the analyze but I will now summarize this directly in relation to my three operational questions.

My first operation question is *What is represented as 'unpeaceful' i.e. the conflict/problem?* The PPP2 describes violent extremism as the problem at face values. It is described as a new phenomenon, hence a new problem. While giving a vague definition in the footnote, it does not employ it. Instead, the PPP gives examples of three forms of violent extremism: banned religious groups, terrorists, and FTFs. The PPP2 also describe an uncertainty about violent extremism, and this as a problem. Despite this uncertainty, the PPP makes some claim about how violent extremism is caused. It describes the Kyrgyz state as a source of grievances. The state is presented as too weak, especially in the social service area and rule of law. Yet, the state is also described as heavy-handed in its response to violent extremism. It points out targeting and harassment of minorities and families of alleged violent extremism, especially by the justice and police sectors. The state weakness and heavy-handed response is described as causing certain groups to feel alienation. This alienation was presented as an alienation from the state, community, and liberal values.

The PPP2 employs the language of vulnerability, claiming that some groups are particularly vulnerable. They focus on four groups: the youth, the women, the migrants, and the prisoners. These groups are described as alienated, but also as having specific vulnerabilities. The youth and women are described as being easily manipulated, which the recruiters take advantage of.

The women are described as having a particular vulnerability due to trouble accessing social services. Women are also described as becoming extremism largely due to pressure from their male family members. The youth is described as being particularly vulnerability because they are in search of identity and supposedly use violence easier than adults. The migrants are described as vulnerable because they return to Kyrgyzstan disconnected from their community, have trouble finding job, and have no channel to express their grievances. The prisoners are described as physically alienated from sociality, and as receiving of the states heavy-handed response. These causes of violent extremism are implicitly being described as a lack of 'civic-ness' or liberalism. This also mean that the cause of violent extremism is found within the Kyrgyz state borders. The PPP2 also focus many of its activities on individuals, as oppose to society. This is perhaps most clear in the prescribed solution.

My second operational question was *What is represented as the road to peace i.e. what is suggested to be done about the problem?* On aspect of activities in the PPP2 is knowledge production. This one of the responses to the described uncertainty. This mean that the PPP2 is producing knowledge about violent extremism at the same time it is attempting to prevent it. The activities to prevent it largely response to the sources of grievances they describe. The state is to be capacitated, including educated about violent extremism and become a better social service provider. The state institutions are also to be developed, including checks and balances to address the states heavy-handedness. The PPP2 describes a tension between human rights and security. To address this one of the activities is forensic psycholinguistic expertise that is supposed to enable more fair trails. The PPP2 does not reflect on how this expertise and programs might be used for surveillance or human rights violations. The presented solution to certain groups alienation is further developing of 'civic-ness' and liberalism. This include civic education focusing on human rights, how the state works, democracy, rule of law, human rights, gender equality, and peaceful or non-violent cultures. The PPP2 also aim to facilitate dialogue and channels to express grievances to those in power. This assumes that alienation is solved by giving the individuals civic education and bringing them in to the liberal society. The society does not change to make room; these individuals are tasked with assimilating. The vulnerability of women and the youth to manipulation is to be address by teaching them 'critical thinking'. However, this is not actually presented as a skill to be learned but as values to adhere to.

My third operational question was *What is represented as peace i.e. what is the desired outcome?* What is described as the desired outcome is a liberal democratic state. It is to be guided by principles of human rights, rule of law, democracy, and division of power. But it goes beyond mere institutionalism. The PPP2 prescribes roles: community as a civil society;

individuals as citizens that adhere to liberal values, are loyal to a civic state, feel a civic identity that take primacy, and actively participate in 'civic-ness" of the society. It implicitly assumes that if individuals filled this role, they would be resilient to negative messages, like violent extremism.

6 Discussion

In chapter five, I traced the internal genealogy of the problem-representations within PBF peacebuilding projects descriptions of Kyrgyzstan, to analyze the underlying rationale behind them. The research question of this project was *Has there been a change in the rationale from the 2013-16 PPP to the 2017-19 PPP?* I adopted three operational questions in order to answer my research question.

My first operational question was *What is represented as 'unpeaceful' i.e. the conflict/problem?* PPP1 presents multiple aspects as issues that together make up the problem representation, violence, weak state, lack of rule of law and lack of 'civic-ness'. The 2010 events which the PPP1 is responding to was mainly described as violence that erupted. The PPP1 also described a cultural acceptance for both impunity and violence. The state was described as a problem as it was weak according to liberal standards. The lack of rule of law was described as a problem because of state institution. Society, as well, was described as not respecting the law. The PPP1 also describe mistrust and tensions as a result of not having a unifying nationalism and identity based on 'civic-ness'.

While some of the forms of violence in PPP1 are mentioned in PPP2, for example gender-based violence, it is not a focus area. Instead, the focus is on violence motivated by extremists' views. This is the phenomena that is described as new and clouded in uncertainty. PPP2 offers a broad definition in a footnote but did not apply it. Instead it exemplified violent extremism with three forms: banned religious groups, terrorists, and FTFs. However, it should be noted that the prevention aspect of PVE led to a focus on the preventing views rather than violent acts. This is because the PPP2 presents violent extremism as an outcome of extremism views. Similar to PPP1, in the PPP2 the state is described as a source of grievance because of weakness. However, in PPP2 the state is also described as heavy-handed. The lack of 'civic-ness' identified in the PPP1 is argued to be the solutions to alienation.

In both PPPs the 'unpeaceful' was described at its most fundamental level as Kyrgyzstan's failure to function as a proper liberal democratic society. This led to a focus on the state, its institution and relationship with its citizens. The state is weak because it is not living up to the criteria of a fully functioning democratic liberal state. The 'civic-ness' both PPPs prescribe, did

not have to be based on liberalism, but it is described as such because of the content of the education, behavior and values that is promoted.

My second operational question was *What is represented as the road to peace i.e. what is suggested to be done about the problem?* The focus in the PPP1 on building a civic and liberal society led to activities of reforming state institutions, especially in the justice sectors and the local governing institutions. The identified lack of 'civic-ness' led to a focus on educating citizens into 'right' values and behavior, by conducting human rights and civic education. The mistrust between the segments of the population as well as toward the state were to be addressed through dialogues and developing 'civic-ness'. Moreover, the PPP1 describes a need for 'closure' of the 2010 events but it is not related to any specific reconciliation activity in the PPP1. Instead, reconciliation is presented as an outcome of other activities.

To address the uncertainty in PPP2, it includes actives of knowledge production. The activities to prevent violent extremism is largely in response to the sources of grievances they describe. Similar to PPP1, the PPP2 claims the state is to be capacitated and reformed. In the PPP2 this includes education about violent extremism and becoming a better social service provider. The PPP2 claims the states institutions need to be developed, including checks and balances to address the states heavy-handedness. The PPP2 describes a tension between human rights and security. To address this one of the activities is forensic psycholinguistic expertise that is supposed to enable fairer trials. The presented solution to certain groups' alienation is further developing of civic-ness and liberalism. As in the case of the PPP1, this is included civic education focusing on human rights, democracy, rule of law, human rights, gender equality, peaceful or non-violent cultures, but also how the state works. The PPP2 also aims to facilitate dialogue and create channels to express grievances to those in power, as the PPP1 did. This assumes that alienation is solved by giving the individuals civic education and bringing them into the liberal society. The vulnerability of women and the youth to be manipulated is to be addressed by teaching them "critical thinking". However, this is not actually presented as a skill to be learned but as values to adhere to.

My third operational question was *What is represented as peace i.e. what is the desired outcome?* If I were to locate the rationale found in the peacebuilding projects in Kyrgyzstan within the genealogy sketched out by Oliver Richmond (2010), it shows strong signs of relaying in the third generation of peacebuilding that focus on liberalism and state-building. But there is inclusion of words from the fourth generation, for example, bottom-up. Yet, the majority of peacebuilding activities are decided on the top, sometimes in cooperation with local organizations or leaders. Some 'locals' and NGOs are also offered to sit in on the JSC meetings.

The focus on human security in the first PPP1 relates to the fourth generation. It is possible that the rationale was developing toward the fourth generation of peacebuilding before PVE entered the dispositif.

Cavalcant (2019) has noted that liberal peacebuilding has developed into a dogma in the UN milieu, and he has noted that the term of reference for the PBF relies on a liberal analysis of conflict and tends to fund projects that follow the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. Blanco (2020) has identified a norm within the dispositif of peacebuilding in the UN, which focuses on creating liberal democratic market-oriented states. The case I have looked at corresponds well to these analyses, as the PPPs focused on state weakness and good governance, judge by liberal criteria. The underlying assumption guiding both PPPs is that in order to have peace, Kyrgyzstan needs to become and function as a liberal democratic state, with a society and subjects believing and behaving according to liberal prescriptive ideas of what it means to be a citizen. As Blanco (2012) noted, peacebuilding today is not merely trying to build liberal institutions but liberal societies. This can be seen as something that is far more invasive as it aims to change not only structures but values, beliefs, cultures, worldviews, and behaviors.

Returning to my research question, *Has there been a change in the rationale behind the UN's 2013-16 PPP compared to the 2017-19 PPP?* The short answer is yes and no. Clearly, the urgent need changed from ethnic violence to PVE. Yet it seems like the dispositif that had been created was believed to be able to respond to the new urgent need, violent extremism, with little adoption. Alternatively, the similarities between PPP1 and PPP2 might be a sign of path dependency. It should also be acknowledged that those working on these projects, like the JSC and the RUNOs, appear to have very little time to actually come up with a new rationale even if they wanted to. It can also be read as a sign of the liberal peace discourse strength, since it has developed for decades, it is perhaps not surprising that no philosophy or paradigm is standing ready to take its place. As mentioned in the background chapter, the liberal peace paradigm has come under heavy criticism, and this debate is well covered in academic debates elsewhere[16]. Yet, it is important to note that in practice the liberal peacebuilding paradigm is still the foundation for many peacebuilding projects.

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[16] See for example: Call, C. T. (2008). The fallacy of the 'Failed State'. *Third World Quarterly*, *29*(8), 1491-1507.; Chandler, D. (2010). The uncritical critique of 'liberal peace'. *Review of international studies*, *36*(S1), 137-155.; Heathershaw, J. (2013). Towards better theories of peacebuilding: beyond the liberal peace debate. *Peacebuilding*, 1(2), 275-282.; Randazzo, E. (2016). The paradoxes of the 'everyday': scrutinising the local turn in peace building. *Third World Quarterly*, *37*(8), 1351-1370.; Jarstad, A. K., & Belloni, R. (2012). Introducing hybrid peace governance: Impact and prospects of liberal peacebuilding. *Global governance*, *18*, 1.; Paffenholz, T. (2015). Unpacking the local turn in peacebuilding: a critical assessment towards an agenda for future research. *Third World Quarterly*, *36*(5), 857-874.; Paris, R. (2010). Saving liberal peacebuilding. *Review of international studies*, *36*(2), 337-365.

But the rationale in the dispositif has changed, and in important ways. Actors have come and gone. More development actors are now in the JSC. UN has adopted new policies, including the PVE framework and resolutions on youth inclusion. It now includes violent extremism that is rarely acted out in Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, the dispositif is now used to create peace elsewhere. This does not mean that it is not still attempting to build peace in Kyrgyzstan as well. And yes, the dispositif can be accused of always building peace in other places when it focused on state fragility, for example. Yet, this form is different. By that I mean, it has a clear conflict in mind: Syria. It is rarely mentioned in PPP2, but without the Syrian conflict[17], it is hard to understand the emphasis the document puts on FTFs.

Richmond and MacGinty (2019) has reflected on the effect of increased mobility on peacebuilding. In the case I have looked at, the dispositif is trying to address a form of conflict that relies on the mobility of people. This has opened up for understanding both the conflict and peace, as multi-locational and mobile. As Richmond and MacGinty (2019) have noted, the structure of peacebuilding might struggle with addressing this mobility. This seems to be true in the case I have analyzed. PPP2 is performing peacebuilding activities in Kyrgyzstan to also build peace in Syria. PVE, a mobile form of conflict, has led to introducing more security discourse and practices.

Moreover, the inclusion of PVE led to a change in the conceptualization of security from human security to a traditional form of security, focusing on state security and physical security. This is important because it is with reference to this kind of security, activities that have violated human rights have been justified. The PPP2 is still performing activities that are bound within state structure, even though the 'unpeaceful' element is not. By this I mean, the PPP2 can be seen to attempt to build peace in Syria (as well as Kyrgyzstan), yet its activities are solely focused on Kyrgyzstan. The liberal peacebuilding found in both PPPs relies on both state-building and society building. In other words, it is based on the system of Westphalia states; the solution is described as state-based.

Moreover, the uncertainty that is described in PPP2 gives rise to some ethical concerns. As I described in the introduction, RUNOs have been encouraged not to be afraid of experimenting or making mistakes (Joint Steering Committee, 2018), and UN agencies in Kyrgyzstan are both implementing and testing the assumptions behind PVE at the same time. This has been described as innovative and outside their comfort zones.

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[17] I am referring to the conflict that started in 2011 in Syria and has since then escalated to a war involving a multitude of actors, including Foreign Terrorist Fighters. Despite different mediation attempts and military operations the conflict is still ongoing, nine years later.

Judith Butler (2006:20) has posed the question: "Whose lives count as lives?". This project leaves me with the question: whose life are we accepting of being experimented with? Would we accept the high level of uncertainty in a peace project in our own backyard? Perhaps this experiment and uncertainty are accepted because of the subject matter, terrorism. Perhaps the discursive power of anti-terrorism is seen as justifying this uncertainty. Nevertheless, this does not justify diverging from the do-no-harm principle. The counterargument might be, so we do nothing against terrorism instead? This is a false dichotomy, and there are more choices than either doing this specific project or not doing one at all. Moreover, there are more alternatives than a project works, or it does not. Projects like these may work or not, yet in both cases cause harm. By the time the PPP1 was initiated, the dispositif of peacebuilding in Kyrgyzstan had accumulated their own knowledge of the Kyrgyz context. By their own account they note ethnic tension, torture, targeting of ethnic minorities of the state, police harassment, corruption, instability, nationalism, and xenophobia. This is the context that the UN has decided to experiment in.

In its most fundamental aspect, PVE is attempting to prevent people from becoming, not from doing. The reasoning is that to stop violent extremism acts, you need to prevent people from having extremist views in the first place. This means that PVE requires to identify vulnerable people and turn them into 'resilient' individuals before they have ever done anything illegal or wrong. They are to be stopped from ever becoming someone who could perform violent extremism. The minorities, especially Uzbeks, have been pointed as overrepresented in the FTF statistics in Kyrgyzstan. It should be noted that there is an overlap of minority labels: conservative Muslims and Uzbeks. The PPP2 does not need to use the words Islam or Uzbeks, those who know the context know what groups the PPP2 is referring to when describing the community as conservative.

We actually know very little of why and how someone becomes radical, extremist, or violent extremist. Perhaps the correct question to ask is then, is: Should PVE be included in the peacebuilding dispositif when we know so little about it? In the case of Kyrgyzstan, I am inclined to say no. PVE has so much potential to legitimatize or cause harm in this highly sensitive context, where those pointed out as violent extremists by the state are the same group being marginalized by said government. Human Rights Watch (2018) and the Universal Periodic Review (2019) has reported the human rights violation as a result of state PVE laws and policies. In other words, the state has already used the PVE framework to cause harm. Indeed, whose lives count as lives? However, this discussion should not be read as reflection of the people working on these projects. I make no claim of any of their opinions or motivation.

7 Conclusion

In 2017 the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) started to fund peacebuilding projects in Kyrgyzstan that focused on preventing violent extremism (PVE). This was a shift away from what they had been focused on previously, the aftermath of the ethnic violence that took place in the southern region of Kyrgyzstan in 2010. This shift was a response to a new 'urgent need', mainly of so-called FTFs that travel to Syria and Iraq to join banned extremist groups.

Concepts connected terrorism, radicalization, extremism, and violent extremism has within the UN milieu been characterized by a lack of definition (Ní Aoláin, 2016; Ucko, 2018; Subedi & Jenkins, 2016). This is also the case of PVE. Theissen (2019a) has shown that there is a conceptual ambiguity in the PVE work that UN PBF is performing in Kyrgyzstan, different actors do not agree on what violent extremism is nor how to prevent it.

The conceptual ambiguity and menu of drivers opened up for the possibility of including different activities under the banner of peacebuilding. This research project aimed to see if the rationale had changed between the two long-term peacebuilding projects that the PBF has funded in Kyrgyzstan: the 2013-16 Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP1) that focused on the aftermath of the ethnic violence and the 2017-19 Peacebuilding Priority Plan (PPP2) that focused in PVE.

The peacebuilding attempts in Kyrgyzstan can be understood as a dispositif. Dispositif is a concept from Michael Foucault's works, which is sometimes translated to apparatus (Dumez & Jeunemaitre, 2010). Foucault argued that dispositif is a form of apparatus that was assembled by non-homogenous elements and deployed in response to an urgent need. The dispositif is a different form of governing than the modern state apparatuses, yet excises power and governs subjects with the goal to normalize the situation. Blanco (2020) has analyzed the peacebuilding dispositif within the UN and argues that it is based on creating states that are liberal democratic and market-oriented. I have argued that the peacebuilding projects in Kyrgyzstan can be seen as 'played out' in Kyrgyzstan. A dispositif of non-homogenous elements was assembled in Kyrgyzstan in response to the ethnic violence in 2010. However, in 2017 the urgent need was now identified as violent extremism. This thesis has analyzed wheather the rationale in said dispositif has changed with inclusion of PVE into peacebuilding projects.

I have conceptualized rationale as three operational questions: what is presented in the documents as 'unpeaceful', 'road to peace', and 'peace'. I answered these questions by employing the *What is the problem represented to be?* method developed by Carol Bacchi (2009). I found that the peacebuilding rationale largely stayed the same because of how it relies on the liberal peacebuilding paradigm. In both PPP's the Kyrgyz state is described as weak,

especially in areas of social service and rule of law. Its democratic institutions are described as still maturing and in need of development. The criteria that Kyrgyzstan is evaluated according to is democratic liberal states that are assumed to be strong, stable, and capable states. The Kyrgyz culture was described as a problem in both PPPs. In PPP1, there were claims of cultural acceptance of violence to resolve conflict as well as a culture of impunity. While PPP2 places less emphasis on this aspect, it is claimed that there exists a moral and ideological vacuum in Kyrgyzstan. Both PPP's lays a heavy emphasis on 'civic-ness". They both describe a lack of 'civic-ness' in Kyrgyzstan. In PPP1, it is described as a source of ethnic tension. In PPP2, it is described as a source of alienation and marginalization. Both promote 'civic-ness' as a solution to these problems. They describe activities that aim to develop civic identity, education, and values. The 'civic-ness' presented in PPP1 refers to values like multilingualism and multiculturalism that indicate a Soviet tradition. However, this seems to have been reinterpreted into a liberal framework connected to democracy and human rights education.

Both PPP's emphasized the youth and women. They are described as similarly vulnerable, victims, disempowered, lacking inclusion, and voice. With the exception that women were also described as pacifying up until the inclusion of the PVE, which now also describes women as also a risk to security. Kyrgyzstan has been one of the pilot countries for the implementation of the Secretary-General's Seven-Point Plan on the implementation of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. Within both PPP's the focus on women is made from a largely liberal point of view. The PPP aims to give voice to women and empowerment. But this is not a carte blanche power to be wielded by the women as they see fit. The things that the PPPs aim to empower women to do is to participate in the public sphere, especially politics and local dialogue, and represent women's particular voice and needs. Within my data, I can see youth developing similarly as the WPS-agenda. It is now the youth that is referred to as the missing piece to peace in many discourses and needs to include in decision-making and dialogue. Within the UN, this has been codefined with several resolutions[18] since 2015. The PBF and PBSO have paid a special focus on these groups with the Gender and Youth Promotion Initiative (GYPI).

The inclusion of PVE did change the dispositif in some important ways. Ní Aoláin (2016:290) has described the inclusion of anti-terrorism into peacebuilding and security debates as a "classic 'mission creep'". One aspect that has crept its way into the peacebuilding dispositif in Kyrgyzstan was security. In PPP1, security was understood as human security, albeit a

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[18] For list over UN resolution, platforms, and working groups on Youth, Peace and Security see https://www.un.org/development/desa/youth/international-youth-day-2017/resources-on-youth-peace-and-security.html

limited one. In PPP2, security was understood as state security and physical security. It mentions, for example, border and cybersecurity. The PPP2 described a tension between human rights and this form of security that needed to be balanced. The activities also included developing phyco-linguistic forensic expertise, including a linguistic software program. Supposedly, this helps ensure fair trials. Though it was never stated as a purpose, this kind of software has previously been developed for surveillance and intelligence purposes.

As Richmond and MacGinty (2019) have noted, the structure of peacebuilding might struggle with addressing the mobility that characterizes much of the world today. The inclusion of PVE also means that the peacebuilding dispositif is now attempting to solve an 'unpeaceful' element that is mobile. Yet, it relies on the liberal peacebuilding paradigm to do so by producing a specific state and society that is seen as stable: a liberal democratic society. The PPP2 is attempting to solve a mobile 'unpeaceful' element with tools that are not mobile.

The PPP2 also introduced a high level of uncertainty into the dispositif. I have argued that the argumentation in the PPP2 can be considered a 'house of cards'. It claims that the phenomenon of PVE is new, which is complex, and very little is known about it. This means that when formulating the PPP2 choices have been made about how to present PVE. This has shaped who is talked about, which on turn shaped the activities. The problem is that many of these choices are not based on research or facts but rather on half-knowledges and assumptions. This is not new; terrorism-related research is hard to conduct for many reasons, not least access to actual participants. The PPP2 does acknowledge much of the uncertainty and describe it. The problem is that they have to make choices, and if the assumption in the first step of the argumentation turns out to be faulty, it can affect the legitimacy of the actions they are performing. In other words, these activities might not prevent violent extremism. I have argued that the discursive power of anti-terrorism might be the reason that we accept this high level of uncertainty in a peacebuilding project. But to experiment in the sensitive context of Kyrgyzstan, where the minority is predominantly being pointed out as the terrorists by a government that has previously marginalized them, seems naive at best and risky at worst. The inclusion of PVE, characterized by uncertainty and ambiguity, into the peacebuilding dispositif in Kyrgyzstan raises important ethical questions that we need to ask before this 'mission creep' goes any further.

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| Given Title by author of this thesis	Project desc. title	Link and uploaded date	Listed as
PPP1	Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2013-2016	https://www.undp.org/content/dam/unct/kyrgyzstan/docs/General/UNPBF_Kyrgyzstan-Priority-Plan-2013-2016-and-PBSO-approval-letter%20(1).pdf	n.a.
PPP2	Peacebuilding Priority Plan 2017-2020	https://www.undp.org/content/dam/unct/kyrgyzstan/docs/General/UNPBF%20in%20Kyrgyzstan_PVE%20PPP_2017-2020%20SIGNED.pdf	n.a.
IRF-22	Program description for three projects of PBF/IRF-22 Peacebuilding	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00076632 31 Dec 2010	n.a.
IRF-22/1	PBF/IRF-22 Peacebuilding Women	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00076632 31 Dec 2010	PBF-IRF-22 2010 Annual Report (UNWOMEN Componen...
IRF-22/2	PBF/IRF-22 Peacebuilding Youth	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00076632 31 Dec 2010	PBF-IRF-22 2010 Annual Report (UNICEF Component...
IRF-22/3	PBF/IRF-22 Peacebuilding FOA	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00076632 31 Dec 2010	PBF-IRF-22 2010 Annual Report (FAO Component).DOC
IRF/36-41	Program description for projects 36-41	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00079516 14 Jul 2011	PBF-IRF-36 Project Document_revised July 14.doc
IRF-36	PBF/IRF-36 Infrastructure for Peace - Policy Dialogue and Preventive Action (Kyrgyzstan)	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00079516 6 Jul 2011	Annex 1 - Infrastructures for Peace_revised Ju...
IRF-37	PBF/IRF-37 Cultivating Peace - Using Water-based Agriculture to Facilitate Reconciliation among Multi-ethnic Residents of Kara Suu (Kyrgyzstan)	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00079518 3 Jun 2011	Annex 2 - Cultivating Peace_revised_3 June.doc

IRF-38	PBF/IRF-38 Administration of Justice (Kyrgyzstan)	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00079519 6 Jul 2011	Annex 3 - Administration of Justice_revised Jul...
IRF-39	PBF/IRF-39 Empowering Youth to Promote Reconciliation and Diversity (Kyrgyzstan)	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00079520 3 Jun 2011	Annex 4 - Youth Empowerment_revised_3 June.doc
IRF-40	PBF/IRF-40 Women Building Peace, Trust and Reconciliation in Kyrgyzstan	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00079521 30 May 2011	Annex 5 - Women Building Peace, Trust and Recon...
IRF-41	PBF/IRF-41 Strengthening Media Capacity to Promote Peace and Tolerance in the Kyrgyz Republic	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00079523	Annex 6 - Strengthening Media Capacity _revised...
A-1	PBF/KGZ/A-1: Strengthening capacities of LSGs for peacebuilding	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00088475 31 dec 2013	PBF-KGZ-A-1_Strengthening Cap of LSGs for PBF_U...
A-2	PBF/KGZ/A-2: Building a Constituency for Peace	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00088479 31 dec 2013	PBF-KGZ-A-2_UN Women_Building Constituency for ...
A-3	PBF/KGZ/A-3: Outcome 2 - Building Trust and Confidence among people, communities and authorities (Part2)	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00088540 31 dec 2013	PBF-KGZ-A-3_UNHCR_Building Trust and Confidence...
A-4	PBF/KGZ/A-4: Multisectorial Cooperation for Inter-ethnic Peacebuilding in Kyrgyzstan	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00089350 18 feb 2014	PBF-KGZ-A-4_UNFPA_Multi-sectoral_ProDoc_GATEWAY...
A-5	PBF/KGZ/A-5: Outcome 2 - Youth for Peaceful Change	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00089448 27 dec 2013	PBF-KGZ-A5_Outcome 2_UNDP_UNICEF_UNFPA_Youth_Pr...
A-6	PBF/KGZ/A-6: Inclusive governance and Justice system for Preventing Violent Extremism	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00108334	PRF-KGZ-A-6_Kyrgyzsta

		18 may 2018	n_ProDoc_G ateway.pdf
A-7	PBF/KGZ/A-7: Communities resilient to violent ideologies	http://mptf.undp.org/fa ctsheet/project/001083 37 30 jun 2019	Outcome 3 Semi-annual narative report June 2019...
B-1	PBF/KGZ/B-1:Outcome 1 - Building Trust and Confidence among people, communities and authorities (Part 1, PPP)	http://mptf.undp.org/fa ctsheet/project/000884 77 31 dec 2013	PBF-KGZ-B-1_UNHCR_ Building Trust and Confidence...
B-2	PBF/KGZ/B-2: Improving the rule of law and access for sustainable peace	http://mptf.undp.org/fa ctsheet/project/000893 25 13 feb 2014	PBF-KGZ-B-2_UNDP_Im proving RoL and access to ju...
B-3	PBF/KGZ-B-3: Peace and Trust: Equal Access to Law Enforcement and Justice (PaT)	http://mptf.undp.org/fa ctsheet/project/000893 42 20 dec 2013	PBF-KGZ-B-3_PRODOC_ signed_GAT EWAY.pdf
B-4	PBF/KGZ/B-4: Peace and Reconciliation through strengthening the rule of law and human rights protection	http://mptf.undp.org/fa ctsheet/project/000894 48 27 dec 2013	PBF-KGZ-B-4_OHCHR_P eace and Reconciliatio n_ProD...
B-5	PBF/KGZ/B-5: Media for Peace	http://mptf.undp.org/fa ctsheet/project/000951 39 8 may 2015	ProDoc signed_Gate way.pdf
B-6	PBF/KGZ/B-6: Support to the prevention of radicalization to violence in prisons and probation settings in the Kyrgyz Republic	http://mptf.undp.org/fa ctsheet/project/001083 36 30 jun 2019	PBF KGZ Outcome-2 SemiAnnual Report 2019_ind re...
D-1	PBF/KGZ/D-1: Unity in Diversity	http://mptf.undp.org/fa ctsheet/project/000884 78 31 dec 2018	PBF-KGZ-D-1_UNICEF_ OHCHR_Uni ty in Diversity_Pr o...
D-2	PBF/KGZ/D-2: Outcome 3 - Youth for Peaceful Change	http://mptf.undp.org/fa ctsheet/project/000894 49 1 feb 2014	PBF-KGZ-A-2_UN Women_Buil ding Constituency for ...
E-1	PBF/KGZ/E-1: PBF Secretariat	http://mptf.undp.org/fa ctsheet/project/000868 31 7 jun 2013	PBF-KGZ-E-1_Submissio n form and

			PRODOC_June2013...
H-1	PBF/KGZ/H-1: PBF Secretariat Support to Joint Steering Committee and PRF projects	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00108374 2 jan 2018	PBF-KGZ-H-1_Kyrgyzstan Support to JSC PRF proje...
IRF-109	PBF/IRF-109: Women as Peaceful Voters & Women as Candidates	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00093224 10 apr 2015	PBF-IRF-109_PRODOC_gateway.pdf
IRF-115	PBF/IRF-115: Building the evidence base to facilitate responsive gender policy and programs for equality and lasting peace in Kyrgyzstan	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00094616	150316_Kyrgyzstan ELP IRF project doc_gateway.pdf
IRF-131	PBF/IRF-131: Cross-border Cooperation for Sustainable Peace and Development	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00097384 9 May 2017	X-border KG TJ Signed No-cost extension documen...
IRF-150	PBF/IRF-150: Women and Girls as Drivers for Peace and Prevention of Radicalization in Kyrgyzstan	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00103672 6 Dec 2016	PBF-IRF-150_ProDoc_GATEWAY.pdf
IRF-155	PBF/IRF-155: Youth as Agents of Peace and Stability in Kyrgyzstan (NUNO)	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00104795 3 Mar 2017	GPI-YPI_Search for Common Ground_ProDoc_Part1.pdf
IRF-195	PBF/IRF-195: Addressing Social Disparity and Gender Inequality to Prevent Conflicts in New Settlements	http://mptf.undp.org/factsheet/project/00108093 30 Jun 2019	PBF project document_June 2019_14062019.xlsx

Appendix: 1

The process for formulating a UN PBF Peacebuilding Priority Plan:

Available at: http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/6-the-peacebuilding-and-recovery-facility-prf/

Appendix: 2

Analytical Questions of the What is the Problem Represented to Be Approach:

WPR Chart: What's the Problem Represented to be? (WPR approach to policy analysis)
Question 1: What's the problem (e.g. of "gender inequality", "drug use/abuse", "economic development", "global warming", "childhood obesity", "irregular migration", etc.) represented to be in a specific policy or policies?

Question 2: What deep-seated presuppositions or assumptions (conceptual logics) underlie this representation of the "problem" (*problem representation*)?

Question 3: How has this representation of the "problem" come about?

Question 4: What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the silences? Can the "problem" be conceptualized differently?

Question 5: What effects (discursive, subjectification, lived) are produced by this representation of the "problem"?

Question 6: How and where has this representation of the "problem" been produced, disseminated and defended? How has it been and/or how can it be disrupted and replaced?

Step 7: Apply this list of questions to your own problem representations.

Adopted from Bletsas, Angelique, and Chris Beasley, eds. *Engaging with Carol Bacchi: Strategic interventions and exchanges*. University of Adelaide Press, 2012.

Appendix: 3

Chart of the organizational structure of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture:

Adopted from Cavalcante, F. (2019:222). *Peacebuilding in the United Nations*. Springer.

Appendix: 4

List of the Joint Steering Committee Members

*Draft List to be endorsed through the President's Decree

No	Position , institution
1	The Head of the Department on Ethnic, Religious Policy and Interaction with Civil Society of the Office of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Co-Chair of the Joint Steering Committee
2	UN Resident Coordinator in the Kyrgyz Republic, Co-Chair of the Joint Steering Committee (as agreed)
Government Agencies	
3	Secretary of Security Council of Kyrgyzstan
4	The Chairman of the Committee on Human Rights, Constitutional Law and government system of the Parliament of the Kyrgyz Republic
5	Special Representative of the Government on Issues of Border Delimitation with the rank of First Deputy Chief of the Government Executive Office
6	Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Court of the Kyrgyz Republic in criminal cases and cases of administrative offenses, member of the Council on the selection of judges
7	Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic
8	Deputy Minister of the Interior of the Kyrgyz Republic
9	Deputy Minister of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic
10	Deputy Minister of Justice of the Kyrgyz Republic
11	Deputy Minister of Culture, Information and Tourism of the Kyrgyz Republic
12	Advisor to the Minister of Labor and Social Development of the Kyrgyz Republic
13	Director of the State Commission for Religious Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic
14	Chairman of the State Penitentiary Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
15	Deputy Chairman of the State Border Service
16	Chairman of the State Forensic Service under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
17	Deputy Director of the State Agency for Youth, Physical Culture and Sports under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
18	Deputy Director of the State Agency for Local Self-Government and Inter-Ethnic Relations under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic
19	Vice Mayor of Bishkek (social block)
20	Chief expert of the anti-terrorism center of the State Committee for National Security of the Kyrgyz Republic
21	Deputy Ombudsman of the Kyrgyz Republic
Committee members: representatives of expert and academic communities and civil society representatives	
22	Alisheva Atyrkul, independent expert on civic education (as agreed).
23	Nazira U. Kurbanova Dean of the Institute of humanities (Faculty of History and Social and Legal Education) KGU named after I.Arabaeva (as agreed)
24	Mars Ibraev , Vice-President of the Islamic University of Kyrgyzstan (as agreed).
25	Oshurahunova Dinara Mazhanovna, Expert, PO Coalition for Civil Society and Democracy (as agreed)
26	Tilebaldy uulu Elizar, Program Director of the Institute for Youth Development (as agreed)
27	Chairman of the People's Assembly of Kyrgyzstan (as agreed)
28	Zulfiya Kochorbaeva, Director of the Agency for Social Technologies (as agreed)

UN agencies	
29	UNICEF Representative in the Kyrgyz Republic
30	OHCHR Regional Representative for Central Asia
31	Representative of UNODC in the Kyrgyz Republic
32	Representative to the UN WFP in the Kyrgyz Republic
33	FAO Representative in the Kyrgyz Republic
34	UN Women Representative in the Kyrgyz Republic
35	UNDP Deputy Resident Representative in the Kyrgyz Republic
36	UNFPA Executive Representative in the Kyrgyz Republic

Available at: https://www.undp.org/content/dam/unct/kyrgyzstan/docs/General/UNPBF-KG-List%20of%20the%20Joint%20Steering%20Committee%20Members.pdf