



***“Socio-Economic Influences on the Active Combat Participants in Kosovo”***

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**KEYWORDS:** *Socio-Economic status, Kosovo, History, Political Tolerance, Political Violence, Combat propensity*

**ABSTRACT:** Within the context of the broader historical background of the region and the theoretical framework on security, socio-cultural diversity and political tolerance this particular research deals with the effects of socio-economic structure on tolerance and combat propensity. *"Socio-Economic Influences on the Active Combat Participants in Kosovo"* illustrates how and to what extent socio-economic status has had direct or indirect influence on the behavior of the active combatants in the highly complex conflict of Kosovo.

In terms of research design, the work is grounded in the year-long data collection and theoretical research. The collected data is divided into two parts. The first part offers a systematic and quantitative representation of the group's demographics relating to their economic and social conditions. The second part qualitatively explores the motivations of those who participated in political violence in an effort to develop a more complete understanding of the conflict's origins both on the individual and group level.

The theoretical tools used are the Modernization theory, Cultural pluralism, Political instability and tolerance, and Human needs theory. The socio-economic analysis of political behavior, suggests possible correlation between Socio-Economic rank and tendencies towards political intolerance and combat propensity.

It concludes that, while providing some key factors that help contribute to and evaluate the prospects of the much-needed viable peace building

and sustainable institutions in divided societies; additional research is needed in studying issues of political tolerance in the region. Moreover, this model relies heavily on its socio-demographic and political tolerance theory predecessors while it is very cautious to take on the unambiguous psychological perspective.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Within a broader historical outline of the region and theoretical framework on security, socio cultural diversity and political tolerance this particular research deals with the effects of socio-economic structure on tolerance and combat propensity. The work *“Socio-Economic Influences on the Active Combat Participants in Kosovo”* illustrates how and to what extent socio-economic status has had direct or indirect influence on the behavior of the active combatants in the highly complex conflict of Kosovo.

In terms of research design, theoretical and historical background, the work is grounded in the year-long data collection and theoretical research. The collected data is divided into two parts; the first part offers a systematic and quantitative representation of the group’s demographics related to their economic and social conditions, while second qualitatively explores the motivations of those who participated in political violence and shows an effort in developing a more complete understanding on the origins of the conflict on both the personal and group level.

At the outset of this study, my goal was to survey and gather a representative sample of ex-combatants from the Kosovo civil war that would present information on the demographic profile of the combatant population, their motivations and incentives for joining and staying actively involved in the conflict. In an effort to develop a more complete understanding of the conflict and its origins, I wanted to explore and show the assumed consistency in the demographic profiles of the different warring parties and explore the motivations of those who participated in political violence.

The study presents the findings of the year long research, based on the surveys and interviews of ordinary citizens of Kosovo, ex-combatants and professionals, both local and international, with deep and widely recognized professional expertise on the issues that are the focus of this research and as such highly relevant to the study. It presents information on the socio-economic demographic profile of the population of Kosovo, its socio-political opinions, motivations and concerns on the issues relating to

political tolerance, violence and combat propensity. It will provide a qualitative, more complete understanding of the motivations of those who participated in the conflict first hand and their incentives for doing so. The research results, in addition to providing an (*socio-political*) understanding of the conflict and its origins, have the potential to show and inform the officials on the issues that could prove critical to conflict resolution, such as socio-economic based peace negotiations and sustainable peace building.

Embedding the research question of socio-economic '*influences*' on political violence and combat propensity within the broader theoretical framework will consequently involve interdisciplinary theoretical concepts such as Individual Values and Priorities, Political Tolerance and Political Instability, Modernization theory, wide ranging theories of (group and individual) Conflicts, Socio-Political theories of relationship between Socio-Economic status and analysis of political behavior, and, lastly, psychological concepts of Basic Human Needs theories.

All of these (*and probably some more that I'm unconsciously unaware of*) theoretical concepts to be presented here have directly or indirectly dealt with the research question that has been the focal point of this study, obviously and expectantly with different approaches and conclusions on the matter.

In this following chapter, I make an effort to systematize and present the above mentioned theoretical conceptions in the way they relate to the research question of this study. The focus of this theoretical framework overview will be put on its different conceptual but nevertheless tangible connections to the research hypothesis of socio-economic influences and their bearing on political violence and combat propensity; keeping in mind the vast amount of academic literature and high level research associated with the above mentioned theoretical concepts, I will present only the ones most centrally related to my study.

By implanting the research into the theoretical framework of Modernization theory, Cultural pluralism, Political instability and tolerance, Human needs theory, etc. and through socio-economic analysis of political behavior, I suggest to the reader the

possible connections between Socio-Economic status and tendencies towards political tolerance, behavior and combat propensity.

It will lead to conclude that, while providing some key sources of information that could help contribute to and evaluate the prospects of the much-needed continued peace and influence the appropriate policies for peace building and sustainable institutions in divided societies; additional research is needed in studying issues of political tolerance in the region. Moreover, this model relies heavily on its socio-demographic and political tolerance theory predecessors while it is very cautious to take on the unambiguous psychological perspective.



## 2. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

Although it is not directly related to the research question proposed in this study, I strongly believe that the following historical overview would provide the readers with a specific *'prism'* if you will, through which the research could be examined and analyzed. It offers a specific chronological viewpoint of the problem and its political background which proves essential in ones' understanding of the history, issues and the people associated with the region.

Kosovo, the province of the present day Republic of Serbia, has definitely shared the unfortunate fate with the rest of the region and as such is the focus of my research thesis. In this following chapter I present a 'general' overview of the region's history as I believe that understanding the historical background of the region and its geopolitical position in throughout history is significant, and to a large extent relates to my thesis work.

Comprehensive history of great nation's power struggles over their vested interests in the region (*or elsewhere*), nation building, religious upheavals and hence the creation of conflicting identities and intractable conflicts would in a nutshell make up for the modern history of the Balkan peninsula, which one could regrettably argue, perpetually extends its worst self, even to the present day.

Today, Kosovo is recognized as the name of a complex problem, a problem where history meets the present day and where two neighboring peoples, Serbian and Albanian, are tied up in the confrontations that have accumulated over the years. In order to better understand the actual political moment of the conflict, in my view it is fairly important, or even necessary, to take a closer look at it from the objective historical perspective.

## 2.1 Historical Overview

The region was first mentioned in 300 B.C. when it was conquered by Alexander the Great 300 and later in 4<sup>th</sup> Century A.D. when it was considered to be the part of the Roman province of Dardania. Greeks and Romans referred to the earliest known inhabitants of the region as 'Illyrians'. Today most of the Albanians scholars argue to be direct descendants of the Illyrians. In contrast, most of the Serbian academic community stresses that Albanians are first mentioned in the early middle ages as a result of intermixing between nomadic shepherds and bits and pieces of Illyrians and 'Dardanians' from Thrace. In all reality tracing such ancestry is definitely extremely complicated, but most agree that people living in the region before the appearance of the Serbs that migrated from the North are likely to have some genetic relationships to Albanians; whatever may prove to be the case, although it could be related to their respective narratives, both sides agree that this argument is hardly significant to the current conflict. Today this ethno-genesis of the people is purposely being politically mystified, but to base any historical, not to mention territorial, right on the ethnic map of Europe to the times dating back before the period of the great migrations would be, in a lack of a better scientific term, absurd.

In the 6<sup>th</sup> century Slavs crossed-over the river Danube and settled in the Balkan Peninsula. In the area of today's Albania they settled in plains and river plains as agriculture based people, leaving the mountainous regions to the native cattle-herders (*whose ancestry could probably be traced to today's Albanians*). Primary meeting between these two ethnicities could not be characterized as aggressive in any way, and it would not be such until the Islamization of the Albanians in 16<sup>th</sup> century. There were no fights over lands, forced migrations or destructions; rather, the Serb-Albanian relationship in the Middle ages could be termed as *symbiotic*. In the medieval Serbian state, since the late 12<sup>th</sup> century, citizens were completely integrated, in both a governmental and social sense, no discrimination or conflict could be traced to ethnicity. The Serbian tsar Stephan Dushan (1331-1355), in line with the medieval

notions of the state, which was never termed as national, carried the title of *"tsar of Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians and Arbanas."* (Batakovic, 1992, p.46)

The region of Kosovo and Metohija, from the early middle ages, is settled with the homogenous Serbian population. The first Serbian states, in the 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> centuries, are traced to the region of Kosovo, back than an ethnically Serbian region, which was under the Byzantine influence until the final incorporation into the Serbian state towards the end of the 12<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 13<sup>th</sup> century, ruled by the powerful Nemanjic dynasty where it developed into the governmental and cultural foundation of the Serbian state. The dynasty lasted for four centuries and it reached its peak during the reigns of King Milutin and later Emperor Stefan Dushan.

## 2.2 Serbian Heritage

The Serbian Orthodox Church, the national church organization from its establishment in 1219, has been instrumental in permanently characterizing the Kosovo region as the center of the Serbian state and *"guardian"* (Noel, 1998, p.67) of Serbian lands. A vast number of dynastic monasteries, as legacies of the Serbian rulers (*Gracanica, Bogorodica Ljeviska, Banjska, Visoki Decani, Arhandjeli, etc...*), with iconographic attributes of the state's sovereignty and continuity of the Serbian rule (*Nemanjic dynasty*) and with relics of the canonized rulers and heads of the church represent the foundation on which the national conscience and cultural identity was formed and indeed over the years, reinforced. These historical monuments concentrated in one particular area, that have survived the five centuries of Ottoman (*Islamic*) rule are still living national, as well as spiritual, strongholds of the of the Serbian people. Serbian medieval art and architecture in Kosovo are held to be of the highest level in than contemporary Europe and its literary creations in these parts represent the mainstream of the Serbian written word, which has shaped the consciousness of the Serbian population in the middle ages. The memorandum (referred to the ambassadors of the great power nations in London, 1913), stressed the

importance of this “holy land” for the Serbian people, where they have “during the medieval times reached high levels of civilizations on which lies its European identity.” (Batakovic, 1992, p.93)

Ethnic relations in the region of today’s Kosovo remained unchanged even during the Ottoman invasion during the 80’s and 90’s of the 14<sup>th</sup> century, the region’s ethnical character was not questioned and it remained strictly Serbian under the rule of despots Lazrevic and Brankovic (*successors of the Nemanjic dynasty*). In these times, the area of the Serb-Albanian *symbiosis* was located far in the north-west areas of what is known as today’s north-Albanian mountainous region.

The loss of the state’s freedom and sovereignty under the invasion of the Ottomans changed the living conditions of the Serbian people at its core. Somewhere between the eras of Serbian freedom and slavery (under the Turkish rule), stands the landmark occurrence, which will (has) become the symbol and the motif of the Serbian history: The Battle of Kosovo (15/28<sup>th</sup> of June 1389). According to a place and historical significance that this battle has for Serbs, as well as for the majority of Christian population of Europe, it can be placed alongside the great battles of Europe such as the clashes at Kulick (1380), Poitiers (731) or even Thermopiles (480). The decisive resistance the Serbs put up to the Ottoman invasion of Europe was crushed in the military and physical sense (although historians disagree on the outcome of the battle), it is an undisputed historical fact that after this moment in history military resistance to the Ottomans which, by the 1450’s had slowly occupied the majority of the medieval Serbian state, was insignificant, but the death of Serbian knez Lazar and his army has gained martyrdom proportions in the historical conscience of the people as the ancient sacrifice for the Christianity and the “*Kingdom of Heaven*” (Noel, 1998, p.114), and is heralded as a heroic sacrifice and a spiritual triumph for the ideals of the Christian civilization. Serbian people, for these particular reasons, regard to Kosovo as the key characteristic of their identity, history and more than anything else their freedom. They see Kosovo as the primary link to their historical perseverance, as the living knowledge of the Serbian medieval state and the notion of Kosovo as its integral part, were crucial

factors in the struggles for the liberation and unification that was to come centuries later. According to Bjelica, *"...inseparable...is that Kosovo is the home of the Serbian nation. For the Serbian people Kosovo put the seal on its identity became the key to its history, the banner of national freedom. However, the Serbs' attitude towards Kosovo is not merely based on memories of the past, nor is the "mythical" factor important in that attitude. The same can be said of its historiographic or political reflections on the problem. Kosovo is not some imaginary legend of the past, but a real historical destiny that continues today."* (Bjelica, 2006, p.418)

### 2.3 Ottoman Invasion

The Turkish invasion moved great ethnic masses in the Balkans and it has caused disturbances with permanent but mostly tragic consequences. Nevertheless, when it comes to Kosovo, the first migrations of Serbs in the 15<sup>th</sup> century did not largely influence this area, nor did the Albanians herders' descent from the north mountain region of *Prokletije*. In the 16<sup>th</sup> century, according to the official Ottoman census data, Christians were still in absolute majority in the region (*compared to the Turks and then Islamized Albanians*); together with Jews and other Christian minorities (*Orthodox Greeks, Vlachs and Catholic Albanians*), the Serb population represented 97 percent of the region's total population. The region of "Old Serbia" as Kosovo and Metohija and its surrounding areas is also known, according to these sources, in 15<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> century still lives as a Serbian land.

Historical sources testify that before the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, under the influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the activation of old spiritual centers along with the renovation of the Patriarchate at Pec (1557), Serbian resistance to the ottoman rule rises. Ottoman (*Islamic*) rule was grounded on religious discrimination, as Bozanic writes: *"Serbia including Kosovo was conquered by the Islamic Ottoman Turks in 1459; Bosnia and Herzegovina fell in 1465 and 1483 respectively. During this time Serbian Christians and Jews, as "people of the book", became dhimmis subject to the dhimma or protection offered to Christian and Jews in newly Islamized lands in exchange for their lives. Dhimmi status goes*

back to the 7th century when the Jews at the oasis of Khaybar in Arabia accepted the treaty offered to them by Mohammed. In exchange for their lives the Jews forfeited ownership of their lands were forced to defer to Muslims on the street, in business dealings and under the Shari'a law, and were forced to pay heavy taxes to their Muslim conquerors. This treaty of Khaybar became the model by which all Christian and Jews in newly conquered lands became subject to a condition referred to by the scholar Bat Ye'or as *dhimmitude*, a contraction of the two words *dhimmitude* and *servitude*. Christians and Jews in lands under Islamic rule remained in the status of *dhimmitude* until the emancipation ordered by the Ottoman Sultan in the middle of the 19th century under pressure from the European powers. In reality the oppression of the Christians and the Jews in the Balkans didn't end until Serbia achieved independence in 1912 as a result of the first Balkan war." (Bozanic, 2006, p.387)

Ivo Andric, Nobel Prize winner, writes in his doctoral dissertation that the Ottoman influence and the societal Islamization had "*absolutely negative*" connotations on the region. Ottoman rule, as mentioned before, was grounded on the laws of discrimination and the absolute rule of Islam, with legal possibilities in practice to conduct the individual or collective violence, until the physical destruction of the individual or areas.

At root, those were the reasons of the constant resistance of the Serbian people for the national freedom and return to the European civilization and the roots of the deep demographic changes that took place in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, which underline the problem of today's Kosovo.

Led by the church, since the end of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the freedom movement of the Serbs grows from the constant resistance of the people and its refusal to accept the Ottoman power. During the great Austro-Turkish wars (1683-1690; 1717-1737), Serbs together with Catholic north-Albanian tribes, participated in great numbers on the side of the Austro-Hungarian empire. After the Austrian defeat, subjected to the cruel repressions of the Turks, Serbs migrate northwards on the vast territories from middle Macedonia to Danube. Two *great migrations* of Serbian people to Austria, under the patriarchs Arsenije III Charnojevic (1690) and Arsenije IV Charnojevic-Shakabent (1737), are undisputable historical facts. It is not possible to determine the exact number of

refugees, but in the first migration of 1690, it is estimated that 185,000 Serbs migrated to Austria. These migrations have definitely played a role in diminishing the Serbian ethnic element within the Kosovo; but from the later developments, and uprisings, it can be seen that the remainder of the Serbian population on those territories, which was constantly *renewed* by individual or group migrations by the Serbian population within the Ottoman empire, was strong enough for the low scale armed resistance. In reality, until the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Kosovo is still an ethnically homogeneous and densely populated Serbian land, as it was before the Turkish invasion.

Albanians migrate into South-Slavic lands on the widespread front from Polimlje to Ohrid, individually or in large groups, from the beginning of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The reasons for this migration could be found in the islamization of the Albanians, implemented in the 16<sup>th</sup> century (at least 50% of the total population of Albania), and in the forced islamization and denationalization of the Serbian population. In their migrations, by the 18<sup>th</sup> century Albanians reach as far as Nish and Sofija on the west, Skopje and Veles to the south and northwards they reach as far to the region of Sandzak. Economic ill-fortunes and infertile lands of the north and middle mountainous regions of Albania were just a starting impulse of these large scale movements, but coupled with islamization and the Ottoman religious policies described earlier in the text, they have turned into mass colonization of Kosovo and today's Macedonia and a gravely unlawful discrimination of the Christian population.

Indeed, these political, and not so much the economical, circumstances have brought the (*Islamized*) Albanians not just to the new territories but to the privileged positions with respect to the Christian population known as '*raja*'. Historians mostly agree that the migration of Serbs together with the rest of the Christian population from their lands, was not a natural process, and instead it resulted from the various forms of violence they were subjected to. The conflicts between Islamized Albanians and the rest of the Christian population intensified proportionally with the scale of the Albanian migration onto, until then, Serbian lands.

## 2.4 Serbia's Independence, Uprisings and Wars

During the first Serbian uprising (1804-1813), Kosovo remained the principle target of the Serbian revolutionary movement regarding national unity and the uncompromised Serbian sovereignty over the region. In the region of Kosovo, in order to repressively counter these revolutionary uprisings by the Serbs, Ottomans used the Muslim Albanian settlers as their main *force*, thus making every liberation effort by the Serbs a direct armed clash with the Albanians in the region. Serbian historians stress the terrors endured by the Christian populations during these times. Another pivotal moment in the repression of the Christian population was a late attempt by the Turks to reform the diminishing Ottoman Empire and bring it closer to the European influence (known as Tanzimat, started in 1839) which as Petrovic states: "...aroused resistance among Albanian Muslims who, with the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, turned against the reform to protect their old privileges, religious and national discrimination, and, as they said, the "true faith". Thus, the Christian masses became the chief victims of an Albanian anti-reformist, conservative and financial movement in a series of local rebellions and pogroms." (Petrovic, 2006, p.399.)

The first and second liberation wars (1876-1877; 1877-1878), fought between Serbia and Montenegro on one side against Turkey, were the first frontal and serious confrontations between Serbs and Albanians. Muslim Albanians fought the Serbian troops defending the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, defending the occupied lands. Turkey's defeat represented the loss of these territories and approximately 30,000 Albanians left the liberated area. In the border dispute with Russia in the Berlin Congress of 1878, Serbia managed to hold only some parts of the liberated territories. The remaining Serbs in Kosovo were then put to 'terrible' and 'bloody' revenge, organized by the *Prizren League*, which was founded the same year.

The *Prizren League* marks an important moment in the constituting of the Albanian national ideology and additionally strained the relationships between the Serbian and Albanian populations. Diminished ottoman influence and growing struggles by the Turks in defending the integrity of the Empire against the newly independent



nations of Serbia and Greece, intensified the efforts of the Islamized Albanian population in searching new ways of countering the new ethnic changes and conquests of the Balkan's Christians. League's statute was directed against not only newly formed Balkan states and its allies, but also against Turkey, whose weakness has become a danger. Most of the Serbian historians deem the "league" as "*aggressive, revenge-seeking, conservative and nationalist*" (Savich, 2000, p.44) but understate the important fact that it has successfully managed to connect Albanians of all three faiths (Muslim, Christian Orthodox and Catholic) for the first time. The three decades after the Berlin congress, 1878-1912, could be characterized by prosecutions, destruction and expulsion of the Serbs, only in this period the ethnic balance of the region was definitely changed. 250,000 people left the region for Serbia, these forced migrations especially intensified during the short war between Turkey and Greece in 1897. Here, Albanian historians mention the Albanian revolutionary moments against the Turks and especially stress the four year period 1908-1912, when even Skopje in today's Macedonia, fell to the Albanian forces.

During the first Balkan War (1912) Turkey and Albania were attacked by Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. Petrovic writes: "*Serbs joined the army in large numbers to avenge the Serbian defeat by the Turks at the Battle of Kosovo Polje. At this time Kosovo was mostly Albanian. Serbs entered Pristina as Albanians retreated to the mountains. The Serbian army destroyed Turkish and Albanian houses and there was much plundering and killing. Serb peasants followed the army into Kosovo re-occupying the land. The Albanians fought fiercely but lost the war and Kosovo came under Serbian authority. In 1913, in the second Balkan War, Bulgaria attacked the Serbian and Greek armies in Macedonia. They miscalculated and were quickly and decisively defeated. Among the outcomes Serbia nearly doubled in size obtaining most of Slavic Macedonia.*" (Petrovic, 2006, p.403) Political and legal aspects of the nations borders and future development between the Albanian and Serbian nations was crated at the London Conference of the European powers (1912-1913), Serbia was awarded the sovereignty over Kosovo, which it has retained to present day.

## 2.4.1 WWI

After the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand by Gavrilo Princip, in Sarajevo (June, 1914), Austro-Hungary together with Germany declared war on Serbia which was backed by Russia, Great Britain and France. The causes and effects of this war are many and widespread but for the sake of this paper I will limit the discussion on the Batakovic's brief review of events only connected to the region of Kosovo. He writes:

*"The declaration of war by Austria-Hungary was greeted with considerable satisfaction in Albania for understandable reasons. Also for understandable reasons Serbia saw Albania and Albanians as its enemy. As a result vicious guerrilla fighting took place between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo with atrocities on both sides and a flow of refugees of Albanians into Albania. In 1915, the Western allies, in the secret Pact of London, agreed to divide Albania between Greece and Italy leaving only a small autonomous state in the central region. Austria-Hungarian and Bulgarian troops moved into Kosovo. And after the two initial victories at mountains of Cer and Kolubara over their Austro-Hungarian adversaries, Serbian armies were forced to what is known as "The Great Serbian Retreat", a disastrous trek across Kosovo and the snow-covered mountains of Albania. The army was accompanied by thousands of Serb civilians who were terrified by what they had heard about the fate of Belgium at the hands of the Axis powers. The best estimate is that 100,000 Serbs lost their lives during this grueling retreat. Kosovo was occupied by Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. Many Kosovar Albanians joined the Austria-Hungarian army. Albanian language schools were opened to undermine the Serbian presence. After the tide of battle turned against Austria-Hungary in 1918 the Serb army took revenge massacring women and children and destroying homes. In retaliation guerilla warfare against the Serbs was relentless. The peace treaties of 1919-1920 established a Yugoslav state with the name "The Kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs". The name was shortly changed to Yugoslavia. Included in the Kingdom, which was a constitutional monarchy, beside those mentioned above were Bosnia- Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia. Kosovo was again an integral part of Serbia. The Kingdom was comprised of 12 million people, of whom 400,000 were Albanian. It was overwhelmingly a Slavic state. In contrast 64% of the population of Kosovo was*

*Albanian, and of these three-quarters were Muslim. The Kingdom was governed from Belgrade.”*  
(Batakovic, 1989, p.108)

Attempts of the Serbian (*then the Yugoslav/South Slavic*) state, focused on using the agrarian reforms and colonization, to establish an ethnic and national balance in the region failed and eventually managed to create even more '*bad blood*'. During the 20's and 30's of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, 60,000 Serbs and Slavs settled in the region, they occupied mostly barren and unusable lands and were openly opposed even by the local Serbian population. Initiatives, like the evacuation of Muslims from the Balkans organized by Turkey and supported by the local government were not systematically conducted and resulted in immigration of not more than 45,000 Muslims from the region.

#### 2.4.2 WWII

After the April (6<sup>th</sup>-17<sup>th</sup>) collapse of the kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1941, Croatia, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, became a Fascist state allied with Germany and which killed and persecuted hundred thousands of Serbs; Slovenia was annexed to Italy and Montenegro was occupied by Italian forces; Serbia, Macedonia and Greece were occupied by Germany (*Kosovo was occupied by Albania except for the important mining region which remained under German control*). In Kosovo, under Albanian and German rule nearly 100,000 Albanians moved into Kosovo. Serbs were harassed and attacked by the occupying force of Albanians. The "Second Prizren league" was formed in 1943, and it operated under the auspices of first Italian and then German occupation. It is estimated that at least 100,000 Serbs were forcefully expelled from the region during the years of war (1941-1944). Bjelica also adds:

*"...in 1943 the 2nd Prizren League was established, with delegates from all Albanian territories including Kosovo, and with similar objectives. During the war years Serbs and Montenegrins in Albanian occupied territory were brutalized by the SS "Skanderbeg" division which was comprised of Albanian soldiers under German officers. Albanian village police units also were involved in these activities directed against Serbs. After the war, thousands of Serbs*

*and Montenegrins were prohibited from returning to Kosovo, and thousands of Albanians immigrated into Kosovo.”* (Bjelica, 2006, p.417)

## 2.5 Post War Kosovo and Metohija

After the war, which saw the allies turn their support from Monarchist resistance to the communists, the region of Kosovo enters the new communist Yugoslavia under the Serbian rule (*Under the 1946 constitution, the region was defined as an autonomous region under Federal, not Serbian jurisdiction*). The next constitution, in 1953, reduced the autonomy for Kosovo and by 1956 Albanian nationalism resurfaced which (*along with disarmament of the nationalists*) led to the 1963 constitution and a complete reduction of the regions autonomy, placing it under the Serbian rule.

In 1967, after Tito's first visit to Kosovo, and the falling-out of the top communist leadership of the communist party which resulted in the purging of Serb nationalist Aleksandar Rankovic, more concessions were made to Albanian nationalism, dealing with languages, education and other cultural issues. According to Jansen, "*flood of Albanian nationalism was the predictable result*" resulting in an increase in the ethnic Albanian population from 67% to 74% (1961-1971) due to the illegal immigration of Albanians from Albania into Kosovo and exodus of Serbian population. As these events intensified, the 1974 constitution made Kosovo a completely autonomous province and equal to Serbia at the federal level. In 1978 the one hundredth anniversary of the first *Prizren league* was celebrated and the Albanian nationalism reached its peak. By the year 1981, 100,000 Serbs have now left Kosovo and Albanian population rose to 77% of the total inhabitants of the region. Serbian historians rarely fail to note that these occurrences were ensued by great number of forced expulsions employing if not the same but similar methods as the 19<sup>th</sup> century murders. Petrovic and Blagojevic wrote that "...rapes, fights, psychological and moral tortures, illegal overtaking of property, destruction of crops, cattle and woods, social and legal injustice and discrimination...had all been organized into the Albanian terror which have methodically created the psychosis of

insecurities and fears among the Serbs and Montenegrins which consequently lead to their expulsion." (Petrovic and Blagojevic, 1990, p.146)

One could argue, as Petrovic and Blagojevic do, and most of the historians agree upon these facts, that in a certain part of their republic (meaning Kosovo) Serbian ethnic populations have been reduced to a minority (without minority rights) while its population percentage in the region constantly fell from 28% in 1948, to 15% in 1981 (most notably between 1961-1981), while Albanian ethnic group in contrast proportionally grew, not only because of the high birth rates recorded among the population but also by uncontrolled and massed immigration from the neighboring Albania.

## 2.6 Recent History, *Last 25 years (1980-present)*

The main problem one encounters when trying to historically systematize the last quarter of the century with regards to the region of Kosovo and Metohija and its ethno-political past is the lack of the historical perspective needed for this type of report. The majority of the sources are contradictory (*even more than usual*) and I will try to limit myself only on those sources that are more or less confirmed by both (*or more*) sides. Keeping in mind that one should look at these socio-political proceedings from the perspective of events unfolding during and in light of the brake-up of Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (1989-1998).

In the 1980's a series of riots *hits* Kosovo, what started out as a student protest over the overcrowding of Pristina's University in 1981, turned out to a full scale riot where Serbian citizens were beaten, their homes burned and their shops looted. This consequently led to even more Serbs settling out of Kosovo, under the pressures of extremist Albanians. Also by this time, according to Jansen, strong *underground* movement for the "*National Liberation of Kosovo*" developed and the remaining Serbs felt, and "*were indeed threatened*", this encouraged the Serbian Academy of Arts and

Sciences to issue a *memorandum* calling for the revocation of the Kosovo's autonomy and "*de-Albanization*" of the province.

All scholars agree that during the period of 1974 until late 1980's, ethnic-Albanians in Kosovo undeniably enjoyed the most administrative and cultural autonomy in their history whether under Ottoman, Serbian or indeed Albanian rule. Politicians and scholars widely disagree with regards to the goals of the Albanian national politics in this region; it ranges from as far as the creation of *Greater Albania* and unifications with Albania and incorporation of some parts of what is today's Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, to independence of the region itself and finally to the status of a republic within Yugoslavia.

I will continue with the chronological presentation of the key events in the region and limit the comments as much as possible as the details and the description of these events are mostly colored with political or ethnic national agendas. Beginning in November of 1988 with the first miners strike, which again ignited the violent demonstrations in which "*Serbs in Kosovo were terrorized and thousands of Serbs from Belgrade demanded that order be restored in the province*" (Jansen, 2002, p.221) and the March of 1989 when the Serbian government stripped the region of its autonomy (*the process was later completed in September of 1990*), the history of Kosovo becomes one of political unilateralism (Serbian program of Achieving Peace Freedom and Equality and Albanian refusal to accept this program, following the unrecognized declaration of a sovereign republic of "Kosova" and its constitution), ethnic skirmishes and violence between the ethnic Albanian extremists and Serbian security forces and unfortunately as always, civilians. The already strained political differences mounted, escalating with the total withdrawal of the ethnic Albanians from the Serbian political life by the 1992 while Serbs intensified the importance of their cultural heritage in Kosovo.

During these years of civil strife, apart from some minor interruptions, international involvement in the crisis increases only in the early 1998 with the creation of *Contact Group for Kosovo* with representatives of Germany, France, Russia, Great Britain and the United States. After some bitter diplomatic negotiations and threats of

NATO military intervention, Serbian government agrees to allow 1,800 UN observers into Kosovo and withdraw the bulk of its security forces from the region; during this time a guerilla group know as *Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)* intensified the attacks on the Serbian civilian and security targets which brought back the Serbian security forces in the region and the agreement fell apart in October the same year. Final negotiations were held at Rambouillet in France under the threat of ensuing NATO air campaign; it was given a two-week time frame to negotiate the end of guerilla war. After the initial peace conference failed, it was then moved to Paris and the air-campaign was extended for another two weeks. Jensen summarizes the negotiations:

*"...settlement, dictated by the West required Yugoslavia to withdraw its forces from Kosovo, the KLA to lay down their arms, NATO peace-keeping troops on the ground to enforce the agreement and a three year period to settle the political future of Kosovo. Yugoslavia believed that in three years following the required referendum it would be forced to grant Kosovo complete independence which was and is the stated goal of the KLA...required Yugoslavia to surrender to NATO many aspects of its national sovereignty. It is not surprising that Yugoslavia was unwilling to sign the Rambouillet document."* (Jansen, 2002, p.212)

But this time KLA under the pressures (*and perspective assurances of the bombing campaign*) of the United States has signed the agreement and the air-campaign was initiated by NATO on the 24<sup>th</sup> of March 1999, it lasted for 73 days. During this time Serbian security forces stepped up their military campaign against the Albanian rebels and drove the KLA outside the borders of today's Kosovo, coupled with the NATO bombing this campaign caused an exodus of between 100,000 and 700,000 *Kosovars (majority ethnic Albanian)* from the region. At the beginning NATO miscalculated Belgrade's resolve to fight and the peace deal was not brokered until a wider array of both civilian and economic infrastructure was being intensely targeted, un-doubtingly setting the country's economy back for decades. When a peace deal was finally brokered with the intense Russian diplomatic effort, both sides had to compromise; Under the UN resolution 1244, Yugoslavia has agreed to *"substantial" autonomy for Kosovo, withdrawal of all Serb military, police and paramilitary forces, return of all the refugees, and an UN led armed security presence in Kosovo with "substantial" NATO participation but*

*under the auspices of the Security Council. The agreement calls for respect of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, Kosovo remains in Yugoslavia, the agreement is under the authority of the Security Council of the United Nations not NATO, and calls for involvement of Russian troops in the peacekeeping forces.”*

In the aftermath of the war in Kosovo, the international community was not able to prevent the expulsion of almost all (*but some*) Serbian population from the region by the Albanian extremist forces. In more recent developments, the Security Council of the UN, based on the facts gathered by the contact group for Kosovo, some indirect negotiations between governments in Belgrade and Pristina, and the UN special envoy, ex-Finish president Marti Arthisari, evaluated the standards of the resolution 1244 and proposed the new resolution that represents the road map and a future political model for mutual co-existence for the province. Without the inclination and any further speculation on the matter, days to come will provide the answer to its legacy. The Government of Kosovo has unilaterally proclaimed region's independence from Serbia proper which was recognized by the United States and most of the EU countries and in contrast, not by Russia, China, India, Spain, etc.; Serbia's government has challenged the legality of such unilateral independence and hence the recognitions, and the legality of the case and the court's projected jurisdiction on the matter is currently set to be processed in front of the International Tribunal.

With all this said, we can only observe that, in the current geo-political moment, again today Kosovo is faced with real problems of decreasing international funding and increasing international debt, a non-functioning economy and lack of governmental infrastructure. With questions of the future political status of the province looming, people are left with highly institutionalized organized crime and corruption that, whatever the status, seriously hinders its socio-economic progress.



### 3. METHODOLOGY

At the outset of this research, my goal was to survey and gather a quantitative representative sample of ex-combatants from the Kosovo civil war that would present information on the demographic profile of the combatant population, their motivations and incentives for joining and staying actively involved in the conflict. In an effort to develop a more complete understanding of the conflict and its origins, I wanted to show the assumed striking consistency in the demographic profiles of the different warring parties and explore the motivations of those who participated in political violence. After an approximately four months of uphill battle, of trying to set up promised (*and sometimes prepaid*) interviews and surveys, and the same amount of time of delays and broken deals and promises by the responsible administrative officials; I did the next best thing.

The study presents the findings of the year long research, based on the surveys and interviews of the ordinary citizens of Kosovo, ex-combatants and professionals, both local and international, with deep and widely recognized professional expertise on the issues that are relevant to the study. It presents information on the socio-economic demographic profile of the population of Kosovo, their socio-political opinions, motivations and concerns on the issues relating to political tolerance, violence and combat propensity. It will provide a qualitative, more complete understanding of the motivations of those who participated in the conflict first hand and their incentives for doing so. The research results, in addition to providing an (*socio-political*) understanding of the conflict and its origins, have the potential to show and inform the officials on the issues that could prove critical to conflict resolution such as socio-economic based peace negotiations and sustainable peace building.

### 3.1 Research Methodology

The main method for gathering demographic information was through the administration of a close ended questionnaire. The questionnaire was designed to gather information (*demographic data*) on eight different socio-economic variables; Age, marital status, number of children, number of supported persons in the household, education, occupation, monthly income and estimated net worth. It also, at the end, asked two open questions, both relating and intended to measure the levels of political tolerance and socio-economic influence on combat propensity in civil conflicts.

Surveys were administered among the thirty (30) randomly selected citizens of Kosovo and Metohija, both to the fifteen (15) ethnic Albanians and fifteen (15) ethnic Serbs. The sample selected was in itself random, but cognitive effort was made to keep the selection surveyed as diverse as possible (at least age wise). The surveys were administered in the two neighboring municipalities in Kosovo and Metohija, Kosovska Mitrovica and Pristina.

There were three types of interviews administered to gather as much qualitative data as possible. First it involved two (2) ex-combatants, one (1) ethnic Serb and one (1) ethnic Albanian, that were closely and actively involved in the civil conflict; Second, two (2) high ranking NGO officers, one (1) ethnic Serb and one (1) ethnic Albanian that were actively involved in the data gathering about the fighting and identifying both the civilian and military victims of the conflict; and the Third, two (2) K-FOR officers, stationed in Kosovo, both with extensive operational experience and knowledge of the Balkans which dates back to the beginning of the 1990's.

After establishing the socio-economic demographic of the interviewees (*for what its worth*) by administering the short survey similar to the one described earlier in the text administered to the non-combatant population, consequently the interviews followed.

During the interviews, the focus is placed on the following issues; on the mechanisms for recruitment, motivation for participation, political preferences before

the war, during the peace negotiations and today after the conflict. I tried to examine and take a deeper look into the command structure of the forces, the economic resources available (*before, during and after the conflict*), the length of the combatant involvement, the interaction and the treatment of the civilians, the disarmament and reintegration into the post-war society. Also, the same two open ended questions intended to measure the levels of political tolerance and socio economic influence on combat propensity (*in civil conflicts*), that were administered in the survey taken by the non-combatants, were asked again, this time just in the form of an Semi-structured interview.

### 3.2 Limitations and Potential Sources of Bias

A number of sources of bias must be considered when studying and evaluating the findings presented in this report. First and foremost, while in the study I deal with a violent civil conflict between two major ethnic groups (*Albanian and Serbian*), reading this paper one must know that, despite the fact that I honor the academic and ethical impartiality while gathering and interpreting the collected data, this study is done by a Serb; and if for no other reason, it may be challenged or scrutinized only because of that fact.

The ongoing processing and investigation of war crimes by the Hague International War Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia is omnipresent and still under way in the region today and has therefore probably affected or limited some of the answers in the interview of the ex-combatants. The presence of the NGO officers during both of the interviews and the guaranteed anonymity of the participants may have somewhat helped in minimizing this potential source of bias.

When it comes to the issues of political tolerance, while as mentioned before, a conscious effort is made to keep the representative sample as varied and diverse as possible, the sheer fact that in a society not so far removed from the recent civil conflict;

the individuals that agreed to participate in the research could prove to exhibit higher levels of political tolerance than that of their respective societies.

On the similar token, people in the region have had vested interests in this conflict on a deep and personal level for such a long period of time that, and this especially applies to some among the older population in the representative sample, that the answers they provided that could have come across as more tolerant in terms of levels of their political tolerance could actually be attributed to the psychological *tiredness* or *exhaustion* in terms of their personal regard to the conflict and not so much to the more tolerant political attitudes explained by the variables in this research. Therefore, younger populations in the representative sample tend to be less affected by this above mentioned issue, accordingly.

The research model heavily relies on socio-demographic and political sources of attitudes and almost totally excludes the psychological factors and antecedents that could also prove to be at the foundation of the researched behavior. This is simply caused by the limitations in data gathering, and although during the interviews I try to inquire into the matters such as psychological insecurities, fears and perceived threats, etc. and some of the psychological factors could be assumed from the socio-demographic data, the conclusions drawn on that basis alone should be taken with a certain dose of academic restraint.

Data related issues notwithstanding, one can draw some tentative conclusions and propositions with regard to political tolerance in the society, and the role of the socio-political factors that shape its course.

#### 4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Embedding the research question of socio-economic '*influences*' on political violence and combat propensity within the broader theoretical framework will consequently involve interdisciplinary theoretical concepts such as Individual Values and Priorities, Political Tolerance and Political Instability, Modernization theory, vast ranging theories of (group and individual) Conflicts, Socio-Political theories of relationship between Socio-Economic status and analysis of political behavior, and lastly, psychological concepts of Basic Human Needs theories.

All of these (*and probably some more that I'm unconsciously unaware of*) theoretical concepts to be presented here have directly or indirectly dealt with the research question that has been the focal point of this study, obviously and expectantly with different approaches and conclusions on the matter.

In this following chapter, I will make an effort to systematize and present the above mentioned theoretical conceptions in the way they relate to the research question of this study. The focus of this theoretical framework overview will be put on its different conceptual but nevertheless tangible connections to the research hypothesis of socio-economic influences and their bearing on political violence and combat propensity; keeping in mind the vast amount of academic literature and high level research associated with the above mentioned theoretical concepts, I will present only the ones most centrally related to my study.

##### 4.1 Political Tolerance

Political Tolerance is thought to mandate specific obligations for individuals and communities which, when fulfilled, result in a peaceful, civil and ultimately more democratic society.

The research and literature on political tolerance presents numerous social and political sources of attitudes (*variables*) that affect group's and individual's political

behavior. Much of this literature emphasizes the valuable influence of education on greater acceptance of political diversity and diversity in general (*It is worth mentioning that some of the literature, although confirming the link between education and tolerance, questions the strength of the connection, exp. Sullivan 1982, p.784*), it suggests that one of the reasons why higher education tends to be linked with greater political tolerance is the fact that it leads to the creation of individual values and priorities that are conducive to and allow greater openness and commitment to political diversity.

One of the reasons for the salutary effects of education on tolerance, according to Golebiowska, lies in the fact that it influences the individual value priorities that are either conducive to or obstructing greater political and social tolerance. This is attributed to the primary function of education, which is to expand one's intellectual horizons through exposure to greater heterogeneity of people and ideas.

In advanced industrial societies we are able to observe the shift in the individual values and priorities that convey important connotations for political tolerance (Flanagan, 1987, p.1303). For example, Flanagan notices that emergence of the unprecedentedly high levels of economic prosperity in advanced industrial (*and democratic*) societies have initiated a gradual shift in individual's values and priorities and demonstrate the imposing influence of education on tolerance due to its stimulus and shaping of the individual's values systems. Although the majority of the literature on political tolerance endorses the view that higher levels of education indeed does lead to the higher acceptance of political diversity in general, it does not suggest that education solely account for the established increase in political tolerance.


Inglehart suggests that people brought up under different economic conditions are likely to demonstrate different "*value priorities*" (Inglehart, 1990, p.95). According to Inglehart, economic prosperity creates a sense of personal security that manifests itself in a decline of "*vulnerability to the external environment*" (Inglehart, 1990, p.306). This sense of security, when physical survival is assured, generally leads to greater tolerance towards diversity than usually exhibited in the cases where the competition

for survival is present. Security and conformity, according Flanagan, then leads to openness and “throwing off constraints of traditional customs and religious beliefs, opening oneself to new ideas, adopting more accepting attitudes toward new lifestyles and a broader range of moral behavior and more tolerance and empathy with people and groups that are different from oneself” (Flanagan, 1987, p.1316)

Political tolerance is more directly or indirectly connected to, and affected by, a number of different *sources of social or political attitudes*; these variables also hold an important position in the theoretical discourse of political tolerance and deserve mentioning. They include age, religious affiliation, race, political party affiliation, profession, region, levels of religiosity and gender.

When considering political tolerance, Golebiowska presents the theoretical expectations concerning the relationship between education, various of the above mentioned value-variables and political tolerance. She emphasizes the role of high education as it promotes greater tolerance directly through its impact on tolerance itself and indirectly through its impact on values and priorities.

(Figure 1)



## 4.2 Modernization Theory

Modernization is characterized as a phased and gradual, irreversible progression towards relatively homogenous forms of liberal democracies and, as a natural consequence of this process, positive changes in cultural values, individual autonomies, political tolerance, rationality and legalism, etc. Modernization and development theorists like Samuel Huntington suggest that modernization reinforces an *“existing nation-state political state in which liberal democracy is held up as an ideal form of political organization...”* (Shapiro, 1997, p.54) and as such consequently lead to the reduction of the potential conflicts on both individual and group level. Lately we can observe a trend where traditional modernization theory goes in line and somewhat converges with the new emerging literature on globalization and the new world order. According to the concepts put forth by the modernization theorists, *“well-designed constitution, strong legal and regulatory infrastructure and defined political and economic freedoms...”* (Shapiro, 1997, p.58) lay a solid foundation for the politically peaceful liberal democracies.

At this point, it is important to bring up the notable fact that in this work we will focus on the modernization theory as it relates to the political tolerance with regards to conflict and the combat propensity; and although we will not focus on the vast amount of academic literature and theory that stresses not so salutary political effects of westernized style modernization in the developing societies and the third world where it is known to create class dislocations as growing discrepancies between rich and the poor, minorities, political and psychological stress on groups and individuals because of the economic changes etc. I feel that it is nevertheless worth mentioning, as these developments intensify with modernization.

Modernization theories see industrialization and its increasingly complex division of labor, enhanced communication, urbanization and rationalization of political and societal institutions as leading to more universalistic principles and more cosmopolitan identities and commitments. According to Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, young urban



residents, people with greater occupational status and higher educational attainment, persons involved in non-traditional organizations and associations should also be more tolerant, as should those most exposed to the wider, more cosmopolitan world. On the other hand, they state that, *“strong religious and traditional values are seen as providing support for political intolerance and violence as well as the nationalist political agendas...”* (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994, p. 1535). So modernization’s positive impact on political tolerance is based in the compelling effects of national diversity, urbanism, mixed family structures, gender equality and participation in formal organizations it promotes.

In their study of the 1989 census of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, Sekulic and Massey study the effects of social status characteristics and the support they provide for the modernization theory. They find that education levels and occupational differences have only a *“modest dampening effect on intolerance... remarkably flat”* (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994, p.1537). On the other hand, they report that intermarriage, urbanism, social participation and the decline in religiosity are all more important in generating greater tolerance. This study could prove particularly interesting for this research paper, as it concludes that Yugoslavian state policies of modernization and *“controlled nationalism”* (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994, p. 1554), may have led to greater tolerance, but it has also set the stage for the *“...political mobilization of groups around nationality, especially within nationally diverse and highly autonomous republics and provinces”* (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994, p. 1554). The study continues to show that the economic crisis of the 1980’s and the *“...decline of federal Communist party influence* (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994, p. 1555) gave rise to newly formed nationally based political appeals.

Many changes associated with modernization, do indeed lead to greater political tolerance; but other aspects still exist, that readily create the potential for heightened inter-group conflict over scarce economic and political resources.

Needler, while studying the relationship between political development and socio-economic development, takes the national GNP *per capita* as an indicator to

(although weakly) confirm his hypothesis that political development correlates with economic development.

Modernization theory states that industrialization and its associated political and occupational transformations imparts greater universalism and acceptance of ethnic and national differences; “general effects of modernization on socio-political participation are more important in generating increased tolerance than the effects of industrialization on education and the occupational structure...” (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994, p.1547)

Stevenson and Morrison, in their work, offer converging evidence that increased modernization decreases the probability of political instability. They show evidence of increasing national income or secondary school enrolment that consistently leads to the decreasing probabilities of communal and therefore political instability. They go on to suggest that; “...modernization does inhibit political instability, but only if it is a constant feature of national development over time.....sustained modernization, if not obstructed by political mismanagement, will facilitate the regulation and moderation of conflicts...” (Morrison and Stevenson, 1972, p.97)

If we were to define the modernization theory within the political instability discourse as we did in the text above, we should not forget to try and define the political instability itself; as a condition in national political systems in which the institutionalized patterns of authority break down; *“the expected compliance to political authorities is replaced by violence intended to change the personnel, policies, or sovereignty of the political authorities by injury to persons or property.”* (Morrison and Stevenson, 1972, p.94)

#### 4.3 Socio-Economic Rank and Behavior

Social theorists widely agree that people’s values and beliefs usually go in line with their behavior, and socio-economic rank is highly associated with nearly every kind of behavior. Louis Kriesberg states that socio-political behavior is affected not only by

the currently held set of values and beliefs, but also by the current situation, i.e. *"the social and non-social constraints and pressures which limit the available alternatives"* (Kriesberg, 1963, p.335).

He highlights two important relationships between socio-economic rank and (*political*) behavior; Cultural and Situational. The first is defined by the societal transmission of values and beliefs which determine the behavior and the *"class subculture with an integrated system of values, beliefs and behavior patterns"* (Kriesberg, 1963, p.347). Second, the situational explanation is that there are no differences in values and beliefs and that the differences in behavior are the direct result of different (social or economical) opportunities.

In the case of the political behavior, theorists widely agree that socio-economic status (with the emphasis on high education) is highly connected to the types of expressed behavior, but also stress the fact that it is *"...likely to be attributed to the situational factors and is characterized by high consensus of relevant and acceptable concepts within the society"* (Putnik, 2004, p.41).

#### 4.4 Human Needs Theory and Political Violence

Persistent and repeated, unprovoked behavior that causes *extreme* harm is defined as violent (*Staub defines it as evil*). This kind of behavior develops under the instigating conditions within the political society and is characterized by e.g. difficult life conditions, group conflicts, societal processes, frustration of basic human needs and their destructive fulfillment. *"In both groups and individuals, extreme violence originates with the frustration of basic human needs and the destructive modes of its fulfillment"* (Staub, 1999, p.179). It is often that violence begins when the frustration of basic human needs is combined with later frustration. As psychological theories confirm, all human beings have certain shared psychological needs that must be fulfilled if we are to lead reasonably satisfying lives, security, positive identity, control of what is essential to us, connection to other people, independence and understanding of the

world and our place in it. There are various theories and views on human needs (*Burton, Kelman, and Maslow, just to name the few; in Staub, 1999, p.180.*) but they all come together on these above mentioned factors. If a person cannot fulfill these needs in a constructive manner, it will engage in a “destructive psychological process and actions” (Staub, 1999, p.179) to satisfy them. Destructive need satisfaction means that one basic need is satisfied in a way in the long run will interfere with the satisfaction of other needs.

In understanding violence in the group, it is important to consider both influences at the level of the group (culture, political system and political processes, the role of leaders, group psychological processes) and the individual.

Life conditions in a society are the important factor when studying the violent political behavior and its origination. Intense economic problems or political conflict, great social changes or the combination of the two profoundly frustrates basic needs. These societal problems “...give rise to psychological and social processes that turn individuals and sub-groups of society against each other” (Staub, 1999, p.183).

Individuals turn to groups for identities and connection “*while they scapegoat some other groups, (they) adopt or create destructive ideologies and hopeful visions of social arrangements...that identify enemies who supposedly stand in the way of the fulfillment of these visions*” (Staub, 1999, p.186). We could be able to attribute this type of behavior to the human psycho-sociological tendency to differentiate between the in-group and the out-group. These processes provide possibilities of control and new understandings of reality (usually, ideologies are especially effective for the fulfillment of basic needs are a part of collective violence). Among the frustrations of basic needs, instigators of political and personal violence could be conflicts of interest, like intractable conflicts over the attachment to the territory, access to resources, power, or fear of the other.

When extreme (*political*) violence occurs, individuals and groups are prone to change as a result of that violence, they usually change in a way that makes “*...future violence greater, easier and more likely*” (Staub, 1999, p.190). Victims are devaluated

and deprived of rights, seen as less human and removed from the grips of ethics and morality. Usual values and principles are replaced with higher priority values derived from ideologies. It is usually not uncommon for one to observe these unfortunate trends over a long historical period (Middle East, Turkey, Balkans, Medieval Europe, South Africa, Japan, USA etc...). Once devaluation becomes the part of the culture (literature, arts, and media) and is perpetuated in social institutions and when it enables institutionalized discriminations it becomes highly resistant to change. *“Even when its public expression is relatively quiescent for a period of time, as it was...during the Tito era in the former Yugoslavia, it often remains part of the deep structure of the culture and can re-emerge when instigating conditions for violence are present”* (Staub, 1999, p.191).

All societies honor certain degree of respect and obedience to authority. Staub stresses that when respect and unquestioning obedience are overemphasized the potential for a destructive socio-political process intensifies. In many cases of extreme structural violence (genocide, mass killings, etc.) the society has been characterized by strong respect for authority (Kressel, 1996, p. 34). Obviously, strong respect to authority makes obedience to authoritative immoral orders more likely; when these kinds of policies and practices are institutionalized people will be less willing to oppose the authorities and the rest of the group (Staub, 1999, p.184).

Another important characteristic that predisposes political violence and social conflict is the “unhealed wounds” in a society; when a group has experienced great suffering, especially due to persecution and violence at the hands of others, it is more likely to respond to renewed threat with extreme violence (Staub, 1999, p.185), e.g. Ex-Yugoslavia, Middle East, etc...

#### 4.4.1 Individual vs. Group violence

According to Staub, group violence is a societal process, and some of the perpetrators that take part and participate in group violence on a more personal level

would be unlikely to become violent as individuals. People with developed strong authority-oriented respect, frustrated childhood needs and adverse wide ranging personal wounds are usually likely to be involved in this type of violence, as these frustrations may be activated by the conditions that instigate group violence.

Needs for identity, connection and low self-esteem prove to be the incentives to join into the violently-ideological groups. However, once a group is formed, Staub states, "...system of careerism takes place...desire to advance in the system, to gain respect from like-minded others, to be a good member of the group, is...important motivation." (Staub, 1999, p.188)

As in a group, individual violent political behavior is often the joint outcome of the socio-political conditions and culture (exp. relationship among individuals, specific instigators). Attention to the different levels of influence of predisposing conditions and instigators is essential to understanding (and preventing) such violence. Violent political behavior serves the satisfaction of basic and profound human needs that are imperative in character, when such needs are frustrated in the life of individuals (and groups), destructive modes of satisfaction are developed; the nature of individuals, culture and the socio-political system of a group may lead to the heightened probability of politically unaccepted violence (Burton, 1990, p.189).

#### 4.5 Property Rights, Need Satisfaction and Conflict

Differing from the concepts of self-maximization, where the origins of the political violence and conflict were unmet basic needs, sources of intractable and violent political conflict are also property rights (to often scarce goods). When the good in question is the resource base that both groups claim necessary for their survival, capacities for generating political conflict intensifies. This political-philosophy discourse views right as a *"enforceable entitlement to pursue one's interest strategically, they do not immediately refer to individuals or group who are set against one another, mutual recognition (of the other) is constitutive for a legal order from which actionable right is*

*derived.*" (Noonan, 2004, p. 9) While group differences are recognized as constitutive of individual citizens, the citizens themselves must recognize their obligations to the universality of the law. It is only when these rights are mutually recognized on both sides in conflict that legislative decisions can be understood and accepted as an extension of that mutually accepted (political) system (Kymlicka 1995, in Noonan 2004, p.16).

The way I try to accommodate the above mentioned theory in a way that relates to the research question of this study is as follows: The higher the level of self understanding (and a level of socio-political life) between the two competing groups, and the more equally distributed balance of power (between the groups) over the competing resources, the higher the possibility of acceptable socio-political behavior that consequently positively influences the judicial and legal resolving of conflicts and reduces the combat propensity of individuals and groups. Equality (balance of power) and mutual recognition (of needs) is always at the very foundation of the values in the peaceful and free socio-political society.

## 5. EMPIRICAL DATA


The administered surveys collected the quantitative data on different demographic characteristics of the population, more precisely; it describes the representative sample on eight different socio-economic variables; Age, marital status, number of children, number of supported persons in the household, education, occupation, monthly income and estimated net worth. These were coded and then compared to the answers given to the two open ended questions supposed to determine the levels of political tolerance and socio-economic influence on combat propensity in civil conflicts.

### 5.1 Enumeration Strategy and Sample Description

The following section describes the representative sample in terms of the empirical demographic data gathered during the surveys of the non combatant population and their respective relations to the levels of political tolerance and possible socio-economic influences on combat propensity.

#### 5.1.1 Age

The representative sample is divided into five different age groups; 18-27 (1) years, 28-37 (2), 38-47 (3), 48-57 (4) and 58+ years (5), as shown in the graph below.







When asked to confirm or dispute the provided hypothesis that people with *more* practical experience and *less* formal education are more likely to fight in the civil conflict, all seven (7) examinees of the first age group (18-27), both (five) Albanian and (two) Serbian agreed with and supported the hypothesis. When asked to give their opinions about the conflict itself, its participants and the potential political resolution, they expressed highly non-tolerant political attitudes towards the opposing ethnic group and their political goals. In the second age group (28-37), out of eight (8) examinees, four Serbian and four Albanian, four Serbians and three Albanians agreed with the proposed hypothesis and one Albanian disagreed, stating it was the other way around. When expressing opinions about the political tolerance and the conflict itself, three out of four Serbians expressed somewhat more tolerant attitudes than the previous age group, while one provided the non-tolerant views; out of four Albanians in this age group, two expressed more tolerant political attitudes, while the other two were politically intolerant. The third age group (38-47), consisted of six (6) examinees, four (4) Serbian and two (2) Albanian. Three out of four Serbians agreed with the proposed hypothesis and one disagreed, while one of the Albanians agreed and one disagreed. When asked about political tolerance one Serbian expressed politically tolerant views about the conflict and thee remained un-tolerant of the other side and their political goals, while one of the two Albanians was tolerant of the other side, the other one expressed politically intolerant views. Age group (48-57) consisted of four (4) examinees, both two (2) Serb and two (2) Albanian. Both Serbian examinees agreed with the proposed hypothesis and expressed intolerant political attitudes about the other side in the conflict, while one of the Albanian examinees agreed with the hypothesis and expressed tolerant attitudes towards other side, the other one failed to provide the answer to the proposed hypothesis and expressed intolerant political attitudes when asked about the conflict and its possible political resolution. The last age group (58+) consisted of five (5) examinees, three (3) Serbian and two (2) Albanian. Out of the three Serbian examines, two agreed with the proposed hypothesis and one failed to provide the answer; both Albanian examinees agreed with the hypothesis. All three

Serbian examinees provided intolerant political attitudes and both Albanian examinees in contrast provided politically more tolerant attitudes about the conflict resolution.


**Percentage of age groups that agreed with the hypothesis**




**Percentage of age groups with tolerant political attitudes**



**Percentage of age groups that disagreed with the hypothesis**




**Percentage of age groups with intolerant political attitudes**




### 5.1.2 Gender

Gender ratios of the sample are presented in the graph below. Representative sample consisted of twenty one (21) males and nine (9) females. Out of the twenty one (21) males that completed the survey, ten (10) were ethnic Serbian and eleven (11) ethnic Albanian. Out of nine (9) women, five (5) were ethnically Serbian and four (4) ethnic Albanian, as it graphically illustrated in the following chart.




Eight (8) out of nine (9) females that completed the survey agreed with the proposed hypothesis and only one (*ethnic Albanian*) disagreed; on the other hand, sixteen (16) out of twenty one (21) males (*seven Serbian and nine Albanian*) that completed the survey agreed with the hypothesis.

**Percentage of male examinees that agreed and disagreed with the proposed hypothesis**




**Percentage of female examinees that agreed and disagreed with the proposed hypothesis**




When prompted about their political attitudes and the levels of tolerance they express towards the other side in the conflict, two out of five Serbian females and one out of four Albanian females expressed the more tolerant political attitudes about the conflicts solution and the other group, while the remaining six females expressed politically intolerant attitudes. On the other hand, out of twenty one males, six (*one Serbian and five Albanian*) expressed politically tolerant attitudes towards the conflicts solutions and the other side, while the remaining fifteen expressed politically intolerant viewpoints, as expressed in the graphs bellow.

Percentage of males with tolerant and intolerant political attitudes




Percentage of females with tolerant and intolerant political attitudes




### 5.1.3 Marital Status

Marital status of the sample is presented in the graph below; it consists of twelve (12) singles, seventeen (17) married persons and one (1) that is divorced. Out of twelve singles, six are Serbian and six are Albanian and out of seventeen married persons, nine are Serbian and eight are Albanian.




All twelve of the singles agreed with the proposed hypothesis, while only one (Serbian) has expressed the tolerant views. Out of seventeen married persons, eleven agreed with the proposed hypothesis (*six Serbian and five Albanian*), while four disagreed (*one Serbian and three Albanian*); two other persons failed to provide the valid answer. Eight (*six Serbian and two Albanian*) out of seventeen married persons have expressed the intolerant political attitudes, while seven (*two Serbian and five*

Albanian) have expressed the tolerant political perceptions; two persons (one Serbian and one Albanian) failed to provide the valid answer.




#### 5.1.4 Number of Children

When it comes to the tolerance levels in political attitudes and the relationship to the proposed hypothesis in the survey, the number of children directly relates to the above examined variable of the marital status (*this is due to the fact that all of the examinees that are married also had children*), so I will just present the demographics of the sample in the chart below.




### 5.1.5 Number of Supported Persons

In the following graph, the number of supported persons in the household is presented. Vast majority of the representative sample, twenty people (*eight Serbian and twelve Albanian*) had no supported persons in their households; two (*one Albanian and one Serbian*) had one person in their household they supported; three persons (*two Serbian and one Albanian*) said that they support two persons; also three persons (*all Serbian*) have stated that they are responsible for supporting three persons in their households; and last, two more persons (*one Serbian and one Albanian*) reported that they are responsible for supporting four or more persons in their household (*one of them supported eight and the other five persons, to be exact*).




Out of the twenty people with no supported persons in their household eighteen of them (*eleven Albanian and seven Serbian*) supported the hypothesis that people with more practical training and less formal education are more likely to fight in the civil conflict while two of them disagreed (*one Albanian and one Serbian*). While out of the eight people with one to three supported persons in their households, four of them (*three Serbian and one Albanian*) agreed with the hypothesis, two of them (*both Serbian*) disagreed and two (*one Albanian and one Serbian*) failed to provide valid answers. Out of the persons that supported four or more persons in their home, one agreed (*Serbian*) and one disagreed (*Albanian*) with the proposed hypothesis.

**Percentage of people with 1-3 supported persons in their household that agree or disagree with the hypothesis**



**Percentage of the people with four or more supported persons in their households that agree or disagree with the hypothesis**




**Percentage of the people with no supported persons in their households that agree or disagree with the hypothesis**




With respect to the political attitudes and tolerance levels exhibited by the people that had no supported persons in their households, thirteen out of twenty (*seven Serbian and six Albanian*) expressed the intolerant political views and five (*one Serbian and four Albanian*) of them expressed more positive and tolerant political attitudes; among the eight persons with one to three supported people in their households, seven of them (*four Serbian and three Albanian*) presented intolerant political views and attitudes, while three of them (*two Serbian and one Albanian*) expressed the more tolerant and acceptable political behavior. Both (*Serbian and Albanian*) of the persons in the sample that reported four or more supported persons in their households held the non-tolerant political view.

**Percentage of people with no supported persons in their household and their political tolerance levels**



**Percentage of the people with 1-3 supported persons in their household and their political tolerance levels**




**Percentage of the people with 4+ supported persons in their household and their political tolerance levels**



#### 5.1.6 Education


The following graph presents the demographic of the sample with respect to the education levels. It shows that out of the total of thirty people that were represented in the sample, twelve of them (*eight Albanian and four Serbian*) have completed the elementary school education or the equivalent of. None of the persons in the sample has had any formal education whatsoever. Total of nine people (*six Albanian and three Serbian*) have completed the high school education and nine of them (*eight Serbian and one Albanian*) have completed the education of the University level or higher.






Among the twelve people that have completed the education level equivalent to the elementary school, eight of them (*two Serbian and six Albanian*) agree with the proposed hypothesis, two of them disagree (*one Serbian and one Albanian*) and two more have failed to provide valid answers (*one Serbian and one Albanian*). Out of the nine people that have completed high school, eight of them (*three Serbian and five Albanian*) agree with the hypothesis and one (*Albanian*) of them disagrees with the hypothesis proposed in the survey. Eight (*seven Serbian and one Albanian*) out of nine people with completed University education levels or higher agree with the hypothesis and one (*Serbian*) disagrees.


**Percentage of people with elementary school or lower that agree or disagree with the hypothesis**



**Percentage of the people with completed High School education that agree or disagree with the hypothesis**




**Percentage of the people with completed University education or higher that agree or disagree with the hypothesis**




Out of the twelve persons that have completed elementary education level in the representative sample, seven (*three Serbian and four Albanian*) of them expressed intolerant political attitudes, while four of them (*three Albanian and one Serbian*) is considered politically tolerant and one (*Albanian*) fails to provide the valid answer. Among the nine persons with completed high school level of education, six of them (*three Serbian and three Albanian*) expressed intolerant political behavior and three (*Albanian*) of them are considered politically tolerant. Among the part of the sample that is most highly educated, seven (*six Serbian and one Albanian*) out of nine expressed politically intolerant views while two (*Serbian*) conveyed more politically tolerant attitudes, as presented in the graphs below.


**Percentage of politcial tolerance levels among the people with Elemntary education**



**Percentage of political tolerance levels among the people with High School education**




Percentage political tolerance levels among the people with completed University education or higher



### 5.1.7 Income


Following section describes the sample with its relation to the income levels. Four persons (*three Albanian and one Serbian*) have income levels lower than one hundred euros per month; thirteen (*seven Serbian and six Albanian*) between one and three hundred euros; nine (*six Serbian and three Albanian*) have reported their income levels between three hundred and one thousand euros per month; two (*one Serbian and one Albanian*) above one thousand euros; while two (*Albanian*) persons failed to provide valid answers; as in the graph below.




All four persons whose income level is under one hundred euros per month agreed with the hypothesis presented in the survey. Nine (*five Serbian and four Albanian*) out of thirteen persons whose income in between one and three hundred euros agreed with the hypothesis and two (*one Serbian and one Albanian*) disagreed,

while two (*one Serbian and one Albanian*) failed to provide valid answers. Among nine people that have shared income between three hundred and one thousand euros per month, seven (*five Serbian and two Albanian*) agreed with the hypothesis, while two (*one Albanian and one Serbian*) disagreed. Both (*one Serbian and one Albanian*) persons that earn more than one thousand euros per month agreed with the proposed hypothesis.


**Percentage of people with income levels less than 100 euros that agree or disagree with the hypothesis**




**Percentage of people with income levels between 100 and 300 euros that agree or disagree with the hypothesis**



**Percentage of people with income levels between 300 and 1000 euros that agree or disagree with the hypothesis**




**Percentage of people with income levels higher than 1000 euros that agree or disagree with the hypothesis**




Three (*two Albanian and one Serbian*) out of four persons that reported income less than one hundred euros per month held intolerant political attitudes and one (*Albanian*) of them expressed politically tolerant behavior. Among the thirteen people whose monthly income was between one and three hundred euros per month, nine (*five Serbian and four Albanian*) of them had intolerant political attitudes, while four (*two Albanian and two Serbian*) held more tolerant political attitudes. Six (*one Albanian and five Serbian*) people among the group whose monthly income is between three hundred and one thousand euros expressed politically intolerant attitudes, two (*one*

*Serbian and one Albanian*) of them expressed politically tolerant attitudes, while one (*Albanian*) failed to provide a valid answer. Out of the two persons whose income exceeds one thousand euros per month; one (*Serbian*) held politically intolerant attitudes and the other (*Albanian*) expressed politically tolerant views.


**Percentage of people with income levels less than 100 euros and their political tolerance levels**




**Percentage of people with income levels between 100 and 300 euros and their political tolerance levels**



**Percentage of people with income levels between 300 and 1000 euros and their political tolerance levels**




**Percentage of people with income levels higher than 1000 euros and their political tolerance levels**




#### 5.1.8 Properties Owned (*Net Worth*)

Out of the thirty persons in the representative sample, four (*three Albanian and one Serbian*) of them have their accumulative properties owned valued less than one thousand euros; ten (*six Serbian and four Albanian*) report their material assets to be worth somewhere between one and five thousand euros; while eight (*seven Serbian and one Albanian*) estimate their net worth total in between five and twenty thousand euros; three (*two Serbian and one Albanian*) said that their properties owned exceed twenty thousand euros and five (*four Albanian and one Serbian*) have failed to provide valid and recordable answers.




All four (*three Albanian and one Serbian*) people that have reported their properties owned to be valued less than one thousand euros agreed with the hypothesis that people with more practical training and less formal education are more likely to fight in the civil conflict. Out of ten people whose material assets are between one and five thousand euros, seven (*three Serbian and four Albanian*) of them agreed with the proposed hypothesis, two disagreed (*one Albanian and one Serbian*), while one (*Albanian*) did not provide a valid answer. Seven (*six Serbian and one Albanian*) out of eight people whose assets are valued from five to twenty thousand euros agreed with the hypothesis presented in the survey, while one (*Serbian*) failed to give an applicable answer. Two (*one Serbian and one Albanian*) out of three persons that report their properties owned worth more than twenty thousand euros agreed with the hypothesis, while one (*Serbian*) disagreed.


**Percentage of people with properties valued less than 1000 euros that agree or disagree with the hypothesis**




**Percentage of people with properties valued between 1000 and 5000 euros that agree or disagree with the hypothesis**



**Percentage of people with properties valued between 5000 and 20000 euros that agree or disagree with the hypothesis**



**Percentage of people with properties valued higher than 20000 euros that agree or disagree with the hypothesis**




All four (*one Serbian and three Albanian*) persons in the sample that report assets owned less than one thousand euros held politically intolerant attitudes. Six (*two Serbian and four Albanian*) out of ten people whose assets are valued between one and five thousand euros held intolerant political attitudes and four (*two Serbian and two Albanian*) of them expressed more tolerant political views of the other and the conflict. Seven (*Serbian*) persons amongst eight who evaluate their assets somewhere in between five and twenty thousand euros held intolerant political attitudes while only one (*Albanian*) expressed politically tolerant perspective. And while two (*Serbian*) people whose assets exceed twenty thousand euros held intolerant political views, one (*Albanian*) person in that group held politically tolerant attitudes.


**Percentage of people whose properties are valued less than 1000 euros and their political tolerance levels**




**Percentage of people whose properties are valued between 1000 and 5000 euros and their political tolerance levels**



**Percentage of people whose properties are valued between 5000 and 20000 euros and their political tolerance levels**



**Percentage of people whose properties are valued more than 20000 euros and their political tolerance levels**



## 5.2 Key Patterns

Here we will briefly glance and notice the number of demographic patterns that emerged from reviewing the data of the representative sample. As already mentioned earlier in the text, variables for the marital status and the number of children directly relate to one another due to the fact that all of the examinees that are married also had children. Also there is an obvious link between the number of children and the number of supported persons in the household, especially among the age groups of twenty eight to thirty seven and thirty eight to forty seven years old, as children of these age groups still tend to be of young age and are obviously still supported by their parents. As expected, a direct link exists between the variables that represent the demographic of the sample for education, income and properties owned.

## 5.3 Interviews

As mentioned in the earlier part of the text that deals with methodology, three types of interviews were administrated, all designed to gather as much qualitative data as possible. The first involved two (2) ex-combatants, one (1) ethnic Serb and one (1) ethnic Albanian that were closely and actively involved in the civil conflict. I have met with both of them through my NGO contacts that work and are extensively present in the region; Second two (2) high ranking NGO officers, one (1) ethnic Serb and one (1) ethnic Albanian that were actively involved in the data gathering about the fighting and



identifying both the civilian and military victims of the conflict; and the Third two (2) K-FOR officers, stationed in Kosovo, both with extensive operational experience and knowledge of the Balkans.

During the interviews, the focus is placed on the following issues; on the mechanisms for recruitment, motivation for participation, political preferences before the war, during the peace negotiations and today after the conflict. I tried to examine and take a deeper look into the command structure of the forces, economic resources available (*before, during and after the conflict*), length of the combatant involvement, interaction and the treatment of the civilians, disarmament and reintegration into the post-war society. Also, the same two open ended questions intended to measure the levels of political tolerance and socio economic influence on combat propensity (*in civil conflicts*), that were administered in the survey taken by the non-combatants, were asked again.

Given the interviewees common political and occupational perceptions the data collected in these interviews are surprisingly uniform.

### 5.3.1 Ex-Combatants

Ex-Combatant **A**, Albanian (*born in 1979*) from the region near the town of Prizren, has no children of his own and has completed eight grades of Elementary School. He has joined the fighting voluntarily and was recruited in to the force by a longtime acquaintance from a neighboring municipality. He claims he never received any material compensation for his participation in the conflict and that his motives for involvement were to help to create a "new and free Kosovo", he was never involved, affiliated or in any way participated in a any event connected to any political party. He left the conflict actively in year 2000 after almost one year of "service" and has returned to his village but now lives in the outskirts of Pristina with his relatives. Currently he has no income but has sporadically worked in the construction industry in the past five years.

He declined to closely and more directly discuss his active combat involvement and tactical operations during that time but has claimed that the command structure in his unit was same as it is in the Army and that he never encountered any maltreatment of civilian population although he has heard many different stories from various people in other units. He states that after his disarmament, reintegration in to the post war society is still *"an ongoing process for him"* but he has coped with it pretty well.

When asked for his opinion about the proposed hypothesis concerning relationship between formal education and active combat involvement he strongly disagreed and has replied that *"in his opinion and from his experiences, people with more education always do better in the civil conflict by using the people that are less educated than them."*

In terms of his personal viewpoint on the political conflict he states that it is the right of the Kosovo Albanians to create their own future free of Serbian influences and that for him only acceptable solution can be the *"Independent Kosovo."*

Ex-Combatant **B**, Serbian (*born in 1974*) is a high school graduate from the town of Pancevo near Belgrade, is divorced and has one child living in Belgrade with his mother. He has participated in the conflict actively as a regular member of the Serbian special police units and today is stationed near the city of Novi Sad. He declined to give specific time frames as to when he was stationed in Kosovo. Currently he is employed full time within the Serbian ministry of interior.

When asked about the motives for his active participation in the conflict he said it was his *"duty to defend his country and the civilian population from the terrorists."* He clearly stated that he never received any kind of special compensation or incentive for his active engagement in the fighting; and when asked about the treatment of civilians during the conflict he replied that the command structure of the Serbian government forces has always had necessary and successful mechanisms for protection of the civilian population.

When asked to provide his opinion about the proposed hypothesis regarding the relationship between formal education and active combat involvement he stated that

*“Freedom has no price”* and that education should not matter when it comes to the conflicts like the one fought in Kosovo.

In terms of his personal viewpoint on the political background of the conflict he stated that the *“West”* is supporting the *“wrong”* side in the conflict and that the *“United States and its corrupt government together with the Albanian lobby in the US”* is to blame for the expulsion of Serbs and the current violent political developments in the province. He sees the hope for the future of Serbian existence in Kosovo in the hands of the Russia and China and their powers to veto in the UN Security Council and blames the international community for allowing the expulsion of almost all of the Serbian population of Kosovo under their direct supervision after the signing of the 1244 UN resolution.

### 5.3.2 NGO Officers

Due to the specific time limitations during the fieldwork, interviews with both NGO officers were conducted together and therefore the answers provided were generally uniform and here are presented as such.

The interviewed NGO officers worked closely on issues of human right abuses and data gathering for war crimes investigations conducted by the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague. They are both currently employed full time as consultants on *Transitional Justice*. NGO officer **A** is a university educated Albanian male from Pristina (*Born in 1974*) and NGO officer **B** is a university educated Serbian female from Belgrade (*Born in 1973*).

They both state the opinion that the conflict in *Kosovo* *“has been motivated with economic, ethnic and religious causes.”* They also stress the fact that the majority of the combat-active participants of the conflict came from the rural and un(*der*)developed areas. This also added a specifically problematic issue of Urban vs. Rural dynamic and perspective to the conflict where, they state, *“this complicated situation on the field after the conflict was politically concluded as it (created) increased animosities between*

*the two groups.*" When it comes to the final political status for the (Kosovo) province, they believe that the final status will result in some form of the provisional independence under the supervision of the international community (*UN, EU, NATO, G8, etc...*).

They declined to talk in full depth about the supposed economic and educational demographic of the combat active participants as they never conducted a specific (scientific) research on the issue, but providing their best "guess" and from their own experience, they suspected that vast majority of them would have come from the groups with low levels of income and formal education.

When faced with the proposed hypothesis concerning the levels of formal education and active combat engagement they replied cautiously affirmative stating that people with low levels of formal education are more inclined of being persuaded by nationalistic politicians' rhetoric. It is easier to manipulate people without formal education or with less formal education since they are not inclined to question motives, statements, or attitudes of politicians. They also stressed the importance of the fact that potential combat propensity also depends on where the people live, actually whether they are living in ethnically mixed communities and whether they come into contact with people of different ethnic origin.

In addition, interviewees were also asked to numerically rate the specific variables presented to them (*Age, Gender, Education, Religion, Economic Status (Wealth), Background (Family upbringing), Past experiences, Residence (Urban/Rural)*) with respect to their influence on Political tolerance, starting with the strongest (1) and ending with the weakest (8), respectively. Their answers are shown below:

1. past experiences
2. background
3. residence
4. education
5. economic status
6. age
7. gender
8. religion

### 5.3.3 KFOR Officers

Both K-FOR officers were stationed in Kosovo and their active service in the Balkan Peninsula dates back as early as the first peacekeeping missions in 1991; this fact provides them with extensive operational experience and knowledge of the Balkans and provides invaluable and much needed expertise and insight relatable to the core subject of this research project.

Much the same as in the case of the NGO representatives; and due to the specific situational constraints during the fieldwork, interviews with the KFOR officers were conducted simultaneously and here are presented as such. KFOR officer **A** is a University educated Norwegian male (*born in 1969*) and KFOR officer **B** is a University educated Finnish male (*born in 1967*).

Based on their individual experiences and professional expertise they describe the recent conflict in Kosovo and the two confronted sides as:

*"UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army) seemed to take advantage out of international media support and they learned how to manipulate the public opinion through western news agencies. They cried for help pretending to be innocent and poor victims of Serbian aggressions. They managed to turn their activities to look like pure self defense against an overwhelming enemy, and by doing that they gained compassion among human rights activists all over the world. In other parts of the world, in other similar conflicts, these actions (ambushes and attacks against legally elected and confessed government authorities) would have been condemned and described as terrorist behavior. On the other hand, Serbs seemed to be too self confident, selfish and arrogant towards the western world and therefore they used excess power for putting down the rebellions. By more discreet diplomacy and more professional media handling they could have turned the Albanian extremist actions to be seen as real threat against an European government and their counter actions could have been more justified in "the eyes of the world". Overflowing nationalism and anger against western politics (NATO, USA, EU etc) in the aftermath of previous conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia, blinded the Serbs to see the political realism and diplomatic professionalism."*

They both agreed with the proposed hypothesis concerning the relationship between the combat active propensity and the levels of formal education stressing the

fact that: *"It is very often the case, that in the war the human values turn upside down. 'Bad guys' take the power over from the 'good guys'. The most recognized human values are callousness, hardness and toughness. So called 'soft values' are seen as signs of weakness and during a conflict there is no room for weakness. It has been like this since the beginning of the times. This is directly comparable to the respect for formal education during peace time in a civilized community."*

Proceeding, we continued to profoundly and in more detail discuss the issues concerning the recruitment, suspected demographics (economic and educational) and motivations for joining of the combat forces, their command structures and interaction with the civilian population. They discussed that deriving from their own experiences people with less formal education tend to be more *"hard-core"* and *"brutal"* and *"gung-ho"* mindsets and that the higher officers (probably more educated) were easier to communicate with. When talking about the forces and their structures they stated that the Serb forces they encountered were highly (well)trained and experienced as they have (large numbers of them) been involved in the recent conflicts dated as far back as active involvements in 1991 and that combat motivation (as well as reputation) among them was extremely high; they also went on to say that some of the elite Serbian forces had an extremely *"mean"* reputation in creating fear and terror among the Albanian forces, using the term *"married to the conflict."* When talking about the Albanian forces, they stress the importance of the US and international media support backing, deep routed and organized criminal element with concern to the funding and among the leaders of the KLA (*Kosovo Liberation Army*) and the local mass hysteria created in the villages and rural areas; which they described as the situationally relatable to the notions *"either with, or against us"* leaving the no choice of being left out because of the local (sometimes extremely criminal) pressures. When discussing the command structures, outside of the Serbian army and police forces and the usual military command structures, and with regards to the Albanian combat element they emphasize the existence of the *"jungle law"* in some local units, meaning that the persons who were more powerful or know to be aggressive before the conflict remained in power which in turn more often than not created certain operational and command problems

in these units. They underscored the fact that the criminal element unfortunately played and continues to play an important role during the conflict; but even now in the *"post war"* Kosovo society stating that past conflicts have only made them stronger and that their (political) influences grew to the extent that some of them have become, due to the lack of the stable civil society institutions in today's Kosovo, *"legitimate"* politicians on the newly created Kosovo political scene.

Concerning the treatment of the civilian population they both confirmed the reports of the high numbers of refugees, stating that most of the Serbian population has fled to Serbia proper and that the Albanian population has also migrated but not to the, percent wise, same extent as the Serb residents; but have declined to discuss in more depth the suspected reports of the alleged war crimes possibly committed by both sides.

## 6. ANALYSIS

This section will portray the summarized empirical data categories from the representative sample described in the previous chapter and make a conscious effort to present them in the light of the theoretical concepts and professional opinions introduced earlier in the text.

### 6.1 Analysis of the Representative Sample Description

This part of the text will depict crucial patterns and relationships in the representative sample and provide some likely causes underlying these trends and, when applicable, their potential connection to the proposed hypothesis that people with *more* practical experience and *less* formal education are more likely to fight in a civil conflict and their relationship to political attitudes and the expressed levels of political tolerance.

#### 6.1.1 Age

When looking at the age of the representative sample and the relationship it has with the proposed hypothesis (that people with *more* practical experience and *less* formal education are more likely to fight in a civil conflict) and the expressed levels of political tolerance, we see the trend of agreeing with the proposed suggestion with twenty five (25) out of the thirty (30) examinees agree with the above mentioned assumption. We fail to see any strong differentiation among the five different age groups; this can maybe be attributed to the relevantly small size of the representative sample, but we can observe that the examinees of the two youngest age groups sampled (18-27 and 28-37 years old) and the two oldest (48-57 and 58 and older) completely agree with the assumed hypothesis while in the age groups consisting of



people between thirty eight (38) and forty seven (47) years old that ratio is slightly skewed to two (2) to one (1) in favor of the agreement with the hypothesis.

When it comes to the measured levels of the expressed political tolerance and its relationship to the age of the representative sample we can observe a slightly different trend and distancing from the results provided concerning the above mentioned high percentage of consent with the proposed hypothesis; we observed a trend of political intolerance towards the other ethnic group or legitimacy of their political goals, only age group that stands against that generalization of the interpreted data is the age group ranging from twenty eight (28) to thirty seven (37) years old, where the ratio is almost two (2) to one (1) in favor of the tolerant political views and attitudes expressed toward the other ethnic group; the remaining four age groups express intolerant political opinions, the youngest age group (18-27 years old) being the most intolerant in their political views and perceptions of the other ethnicity.

Political tolerance theory does support the fact that as a variable in determining the levels of political tolerance age does impact the levels of political tolerance (Golebiowska, 1995, p. 23) directly and indirectly by influencing certain values that later can have some bearing on the levels of political tolerance; but it fails to offer the specific age groups that are more prone to the political tolerance (or intolerance) which could than be cross referenced with the findings of our study. In our study by observing the above mentioned and described patterns of the sample selection we can very cautiously and without generalization become aware of the fact that the examinees of the youngest age group do tend to express politically more intolerant attitudes than the older correspondents. This notion could also be attributed to the past personal experiences (*which affects youngest population the most*) as well as the fact that the local society does not impart the certain values that would promote political tolerance that would than in turn lead to, in line with the modernization theory of Hodson, more universalistic principles, more cosmopolitan identities and commitments and to inevitably more tolerant young urban residents.

### 6.1.2 Gender

Comparing the gender ratios of the representative sample and its relationship regarding the agreement or disagreement with the proposed hypothesis; we observe a trend showing that the women do tend to agree with the hypothesis (*nine out of ten females agreed with the proposed hypothesis; 90%*) more than men do (*sixteen out of twenty one males agreed with the proposed hypothesis; 76%*). As this work fails to incorporate any gender related theories of political tolerance but focuses on the socio – economic influences on combat propensity we will confide our discussion within the entrusted theoretical concepts introduced earlier in the text; according to Golebiowska, gender is among the “sources” that directly or through the impact on certain values indirectly influence social or political attitudes, assuming, as our results have shown that certain values traditionally do tend to be more closely connected with the specific gender.

On the other hand, when it comes to the political attitudes and the levels of political tolerance demonstrated towards the other group, we see the certain uniformity in results obtained which state that only thirty three percent of females (*three out of nine, 33.3%*) and twenty eight percent of males (*six out twenty one, 28.6%*) expressed politically tolerant attitudes failing to show the direct and clear link between gender and political tolerance levels.

### 6.1.3 Marital Status and the Number of Children

Concerning the marital status and the number of children being tested variables in the study, as explained in the earlier portion of the text, researched expressed tolerance levels in political attitudes and the relationship to the proposed hypothesis in the survey is directly connected and the results from both variables match exactly, hence here will be presented together. This is simply due to the fact that all of the examinees that are married also had children and that none of the single participants of

the study had children. In the introduced theoretical concepts intended for this study, we fail to find any proposed concepts to directly reference our results for these two researched variables; Nevertheless, we observed a trend where single persons completely agreed with the proposed hypothesis (*all twelve single persons, 100%*) while out of the seventeen (17) married persons, sixty four percent agreed (*eleven out of seventeen, 64.7%*) and twenty three percent disagreed with the proposed hypothesis (*four out of seventeen, 23.5%*), while the remaining failed to provide a valid answer. Regarding the levels of political tolerance, we can witness that single persons expressed highly intolerant political attitudes towards the other group with ninety one percent (*eleven out of twelve, 91.6%*) expressing the intolerant political views of the other, while the married people conveyed as more politically tolerant with forty one percent of the sample (*seven out of seventeen, 41.2%*) with tolerant attitudes and with forty seven percent of the sample (*eight out of seventeen, 47.1%*) expressing intolerant political views, while the rest failed to provide valid answers. We could tentatively assume some potential causes for why this is so; according to Golebiowska and her theory of political tolerance, certain values do impart political tolerance, and assumedly, the set of values and priorities held by the married portion of the sample and persons with children could acutely genuinely differ from the sets of values and priorities held by the other part (singles) of the representative sample and could lead to the possible explanation of the results obtained.

#### 6.1.4 Number of Supported Persons

Somewhat in line with the section above, with regard to the number of supported persons as a tested variable in the study we find that the vast majority of the representative sample, sixty six percent of the sample (*twenty out of thirty persons, 66.6%*) had no supported persons in their households, and the rest thirty three percent (*ten out of thirty, 33.3%*) had one or more persons supported in their homes. Referring back to the theoretical framework of this study we fail to directly connect this

researched variable to any of the presented concepts; but while looking at the empirical data we can observe the trend where the people with no supported persons in their households do tend to agree with the proposed hypothesis in much higher percentage (*eighteen out of twenty, 90%*) than the people surveyed that do have one or more supported members in their households (*five out of ten, 50%*). In contrast, when looking over the levels of expressed political tolerance, we find that both, sample representatives with no supported persons in their households (*thirteen out of twenty, 65%*) and people with supported members within their households (*seven out of ten, 70%*) hold intolerant political attitudes towards the other side.

#### 6.1.5 Education

In tentative support of the theoretical concepts presented here, our sample results show a gradual statistical shift from; *66% (eight out of twelve)* of the people with completed elementary school or lower do agree with the proposed hypothesis, to a bit higher level of *88% (sixteen out of eighteen)* with completed high school and higher levels of formal education that agree with the proposed hypothesis. When it comes to the expressed levels of political tolerance our results fail to show a strong link between the levels of formal education and tolerance. In our representative sample, *58% (seven out of twelve)* people with the elementary education levels express intolerant political attitudes, while *72% (thirteen out of eighteen)* of the sample belonging to the group with higher levels of formal education (*completed high school and above*) expressed intolerant political attitudes.

In reviewed theoretical concepts regarding this study we have observed the emphasis of the salutary effects of education on the levels of political tolerance (Golebiowska 1995, Sullivan 1985). According to them, education influences individual value priorities and consequently imparts openness and commitments to political diversity and greater social tolerance. All things being equal, higher educational attainment according to Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, should lead to more tolerant

individual and political attitudes, but this is indeed influenced by other factors (*exp. levels of religiosity and traditional values*). According to their study and interpretation of Modernization Theory, education has "*modest, dampening effect on tolerance..., remarkably flat*" (Hodson, Sekulic and Massey, 1994, p. 1537). In the case of the political behavior, theorists widely agree that socio-economic status (with the emphasis on high education) is highly connected to the types of expressed behavior, but also stress the fact that it is "*...likely to be attributed to the situational factors and is characterized by high consensus of relevant and acceptable concepts within the society*" (Putnik, 2004, p. 41).

#### 6.1.6 Income and Net Worth

In addition to just above mentioned, Inglehart suggests that people brought up under different economic conditions are likely to demonstrate different "*value priorities*" (Inglehart, 1990, p. 95). According to Inglehart, economic prosperity creates a sense of personal security that manifests itself in a decline of "*vulnerability to the external environment*" (Inglehart, 1990, p. 306). This sense of security, when physical survival is assured, generally leads to greater tolerance towards diversity than usually exhibited in the cases where the competition for survival is present. Economic security, according to Flanagan, then leads to openness and opening to new ideas and accepting attitudes towards broader range of behavior and increased levels of tolerance.

Furthermore, here we present Income and Net Worth, both economic variables, as they relate to the theoretical concepts stated above. The majority of our representative sample, regardless of their Income levels or Economic Net Worth, agrees with the proposed hypothesis that people with *more* practical experience and *less* formal education are more likely to fight in a civil conflict. Namely, 76% (*thirteen out of seventeen*) of the people with the monthly income less than the 300 Euros equivalent while 81% (*nine out of eleven*) with the income over 300 Euros equivalent both agree with the proposed hypothesis; 79% (*eleven out of fourteen*) people in the sample whose

properties owned are worth less than 5,000 Euros equivalent and 81% (*nine out of eleven*) of the sample whose properties owned are valued more than 5,000 Euros equivalent agree with the proposed hypothesis. When it comes to the expressed levels of political tolerance, 70% (*twelve out of seventeen*) of the sample whose income levels are less than 300 Euros equivalent and 63% (*seven out of eleven*) of those whose monthly income levels are above 300 Euros equivalent express intolerant political attitudes; 71% (*ten out of fourteen*) of the sample who declared their properties owned valued less than 5,000 Euros equivalent while 81% (*nine out of eleven*) of the persons in the representative sample who value their properties over 5,000 Euros equivalent hold politically intolerant views.

## 6.2 Key Patterns

Looking over our representative sample as a whole, we observe a strong trend of the agreeing with our proposed hypothesis, that people with *more* practical experience and *less* formal education are more likely to fight in a civil conflict; with 83% (*twenty-five out of thirty*) in agreement with the hypothesis and only 10% (*three out of thirty*) in disagreement where the remaining 7% (*two out of thirty*) has failed to provide valid answers.

When it comes to the expressed levels of political tolerance towards the other ethnic group and acceptance of their political goals we find that "*only*" one third, 33% (*ten out of thirty*) holds politically tolerant attitudes towards the other side, while the remaining 66% (*20 out of thirty*) remains politically intolerant.

This being said, some of the tested variables, prominently differ from the generalizations of the representative sample. For example, when studying results of the surveyed AGE variable, we find that the examinees of the youngest age group (18-27) do tend to express politically more intolerant attitudes than the older correspondents with all of the examinees (100%) expressing highly intolerant attitudes towards the "political" other. As mentioned in the sections above, this observation may be attributed both to

the past personal experiences which often affects youngest population the most, as well as the fact that the local society does not impart the certain values that would promote political tolerance (exp. universalistic principles, cosmopolitan identities and commitments) and more tolerant young urban residents. Only one sub-group, of all the variables tested here, holds more tolerant political outlook toward the other side; this is the second (28-37) age group where 63% (*five out of eight*) manage to find arguments for the understanding of the "others" political goals.

Results have not shown the direct connection between gender and political tolerance levels. Results obtained are consistent in stating that only thirty three percent of females (*three out of nine, 33.3%*) and twenty eight percent of males (*six out twenty one, 28.6%*) expressed politically tolerant attitudes.

Surveying the levels of political tolerance amongst the single and married participants of the study; we find that single persons hold higher intolerant political attitudes towards the other group with 92% (*eleven out of twelve*), while the married participants of the study appear more politically tolerant with 41% of the sample (*seven out of seventeen*) with tolerant attitudes compared with 47% the sample (*eight out of seventeen*) that expressed intolerant political views; while the rest 12% failed to provide valid answers. Corresponding to the Golebiowska's theory of political tolerance, where she states that certain values held tend to communicate political tolerance; this could be relevant in interpreting the surveyed results as we could anticipate that the set of values and priorities held by the married portion of the sample and persons with children could highly differ from the sets of values and priorities held by the other part (singles) of the representative sample and could therefore provide theoretical explanation to this trend.

We also observe the trend where the people with no supported persons in their households do tend to agree with the proposed hypothesis in much higher percentage (*eighteen out of twenty, 90%*) than the people surveyed that do have one or more supported members in their households (*five out of ten, 50%*).

When it comes to the expressed levels of political tolerance towards the legitimacy of the "other" side's political goals, our results fail to show a strong link between the levels of formal education and properties owned and political tolerance; accordingly 31% of the representative sample within the ranks of lower educated and less properties owned express tolerant political attitudes which is exactly the same (31%) as the percentage of higher educated and people with more properties owned that express tolerant political attitudes towards the other side's political legitimacy.



## 7. CONCLUSION

Within the context of the Kosovo and Metohija conflict, this work has dealt with the effects of socio-economic structure as it relates to political tolerance and combat propensity; it has made a sound effort to illustrate exactly to what extent socio-economic variables have had an influence on the political tolerance and the politically violent behavior of active participants in political violence. After the year long data collection in Kosovo and the conscious theoretical research design this work presented a systematic and quantitative representation of the economic and social demographic (variables) included in the representative sample and the qualitative exploration of the motives and incentives of those who participated in political violence in the region as well as the issues relating to political tolerance and combat propensity.

### 7.1 Theoretical overview

As mentioned earlier in the text, vast amount of theoretical literature encompassed in this text highlights the authority of education on bettering recognition of political variety and diversity in general. Higher education is commonly associated and correlates with higher levels of political tolerance and it leads to creation of individual principles and priorities that are communicating greater sincerity and allegiance to political diversity.

Economic prosperity in advanced industrial societies also initiates a gradual shift in individual's value priorities and hence demonstrates the influence of education on tolerance due to its direct stimulus and shaping of the individual's value system. As Inglehart suggests, people raised within various economic conditions exhibit various "value priorities" and he continues to say that higher levels of economic prosperity help create an increased sense of personal security that we can observe as it manifests through a decline of vulnerability to the external environment and consequently leads

to greater tolerance towards diversity and decline in traditional customs and levels of religiosity.

Modernization theory through its complex division of labor, high communication levels, urbanization and rationalization of political resources tends to show the way and introduce more universalistic principles and commitment to more cosmopolitan identities, especially among young urban residents and people with greater occupational status and educational attainment. This is somewhat challenged by Sekulic and Massey as they state in their research of former Yugoslavia that the education has only a modest effect on intolerance and stress the importance of the levels of urbanism and socio political participation as the stronger variables that influence the decline in the intensity levels of political tolerance. According to Needler, some levels of political development (political tolerance levels) directly correlates to the levels of economic development (national GNP per capita).

Modernization theory states that industrialization through its associated socio-political participation and occupational transformations imparts greater universalism and acceptance of ethnic and national differences and is more important in generating increased tolerance than the effects of industrialization on education and the occupational structure. So it is exactly thorough these processes that Stevenson and Morrison conclude that increased modernization decreases the probability of political instability.

Social theories generally are of the consistent opinion that one's values and beliefs go in line with their actions and behavior, and that socio-economic rank is very much associated with almost every kind of behavior. Kriesberg says that correlation between socio-economic rank and (political) behavior can be either cultural or situational. Cultural relates to a class subculture with an integrated system of values, beliefs and behavior patterns and the situational recounts that there are no differences in values and beliefs and that the differences in behavior are the direct result of various socio-political or economic opportunities.

According to Staub, when intense political violence occurs, individuals and groups are prone to change as a direct result of that hostility and usually in the direction that makes future political violence perpetual. This notion closely correlates to the fact that during these socio-political processes common values and principles are replaced with higher priority values that are usually derived from popular non tolerant ideologies with the vision of devaluated others, which could then lead to cultural and institutionalized discriminations and become highly resistant to change.

The capacity to contain the aforementioned theories in a way that it communicates a relationship and accommodates it to the research question of this study could be that; the higher the levels of mutual and self understanding and ranks of socio-political processes between the two or more competing groups, and the more equally distributed balance of power among the groups over the competing resources, the higher is the possibility of acceptable socio-political behavior that consequently has a positive influence on tolerance levels and societal capacity that through judicial and legal resolving of conflicts reduces the potential for combat propensity and political intolerance of its individuals and groups. Equality in the balance of power and mutual recognition of needs, supported by the economic development, is always at the very foundation of the values in the peaceful and free socio-political society.

## 7.2 Interviews and the representative sample

The interviews underline the notion that the majority of the combat active participants of the conflict came from the rural and underdeveloped areas which closely correlates to the groups of low levels of income and formal education. This way, interviews only cautiously confirm the proposed hypothesis concerning the levels of formal education and active combat engagement, stating that people with low levels of formal education are more inclined to political intolerance. The drawback of such a claim could be that while our interviewees actually refer to the levels of formal education they might also be refereeing it in a more general context where they see

education as it influences other important variables such as for example levels of urbanism and socio-political participation; As they continue to stress the importance of the fact that potential combat propensity and political intolerance is highly dependent on exactly the levels of urbanism, meaning of where the people live, actually whether they are living in ethnically mixed communities and whether they come into contact with people of different ethnic origin, as it was mostly, not exclusively, related to the urban areas.

Due to the small size of the representative sample, we fail to see any coherent correlation between the different age group, gender, levels of formal education and their influence on the levels of political tolerance, but offer only a speculative notion based on the theoretical concept that these variables do impact the levels of political tolerance directly and indirectly by imparting and influencing certain values; We fail to clearly point to direct correlation between the tested variables cross-referenced to the levels of political tolerance. Instead, through interviews and the theoretical overview we come to the notion that most of the tested variables, in the sense of their correlation to the expressed levels of political tolerance, could be attributed to the different situational factors such as past personal experiences, social background, place of residence, urban vs. rural, etc. Marital status, the number of children and the number of supported persons in the households do show a somewhat dampening effect on political intolerance again due to the fact that sets of values and priorities held by the married portion of the sample can be associated with more 'safer' values and can acutely differ from the sets of value priorities held by the other segment of the representative sample. With modest or no effect directly related to any of the particularly tested variables, large section of the representative sample (83%), agrees with the proposed hypothesis that people with more practical experience and less formal education are more likely to actively participate in political violence and fight in the civil conflict and only one third (33%) of the sample expressed higher levels of political tolerance towards the other group.

Our interviews also go very much in line with the notions of Staub and his theory which states that when intense violence occurs values of both groups and individuals are liable to alteration in a way that perpetuates and enables future violence to be *“greater, easier and more likely.”* Usual values and principles are replaced with higher priority values derived from ideologies, as stated in the interviews with the KFOR officers, they confirm *“that in the war the human values turn upside down...”* and that human values mostly recognized during the conflict are *“callousness, hardness and toughness..”*, and they make a direct connection of these values as they compare them to the respect for formal education during the time of peace in civilized societies. Therefore, although they somewhat confirm a weak correlation between levels of formal education and political tolerance they also in some aspects challenge education as a sole instrument of tolerance and introduce a notion that socio-political and economical opportunities play well into the Kriesberg’s theory that correlation between socio-economic rank and political (violence) behavior is very much situational in a sense that political behavior is a direct consequence of socio-political and economic prospects. As our interviewees confirm, faced with extreme (sometimes even criminal) pressures and notions of *“either with, or against us”* majority of the time leaves no choice to groups and individuals and reinforces the situational theory that in the light of aforementioned plays down and minimizes the tested variables. This notion is also substantiated in the interviews of the NGO officers working in Kosovo and Metohija as they emphasize the importance of the fact that the majority of the combat-active participants of the conflict came from the rural and underdeveloped areas of the society and believe that considerable mass of them comes from the groups categorized by low levels of income and formal education. In general, interviewees rank levels of formal education on the fourth place of the scale of tested variables that influence levels of political tolerance, behind past experiences, personal background and place of residence; and in front of variables such as economic status, age, gender and levels of religiosity.

### 7.3 Historical origins of political violence in the regional context

Historically, at the origins of these past conflicts is the decline of a ruling political power of the state that leads to tenacious shift in the balance of power and the vacuum of socio-political legitimacy and hence to the increased tensions and a decrease in the levels of political tolerance. Namely here, the decline in the influence of the communist party of Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the weakening of the central power of the state can be traced to, in the political context, the decline of the influence of the Ottoman Empire in the region as it is related to the origins and the perpetuation of the conflict and hence to levels of decreased political tolerance in the region. If we concentrate on the geographic region of Kosovo and Metohija, and one could also maybe extend this notion to all regions of the former Yugoslavia where political violence took place (*but with different colonial powers ruling the region*), we could observe a trend of continuous shifts in political power over the region and a constant tension between the socio-political elites in the area which was at base and *'laid the ground'* for future political violence and the decreased levels of political tolerance; starting with the 1876 and the liberation wars against the Turks and continuing throughout Balkan wars (1912, 1913), First and Second World Wars (1914-1918; 1939-1945) and changes in the constitution of former Yugoslavia which is a direct result of the strife and the elite change in the communist party (1946, 1968, 1974, 1989).

### 7.4 Inference

Theoretical concepts related to this study embed the socio-economic variables and their influences on political tolerance and combat propensity and do provide some direct but very tangible connections between the two. We do not find major patterns and generalization among the results that could indisputably confirm our proposed hypothesis that persons with higher levels of formal education are less prone to acts of political violence, but we can observe a trend where certain sets of values represented

by some of the tested variables do in fact lead to a more tolerant political attitude. A likely cause that underlines this line of reasoning is clearly inferred from the direct connection of the theoretical models presented in this text and the qualitative interviews which concur on the issue and their correlation to the tested variables of the representative sample. In particular, this research has produced a conclusion where levels of formal education alone or any of the other tested variables do not by themselves directly lead to the greater political tolerance, but indirectly through independently imparting certain sets of values and individual value properties can show the way to the increased levels of political acceptance and social open-mindedness. One of the issues, I feel, this work helps better understand, is the notion that there is a weak correlation between the individual values properties and a certain one socio-economic variable (tested here); much stronger is the association between the development of the sets of 'democratic' values which is based not only on the tested levels of socio-economic variables but also on the situational and psychological perspectives of collectives and individuals. It is exactly these 'sets of values' which could be affected, although not exclusively by, socio-economic variables that can impart increases in the levels of political tolerance. Practical justification of this work's development is that it bluntly illustrates the fact that for the groups and individuals, with no (direct) correlation on the levels of formal education attained or association within the certain socio-economic echelons, it is harder to reach 'democratic' and politically acceptable and tolerant value properties if their society as a whole does not share, emphasize nor practice those same values and principles. If further developed, this work could aspire to substantiate a future sustainable development of socio-economically based conflict resolution programs in the region that could be used as remedial actions to tackle the issues of political intolerance in the area. As society at a critical juncture, in Kosovo, one could recommend the establishment of gender empowerment and emancipation programs, urbanism and social participation, decline in religiosity, peace education and youth cooperation programs to be superseded and encompassed by economic development and political support. Either peace,

reconstruction and a cooperative framework for the region are to be established, or disastrous consequences will be wrought upon the Balkans and Europe as a whole. Societal stakeholders must make the necessary effort to underpin the culture of peace and tolerance in the region. Failure to sustain development investment, human rights monitoring and support for civil society in the area will almost certainly lead to a renewal of ethnic conflict, as well as a large-scale and potentially uncontrollable movements of population out of the region. There is only one condition of freedom in Kosovo, Tolerance. Tolerance need not mean amnesia, and tolerance is no substitute for justice.



## 8. APPENDIX – TABLES

Legend: **H+** / Agreement with proposed hypothesis  
**H-** / Disagreement with proposed hypothesis  
**T+** / Tolerant political attitudes  
**T-** / Intolerant political attitudes

Table 1.1 - AGE

Age Groups	Number	H+	H-	T+	T-
18-27	7	7	-	-	7
28-37	8	7	1	5	3
38-47	6	4	2	2	4
48-57	4	3	-	1	3
58+	5	4	-	2	3

Table 1.2 – GENDER

Gender	Number	H+	H-	T+	T-
F	9	8	1	3	6
M	21	16	5	6	15

Table 1.3 – MARITAL STATUS AND No. OF CHILDREN

	Number	H+	H-	T+	T-
Single	12	12	-	1	11
Married	17	11	4	8	7

Table 1.4 – No. OF SUPPORTED PERSONS

Supported Persons	Number	H+	H-	T+	T-
0	20	18	2	7	13

<b>1-3</b>	<b>8</b>	4	2	3	5
<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>	1	1	-	2

Table 1.5 – EDUCATION

<b>Education Level</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>H+</b>	<b>H-</b>	<b>T+</b>	<b>T-</b>
<b>Elementary School</b>	<b>12</b>	8	2	4	7
<b>High School</b>	<b>8</b>	8	1	3	6
<b>University</b>	<b>8</b>	1	1	2	7

Table 1.6 – INCOME

<b>Monthly Income</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>H+</b>	<b>H-</b>	<b>T+</b>	<b>T-</b>
<b>-100e</b>	<b>4</b>	4	-	1	3
<b>100e-300e</b>	<b>13</b>	9	3	4	9
<b>300e-1,000e</b>	<b>9</b>	7	2	2	6
<b>+1,000e</b>	<b>2</b>	2	-	1	1

Table 1.7 – PROPERTIES OWNED

<b>Net Worth</b>	<b>Number</b>	<b>H+</b>	<b>H-</b>	<b>T+</b>	<b>T-</b>
<b>-1000e</b>	<b>4</b>	4	-	-	4
<b>1,000e-5,000e</b>	<b>10</b>	7	2	4	6
<b>5,000e-20,000e</b>	<b>8</b>	7	-	1	7
<b>+20,000e</b>	<b>3</b>	2	1	1	2

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