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Ghosts of Literature: Tracing the Spectral in Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Mary Shelley

Nelly Minssieux

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Illustration: Turner, J. M. W. *Morning Among the Coniston Fells*, oil on canvas, 1229 x 899, Tate Museum, Britain, 1798.

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Preface

This thesis has taken multiple turns before arriving where it is now. I initially wanted to investigate the theme of immanence in Romantic writing, where Spinoza arose as a compelling choice. Indeed, his conception of God as manifested in nature alongside his lesser-known influence on British Romanticism appeared well suited to addressing the topic. After some research, I discovered the Coleridgean controversy involving the writer's philosophical commitments to Spinoza and Christianity. This debate, sparked by Coleridge specialist Thomas McFarland in his 1969 book *Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition*, discussed the poet's endorsement of the conflicting modes of thought in his writings.

Following the publication of McFarland's book, numerous articles were published, taking varied stances on Coleridge's adoption of what were claimed to be the opposing views. It was interesting to note that a lot of the criticism within the debate revolved around the need to label Coleridge either as a Spinozan or as a Christian. Another recurring claim was that the contradiction between the opposing views lessened with time with Coleridge endorsing Christianity as a resolution to this conflict. Thus, the tension exhibited had to be overcome in a tangible way. However, even Coleridge's later works, such as his 1802 "Hymn Before Sunrise in the Vale of Chamouni" maintains Spinozan elements. Furthermore, the need to label Coleridge felt constraining to me. Was it not the very tension between the respective philosophies that was at the heart of his poetry, inspiring many of his writings throughout his life? Furthermore, does literature have to "make sense", or "choose sides"?

These questions, haunting the Coleridgean debate, led me to the topic I have now chosen to study. Jacques Derrida's concept of hauntology appeared as an insightful and rigorous; yet, holistic and comprehensive way of approaching the tension exhibited (this being the very dilemma of haunting). Although not previously versed in his philosophy, the theory manifested as a compelling response to dualistic and categorizational thinking. Rather than choosing sides, the framework leaves space for conflicting philosophies to coincide within a literary work simultaneously. Furthermore, hauntology's understanding of literature as spectral suggests that literature does not have to rationally make sense. Thus, the concept

equipped me with the tools I required for approaching the debate with an alternate lens, leaving space for contradiction and ambiguity to coexist within the writer's poems.

The framework of hauntology appeared as a valid tool to investigate, not only Coleridge's writings but other works of literature as well, challenging a dualistic and limited reading. Due to her leaning heavily on Coleridge both through direct intertextual references and her inclusion of similar themes in *Frankenstein*, Mary Shelley manifested as a suitable choice for pairing with the writer. In fact, the novel contains numerous references to the 1798 "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner". Furthermore, the work encompasses spectral elements that are relevant for a hauntological reading. As Shelley is a Romantic novelist and similarly versed in Spinoza's philosophy (she translated the philosopher's *Theologico-Political Treatise* (1670) from 1817-1822 in consort with her partner Percy Shelley), a pairing of the two writers appeared as a suitable match. Lastly, studying works from separate writers simultaneously enabled me to approach my topic from a more spectral position. Here, I could broaden the scope of this thesis from the confines of a narrow Spinozan/Coleridgean debate to the more nuanced and comprehensive framework that hauntology embodies. Thus, in this thesis, I attempt to investigate these literary works in a way that reflects my theoretical framework, namely, with an open and flexible approach.

Abstract

This thesis investigates the ways in which literature can access the spectral as an alternative to dualist discourse within the selected works of Samuel T. Coleridge and Mary Shelley. Western dualistic philosophy promotes a sharp distinction between the ontological categories of mind and matter, life and death, being and non-being. Within such a system of binaries, hierarchies arise, in which mind is favoured over matter. Derrida's concept of hauntology manifests as a response to dualistic discourse by inhabiting an *in-between* space. In this work, I investigate five of Coleridge's poems and Mary Shelley's novel *Frankenstein* as a challenge to binaric thinking. I take as a point of departure the Coleridge Spinozan/Christian debate, in which scholars have mostly attempted to identify Coleridge as Spinozist (monist) or Christian (dualist), leaving little space for both philosophies to co-occur within his work. However, I maintain that it is the very tension between the respective views that has inspired Coleridge throughout his life, providing his poetry with creativity and innovation. Derrida's notion of hauntology is a flexible concept leaving space for ambiguity and contradiction. With this method, I approach Coleridge's poetry, revealing its hauntological nature by expressing that which cannot be grasped by dualistic thinking. In turn, Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (1818) is investigated revealing the novel's spectrality as a challenge to dualistic discourse.

Keywords: Hauntology; Jacques Derrida; Dualism; Western Philosophy; Baruch Spinoza; Ontology; Romanticism; Ghosts; Spectral; Poetry; S.T. Coleridge; Mary Shelley; Transcendentalism; Christianity; Anthropocentrism; Close Reading; Interdisciplinarity; Intertextuality, *Frankenstein*

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My gratitude extends to my partner Michael Castanieto, for encouraging me throughout the arduous process that thesis writing may at times be. Discussing ideas together helped me achieve a sense of grounding in the abstract and esoteric topic I have chosen to explore.

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Lastly, I am grateful for the opportunity to write this thesis, which has enabled me to deepen my awareness of a topic I find exceptionally intriguing and fascinating. Research into a field in which one does not have extensive experience or knowledge is at times demanding; however, the insight gained has been well worth the effort.

1 Introduction

Water is fluid, soft, and yielding. But water will wear away rock, which is rigid and cannot yield. As a rule, whatever is fluid, soft, and yielding will overcome whatever is rigid and hard. This is another paradox: what is soft is strong (Lao Tzu qtd. in Jammtveit and Hammer).

Our Western discourse is locked in a dualistic system of thought in which concepts are perceived in binaries. In fact, tracing as far back as Plato, Western philosophy has conceived of thought and matter in opposition, where thought is superior to matter. This is exhibited in Plato's cave allegory, in which matter, which is found inside the cave, is an imperfect reflection of the ideal which is located outside. Dualistic philosophy persists in Western metaphysics through Christianity and major philosophical figures like Descartes. Within a system that classifies, life is perceived in opposition to death, mind to matter, time to eternity, the real to the imaginary, and so on. However, not all aspects of life can be constrained within these binaries. In fact, some aspects fall in-between these categories. The concept of hauntology, introduced by philosopher Jacques Derrida in his 1993 *Specters of Marx* represents a response to Western metaphysics (Loevlie 339). The concept was first introduced to describe indefinable ontology, expressing what resists or surpasses classification (Wolfreys 70). Derrida refers to hauntology as that which is both visible and invisible, material and immaterial ("Spectographies" 39). Thus, the term refers to aspects of our existence that cannot be confined within our traditional ontological categories.

Literature, due to its unstable ontology, is hauntological. In fact, as it is not in direct reference to external reality, it is able to portray events that do not exist in our world, thereby challenging empirical ontology (Loevlie 340). For example, literature can evoke green skies or red rivers without our objecting to such depictions (340). Thus, it is not obligated to communicate something accurate about external reality (340). This, therefore, grants it the freedom to express itself beyond the confines of our reality. However, literature simultaneously has the ability to evoke rich sensory worlds within us, since when we read, we visualize these worlds. Thus, its ontology is not fixed but oscillates between the material and transcendent (337). The concept of hauntology enables us to challenge dualistic Western metaphysics, in so far as it opens up ulterior ways of conceiving and framing knowledge.

Furthermore, literature, because of its hauntological nature, is able to grasp the spectral aspect of our lives that are not readily accessible by dualistic discourse. My purpose in this thesis is not to demonstrate this broad claim on behalf of literature in general, but to pursue more modest objectives. This thesis investigates the ways in which literature can access the spectral as an alternative to dualist discourse within the selected works of Samuel T. Coleridge and Mary Shelley.

Literature, despite its spectrality, has at times been categorized or made to choose sides. This is apparent in the Coleridge Spinoza/Christian debate sparked by McFarland in his 1969 book *Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition*. The debate is centred on Samuel Taylor Coleridge's simultaneous adoption of Spinozan and Christian elements in his writings. While enlightenment philosopher Baruch Spinoza's writings are monist, pertaining to God's presence in the physical world, Christianity posits a dualist vision of transcendence. Thus, in the latter system, God is transcendental to the material world, where mind is superior to matter. Within the Coleridge Spinozan/Christian controversy, a recurring claim is to resolve the tension exhibited in Coleridge's writing. In fact, the poet's inclusion of conflicting philosophical modes is viewed as an issue requiring resolution. McFarland argues that the tension between opposing views is resolved by Coleridge leaning towards Christian Trinitarianism later in his life (222). However, the poet maintains Spinozan elements in his later writings, such as his 1802 "Hymn Before Sunrise in the Veil of Chamouni". In fact, the poem integrates Spinozan ideals of immanence through a Godlike presence in nature. Thus, both philosophies manifest simultaneously, persisting in the poet's later writings.

Because I aim to challenge binaric paradigmatic modes of thought, investigating Mary Shelley's novel alongside Coleridge's poetry enables me to broaden the scope of my research from the narrow debate that the Christian/Spinozan controversy embodies. In fact, engaging with Coleridge's poetry based on the Coleridge/Spinozan debate only would limit my framework to a rigid reading. With the latter approach, I would be contributing to a dualistic discussion focusing primarily on the presence of monism and Christianity within the writer's poems. Thus, I would be reproducing the discourse I aim to challenge. However, by including Shelley alongside Coleridge, my reading of literature becomes spectral, where I am able to explore hauntological elements within literature generally, and not only within the Spinozan/Christian framework. Thus, this research avoids falling into the pitfall of reproducing a binaric reading of literature. Integrating a reading of poetry alongside fiction

similarly permits the framework of my thesis to become increasingly nuanced. Here, I am able to note the overlap between the different modes, along with the hauntological themes prevalent in both.

The primary literature investigated in this research in order to examine literature's spectrality is Coleridge's "The Eolian Harp" (1796), "Frost at Midnight" (1798), "Hymn before sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni" (1802), "Dejection: an Ode" (1802), and "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" (1798). In addition, Mary Shelley's novel *Frankenstein* (1818) is simultaneously integrated. Although not frequently studied together, pairing Mary Shelley and Samuel T. Coleridge is sensible as the chosen works contain themes that are auspicious to a hauntological reading. In fact, Coleridge's poems contain both philosophical modes of Spinoza and Christianity. While the former posits a view of God as manifested in nature (Spinoza 87), the latter assumes God to be transcendent to the material world. Thus, the simultaneous integration of both systems reflects hauntology, by refusing to adhere to a singular system, thereby challenging categorization. Furthermore, a linear conception of time is rejected in "Frost at Midnight" revealing Derrida's notion of time as being out of joint (*Specters of Marx* xxi). Simultaneously *Frankenstein's* numerous intertextual references to Coleridge's "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" suggest that the earlier poem infuses the later novel in a haunting-like motion, blurring the ontologies between the literary works. Here, the inability to clearly distinguish one work from another reveals hauntology.

Another argument for investigating the authors together is their inclusion of the theme of anthropocentrism as stemming from a dualistic distinction of mind and matter. According to McFarland, the binaries between mind and matter in Western philosophy have led to a system in which God is understood in anthropomorphic terms (62). He calls the system an "I am" mode, which introduces a hierarchy between mind and matter, with thought as superior to matter (55). Thus, external reality is understood as misleading. Although the former system traces back to Platonic idealism and Christianity, McFarland draws on Descartes as an example of this philosophical view (55). For Descartes, existence is founded on doubt, which is based on thought, where empirical reality is understood as misleading (55). McFarland argues this system is derived from 'self' philosophy, being centred around the human mind rather than external 'things'. Within this axiom, God is understood in personified and anthropomorphic terms (62). Christianity is an example of this system. If reality is found in the self rather than in external reality, this has consequences of anthropocentrism. Scholar

Sarah Boslaugh suggests that many Western religions and philosophies are embedded in anthropocentrism, holding a view that humans are superior to the rest of nature (Boslaugh). Thus, a hierarchy is introduced between humans and nature.

In “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” and *Frankenstein*, there is a haunting of anthropocentric thought stemming from a dualistic distinction between mind and matter. In Coleridge’s poem, this is exhibited in the mariner’s entitlement over nature, and his shooting of the albatross. In *Frankenstein*, the prevalence of anthropocentrism is similarly demonstrated through Victor’s attempt at altering nature by “playing God”. In both works, these actions lead to the haunting the characters must face, revealed by the mariner inhabiting a deathly life ensuing his curse, and Frankenstein’s haunting by the creature. Because of their similar themes, the two works can be investigated together, with elements from the poem infusing the novel in a haunting motion.

Contributing to examining both authors together, Mary Shelley and Coleridge are both versed in Spinoza’s philosophy, as both engaged closely with his writings throughout their lives. Coleridge worked with Spinozan metaphysics both directly by reading the latter’s works, and indirectly through the pantheist controversy of the 1790s (Halimi). Similarly, Mary Shelley studied the philosopher extensively, participating in the translation of the *Theologico-Political Treatise* from 1817 to 1822 in consort with her husband Percy Shelley (Eileen Botting). Spinoza scholar Moira Gatens adds that Shelley, with her literary influences, must have known of the pantheist controversy which led to Spinoza’s role as a central figure in the discourse of Romanticism (740). Although this thesis does not intend to get into depth on Shelley’s Spinozan inclinations as this is not within the scope of this paper, their similar intellectual backgrounds manifest as a compelling reason to investigate these together.

Coleridge’s writings lend themselves well to a hauntological reading challenging dualist discourse. Coleridge himself states of the pantheist thinkers that inspired him and of which Spinoza was a leading figure: “For the writings of these mystics acted in no slight degree to prevent my mind from being imprisoned within the outline of any single dogmatic system. They contributed to keep alive the heart in the head” (Coleridge qtd. in Berkeley 458). The writer, therefore, admits that the philosopher enabled him to escape a singular confined mode of thought. Indeed, had he pursued Christianity only, the writer would have found himself following a dogmatic system. However, adopting multiple views and perspectives enables him to avoid this. The writer thus promotes the value of embracing

diverging views and what this opens up to intellectually and emotionally. Furthermore, the poet frequently insisted on the interdependence of philosophy and poetry and how the two must be performed together (Coleridge qtd. in McFarland 113). The poet affirms that he is: “convinced that a true System of philosophy (...) is best taught in poetry” (Coleridge qtd. in McFarland 113). When speaking of Plato, the poet adds that his philosophy is poetry (Coleridge qtd. in McFarland 113). Thus, Coleridge’s approach is a syncretic one, where poetry and philosophy inform one another rather than being distinct and unrelated. It seems pertinent that we allow ourselves to read Coleridge as he approached his own writing, with nuance and space for contradiction.

There are several reasons why the framework of hauntology is relevant in our day. Firstly, the concept manifests as a compelling response to the contemporary Spinozan/Christian debate. As the last article in the controversy entitled “Coleridge’s Eucnemical Spinoza” was published by literary critic Nicholas Halmi in 2013, the debate is still ongoing, and therefore remains relevant for further study. Furthermore, Shelley’s novel *Frankenstein* has not been investigated with the concept of hauntology as a challenge to dualist thinking, and would similarly benefit from further research. In addition, the concept appears as an alternative to dualistic discourse. James S. Cutsinger who is a Coleridge scholar argues that in much of modern theology, an “oppressive set of dividing surfaces” has surfaced in relation to God (102). He argues that this leads to a system of dichotomies where the immanent is perceived in opposition to the transcendent, the scientific to the religious, natural to the supernatural and so on (Ibid.). Cutsinger’s suggestion is that we allow these concepts to coexist together simultaneously (Ibid.). Thus, although he is not employing a framework of hauntology, the concept appears well suited to addressing such binaries. Hauntology, therefore, appears to be a beneficial tool to consider not only within the field of literature but opens up new possibilities in other fields of research areas as well.

In this research, I acknowledge that a plethora of postmodern theorists have challenged dualities in their approaches such as psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan in his discussion of the symbolic order or Michel Foucault’s treatise *The Archaeology of Knowledge*. However, I have chosen to draw on Derrida’s framework of hauntology because of its relevance within the discourse of Romanticism. Literary critic Orrin N. C. Wang suggests that within this literary movement, ghosts are present in abundance (207). Wang adds that the discourse may well embody the concept of hauntology that Derrida discusses in

his *Specters of Marx* (Ibid.). In fact, Romanticism is full of ghostly images and hauntings. These themes are prevalent in Coleridge's "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" and Shelley's *Frankenstein*. In the poem, this is notable through the numerous references to "spectral" beings and the mariner's own spectral-like appearance, and in *Frankenstein*, the creature similarly manifests as spectral through its haunting of the protagonist. Thus, the discourse of Romanticism lends itself well to a hauntological reading.

In terms of the spectrality of literature, the term is even more relevant in today's world with recent surges in technology. In fact, we do not require a book's materiality in order to read as we did several decades ago, where we are able to access these rich and vivid worlds digitally. Thus, the physical aspect of literature becomes all the more spectral. In a world of increasing technological progress, the spectrality of literature is therefore a question that becomes prevalent. Although this thesis does not intend to get into depth on the digital aspect of literature and haunting, it remains worth noting the relevance of research in this field in our day and age.

In this thesis, the sections on Coleridge are slightly longer than those on Mary Shelley. As the Spinozan/Christian debate is the backdrop to my thesis which I aim to respond to, it is pertinent to present the relevant background information before investigating Shelley's works. This allows me to contextualize the debate and demonstrate where I stand. Furthermore, many of the themes investigated in Shelley's novel are drawn from those in Coleridge due to her numerous intertextual references. Thus, I understand Coleridge's poem "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" as infusing the novel *Frankenstein* in a haunting motion. The hauntological elements in Coleridge's poetry are, therefore, a foundation for my analysis of *Frankenstein*.

1.2 Background of the Authors

This section will provide a brief overview of the authors and their literary works so as to place their writing into the context of their time frames and personal life. Because both are canonical writers, this chapter is brief, providing information on Coleridge before Shelley.

1.2.1 Samuel Taylor Coleridge

Coleridge was born on October 21, 1772, in Devonshire in South West England (Colmer Coleridge book 2), and his legacy as a writer was prominent already during his time with contemporaries such as De Quincey and Wordsworth regarding him as a poet of great intellect (1). Throughout his life, the writer suffered from pain and depression, which he attempted to treat through opium (10). Although taken with the intent to alleviate his mood, the drugs only worsened his symptoms (10). Some of this pain is exhibited in his most famous work “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”, which is included in this thesis. In fact, dark imagery and themes of guilt are prevalent in the poem. The most significant source of inspiration for the writer was his close friend William Wordsworth with whom he formed a literary partnership (7). Coleridge, alongside Wordsworth, are generally regarded as the pioneers of British Romanticism.

1.2.2 Mary Shelley

Mary Shelley was born on August 30th 1797 to feminist Mary Wollstonecraft and political philosopher William Godwin (Butler book xix). The context around her novel *Frankenstein* is renowned, stemming from a competition at a summerhouse in Switzerland between Lord Byron, Percy Shelley and herself (Gatens 740). The group of friends sought to write the best ghost story they could think of, and, out of the three parties involved, only Shelley completed the task. Prior to writing *Frankenstein*, the author endured many hardships which participated in shaping the dark narrative (Butler xiii). In fact, during the years 1815-1819, the writer lost three of her four children, which may account for the theme of death in the novel (xiii). *Frankenstein* is considered a canonical Romantic work, containing the theme of nature’s overwhelming presence, where it is eventually the icy weather that brings the protagonist to his demise.

1.3 Terminology

This section provides a description of the terms employed in this research. Although I am aware that these concepts are part of a broader debate, the definitions reveal how they are

utilized within the frame of this research. I simultaneously acknowledge that when using language, one must categorize; furthermore, by defining terms, I am also classifying. However, although this thesis aims to challenge categorization, a common understanding is necessary before proceeding with the theoretical framework and analysis of the chosen literary works.

Ontology is a field of study preoccupied with the study of being, which relates to classical philosophical problems, such as the existence of God, the concept of infinity etc (Hofweber 12). In response to the concept, Loevlie suggests that hauntology is a homophone of ontology, questioning what lies in between being and non-being, existence and death (337). Hauntology is a non-concept coined by Derrida in his *Specters of Marx* which is purposely difficult to describe or assign fixed meaning. In this thesis, I understand the term in Wolfrey's sense of that which "cannot assume coherence of identification or determination" (70). Thus, it relates to the areas of our existence which resist classification and cannot be accessed by our traditional ontological categories.

In line with the hauntological, by spectral are understood the hauntological aspects of life which are not constrained to our traditional ontological categories. Thus, they are also in between borders (Wolfreys 70). By liminal is understood that which lies in-between our ontological categories and resists categorization. When alluding to ghosts, these refer to undefinable ontology. Thus, the concept relates to an ontology which cannot be grasped by our traditional dualistic categories, defying classification. In this thesis, ghosts often refer to that which is both material and immaterial, or dead and alive.

The term idealism is employed in the sense that the mind is the foundation of our reality (Guyer 3). Within this system, the material or external world are considered as "features of our own mind" (4), where they do not exist in themselves, but in relation to us (4). The system, therefore, posits a distinction between mind and matter, where mind surpasses and determines matter. I understand the term dualism in relation to idealist metaphysics which are prominent in Western metaphysics. Tracing back to Plato, through to Christianity and Descarte's *cogito*, dualistic metaphysics assume a clear distinction between mind and matter, with mind surpassing matter. This system, therefore, involves hierarchies in mind as valued over matter. In this research, I refer to the term binaric as manifesting dualistic attributes of categorization. The concepts of dualism and binarism are what this thesis aims to respond to.

Dualist metaphysics inform the notion of transcendence which implies that the divine goes beyond the material world (Smith John E. “The Structure of Religious Experience”). Here, divinity transcends humanity and the world (Ibid.). Within the framework of this research, Christianity is understood as being informed by dualism. In line with dualist metaphysics, Loevlie suggests that in a Western context, God, being transcendent, is perceived in opposition to flesh, time immanence etc. (Loevlie 339). Therefore, within this framework, God is defined in opposition to our earthly life, within a system of binaries.

McFarland proposes that Christianity is derived from an “I am” mode of thought, in which thought is superior to matter (55-56). Furthermore, the scholar suggests that the “I am” God is perceived in anthropomorphic form (62). Anthropocentrism is understood as deriving from this distinction within an idealist framework. Scholar Sarah Boslaugh suggests that Western religions and philosophies are embedded in anthropocentrism, holding a view that humans as superior to the rest of nature (Boslaugh). Thus, a hierarchy is introduced between humans and nature.

Monism is defined in the Spinozan sense as the presence of God within the material world (Spinoza 87). According to Spinoza, extended substance manifests as an attribute of God (87). Within this axiom, mind and matter are not opposites with one category being superior to the other. Rather, they are both attributes of God (Scruton 46). Substance monism refers to the encompassing of mind and matter within God (46). In this thesis, I refer to immanence in the Spinozan sense where the material encompasses God, rather than positing a transcendent outlook. When referring to materialism, I denote the presence of God in the material world as noted in Spinozan philosophy. McFarland's term “It is” similarly refers to a philosophical system founded on an immanent conception of God (McFarland 56).

1.4 A Layout of the Thesis

To argue for the chosen literary works’ spectrality, and their ability to open up to ulterior ways of framing knowledge straying from a dualistic reading, this thesis is organized into one historical background section, a theoretical chapter and three literary analyses.

In a subsequent section, this thesis provides the historical context of the pantheist controversy of the late 1700s initiated by philosophers Friedrich Jacobi and Gotthold Lessing. Knowledge of this controversy is important, as it is what shapes Coleridge's understanding of Spinoza (Halmi). Furthermore, it is this controversy that informs the tension observed in Coleridge's writing (Halmi). After the historical overview, the contemporary debate sparked by scholar Thomas McFarland in his 1969 *Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition* is elaborated. Recent contributions to the debate from literary critics Nicholas Halmi (2012) and Richard Berkeley (2007) are simultaneously integrated as contributors to the discussion. Providing sufficient background knowledge to this controversy is necessary, as it is this discussion my thesis responds to, challenging the need to categorize literature or having it choose "sides".

Thereafter, a theoretical section is provided where the concepts of hauntology and Spinoza's monism are demonstrated. Firstly, the concept of hauntology is discussed as an alternative to dualist metaphysics. With its ability to inhabit the liminal areas between our categories of certitude, the concept is well suited to challenge dualistic thinking. The chapter goes through the themes of the Death of God, and the haunting of the past and its repercussion on our linear concept of time. Lastly, literature is defined as spectral due to its non-referentiality to external reality and its freedom to create a world that defies empirical ontology. Thereafter, Spinoza's philosophical system is defined based on his concept of substance monism. The concept is defined to examine the tension between monism and ontological dualism as stemming from a Christian framework within Coleridge's writing. Because Spinoza's philosophical system is not the primary theoretical framework of this research, this section is briefer than the former.

The chosen works are investigated in three analysis chapters, revealing hauntology as a challenge to dualistic thinking. In order to demonstrate this, I will start by investigating four of Coleridge's poems: "The Eolian Harp", "Frost at Midnight", "Hymn Before Sunrise in the Veil of Chamouni" and "Dejection: an Ode". Although examined in chronological order, "Frost at Midnight" and "Hymn Before Sunrise in the Veil of Chamouni" are studied together due to their short size and inclusion of similar themes. In a fifth chapter, "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" is investigated. I have chosen to investigate the poem on its own as it is Coleridge's longest, and encompasses many spectral elements worth examining. Lastly, a sixth chapter explores Shelley's *Frankenstein*, drawing on similar themes to the previous

section. Here, the poem written twenty years prior is understood as informing and haunting the novel. In this section, I simultaneously integrate a reading of the spectral aspects of the novel so as to demonstrate how literature defies categorization, departing from a dualistic reading established solely in relation to Coleridge's poem "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner".

2. Background Knowledge and Historical Overview

This section traces the historical background as the foundation for my thesis. Firstly, the pantheist controversy of the late 18th century is illustrated before providing the Coleridge Spinozan/Christian debate sparked by McFarland's research. The dispute between philosophers Friedrich Jacobi and Gotthold Lessing was the cause for the resurging interest in Spinozan philosophy over a century after the latter's death in 1677 (McFarland 78). Thus, it is this debate that led to and informed Spinoza's resurgence within the discourse of Romanticism (McFarland 78). As Coleridge learned of Spinoza through this debate, it is relevant to engage with this material to understand the philosopher's role as a central figure during the Romantic period, along with his influence on the writer. Thereafter, the criticism around the Coleridge Spinozan/Christian debate is provided. Here, Coleridge is understood by critics as oscillating between the diverging views, leaning increasingly towards Christianity in his later years. The criticism surrounding this debate will be a foundation for my position, where I take a stance that the tension observed in Coleridge's writings is what grants him innovation and creativity. Furthermore, this thesis understands literature as being able to hold contradictions.

2.1 Spinoza and the Pantheist Debate

During the enlightenment and until the early period of romanticism, Spinoza's philosophy was heavily criticized (McFarland 72). Indeed, the philosopher was condemned for promoting atheism by many leading intellectuals of his time (Ibid.). Leibniz suggested that Spinoza was truly an atheist (Leibniz qtd. In McFarland 72), while archbishop Fénelon stated of his philosophical monism that: "[...] and all this would constitute a monstrosity from which reason would recoil with shame and horror" (Fénelon qtd. In McFarland 73). The accounts of prominent figures of the time Enlightenment impacted the general opinion, leading to the philosopher becoming a theological and philosophical laughing stock (McFarland 73). Spinoza remained in this role until roughly one hundred years after his death, where, with the start of Romanticism, views of the philosopher were shifting (76). McFarland notes of Spinoza's followers that during this time, there was a remarkable enthusiasm that was previously unseen in the history of philosophy, except perhaps with Plato (77). Thus,

during this time, Spinoza was able to provoke enthusiasm and wonder in his followers which was previously unseen.

Contributing to the renewal of interest in Spinozan philosophy during the Romantic period, the late 1700s saw a disagreement between philosophers Friedrich Jacobi and Gotthold Lessing leading to the *pantheismusstreit*, the renowned pantheist controversy (78). Coleridge's understanding of Spinoza was largely shaped by the pantheist controversy of the 1780s and 1790s (Halmi). The dispute initially arose when philosopher Jacobi claimed that his friend Lessing had privately been a Spinozist (Berkeley 458). The former argued that the urge for rationality inevitably led to pantheism, which he associated to determinism and atheism (Berkeley 458). Jacobi further suggested that a Spinozist philosophy comprised a threat to the German enlightenment and was to be avoided (Berkeley 459). Lessing opposed these claims, admitting: "There is no other philosophy than the philosophy of Spinoza" (McFarland 79). These words would become emblematic of all of the 19th-century philosophy with few exceptions (Ibid.). The pantheist debate eventually included prominent German intellectuals of which Kant and Goethe were members, leading to the renowned *pantheismusstreit* (Halmi). Despite the importance of this event and its relevance to Romanticism, its occurrence remains relatively unknown to most Coleridge specialists (McFarland 53).

According to critic McFarland, it is the emotional identification of Romantics towards Spinoza which is most impressive in terms of Spinoza's legacy (86). He argues that: "All the philosophy of the nineteenth century, with rare exceptions such as Coleridge, Jacobi and Kierkegaard, is, either, in its open statement or in its implications, Spinozism" (99). In fact, philosophers Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer admittedly departed from a Kantian philosophy to later embrace Spinozist monism (99). Furthermore, not only was the philosopher renowned for his theoretical contributions but he was simultaneously viewed as the founder of a new monist religion which philosophers such as Schlegel attempted to bring forth (103). The influence of Spinoza within the discourse of Romanticism is therefore of major significance.

McFarland suggests that it is the tension between the philosophical modes of 'it is' and 'I am' which lies the heart of the *pantheismusstreit*, revealing a larger dispute between Spinozan philosophy and Christianity (53). As does Coleridge, McFarland distinguishes

between the two philosophical systems of 'it is' and 'I am', of which the former is pantheist and the latter Christian (55-56). The philosophy of 'I am' builds on idealism as seen through Plato in ancient philosophy to Descartes and Kant in more recent times (59). McFarland suggests that Descartes, who embodies 'self' philosophy, begins his philosophical system by founding existence on doubt, which is based on thought (55). This approach implies a hierarchical system in which thought is superior to matter (55). Accordingly, external reality is understood as misleading and subject to scepticism (55). Thus, this system leads to a system of binaries in which hierarchies are introduced. In the 'I am' system of thought, God is transcendent to that which he creates. In Western culture, Christianity is derived from such 'self' philosophy where God is understood in personified or anthropomorphic terms (62). This system is the dominant system in the Western world as seen through the predominance of Christianity as a religion.

The 'it is' axiom, on the other hand, founds its system not on the self, but on external reality, i.e. "things" (56). This philosophical mode reaches back to Aristotle's philosophy in antiquity with roots in materialism (Ibid.). Philosopher John Locke summarises this view: "Philosophy is nothing but the true knowledge of things" (ctd. in McFarland 56). Accordingly, such a view promotes God as being discernible through knowledge of things rather than the self (McFarland 56). Here, God does not manifest physical attributes or consciousness (Ibid.). In fact, God is immanent to the world and not transcendent as seen in Christianity, where the concept is not distinguished from the physical world but manifests in it. In terms of pantheist systematisers of the 'it is' system, Spinoza holds a significant role (61). Indeed, he is the first philosopher who succeeded in introducing an immanent conception of God to the Western world in a Christian-dominated setting (53). In fact, it is Spinoza's thought alone that sparked the *panteismusstreit* of the late eighteenth century demonstrating the significance of the system (53). Thus, it is pertinent to study the philosopher's influence within the discourse of Romanticism.

2.2 Coleridge and the Spinozan/Christian Debate

The discourse surrounding the Coleridge-Spinozan debate sparked by McFarland's 1969 book *Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition* is generally one of attempting to identify Coleridge as Christian or Spinozan. Indeed, throughout his book, Coleridge's oscillating

between the two philosophical views is mostly portrayed as a problem requiring a resolution. McFarland suggests of the philosophical modes of 'I am' and 'it is' that Coleridge stayed true to the "ineradicable fact of their tragic opposition" where the respective views are perceived in binaric terms (254). According to the critic, Coleridge's investment in the philosophical systems and their irreconcilability was a source of lifelong tension for the writer: "This inability either really to accept or wholeheartedly to reject pantheism is the central truth of Coleridge's philosophical activity (...) And so he bore the pain of conflicting interests" (107). Thus, Coleridge's inability to constrain his philosophy to a singular system is identified as a source of pain.

McFarland adds that Coleridge considered writing a draft of a poem about Spinoza which was never completed (172). The critic assumes it remained unfinished because of the irreconcilability of the opposing modes of "I am" and "it is", and the distressing impact composing the work would have on the writer (172). Thus, the critic argues the work remains unfinished because Coleridge is torn between the opposing system. McFarland adds that in his writing, Coleridge initially departs from a Spinozan leaning view (222). However, with time, the writer is seen as favouring Christian trinitarianism (Ibid.). McFarland adds that Coleridge increasingly leaning towards the doctrine is done so as to "remove the internal contradictions of his heart's convictions" (Ibid.). The critic further states that for Coleridge, the Christian 'I am' mode of thought was his lifelong religious and philosophical aim (251). Thus, it appears as though the contradiction is resolved in a tangible way.

For Richard Berkeley, Coleridge's ambivalent relationship to Spinoza did not stem from the opposing modes of 'it is' and 'I am' as assumed by McFarland (257). Rather, the 2006 article suggests the tension originates from the writer's conflicting interpretations of the philosopher (257). The critic argues that Spinoza as a philosopher has often been misunderstood and seen in a mystical transcendental light rather than through a material 'it is' perspective (457). Berkeley suggests Coleridge is torn between what he considers to be the "inanimate cold world" from "Dejection: an Ode" and "the one life" promoted in "The Eolian Harp" (457). Coleridge is thus understood as being simultaneously attracted and repelled by the same system, which, on the one hand, is cold and mechanical, and, on the other, a system in which all is interconnected in God. Berkeley in his article concludes that the poet agrees more with Spinoza than McFarland had claimed:

In the end he seems to agree with Spinoza more than he disagrees, and this is important because it shows that Coleridge was not, as McFarland argues, attracted to pantheism for logical and emotional reasons, and repelled from it for theological ones. Instead he actually agreed with Spinoza on the difficulty of the central issues, and was both attracted and repelled by the same thing (470).

Ultimately, he suggests that Coleridge agreed more with Spinoza than what had been previously acknowledged. Thus, Coleridge's ambivalent relationship with Spinoza finds a resolution in his agreeing with Spinoza, leaning more heavily towards the monist system. What the poet was attracted to was the mystical possibility (457), while he was simultaneously repelled by the system's perceived mechanic coldness (458). Berkeley's conception, although attempting to resolve the tension manifested in Coleridge's thought, reveals nuance by acknowledging the ability to be both attracted to and repelled by the same system.

In a similar line of thought to McFarland, Nicholas Halmi in his 2013 article "Coleridge's Ecuemical Spinoza" views Coleridge as being torn between his attraction to monist philosophy, and his desire to affirm trinitarian Christianity. Throughout his life, the critic claims that Coleridge attempts to convert Spinoza to Christianity (Halmi). This tendency is qualified by the scholar as a major and unresolved conflict in the writer's life (Ibid.). Furthermore, the article suggests Coleridge's attempts at Christianizing Spinoza are "self-contradictory" (Ibid.). In this paragraph, Halmi summarizes Coleridge's approach in terms of pairing the two systems:

If Coleridge was consistently drawn to dichotomizing, to the extent that his most enduring contributions to critical theory are the distinctions he formulated himself or adapted from others (e.g., imagination vs. fancy, imitation vs. copy, organic vs. mechanical form, symbol vs. allegory), he was just as consistently unable to constrain his thought by a dichotomous logic. Having identified two mutually exclusive intellectual positions, he might try simultaneously to adopt both while nonetheless accepting the truth of their mutual exclusivity. Coleridge's engagement with Spinoza is one example of such a situation, the "it is" and "I am" circling each other endlessly, the finite modes, one might say, of his infinite irresolution (Ibid.).

Here, the systems are perceived as mutually exclusive, where these may not be incorporated or implemented together. In addition, Coleridge's irresolution is promoted in a negative way as exhibited in the impossibility of making up his mind. Thus, the tension between the respective views is exhibited as problematic.

In his work, McFarland does refer to Coleridge's indecisiveness as a strength: "This commitment ["I am"] was in continual tension with his poetic concern, emanating from the "it is", and the tension is the secret of his wonderful vitality" (252). Thus, Coleridge's religious views originating from the 'I am' system alongside his 'it is' concerns are perceived as a source of innovation and creativity. In addition, the critic mentions that the writer's interest in both views persists until the end of the writer's life (254). McFarland further suggests that Christian trinitarianism as a system accommodates the two opposing modes of thought (227). The philosophies are therefore not consistently viewed as mutually exclusive. The tension, however, eventually finds resolution in a singular system that accommodates both within Christian Trinitarianism. In addition, as mentioned previously, the critic suggests that the Christian system was favoured by Coleridge because a total commitment to an immanent system could not accommodate the religion (253). Thus, although McFarland refers to the tension as a source of strength on several occasions, these eventually need to be resolved in a tangible way where the transcendent is favoured over monism.

Berkeley similarly addresses the instability of Coleridge's philosophy, promoting it as a result of his thorough investment in pantheist thought and as a reflection of his profound knowledge of the topic (471). However, this is only referred to once in the article, where the tension is not thoroughly addressed or integrated as a strength. As noted previously, it is generally argued as a problem requiring a resolution. Thus, Halmi's article is mostly representative of how Coleridge appropriates Spinoza to fit into a Christian setting, arguing that the aim is contradictory and unrealizable (Halmi).

3. Theory

This chapter provides the reader with the theoretical framework that is employed in this thesis. In the first section, the concept of hauntology is introduced before moving on to Spinoza's *Ethics* (1677). The first section draws on hauntology as a challenge to Western dualistic metaphysics. Hauntology by inhabiting the liminal areas between our traditional ontological categories accesses spectral layers of existence that are not accessible to dualistic discourse. Derrida's 1993 *Specters of Marx* is employed as a theoretical grounding for this work. However, as Derrida's research does not get into depth on the topic of hauntology, only referring to it on several occasions, I have simultaneously included sources who have contributed to the theoretical field from the 20th and 21st centuries. Various scholars from the 2013 anthology *The Spectralities Reader*, alongside Elisabeth M. Loevelie's 2013 article "Religions" are included in this thesis. The first section of this chapter demonstrates the notion of God in relation to hauntology, while the second section investigates the theme of ghosts. Lastly, a third section explores literature as a spectral medium by its ability to challenge empirical reality.

Thereafter, Spinoza's philosophy is defined as demonstrated in his influential work *Ethics* (1677), which encompasses the notion of substance monism and its implication on nature and God. Because Coleridge read the philosopher's works and is versed in Spinozan philosophy (Halimi), it is pertinent to discuss the concepts that have inspired the author before investigating the tension between Spinozan philosophy and Christianity. The chapter investigates the philosopher's metaphysical views on God and its immanent presence within nature. Within this system, God is not understood in transcendent terms (Spinoza 93), but as an infinite substance manifesting in nature (87). From this distinction arises the tension noted between the modes of Spinozism and Christianity. Because Spinoza's concepts are not a primary theory in this research being applied primarily to Coleridge, the section on his metaphysics will be less detailed than the former on hauntology.

3.1.1 Literature and the Death of God

a specter does not only cause séance tables to turn, but sets heads spinning (Derrida *Specters of Marx* 127)

Hauntology is a concept introduced by Derrida in his 1993 *Specters of Marx* derived from its homophone ontology which in French is pronounced almost identically. Hauntology suggests a disruption of Western ontology and metaphysics where dualist thinking has been dominant (Loevlie 339). The spectre as a term is difficult to define. Indeed, it goes against its purpose to ascribe it to a fixed meaning, as for Derrida, the spectre is a “concept without concept” (Marx C’est Quelqu’un 23). The quasi-concept defies and surpasses epistemological modes of inquiry which are based on classification and attribution of a final signified (Wolfreys 70). By nature, the spectre always surpasses definition, being located in between borders. In fact, it is not definable or localizable at a fixed origin (Wolfreys 70). According to Derrida, it is that which is “neither alive nor dead” (Derrida Marx C’est Quelqu’un 12). The spectre thus manifests in the gaps between ontological worlds (Wolfreys 70). Thus, it does not fit into neatly defined categories, but surfaces between them, in spaces of uncertainty.

In Derrida’s autobiographical work *Circumfession* (1993), the theme of religion is prevalent where Derrida refers to himself as an atheist (155). In 2002, Derrida critic, John D. Caputo, asks Derrida in a conference why he refers to himself as an atheist in his autobiography (*Derrida and Religion Other Testaments* 46). The latter responds that in order to believe in God, one must pass through “a number of atheistic steps” adding that “True believers know they run the risk of being radical atheists” (Ibid.). Thus, true belief must be accompanied by doubt and skepticism, with a potential for atheism. Derrida stresses that the transcendent God does not have a tangible physical presence, and thus no ontology (Ibid.). Indeed, if God does not exist in our reality, belief in God will in turn be followed by doubt.

The rejection of God as advocated by Derrida suggests a dismissal of the transcendent God prominent in dominant Western discourse. In fact, here, God is superior and all-knowing where the rest is of lesser value and detached (Loevlie 339). In addition, this system places God in opposition to earthly life where material and transcendent are perceived in a dualistic relation of opposites (Ibid.). In allusion to Nietzsche’s death of God, Derrida states: “The death of God will ensure our salvation because the death of God alone can reawaken the divine” (Writing and Différence 184). Thus, according to the philosopher, the death of the transcendental God opens up alternatives to experiencing the divine. This scepticism towards the transcendental God indicates a refusal of an all-powerful God detached from worldly matter (Loevlie 339). Furthermore, it simultaneously rejects the binaric view that mind and

matter are opposed (Loevlie 339). The rejection of God, therefore, enables one to opt out of a reductionist Westernized framework.

Loevlie suggests that the God posited in hauntology may paradoxically be accessible as transcendent, but also as a real experience in time and language (Ibid.). Thus, rather than adhering to one category, God is crossing lines between the ontologies of the material and the transcendent. This oscillation between opposing ontologies permits a reconceptualization of our dualistic discourse, leaving space for what does not fit into neatly defined categories. Loevlie points out that our layers of existence:

cannot be defined according to the traditional ontological criteria of being or non-being, alive or dead, material or immaterial. Existence offers a whole range of dimensions that don't fit this scheme. Rather they are *in-between*—ungraspable and unidentifiable (337).

The critic suggests that our traditional concepts for making sense of the world are not equipped to approach all aspects of being. By breaking down traditional ontological borders, new ways of approaching and creating knowledge emerge where contradictions do not need to be resolved, as posited in God's ambiguous ontology. Reflecting this, literary critics Maria del Pilar Blanco and Esther Peeren suggest that the ambiguity of the spectre should not be negated, but welcomed and lived with ("The Spectrality Turn/Introduction" 33). Thus, we may resist the urge of forcing what surpasses our rational understanding to fit into neat and orderly categories, leaving space for what falls outside and cannot be contained within these.

The death of the transcendent God as posited by Derrida, therefore, paves way for an alternative approach released from dualistic reasoning. In fact, the God that is rejected is an all-powerful force that is viewed in opposition to our earthly life. Thus, this system introduces binaries where the transcendent stands in opposition to the material. By shaking up the paradigm through which knowledge is created, a comprehensive understanding is demonstrated leaving space for contradiction and ambiguity to coincide.

3.1.2 Ghostly Hauntings

Within the framework of hauntology, the term ghost is drawn on as a metaphor for what surpasses cognition or categorization. Philosopher Bernard Stiegler suggests that ghosts are employed by Derrida as a response to Karl Marx's dialectic materialism and his 'fear' of ghosts ("Spectrographies" 44). Marx begins his *Communist Manifesto* (1848) indicating that a spectre is haunting Europe. Significantly, Marx, as a figure of materialism, is not generally associated with the supernatural. Indeed, Marxist thought is rooted in materialism where the base determines the superstructure. Thus, Derrida when referring to ghosts responds to this materialism by promoting an alternative to the system (Ibid.). However, the philosopher simultaneously maintains a certain materialism in his concept of hauntology (Ibid.). The spectral figures, therefore, by embodying materialism and spirit challenge a purely materialist empirical paradigm, manifesting an *in-between* ontology.

Contributing to the ghost's ambiguous ontology, they are paradoxically both visible and invisible which further upsets established binaries: "it is the visibility of a body which is not present in flesh and blood" (Blanco and Peeren "The Spectral Turn/Introduction" 33). In a sense, ghosts embody the paradoxical due to their being immaterial and simultaneously visible. The spectral figure, therefore, does not simply represent a turn towards the supernatural (Ibid.). Rather, through its ambivalent ontological nature, it embodies ambiguity. By transgressing binaries and categorization, drawing on the ghostly challenges 'either/or' modes of thinking, leaving space for contradiction. The figure of the ghost, therefore, is of interest in hauntology studies being metaphysically unstable. Critic Tom Gunning suggests that by disrupting our conception of the material and spiritual, ghosts make us uneasy (232). In fact, they roam through the material world while maintaining an incorporeal aspect, challenging dichotomous ontology (Ibid.). Gunning suggests that the conflict caused in us by a ghost is therefore not a phenomenological one, in that it is not simply linked to our perception of the ghost (217). Rather, it is the upsetting of ontological boundaries such as those of material/immateriality, life/death, and presence/non-presence which are unsettling to us.

Ghostly figures simultaneously refer to the haunting of the past, in that we are tied to our history and past experiences. Derrida suggests in Ken McMullen's 1983 film *Ghost Dance*: "The future belongs to ghosts" (Blanco and Peeren "The Spectral Turn/Introduction" 33). This statement implies that we are in constant dialogue with our past. In his *Specters of Marx*, Derrida refers to Marx and how his legacy has continued to impact intellectual thought

in the 20th century (4). Here, Marx's ideas manifest as a spectre persisting well beyond the philosopher's lifetime (Ibid.). Thus, past events continue to have an impact long after these occur. This ability of the past to affect later generations suggests the present moment is not dislocated and isolated. Rather, it is in interaction with the past.

Furthermore, ghosts, by appearing after the departed, carry the notion of our history haunting and keeping up with us. Blanco and Peeren suggest that:

The specter is always already before us, confronting us with what precedes and exceeds our sense of autonomy, seeing us without being seen, and demanding a certain responsibility and answerability [...]” (“The Spectral Turn/Introduction” 33).

The ghost, therefore, requests that we acknowledge what we have not faced or come to terms with. Thus, there is an ethical aspect promoted when drawing on ghosts where we are urged to look at our history. It is revealing that the ghost relationship is one where we cannot distinctly see the ghost, mirroring how difficult it is to clearly see our past.

3.1.3 Literature's Spectrality

In terms of literature's spectrality, Derrida states in his 1969 *Dissemination* that there is no literature (223). In fact, although literature appears to have corporeality in the form of books (Loevlie 342), without its materiality, a work of literature continues to exist (Wolfreys 71). Illustrating this, if a copy of Charlotte Brontë's *Jane Eyre* (1847) is destroyed, the work of literature does not cease to exist. Thus, in a sense, it extends beyond its materiality. Derrida scholar Joseph G. Kronick suggests that “[...] As a specter, literature is neither spirit nor body and both at the same time, which makes it difficult to name” (pp 1-2). In fact, because it is not tied to its materiality, it is not physical. However, we similarly require some kind of physicality in order to access these works. Thus, as a mode, it is spectral, possessing an undefined ontology quivering between being and non-being.

Further promoting literature's spectrality is the fact that it is not in direct relation to external reality. Indeed, it defines its own world without relying on referentiality which gives it the freedom to express itself beyond our limited reality (340). Reflecting this ability, it is

able to conjure images of pink skies or yellow foliage, without us objecting. Literature is therefore not limited in its referentiality, but constructs its own reality, being capable of challenging empirical ontology (Loevlie 341). Stéphane Mallarmé touches upon this in 1986 “Crisis in Poetry”, suggesting that literature can refer to a flower without this flower existing in reality:

I say: a flower! and outside the oblivion to which my voice relegates any shape, insofar as it is something other than the calyx, there arises musically, as the very idea and delicate, the one absent from every bouquet (76).

Poetry is able to evoke in us the emotion of flowers without requiring the same object to exist. Thus, it is independent of our reality. In addition, it presents an “in-between” quality. Indeed, while these flowers are an abstraction, they simultaneously provide an emotional response from the reader (Loevlie 342). Thus, literature’s ontology is “*in-between*”, evoking in us the ‘real’ and material while rejecting that very connection (Ibid.).

Literature provides instances of unreadability, as there are moments where we cannot make sense of it, and where it resists logic (344). As an illustration of this unreadability, the words “I die” are spectral (Ibid.). Derrida touches upon this, suggesting that we cannot testify to our own death if alive (*Demeure* 46). However, neither is this the case if we are dead (Ibid.). Indeed, announcing one’s own death would imply that one is dead and alive simultaneously. Thus, voicing one’s death is an act which belongs to the literary voice only (Loevlie 344). It is in the instances that literary language resists logic by articulating that which is not possible realistically speaking that a text’s unreadability is released.

When observing the unreadable, we are invited as readers to witness literature’s spectrality, partaking in our own hauntology (Ibid.). Indeed, when noticing that which is neither dead nor alive, material nor immaterial, we are confronted with that which we cannot rationally understand (Ibid.). When reading what defies reason, the hauntology of a text is released (Wolfreys 73). Loevlie suggests that: “We are permitted, strangely, through literature to relate to the haunting of our own existence, to that in us which is neither dead nor alive, neither immaterial nor concrete” (Loevlie 344). Reading literature thus enables us to witness aspects of our lives that are not definable or qualifiable, releasing the spectrality of our own existence.

Strikingly, when confronted with that which we cannot rationally understand, our ontological reality is shaken, providing what Loevlie refers to as an ontological quivering (337). Ontological quivering consists in our ontological borders being blurred and transgressed. These borders may be those of certitude and incertitude, life and death, material and spiritual etc. When these borders are shaken, this gives rise to what we cannot fully understand (Ibid.). This incertitude provides us with an alternate way of approaching our reality released from analytic and quantifiable thought. As literature is spectral, it has the ability to access layers of our existence that other dominant modes suppress. Thus, a voice is given to the in-between quality of our existence (337; 343). Literature, therefore, has the ability to release the spectrality and haunting of our lives which are suppressed by dominating rationalist discourse.

3.2 Spinoza's Philosophy

Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) is a prominent philosopher of the Enlightenment whose philosophy, although characteristic of his time as a result of his rational writing, was also very innovative and controversial (Nadler 2-3). Indeed, his arguments being divided into sets of propositions alongside his inclusion of geometrical patterns in his *Ethics* (1677) reflect his position as an enlightenment figure. The Dutch theorist was simultaneously bold in his critique of traditional conceptions of God and philosophy (3). For instance, his argument against the possibility of the soul, alongside his rejection of a transcendent God conflicted with the dominating religious discourse of the time that posited a dualist outlook (2). The author's *Ethics* published posthumously in 1677 remains his most influential philosophical contribution, promoting a monist view of God as manifested in nature (Spinoza 87). Although the *Ethics* develop an ethical framework alongside his metaphysics, this thesis draws on the metaphysical aspect so as to examine the tensions with ontological dualism as noted in Christianity in the context of Coleridge's writing.

Spinoza begins his *Ethics* by defining his understanding of God. Before moving on to God's manifestation in the material world, he suggests that God is eternal and infinite (86). Furthermore, he argues that the only substance to exist is God (85). If God is the only substance that exists, follows that God encompasses the material world (86). The philosopher

moves on to describe the physical world which he understands as one of God's "attributes" (87). Spinoza argues: "Extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God" (87). By extended substance, the philosopher is referring to the material world as one of God's attributes. The philosopher adds that because all substance is made from the same matter (God), a substance cannot be produced by another substance (78). In fact, because the physical encompasses God (Spinoza 87), the material world cannot be produced by a God that would be outside or transcendent to it (93). Spinoza, therefore, proposes that: "God is the immanent not the transitive cause of things" (Spinoza 93). Thus, the material world becomes the cause of its own being, *causa-sui*¹, rather than being caused by an external force (Spinoza 93).

Spinoza by positing a connection between the material and transcendent is able to provide a new outlook on the mind/body affirmed by his contemporary René Descartes (Scruton 46). In fact, the latter was unable to account for the mind's place within the physical world (45-46). Within this system, due to the mind being distinct from matter, there is no causal relation between the two (Ibid.). This leads to problems in terms of the mind's impact on matter, and the interaction between thought and movement, for instance. Spinoza's philosophy, by maintaining that the physical world and ideas are a manifestation of a single substance, which is God, provides a solution to this problem (46). Thus, mind and matter are able to impact each other in this axiom. Although defined as having one substance, God is simultaneously infinite (Ibid.). Spinoza defines God as: "a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence" (Spinoza 82). Thus, Spinoza's substance monism is discerned by his conception of God as a singular substance of which mind and matter are two of its infinite attributes (Scruton 46).

The philosopher simultaneously denies the possibility of God maintaining a corporeal aspect in an anthropomorphic sense (Spinoza 86). In fact, if God is infinite in substance, this means that the concept may not be divided into individual parts (Ibid.). Spinoza scholar Roger Scruton in his 1986 book *Spinoza* suggests that God is not individuated, because the concept is infinite and manifests in everything (Scruton 50). Therefore, it is not an entity whose being can be distinguished or separated from another. Rather, extended substance, meaning the material world, manifests as one of God's attributes (Spinoza 87). Alongside denying the

¹ In latin: cause of itself or self-caused

possibility of an anthropomorphic God, the philosopher adds that God is not subject to passions (Spinoza 86). His concept, therefore, provides an alternative framework departing from an “I am” mode of thought in his rejection of anthropomorphism.

Spinoza’s *Ethics*, by promoting the presence of the divine within the material world challenges the dominant religious and philosophical discourses of his time. Indeed, while Descartes or Christianity’s distinction of mind and matter as separate modes was the dominating paradigm during the enlightenment, Spinoza held the view that God manifests in the material world (Spinoza 87). Thus, rather than the two concepts manifesting as polar opposites, mind and matter are understood as two of God’s infinite attributes (Scruton 46). This system departs from an “I am” conception, by denying the possibility of a transcendent (Spinoza 93) or anthropomorphic God (86). Rather, within this framework, nature manifests in God as extended substance (87).

4. Ghosts of Coleridge: Textual Analysis of the Poems

Although Coleridge's engagements with Spinoza have been examined previously, the approach to the Spinozan/Christian conflict is generally one of attempting to identify Coleridge as Spinozist or Christian. Critic Richard Berkeley suggests that "Understanding Coleridge's understanding of Spinoza has been a major difficulty for scholars interested in Coleridge's philosophical engagements" (457). According to Berkeley, this is due to the centrality of Spinoza as a philosophical figure within Romanticism, and the multiplicity of interpretations of the philosopher (Ibid). The "one life within us and abroad" promoted in "The Eolian Harp" strongly emphasises the possibility of an immanent God. Strikingly, this God is refuted by the end of the same poem where the philosophy is paralleled to bubbles that "rise and break" (Ibid.). This simultaneous attraction and repulsion to monist philosophy is prevalent in many of his writings and is representative of Coleridge's engagements with Spinoza. In "The Eolian Harp", "Hymn Before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni" "Frost at Midnight" and "Dejection: an Ode", Spinozan philosophy is promoted through the union of mind and body while Christian elements are simultaneously advocated as seen in the use of transcendent elements. It appears to be the very tension between the opposing modes that provides Coleridge's poetry with creativity and innovation. Thus, attempting to identify Coleridge as belonging to one of these doctrines does not do justice to his writings' complexity.

In this analysis, "The Eolian Harp", "Hymn Before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni" "Frost at Midnight" and "Dejection: an Ode" are investigated in chronological order. This permits a contextualization of the poems, noting the development in Coleridge's thought and writing. "Hymn Before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni" and "Frost at Midnight" are analyzed together, as both are shorter works containing similar themes of immanence. When reading these poems, this research will be drawing on a hauntological framework. Applying this method enables me to examine the poems while remaining true to the tension exhibited rather than attempting to resolve it. In turn, this reveals the poems' spectrality, which is not constrained to one singular system of thought. Indeed, by promoting both views and simultaneously rejecting these, the text's ontological nature can be seen as quivering. Furthermore, I develop a reading of the hauntological elements within the poems, enabling me to stray from a binaric reading focusing solely on the presence (or not) of monism and

dualism. With the former approach, I would simply be reproducing the discourse I aim to challenge. Thus, revealing the poems' hauntological elements allows me to stray from a dualistic reading.

4.1 An Introduction

“The Eolian Harp”, is written by Coleridge in 1795 and is one of his earlier poems published in his poetry collection *Conversation Poems*. The poem reveals the writer's anticipation of his marriage with his fiancée Sarah Fricker along with his religious views. According to critic Henry J. W. Milley, “The Eolian Harp”, promotes a shift from Coleridge's earlier writing, with a sharper focus on nature than seen previously (362). The scholar argues that this is a result of the writer spending more time in the countryside which is reflected in his works (Ibid.). The poem reveals the writer's torn attitude toward Spinozan philosophy and his simultaneous attraction to Christianity. Here, both themes are present, where the writer initially endorses a Spinozist outlook of immanence as seen in the “one life within us and abroad” (“The Eolian Harp”). However, by the end of the poem, the writer leans towards Christianity with emotions of guilt and sin. The concept of hauntology equips me with tools to uncover the wavering between the alternate philosophies, revealing the poem's spectrality.

4.2.1 Spinozan Philosophy

In the poem, revealing Spinozan philosophy, it is of significance that the poem draws on the image of an aeolian harp, as an aeolian harp is an instrument that is located outdoors and played by the wind. Drawing on this instrument promotes the notion of nature having agency, as this view does not place man at the centre of its hierarchy as seen in Christian “I am” mode of thought. In the latter system of thought, the mind is perceived as superior to the material world where external reality is subject to doubt (McFarland 55). Here, however, it is the material world/nature that has agency, where its strings are animated by nature without man's intervention. This promotes the notion of an immanent presence within nature endorsing a Spinozan outlook.

Contributing to the presence of Spinozan elements in the poem, Coleridge suggests that motion is encompassed by a soul, stating that “the one Life” “meets all motion and becomes its soul” (“The Eolian Harp”). The term “The One Life” implies a view that all is interconnected as one. Berkeley proposes: “Spinoza is linked, through his monism and pantheism, to the mystical possibilities that are broached in the “one Life within us and abroad” passage added to *The Eolian Harp* in 1817” (457). Thus, such a world implies a Spinozist outlook where all beings and nature are interconnected through a divine presence. According to Spinoza, extension is one of God’s attributes, allowing him to manifest in the physical world (87). When suggesting that “the one Life” meets motion, Coleridge similarly integrates the view of a divine presence within the material world (“The Eolian Harp”). In addition, Coleridge adds that “nature” is “animated” which increasingly promotes the notion of a divine presence within nature (“The Eolian Harp”). This view challenges a Christian dualist perspective where thought and matter are perceived in opposition to each other. By combining divinity with motion, Coleridge reinforces the connection between the physical world and the divine, ultimately reinforcing Spinozan monism.

In “The Eolian Harp”, there is a development in terms of the spatial relations departing from a singular focus point before broadening to a larger frame through the themes of music and divinity. While the poem departs from Coleridge’s wife-to-be Sara and her cheek resting on the former’s arm, it grows to encompass all of nature and its inherent divinity. The poem starts as follows:

My pensive Sara! thy soft cheek reclined

Thus on mine arm, most soothing sweet it is (“The Eolian Harp”).

Over the next stanzas, the focus broadens to the wind and melodies infusing nature with the divine. Departing from a narrow focus on the material before broadening to divine presence allows Coleridge to emphasise the presence of divinity within material substance. The shift from the initial modest contact point to the broader focus on God parallels the presence of the infinite within material confines. Indeed, had passage promoted a transcendental God, it would have departed from a diffuse and abstract force before moving onto material substance, mirroring an external God imbuing life onto nature. Here, even small elements of twigs or birds are perceived as containing Godlike presence, further mirroring the theme of immanence.

In the poem, the use of synaesthesia similarly promotes the theme of monism. Indeed, there are numerous occasions where the merging of distinct senses is promoted. Suggesting this:

A light in sound, a sound-like power in light,

Rhythm in all thought, and joyance everywhere— (“The Eolian Harp”).

In these lines, there is a clear transgression between sound and vision where the blurring of sound into light promotes the interconnection of these senses. In addition, there is a simultaneous integration of rhythm with thought in the second line. Coleridge Scholar Joseph McQueen argues that in “The Eolian Harp”: “wind joins with harp, sight joins with sound, and world joins with poet. The lack of firm boundaries permits the transcendent to interact freely with the material” (24). Thus, the use of synaesthesia enables Coleridge to parallel the theme of substance monism. Here, the merging of distinct senses mirrors Spinozan philosophy where the connection between the finite and the infinite is posited. Further advocating this, Coleridge adds:

the long sequacious notes

Over delicious surges sink and rise (“The Eolian Harp”).

In these lines, there is a combination of sound as seen through musical notes, and taste visible through the adjective “delicious”. In addition, the verbs “sink and rise” further suggest movement, relating to the sense of sight. The interconnection of these three senses similarly reflects the theme of monism, where through the union of hearing, taste, and sight, the connection of the divine within the finite is paralleled.

4.2.2 Christianity and Uncertainty

Although Coleridge embraces Spinozism throughout most of the poem, there is tension exhibited in the last stanza. Indeed, the section initially suggests that Coleridge’s wife Sara disapproves of the writer’s interest in monist philosophy, pressuring him to follow the way of Christ (Ibid.). According to Berkeley, Coleridge “[...] often tries to suggest that Spinoza was like the poet-persona of *The Eolian Harp*—an innocent thinker led astray by the vagaries of metaphysical speculation” (462). Indeed, in the poem, the immanent conception of

nature is associated with “vain philosophy” or “Bubbles that glitter as they rise and break” (“The Eolian Harp”). Thus, the philosophy is promoted as unreliable. By the end of the poem, Coleridge strays from Spinozism, appearing to find solace in the Christian faith. Here, he admits to God’s ability to heal and comfort him, regarding him with “praise”, where his “saving mercies healed me”. In addition, this God offers the protagonist “peace” along with his “Cot” and “Maid” (“The Eolian Harp”). Thus, the narrator finds comfort within the Christian faith.

However, despite endorsing Christianity, the same faith is steeped in a rhetoric of guilt. This is exhibited in the lexical field of repentance in the last stanza: “reproof” “dispraised” “never guiltless” “sinful” “miserable” “Wilder’d and dark” (“The Eolian Harp”). Thus, as Christianity provides Coleridge with self-doubt and shame, the doctrine does not manifest as a clear resolution to the conflict between opposing systems. Furthermore, the writer’s shift towards Christianity does not appear to be initiated Coleridge’s own will, but as a consequence of his wife’s reproof. Indeed, the shift towards Christianity is initially introduced after his fiancé Sarah reprimands Coleridge when he adopts a Spinozan outlook:

And what if all of animated nature
Be but organic Harps diversely framed,
That tremble into thought, as o’er them sweeps
Plastic and vast, one intellectual breeze,
At once the Soul of each, and God of all?

But thy more serious eye a mild reproof
Darts, O beloved Woman! nor such thoughts
Dim and unhallowed dost thou not reject,
And biddest me walk humbly with my God.
Meek Daughter in the family of Christ! (“The Eolian Harp”)

In the first stanza, the narrator is referring to Spinozan philosophy when suggesting the presence of a God within nature. Significantly, it is only after this reproof that the poet adopts a Christian outlook. Furthermore, Coleridge calls his wife’s reproof to a Spinozist conception of nature “darts”, suggesting the difficulty in letting go of the view (Ibid.).

The narrator’s reluctance in letting go of the Spinozan view suggests that the writer remains drawn to the system. Thus, the adoption of the Christian system does not manifest as a clear resolution to the conflict between opposing systems. Contributing to the uncertainty of

God's status, the narrator of "The Eolian Harp" adds that he is never guiltless when speaking of God (Ibid.). This remorse is caused by his Spinozan inclinations throughout the poem which are perceived as a distraction from the Christian faith. Although the poem eventually embraces Christianity, it is clear that there is a simultaneous attraction and tension caused by his relationship to Spinozist monism. In addition, Christianity is only promoted at the end of the last stanza whereas Spinozism is endorsed throughout the poem's three stanzas. Thus, Coleridge's Christian inclinations do not manifest as a clear resolution to the tension between opposing doctrines.

4.2.3 The Ontology of God

Derrida suggests that belief in God must be followed by doubt (*Derrida and Religion, Other Testaments 184*). Indeed, according to the philosopher, faith in the Christian God will be followed by skepticism as the transcendent God is not accessible to our empirical senses (Ibid.). Thus, when believing in God, one runs the risk of being an atheist (Ibid.). As noted above, this doubt is equally prevalent in the poem. Indeed, it appears as though Coleridge is not fully convinced by the Christian faith, where it is his wife who pressures him in this direction. Further promoting doubt, when speaking of the Christian God, Coleridge calls him "The Incomprehensible!" ("The Eolian Harp"). Therefore, the writer does not appear to understand the divine nor fully trust in its presence.

Loevlie suggests that Derrida's refusal of the Western God posits a rejection of the transcendent God locked in a dualist relation of opposites (339). Indeed, in this system, mind and matter are perceived in opposition, with spirit being superior to the material. Derrida's God, therefore, comes to inhabit an in-between space with an ontology that cannot be reduced to 'either/or' binaric reasoning. Thus, God manifests in between our ontological categories. Here, Coleridge's scepticism alongside adopting alternate views similarly posits God as having an unstable ontology. In fact, God is promoted both as a divine presence in nature, suggesting a material God. However, the transcendent Christian God is simultaneously posited by the end of the poem, where Coleridge's God similarly manifests as having an unstable ontology, quivering between the material and transcendent.

In relation to God's uncertain ontology, Loevlie suggests that:

“[...] the hauntology of God seems to affect the ontology of the subject. In relation to an object that cannot be determined or fixed, the status of the subject, of my sense of being, is equally weakened. To believe in God is to experience a trembling of one’s own ontology” (339).

If God’s ontology becomes spectral, our ontology itself is affected. Indeed, our reality is dependent on the status of God. Therefore, if our God inhabits an in-between space, our reality itself is shaken. Like the ghost, the God promoted by Coleridge has an ontology that is spectral, quivering between the material (Spinozan metaphysics) and transcendent (Christian metaphysics). This, therefore, suggests that our own ontology becomes uncertain as a result of the blurring of categories.

The shift between the systems of Spinozism and Christianity in “The Eolian Harp” reveals a simultaneous attraction and repulsion to both philosophical modes. According to Peter Hitchcock, an oscillation, which consists of “restless inquiry” and “vacillation — a moment of doubt, of hesitation, of wavering” can be considered as spectral (Hitchcock *Oscillate Wildly* 3). Here, it is clear that doubt is enacted in the shift of systems, as well as an oscillation between the respective philosophical views. Thus, the wavering may be seen as an instance of spectrality where the text does not resort to one signified only, embodying an in-between space. By alternately promoting and dismissing both philosophical modes, the text inhabits an in-between space.

It is relevant to recall what Loevlie affirms about overturning our ontological paradigm and the fear this induces in us (348). Indeed, the critic suggests that abandoning our ontological paradigm that is based on what is materially verifiable and quantifiable is a source of anxiety for us, as this involves delving into the unknown (Ibid.). However, by allowing ourselves to experience this anxiety, we gain access to the hauntological aspects of our lives that are not constrained by binaric reasoning (Ibid.). When Coleridge promotes a God whose ontology quivers between the material and transcendent, as readers, our linear ontological paradigm must similarly be abandoned. Indeed, the God endorsed inhabits an in-between space that cannot be grasped through binaric discourse. It is significant that the critics surrounding the Coleridge Spinoza-Christian debate mostly attempt to categorize Coleridge as belonging to one of the systems. Indeed, this posits the difficulty of letting go of our widely dualistic paradigm.

In this poem, it is the very tension between the respective philosophical modes that provides Coleridge's writing with creativity and innovation. Indeed, both systems are promoted and refuted simultaneously. This is revealed in Spinozan philosophy being paralleled to "bubbles that glitter as they rise and break" ("The Eolian Harp"). However, there is simultaneously scepticism as to the transcendent God as noted through Coleridge leaning towards the system after his wife's reproof of Spinozism ("The Eolian Harp"). Furthermore, the joyful atmosphere provided by Spinozan philosophy as opposed to that of guilt and sorrow further suggests that the Christian doctrine does not manifest as a clear resolution to the protagonist's inner conflict. McFarland suggests that the tension between the systems of "I am" and "it is" is "the secret of his wonderful vitality" (252). Here, the conflicting philosophical views coexisting side by side surpass rational thinking inhabiting an in-between space. As Coleridge's God oscillates between the opposing views, it seems pertinent that we also read Coleridge in this way. Resolving the tension would disregard the themes that are promoted, hindering a comprehensive reading of the poem. However, by allowing contradiction to remain, the reader is able to access the poem's hauntology.

4.2.4 Hauntology of Imagination

In "The Eolian Harp", further contributing to the poem's hauntology is the narrator who appears to be in a trance-like state, straying away from the landscape around him. Indeed, the poem introduces a protagonist sitting with his wife, gazing at his cottage. However, after the surroundings are described, the narrator loses himself in dreams of harps, music, and contemplations on his faith. The poem refers to a lute's "delicious" music, thoughts of "the distant sea", and "idle flitting phantasies" ("The Eolian Harp"). Thus, the protagonist is not fully present with external reality but is lost in a projection state, daydreaming. This in-between state reveals an instance of hauntology.

According to Derrida, the present moment is never isolated in time but is caught between past and future (*Spectrographies* 47). Here, it is clear that the narrator is lost in contemplation where he is not fully in the present moment. In relation to the act of imagination, Loevlie suggests that:

Imagination is the faculty by which we depart from the confines of the real, and strive towards the in-between of hauntology. Here we are not burdened by the facts of the past or by the materiality of the present, but rather free to roam a different landscape, a landscape that invites and permits our emotional partaking in an immaterial and lost present moment. We are here, yet we are not here (345).

In the poem, the protagonist embodies this in-between state, where his thoughts roam a dream-like landscape. Indeed, although he observes the world around him, he simultaneously reflects on events that are not seemingly present.

Further promoting the in-betweenness the narrator finds himself in, the poem initially departs from a narrow contact point before moving on to the poet's philosophical ruminations. This shift from a concrete point of contact to the general enables Coleridge to emphasise the hauntological aspect of our lives. Indeed, within seemingly daily mundane experiences, we are able to abstract ourselves using our imagination. Thus, although we are in the present moment, we are simultaneously somewhere else. Our existence is therefore haunted by alternate layers of existence as seen through our capacity for abstraction and imagination.

4.2.5 Hauntology of Language

Of relevance is the instability of language noted in the poem as promoted through the use of synaesthesia. Indeed, as suggested previously, the rhetorical device reveals monist philosophy in "The Eolian Harp". However, the same stylistic device simultaneously promotes the presence of hauntology within the poem. Synaesthesia relates to "the experience of two or more modes of sensation when only one sense is being stimulated" (Abrams 323). Thus, synaesthesia relates to an overlapping of the senses. Blanco and Peeren suggest that the spectre is undefinable where we cannot grasp its source ("Introduction: Conceptualizing Spectralities" 10). Indeed, assigning a unitary moment for the origin of the spectre would go against its nature (Ibid.). This means that the spectral is difficult to identify as it is porous.

In "The Eolian Harp", borders between distinct senses are blurred, providing a spectral experience. Indeed, this is visible in the sense of vision merging with that of hearing and taste. This overlap between diverse senses suggests that these are not clearly demarcated, but the boundaries between them are porous. The blurring of senses thus parallels their in-

betweenness where these are not clearly separated or defined. In addition, the experience of synaesthesia cannot be grasped through rational understanding. Rather, it is a spectral experience of in-betweenness which surpasses binaric reasoning. Thus, to experience synaesthesia is to experience the spectral.

Contributing to the hauntology of the poem, the words employed in the text may be understood in a variety of ways. Indeed, in this analysis synaesthesia was initially interpreted as a possibility for Spinoza's monism. However, it simultaneously expresses a spectral element of in-betweenness as seen through the overlap of senses. This is of significance, revealing that language itself is hauntological, where meanings overlap. Indeed, there is not a clear demarcation or boundary between the words and their meaning. We may recall Blanco and Peeren's statement about the spectral not having an identifiable source ("Introduction: Conceptualizing Spectralities" 10). Here, the multiple meanings associated with the literary device suggests that there is not one totalizing meaning, but a quivering between distinct possibilities. The multiplicity of meanings haunt each other in the poem leaving the reader with openness in interpretation. Literature is therefore spectral, where language is open to multiple meanings without being constrained to one signified only.

4.3 "Frost at Midnight" and "Hymn Before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni": an Introduction

"Frost at Midnight" (1798) and "Hymn Before Sunrise in the Vale of Chamouni" (1802) are poems written by Coleridge, both reflect on nature's ability to heal the mind. "Frost at Midnight" was initially published in the writer's *Conversation Poems*. The poem recounts Coleridge's childhood experiences in school where he feels trapped by city life. In addition, the writer goes on to reflect on his plans for his son Hartley's future, where he will grow up surrounded by nature unlike himself. The poem stresses the importance of nature and its soothing benefits on the narrator while promoting qualities of immanence. Significantly, the work simultaneously integrates Christian elements as seen in the personification of God.

"Hymn Before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni" is written in 1802, and describes a mountain peak along with Coleridge's feelings towards nature. The poem was published in

the *Morning Post* in the same year, where Coleridge later printed copies for his friends in 1803 and 1815 (Morton D. Paley 351). During his lifetime, the poem was considered one of Coleridge's greatest accomplishments (352). Later, however, it was revealed that the poem was not inspired by Coleridge's own experience in nature as he himself claimed, but was heavily indebted to a poem by German poet Frederica Bruhn (Ibid.). This information led to a controversy about Coleridge's plagiarism (Ibid.). It is significant that the poem is considered one of his last works containing positive emotions (Yarlott 276). "Hymn Before Sunrise" stands out from the other writings of the period in promoting nature as having immanent qualities, as, by this time, Coleridge's poems were mostly steeped in Christian ideals (Gingerich 1).

In this section, I investigate the presence of Christian ideals alongside Spinozan philosophy, revealing the poems' spectrality. Indeed, by endorsing both systems simultaneously, the poems' hauntology is revealed where the foregrounded ontologies quiver between the material and transcendent. In addition, the unchronological time frame posited in "Frost at Midnight" simultaneously ruptures from a linear time frame as seen in Christianity. According to Blanco and Peeren, the spectre does not have one clear origin ("Introduction: Conceptualizing Spectralities" 10). Thus, time is not perceived through a linear chronological frame. The disjunction of time, therefore, reveals hauntology. I have chosen to investigate these poems together as they are Coleridge's shorter works and draw on similar themes. In addition, analysing these together will contribute to a more spectral and comprehensive reading where I understand the works as informing each other.

4.3.1 Spinozan Philosophy

Reflecting Spinozan philosophy, in "Frost at Midnight", Coleridge refers to God as being "himself in all and all things in himself", heavily emphasizing Spinoza's substance monism. Indeed, according to Spinoza, God manifests an infinite essence (86) of which the physical is an attribute (86-87). Spinoza argues that: "There exists in the universe only one substance, and that is absolutely infinite (...)" (86), adding that: "extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God" (87). Thus, God manifests as an infinite presence of which physical nature is an attribute. Here, the statement of God being in all things similarly promotes God's presence in the physical world. Coleridge adds that this God is a "Great

universal Teacher” (“Frost at Midnight”). By suggesting that God is “universal”, the latter is perceived as infinite which simultaneously promotes Spinozan metaphysics. Indeed, according to the philosopher, God is infinite in essence (86). Thus, Coleridge is drawing on similar aspects by promoting God’s infinite substance alongside positing the material world as its attribute.

In “Hymn Before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni”, the connection between God and nature is similarly posited:

Ye lightnings, the dread arrows of the clouds!
Ye signs and wonders of the element!
Utter forth God, and fill the hills with praise! (“Hymn”)

Here, God is present in nature, where the latter has the potential to summon the divine. Indeed, it is nature which calls God forth, and not a transcendent deity that imbues life into nature. God is, therefore, perceived as an immanent force that is present in nature *causa sui*. This reflects Spinozan philosophy where nature and God are one, and the material world is its cause rather than propelled to life by a transcendent deity. In fact, Spinoza referred to God as the immanent, and not the transient cause of things (Spinoza 93). In the poem, because nature is able to utter forth God, this similarly suggests that the material world contains an immanent force rather than a transcendent God.

In “Hymn Before Sunrise”, the presence of a divine force within nature is simultaneously promoted through the recurring theme of music. In the poem, the theme of music promotes nature as being animated. Indeed, Coleridge compares the mountain to a “sweet beguiling melody” (“Hymn”). Drawing on music grants a lively and agentive quality to the mountain reinforcing the theme of immanence. Coleridge adds:

Awake my soul! Not only passive praise
Thou owest! Not alone these swelling tears,
Mute thanks and secret ecstasy! Awake,
Awake voice of sweet song! Awake, my heart, awake!
Green vales and icy cliffs, all join my Hymn (Ibid.)

As noted previously with nature summoning God, here, it is nature that calls forth music further indicating the lifelike quality inherent to the material world (Ibid.). Indeed, rather than

nature being a static recipient, it is perceived as agentive (Ibid.). Thus, the theme of music parallels the presence of the divine in the material world and the theme of immanence (Ibid.).

In “Frost at Midnight”, the material world is not depicted as inferior to the transcendent as seen in a Christian framework. Indeed, here, nature is perceived as having agency. In the first stanza, the frost “performs its secret ministry”, where nature is capable of action (“Frost at Midnight”). Thus, this suggests an immanent presence within nature. Furthermore, in the last stanza, frost is depicted as active again. Indeed, it creates icicles that shine to the moon (Ibid.). Thus, rather than being a passive recipient of God, nature is capable of action through an immanent divine presence. Here, a bird is said to “make a toy of thought” (Ibid.). This is because the human mind is self-absorbed, seeking a “mirror” (Ibid.). The material world is not misleading, where it is “thought” which is depicted as misleading. In addition, the bird enlivens the “idling spirit” where the material world is seen as informing the spiritual (Ibid.).

Further revealing Coleridge’s investment in Spinozan philosophy, in “Hymn Before Sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni”, Coleridge admits to having been led astray by the Christian faith – “the invisible alone” when he was “entranced in prayer” (“Hymn”). Indeed, it is the mountain that enables Coleridge to awaken his soul. He suggests that the peak “still present to the bodily sense” had previously vanished from his thoughts (Ibid.). However, it is the sight of this “bodily” entity that awakens his “soul” and “heart” (Ibid.). Here, Coleridge suggests the transcendent as leading him astray while the material allows him to connect with divinity. Thus, Spinozan philosophy is

4.3.2 Christian Philosophy

Although the poems do contain elements of Spinozan philosophy, they simultaneously integrate Christian ideals. Indeed, this is reflected in the presence of the Christian faith in the biblical lexical field: “ministry” “musings” “meditation” “old church-tower” “bells” “Spirit” “God” “eternity” “trances” (“Frost at Midnight”). In addition, in “Hymn Before Sunrise”, biblical elements similarly remain in the poem: “sovrain” “shrine” “prayer” “worshipped” “Soul” “Heaven” and “praise” (“Hymn”). Thus, although Spinozan elements are present in both poems, there are simultaneously Christian themes throughout the poems.

Further promoting the Christian system is the personification of God as seen through the pronouns: “himself” and “he” (“Frost at Midnight”). In addition, this God “utters” and is a “Teacher!” (Ibid.). Furthermore, he is able to “mould Thy spirit” (Ibid.). Thus, although God manifests in nature, he is also personified. In a similar line of thought, in “Hymn Before Sunrise” God is also personified. When speaking of nature, Coleridge asks: “Who made thee parent of perpetual streams?” (“Hymn”). Furthermore, this God is paralleled to a “chief” (Ibid.). According to McFarland, a Christian framework adopts an anthropomorphic conception of God (62). The poem thus integrates Christian elements alongside a Spinozan outlook of immanence. In fact, the presence of anthropomorphism reveals a Christian framework rather than one of immanence.

4.3.4 A Hauntological Reading of the Poems

In the poem, it is clear that Coleridge integrates both systems, adopting a Spinozan outlook of immanence alongside Christian elements. According to Critic Halmi, Coleridge’s attempts to convert Spinoza to Christianity throughout his lifetime (Halmi). He affirms that “The wistful hope of squaring the circle, so to speak, in a philosophically coherent and religiously satisfying way continued to manifest itself in Coleridge’s statements about Spinoza to the end of his life” (Ibid.). As observed, Spinozan philosophy in both poems is reconciled with an anthropomorphic God. However, suggesting that the circle must be squared in a “coherent” manner reveals an attempt to categorize the conflicting systems, suggesting that only what is cognitively intelligible is of value (Ibid.). By implying that literature must rationally “make sense”, its ability to evoke emotions in the reader is dismissed.

It is challenging to rationally understand or make sense of the opposing philosophies coinciding within these poems. In relation to what we cannot make sense of, Loevlie states that the unreadable amounts to moments when the text resists cognition (344). Thus, what we cannot rationally comprehend embodies the unreadable. Here, two ontological systems are promoted simultaneously. In the poems, it is clear that adopting opposing views alongside each other results in a language of unreadability. Indeed, by promoting both views simultaneously, our rationality is challenged where we cannot assign a final signified to the poem. Rather, its ontology hovers between the two opposing systems.

Loevlie suggests that witnessing literature's spectrality involves:

abandoning our ontological paradigm that only grants existence to that which is materially present and conceptually definable. This of course stirs our anxiety. But to endure this anxiety is to gain access to our own hauntology, to our own death, as it haunts our lives (348).

Thus, experiencing literature's spectrality may be of discomfort for us by pushing the boundaries through which we usually make sense of the world. Indeed, by consecutively promoting and rejecting the opposing ontological views simultaneously, a "grey area" is unveiled opting out of paradigmatic dichotomous modes of thought. This area is released from the confines of binaric reasoning, releasing the text's spectrality. It appears as though Halmi in admitting that Coleridge attempts to "square the circle" pursues to impose 'order over chaos' in suggesting that the system of Spinozism is moulded to fit into a Christian framework (Halmi). Literature, however, is not obliged to make rational sense or fit into neatly prescribed categories. In witnessing this haunting, we are invited as readers to witness the spectrality of these poems.

4.3.5 Hauntology of Time

In "Frost at Midnight", fragmented time frames challenge linear chronology reflecting the poem's spectrality. Revealing the disjointedness of time, in "Frost at Midnight", the protagonist is in a projection of the past and future. Indeed, the protagonist contemplates his past days as a schoolboy, where he felt trapped in school ("Frost at Midnight"). He adds that the sight of birds through the window would allow him to escape ("Frost at Midnight"). The in-betweenness is increasingly emphasised in the poem as the protagonist recalls memories from his country house to escape classroom hours. Thus, Coleridge recalls his days as a youth in school, where he ponders former days in the countryside. The overlapping of pasts enhances the notion that, in Derrida's words, there is "never an absolutely real-time" ("Spectrographies" 47). Indeed, we are caught in perpetual oscillation between past and present.

Further contributing to this oscillation in time, over the next stanza, the poem goes to

reflect on the future of the protagonist's son, suggesting that he will live in the country rather than the city:

But *thou*, my babe! Shalt wander like a breeze
By lakes and sandy shores, beneath the crags
Of ancient mountain, and beneath the clouds ("Frost at midnight")

Here, the protagonist is in a protention towards the future. This poem reflects on how our present moment is not static or linear. Indeed, it is caught between past and future, revealing a hauntological nature where past and future continuously overlap. In doing so, duality is challenged revealing the spectrality of our existence by embodying an in-between area.

4.4 "Dejection: an Ode": an Introduction

"Dejection: an Ode" is a poem written by Coleridge in 1802 and published in the *Morning Post* the same year (Thomson 217). The poem is addressed to Wordsworth's sister-in-law, Sarah Hutchinson, for whom Coleridge felt strongly (Fogle 71). In the work, Coleridge discusses his lack of creative inspiration, which is portrayed as painful. The absence of inspiration is paralleled to nature's inability to evoke emotions in him. Here, the writer turns to a Christian God, in whom he appears to find meaning. Critic Solomon F. Gingerich suggests that: "In the first stage he was a Necessitarian, and almost simultaneously a Unitarian, while in the second he became a Transcendentalist" (Gingerich 1-2). By Unitarianism, the critic is referring to Spinozan philosophy. The transition between the two systems takes place in the years 1778-1779 after Coleridge's visit to Germany (Gingerich 1). Here, the poem follows the transcendentalist framework as proposed by Gingerich. Strikingly, the poem contains numerous intertextual references to his earlier work "The Eolian Harp", refuting nature's ability to heal him. However, the poem nevertheless maintains that the physical world is of importance in alleviating his pain.

4.4.1 Christian Philosophy

In "Dejection: an Ode", Coleridge responds to Spinozan philosophy as promoted in "The Eolian Harp". In allusion to "The Eolian Harp", he draws on an Aeolian lute and states

in the first stanza of the lute's strings that it would be far "better" if these "were mute" ("Dejection: an Ode"). As seen previously in "The Eolian Harp", the instrument was identified as an embodiment of Spinozan monism. Coleridge affirming that it should be mute suggests a refutation of the monist philosophy. Further indicating scorn for the instrument, the poet later states of the musician "mad lutanist!" (Ibid.). Coleridge foregrounding the unreliability of the lute affirms a rejection of the theme of immanence as evidenced in "The Eolian Harp".

Contributing to this rejection of immanence, in "Dejection: an Ode", music is not inspired by nature, where, rather than being produced by the outer world, it is found within:

Ah! From the soul itself must issue forth
A light, a glory, a fair luminous cloud
 Enveloping the earth -
And from the soul itself must there be sent
A sweet and potent voice, of its own birth,
Of all sweet sounds the life and element! (Ibid.)

Here, it is the soul which calls forth music, and not nature as demonstrated in "The Eolian Harp". This posits the soul (and mind) as being superior to matter where it is capable of summoning music. Thus, it introduces a dualist vision where the soul is transcendent to the material world, imbuing life into the material.

Further reinforcing the departure from a Spinozan outlook, Coleridge states in the third stanza:

I may not hope from outward forms to win
The passion and the life, whose fountains are within (Ibid.)

Here, again, joy is found in the self rather than in the sensory world. In addition, Coleridge further addresses the material world as being ephemeral, stating: "in our life alone does nature live" (Ibid.). Nature is thus depicted as transient as noted through its limited span in human years. This finite view of nature conflicts with "The Eolian Harp" 's conception of the material world. Indeed, as noted previously, "the one life within us and abroad" promotes an infinite substance connecting both spiritual and material ("The Eolian Harp"). Thus, Coleridge dismisses this metaphysical perspective in the poem. Further suggesting a departure from a Spinozan system, the writer describes the sensory world as an "inanimate cold world",

in reference to his lack of inspiration (“Dejection: an Ode”). Again, this contradicts the agency found within nature as promoted in the previous poems. By suggesting nature is “inanimate”, Coleridge denies the possibility of immanence within nature (Ibid.).

Here, Coleridge is not appeased by the material world, maintaining that what humans require is “of higher worth” than what the material world is capable of providing (Ibid.). Indeed, it is spirit alone that is able to fulfil humans, where “passion and life” are found “within” (Ibid.). Contributing to the theme of Christianity, the last stanza of “Dejection: an Ode” adopts a biblical lexical field: “soul” “spirit” “wings” “rise” “from above” (Ibid.). Indeed, Christianity provides joy to the addressee of the poem Sara Hutchinson. Aiding her in this quest of happiness is the Christian faith, where the very “wings of healing” enable her “soul” and “spirit” to rise (Ibid.). Thus, Christianity is capable of granting peace and joy to Sarah Hutchinson.

4.4.2 Spinozan Philosophy

Significantly, alongside containing a dismissal of monist philosophy, the poem simultaneously integrates elements of Spinozan philosophy. Amid his sorrow, Coleridge admits that connecting with nature granted him happiness in the past (“Dejection: an Ode”). Furthermore, in the first stanza, when affirming that the aeolian lute should be mute, he simultaneously states that it is nature, i.e. the “gust” and “rain” which might allow him to “live” (Ibid.). Thus, nature is perceived as allowing the writer to reconnect with the inspiration he has lost. He adds that his grief finds no outlet in “word, or sigh, or tear”, implying that physical outlet is of significance in uplifting his mood (Ibid.). Thus, although the transcendent is what appears to be favoured by the writer, there nonetheless remains a longing for connection with the material world.

It is worth noting that this poem does not contain joy, whereas the poems endorsing Spinozan philosophy do. The grief, therefore, appears to be associated with the loss of connection to the material world as observed in nature. By the end of the poem, although Coleridge prays that Sarah Hutchinson may find peace, there is no resolution to the persona’s inner turmoil. His emotions are described as a painful “agony by torture” or “reality’s dark dream!” (Ibid.). Critic Fred Manning Smith asserts that: “In Wordsworth's Ode grief finds

relief and ends in joy; in Coleridge's, grief finds no relief and ends in dejection" (224). Thus, where the reader might expect a resolution, we are left to endure the painful predicament the narrator finds himself in associated with his loss of connection with the material world.

4.4.3 A Hauntological Reading

Although Christianity is endorsed as a philosophy throughout the poem, there is a longing for connection with the material world. Furthermore, Christianity is not perceived as alleviating the narrator's grief. This, therefore, suggests that the system is not fully satisfactory in alleviating Coleridge's pain or granting him joy. The oscillation between respective philosophical systems reveals hauntology. Indeed, here, doubt and uncertainty are prevalent where the protagonist embraces Christianity while longing for a more nature-oriented approach. Wolfreys suggests that: "the condition of haunting and spectrality is such – that one cannot assume coherence of identification or determination" (70). Thus, the spectral cannot be reduced to one singular meaning, appearing in between ontological categories. It is clear that Coleridge oscillates between diverging ontologies throughout "Dejection: an Ode" without resolving to 'take sides'. With a hauntological approach, concepts are not separated into clearly demarcated categories. Derrida rejects the binary of 'either/or' thinking within Western rational discourse (Ibid.). By promoting alternate views simultaneously, Coleridge equally challenges either/or thinking, endorsing both simultaneously.

Of significance here is the fact that the systems individually are not satisfying for the narrator. Indeed, belief in a transcendent God alone appears to provide Coleridge with grief as he longs for connection to nature and the material world. In the poem, it is the physical world that provides Coleridge with creative inspiration and joy, thus, dismissing this aspect not manifest as appealing to the narrator. However, the writer simultaneously requires a system enabling him to access "the passions and the life whose fountains are within" which is accessible through a transcendental system ("Dejection: an Ode"). It is apparent that Coleridge requires both systems to fulfil his intellectual and creative needs. Thus, his writing cannot be limited to one dogmatic system. Critic Morris affirms that: "nearly all Coleridge's work is held in suspension between idealist and realist tendencies" (Morris 51). In "Dejection: an Ode", this suspension is noted in the narrator's uncertainty, oscillating between the opposing views.

Literature is not obliged to make sense or take sides. Indeed, through its spectrality, it is able to create its own worlds and rules, maintaining freedom towards external reality (Loevlie 340). Blanco and Peeren suggest that rather than attempting to rid ourselves of what we do not cognitively understand, we should accept uncertainty as a metaphor for ontological instability (“Introduction: Conceptualizing Spectralities” 7). Thus, rather than resolving areas of ambiguity, these may be accepted as a reflection of that which escapes our cognition. As revealed in the poems, contradictions may occur, and there are simultaneously multiple ways of understanding and experiencing the world. As our lives contain contradictions, it appears pertinent that we allow ourselves to read literature accordingly. Thus, Coleridge’s poetry may be approached as he himself wrote, namely, namely, with an openness to the *in-betweenness* that our life embodies.

4.5. “The Eolian Harp” and “Dejection: an Ode”: Intertextuality and Haunting

The poems “The Eolian Harp” and “Dejection: an Ode”, due to their intertextuality, reveal hauntology. Indeed, “Dejection: an Ode” which is written 7 years after “The Eolian Harp”, refers back to the poem’s themes of wind and music. The former work additionally draws on the image of an “Æolian lute” in allusion to the earlier poem. Significantly, the winds which appear strong and pleasing in “The Eolian Harp” have eased in “Dejection: an Ode”. In the later poem, these elements are contrasted with the narrator’s lack of inspiration who wishes for the winds to reappear, as he is agonized by the “dull pain” that this silence induces in him (“Dejection: an Ode”).

In the poem, the absence of music and wind symbolises a loss of inspiration for the protagonist who wishes for these to reappear to enliven his soul:

Those sounds which oft have raised me, whilst they awed,
And sent my soul abroad,
Might now perhaps their wonted impulse give,
Might startle this dull pain, and make it move and live! (“Dejection: an Ode”)

Here, Coleridge longs to witness the music inspired by his love of nature as exhibited in “The Eolian Harp”. Indeed, he is torn by the lack of passion that he once felt toward nature. He states “this night so tranquil now will not go hence” in allusion to the music and winds which have eased (Ibid.). There is, therefore, a haunting of the elements of wind and music pervading in the later poem. Here, the elements which were previously pleasing are a source of grief.

Coleridge drawing on intertextual references suggests a disruption of time. Indeed, elements from the past persist in the future, impacting the protagonist years after their occurrence. Thus, time is not perceived as linear, where the present moment is in conversation with the past. This conception of time goes against the Judeo-Christian system which is in linear motion. Here, however, as the present moment is haunted by the past, present and past overlap. Derrida famously stated: “the future belongs to ghosts” (Spectrographies 37). In fact, the past is not limited to its occurrence in time but continues to affect us long after an event has taken place. In his *Specters of Marx*, Derrida refers to Marxism, and how the philosophy has persisted well after the death of Marx (4). Thus, time is spectral where past and future overlap. This is similar in the poem with past and future being in conversation.

Contributing to this disjointedness of time is the fact that the later poem “Dejection: an Ode” informs the reading of the earlier poem “The Eolian Harp”. Indeed, our reading of the earlier poem is affected by our knowledge of the emotional development noted in Coleridge. When reading “The Eolian Harp” with knowledge from the later work “Dejection: an Ode”, the reader already fears the narrator’s loss of joy and passion for nature that is to come. Thus, “Dejection: an Ode” which is the more recent work has the ability to impact our reading of the poem preceding it. The fact that a more recent poem has the ability to impact our reading of an older literary work suggests time is even more fragmented. Here, Derrida’s referring to time as being out of joint is relevant where linear chronology is shaken (*Specters of Marx* 1). Thus, the poems through their spectrality challenge linear chronology.

Further contributing to literature’s spectral nature, when acquainted with both poems, it becomes difficult to recognize where one work begins and where the other ends. Indeed, as suggested previously, the reading of the more recent poem is taken into a reading of the one preceding it. However, when reading “Dejection: an Ode” after “The Eolian Harp”, the reader cannot help but empathize with the narrator who has lost his artistic inspiration and passion

for nature so vividly painted in the former work. The poems' ontologies, therefore, overlap where the boundaries between them become porous. According to Blanco and Peeren, the spectre challenges our notion of "inheritance" ("Introduction: Conceptualizing Spectralities" 7). Indeed, the theorists add that the spectre does not have one clear origin but is diffuse in nature (10). Here, it is similar where the texts are not clearly demarcated and their identities overlap. Wolfrey states of literature that:

one is forced to concede, from the perspective of considering the notions of haunting and the spectral, that the idea of text is radically unstable. What constitutes text, textuality, as an identity is, in the final analysis, undecidable and irreducible to any formal description (73).

What Wolfrey means is that the text does not have a fixed or static identity as it is spectral. Here, it is clear that the poems' meanings rely on a reading which alters depending on the knowledge of the reader. Indeed, the poems are in conversation mutually contributing to each other's meanings. Thus, the text's ontology is in oscillation, where borders between the poems are porous.

Contributing to this spectrality, it becomes increasingly difficult to determine which poem is the "original" and which is the sequel. Indeed, "The Eolian Harp" which is written 7 years prior manifests in the later poem through intertextual references. Thus, the poems are in conversation through this literary device. Furthermore, "Dejection: an Ode" informs our reading of "The Eolian Harp", and vice versa. The poems, therefore, overlap where it becomes difficult to determine where one's ontology ends and the other begins. In addition, as linear time frames are collapsed, this makes the notion of an origin difficult to maintain. As the specter does not have one clear origin, but manifests as a haunting, it is clear that these works simultaneously maintain this characteristic. Thus, the overlapping observed suggests that there is not one original work where both inform each other, revealing their spectrality.

5. Ghosts of “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”: A Textual Analysis of the Poem

“The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” is Coleridge’s longest poem and was published in 1798 in his *lyrical Ballads*. The poem, along with others from this collection, mark a shift in British writing with a turn towards Romanticism. The work begins *in medias res* where the mariner stops a man who is on his way to a wedding ceremony in order to reveal his tale. The narrative functions as a confession in which the protagonist admits his wrongs seeking repentance. In the poem, the narrator’s killing of an albatross manifests as a consequence of his perceived superiority over nature. Indeed, the act does not manifest as self-defence, but rather, as a display of power. Thus, his actions are illustrative of his sense of entitlement. The preconceived superiority of man over nature is traced back to a dualist “I am” system of thought in which man is central in its hierarchy. Indeed, in the “I am” philosophical model, thought is superior to matter where man is accordingly of primary importance (McFarland 55; 62). Thus, if mankind is understood as superior to nature within an anthropocentric system, arises that man can assert dominance over the world around him/her. In the poem, this attempt at mastery over nature comes back to haunt the protagonist where he spends the remaining of his life repenting for his action.

In this section, I will start by providing an overview of the haunting of anthropocentric discourse on the mariner. Thereafter, the spectral elements are examined. Indeed, the unchronological time frames as evidenced through the *in medias res* narration suggests a disruption from linear storytelling. Here, a breaking down of conventional time frames suggests that we cannot attribute a clear origin to an event. Furthermore, the concepts of life and death are blurred on multiple occasions challenging their conception as binary opposites. Indeed, this blurring is brought up by a spectral entity who is called “life and death”, inhabiting a liminal space between these notions. Furthermore, the mariner himself manifests as somewhat dead and alive after being cursed by the spirit. Thus, binaries are challenged leaving space for a more nuanced understanding of our traditional ontological categories. The poem integrates many spectral elements as a challenge to dualistic discourse. I have chosen to analyze the poem on its own because it is much longer than the previous chosen works, thus, there is an ample amount of material to investigate. Furthermore, the poem encompasses the theme of the haunting of anthropocentrism that was not noted in the previous works. Because

this poem is investigated in relation to *Frankenstein* in a subsequent section, it is necessary to provide sufficient background information before investigating their intertextuality.

5.1 Anthropocentrism and Haunting

In the poem, the mariner's sense of mastery over nature stemming from the period's predominant "I am" mode of thought is apparent. Indeed, nature is depicted as untamed and overwhelming. The protagonist's shooting of the albatross, therefore, manifests as a way to tame nature's wilderness. The Western dominant, according to McFarland is based on an "I am" mode of thought (55-56). Within this system, thought and matter are placed in binaric opposition where spirit is superior to matter (55). In accordance, external reality is promoted as unreliable and deceptive (Ibid.). Within such a system of binaries, hierarchies arise, manifested in thought as being superior to matter. In the "I am" system, God reveals himself as anthropocentric where mankind is perceived as predominant in its hierarchy. In the poem, this system of anthropocentrism has repercussions on the protagonist who after slaying an albatross becomes haunted by his actions. This section argues that the haunting of the mariner results from his entitlement over nature as stemming from an "I am" mode of thought. Furthermore, the haunting confronts the character with his actions, enabling him to learn from his ways.

In the poem, nature is depicted as wild and fierce. Indeed, promoting this, the ship the mariner is travelling on is initially caught in a storm that takes the boat off its course. Here, the storm is described as "tyrannous and strong", leading the crew to an icy and frozen landscape (line 42).² Furthermore, the arctic region is hostile, where it "cracked and growled, and roared and howled" (lines 61-62). Thus, nature appears to be powerful and overwhelming. As the ship departs from the icy regions, it sails to warmer climates, where the sun is scorching hot. Here, there is no more water to drink, and the crew is "baked" (line 157). Thus, it appears that humans are at nature's mercy and cannot master it. Further suggesting nature's sovereignty over man is the fact that because of the winds, the ship sails without the interference of sailors. Indeed, it is the storm that navigates the boat towards the icy landscapes. Furthermore, it is also the winds that direct the ship toward the scorching tropical

² This chapter refers to the lines of the poem and not the pages as the poem is divided into lines.

climate. Thus, where man is powerless in navigating the boat, nature has the ability to do so, promoting nature's power over man.

Further contributing to nature's sovereignty, the albatross in the poem is simultaneously perceived as containing Godlike qualities. Upon first seeing the creature, it becomes perceived as a good omen. Indeed, the bird is first spotted in the arctic region after the crew has seen no form of life in what appears to be a long time. The bird is fed, and hailed as a "God", suggesting its inherent power (line 66). It is only after the albatross's arrival that the ice splits while winds reappear enabling the ship to sail again (lines 69-71). Thus, the albatross is able to alter the topographical landscape. The importance attributed to the albatross further enforces nature's power over man.

Man's attempt at dominating nature is demonstrated in the poem. Here, the narrator admits to shooting the albatross, although no apparent reason for his crime is given. Indeed, the bird is slain on the ship while "perched" on the vessel (line 76). Thus, it is the narrator's sense of entitlement over nature that accounts for the creature's death. Although there is no apparent cause for the albatross's death, it appears to be enacted as a way for the narrator to control that which surpasses him. Indeed, if humans are superior to nature, it becomes legitimate to interfere and assert one's dominance. Here, as humans are at the mercy of nature's grandeur, the mariner's killing of the albatross becomes a means for taming that which surpasses him.

After the incident, the rest of the crew is grief-stricken, suggesting that the bird's death will curse the ship. The mariner asserts:

And I had done a hellish thing,
And it would work 'em woe:
For all averred, I had killed the bird
That made the breeze to blow.
Ah wretch! said they, the bird to slay,
That made the breeze to blow! (lines 91-96)

Here, the protagonist realizes the severity of his actions and their consequence on the wind. Throughout the rest of the poem, the death of the albatross returns to haunt the narrator. Firstly, after the creature's death, the winds navigate the boat near the Pacific, where the sun becomes "bloody", leaving its members in scorching heat with no drinking water. It is further

suggested that several of the sailors believe they are cursed and followed by a spirit “From the land of mist and snow” (line 134). The ship’s crew hang the fallen albatross to hang on the mariner’s neck instead of a cross so as to remind him of his predicament. Further promoting his plight, the ship is visited by a spirit called Death who kills all the sailors except for the mariner. Thus, ensuing the mariner shooting the albatross, his life becomes a sequence of unfortunate circumstances.

Of significance, it is only after the mariner notices the beauty of the sea snakes that he once described as “slimy things” (line 125) that the curse eases:

O happy living things! no tongue
Their beauty might declare:
A spring of love gushed from my heart,
And I blessed them unaware:
Sure my kind saint took pity on me,
And I blessed them unaware.

The self-same moment I could pray;
And from my neck so free
The Albatross fell off, and sank
Like lead into the sea.
(lines 282-291)

Thus, it is the mariner’s realization of the beauty of the sea snakes and his prayer ensuing this understanding that leads to the albatross falling off his neck. Here, it is respect towards animals that were previously despised that lessen the character’s haunting. Furthermore, after admitting the beauty of the animals, the winds appear again, and the spirits of the crew re-emerge as spectral entities to navigate the ship back to their home (lines 327-340). Through his haunting, the protagonist, therefore, learns a valuable life lesson and, although only temporarily, redeems himself.

According to Blanco and Peeren, the spectral can see us without being seen, demanding responsibility (“The Spectral Turn/Introduction” 33). Thus, in addition to introducing an alternative ontology, the spectral simultaneously reveals an ethics (Ibid.). Here, it is clear that this aspect of spectrality is enacted where the mariner is made to see the error of his ways and repent for his actions. Indeed, the character realizes the severity of his actions, and appears mortified when recounting his story to the wedding guest:

God save thee, ancient Mariner!
From the fiends, that plague thee thus! - Why look'st thou so? (lines 79-81)

Thus, the character appears tormented by his actions. The mariner, therefore, appears to have learned a lesson, as the curse eases upon him when treating animals with respect.

Despite the temporary shift in luck noted after the character admits the beauty of the sea snakes, the protagonist remains forced to take responsibility for his actions. Upon arriving in his homeland, the character witnesses his vessel whirl to the bottom of the ocean (lines 556-557). Furthermore, when the mariner is saved by a pilot and his son, the pilot screams with fright when seeing the mariner (line 560). And, more significantly, the protagonist is left to wander the earth telling his deathly tale, thus remaining under the spell of the spirit Life-in-Death (lines 582-585). The fact that he is left to confess his tale for the remaining of his life suggests that he must take further responsibility for his actions, repenting for his wrongs. This, therefore, suggests the character's haunting reveals an ethical aspect as advocated by Blanco and Peeren ("The Spectral Turn/Introduction" 33).

The mariner manifests as a spectral figure, haunting others so that they may learn from his mistakes. Indeed, the character is haunted by his sense of entitlement over nature stemming from the discourse of anthropocentrism of his time. Thus, the character manifests as a spectre urging others to learn from his mistakes. This reveals Blanco and Peeren's notion of the spectre as having an ethical aspect of accountability (Ibid.). As anthropocentrism was dominant in Coleridge's time, the mariner is able to spread his knowledge to others who may be reproducing this discourse. The tale concludes with the wedding guest becoming "sadder", but also "wiser" upon hearing the mariner's tale (line 625). Thus, the story is able to impart wisdom to its audience, where the guest becoming "sadder" reflects change and growth. Indeed, while acknowledging our actions are unethical or hurtful may be challenging, the wisdom gained from the realization is worthy of our efforts.

5.2 Ontological Quivering: Life and Death

In the poem, the binaries of life and death are transgressed, promoting spectral ontology. Indeed, the mariner manifests as spectral, embodying traits of life and death

simultaneously. Thus, the poem's ontology, rather than adhering to binaric categories, reveals an in-between space. Promoting this, the mariner's life becomes haunted by death. Indeed, throughout the narrative, the protagonist witnesses multiple deaths. The first death the mariner observes is that of the albatross. In addition, the narrator is the only survivor on the ship, where all the crew members and his nephew are executed in front of him. The mariner states that: "four times fifty living men" are executed (line 216), after which he is left in "agony" (line 235). Thus, it is apparent that the protagonist has dealt with multiple troubling experiences of death.

Furthermore, cursing the crew are two spectral spirits visiting the ship. Indeed, the narrator claims of one of them: "A spirit had followed them, one of the invisible inhabitants of this planet, neither departed souls nor angels [...]" (93-94³). This introduces a ghostly image in the Derridean sense, where the spirit is of this world, and simultaneously spirit. Indeed, the concept of hauntology challenges our reliance on binaries in creating meaning. Here, the spectral spirit, like Derrida's ghost, is both invisible, and of this world. Thus, the ontological categories of material and spiritual are transgressed, inhabiting an in-between space. Furthermore, the spirit is referred to as a "spectre-woman" who is called "Life-in-Death" (line 194). The spectre's name thus reveals an ontology quivering between life and death. This spirit is accompanied by another named Death (line 96). In the poem, while the latter spirit curses the crew with death, Life-in-Death wins a game of dice against Death, and bestows upon the mariner an ordeal that resonates with her name, namely, a deathly life (lines 196-198). Thus, the spirit's name comes to embody the ordeal of the narrator throughout the narrative.

It is revealing that after this encounter, the mariner's life is haunted by death. Indeed, as mentioned above, he witnesses two hundred deaths upon the arrival of the spirits. Furthermore, contributing to his initiation with death, the protagonist appears to have a ghostly appearance, frightening those who look at him. Suggesting this, the pilot screams upon the mariner opening his mouth (line 560). Furthermore, the wedding guest is frightened when speaking to him (line 345). In addition, even the mariner's boat looks dead, where its planks are "warped" (line 528), and sails are "thin" and "sere" (line 530). Thus, the mariner

³ Page numbers are referenced here as this is Coleridge's commentary included in the poem. In this section, when line numbers are omitted, numbers in parantheses indicate the pages of the poetry collection.

appears to carry death with him. Further contributing to his ghostly appearance, the character is now an “ancient” (line 1) and “skinny” man (line 9) with grey hair (line 619). Thus, his appearance itself is deathly. Strikingly, after his encounter with “Life-in-Death”, the character is made to spend the remaining of his life repenting for his actions by revealing his deathly story. Indeed, the mariner suggests that when his “agony” returns, he must find someone to tell his tale to (line 583). Thus, his life’s purpose is to tell a tale of death.

This notion of life as being permeated by death reveals hauntology. Indeed, in the poem, life and death are not perceived as binaries. Rather, the two overlap. According to Derrida, our Western philosophical system is governed by binaries (Loevlie 339). The concept of hauntology, however, attempts to draw attention to that which lies in between our clearly demarcated ontological categories (Loevlie 337). Loevlie suggests that: “Hauntology questions (or haunts!) its homophone concept ontology as it attempts to indicate that which moves insistently in-between being and non-being, existence and death” (Ibid.). Thus, hauntology is found in-between our clearly delineated ontological categories. Here, Coleridge, by promoting life and death as overlapping, does not perceive the terms in opposition to each other. Here, both characteristics do not contradict one another, rather, the mariner’s ontology oscillates between the two categories.

Contributing to the mariner’s hauntological nature, there are numerous questions left unanswered as to the protagonist's identity. We understand that many years have passed since the events he recounts. Indeed, he appears to be very old, yet, we do not know how old he is. Because of his spectral characteristics and his curse by Life-in-Death, there is a possibility that he is a spectral figure himself. Contributing to his spectral nature, the character is a nomad, leaving at the whim of his story needing to be told (line 583). His existence is such that we cannot pin him down. This incertitude as to his identity reveals hauntology, where we cannot attribute a final signified to his person. Thus, his nature cannot be apprehended by our ontological categories of being and non-being. The mariner’s existence, like that of a ghost, defies categorization, exceeding our binaries of life and death. Rather, he roams in between.

Contributing to the character’s embodying of death, when conveying his tale, there is a death that occurs in those addressed. Indeed, we learn that they become “wiser” but also “sadder” after hearing his story (line 624). Thus, it appears as though there is a death that occurs within them, where grief suggests a sense of loss. However, the same story is

simultaneously able to give rise to something new, as seen through the wisdom gained. Thus, although there is a “death”, there is simultaneously a “rebirth”. Thus, it is possible to have opposing characteristics present at once. The co-existence of these categories suggests their interconnectedness, where the two do not exclude each other. Indeed, rather than functioning in opposition to each other, they contribute to each other, where “death” is able to give “birth” to life, as seen in a new knowledge imparted. Thus, rather than being polar opposites, the notions are two sides of the same coin, informing each other.

In the poem, the “ghosts” do not require a resolution. Indeed, the mariner’s curse is not resolved where he remains haunted although repenting for his wrongs and learning from his mistakes. According to Blanco and Peeren, the ghost should be sustained and lived with rather than negated (“Introduction: Conceptualizing Spectralities” 7). Here, the curse pervades despite the mariner atoning for his actions. Contributing to the pervading presence of ghosts, there are many questions left unanswered in the poem. Indeed, the protagonist’s identity cannot be determined, as we are unsure as to whether he has become a spectral spirit, or is still human. Furthermore, there are simultaneously contradictions, as seen in the narrator providing his listeners with both loss and gain through his tale. The ghost, therefore, becomes an embodiment of that which surpasses rationalization and categorization. Here, rather than attempting to rid ourselves of that which surpasses our cognition, accepting and leaving space for it reveals the hauntology of the poem.

5.3 Spectrality of the Poem

According to Loevlie, literature is spectral as it is not in direct relation to external reality (340). Indeed, it has the ability to conjure images that do not exist, challenging empirical ontology (340). In line with this, “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” is similarly able to challenge empirical ontology. Indeed, the poem we are reading is a ghost story including supernatural elements. Indicating this are the spirits of Death and Life-in-Death who haunt the protagonist in part III. Furthermore, in the narrative, many supernatural elements occur, such as the sinking ship which spins in circles to the bottom of the ocean (line lines 556-557), or the crew returning from the dead to steer his ship (lines 331-340). Contributing to these supernatural elements, as noted previously, the mariner manifests as a

ghostly character, frightening those who look at him. Thus, the poem ruptures with empirical ontology where it is free to create its own reality.

According to Loevlie, literature evokes worlds that are not empirically accessible, being free of reference toward external reality (340). Thus, the spectral is not limited in its relationality to our reality. Here, it is clear that this is enacted by the poem promoting images that do not exist in our reality. Indeed, the poem's supernatural elements reveal its disconnectedness from external reality where it has the ability to create its own world. Literature, however, alongside being free of referentiality to external reality simultaneously has the ability to evoke worlds in us, by promoting vivid sensory details (Loevlie 336). Indeed, as readers, we visualize what we are reading. Thus, when reading the poem, we see a mariner, and the rich landscapes described. Literature's ontology is therefore in-between the material and the transcendent.

In addition, contributing to literature being free of reference towards external reality, characters themselves are spectral. According to Wolfrey:

We 'believe' in the characters, assume their reality, without taking into account the extent to which those figures or characters are, themselves, textual projections, apparitions if you will, images or phantasms belonging to the phantasmatic dimension of fabulation ("Preface: On Textual Haunting" 73)

Thus, when reading literature, we assume the characters to be real. Indeed, in my own analysis I have referred to the protagonist's immoral act of killing the albatross, or his pain thereafter. However, although it may appear that characters are real, and although we read them as such, they are spectral. Thus, these characters are themselves spectral, their ontology originating from an imagined space free from relation to our external reality.

Further contributing to the poem's spectrality is the fact the poem we are reading is not an objective representation of the events that have taken place. Indeed, the information we are given is an account of what has happened many years prior to the narration. This is apparent in the mariner's old age where we understand that a long time has passed since the events have occurred. As a result, the information divulged may have "holes", where events may have been forgotten. Thus, the information we are receiving is not an objective portrayal of events, but a narrative that has shifted with time. Contributing to the unreliability of sources, we learn that the mariner appears to be troubled emotionally, having been through

traumatic events. Indeed, the protagonist's mere appearance frightens others. This suggests that the narrator is unreliable and we cannot fully trust all that is being told.

The unreliability of narration relates to the spectral's dismissal of the origin (Blanco and Peeren "Introduction: Conceptualizing Spectralities" 10). In fact, Blanco and Peeren suggest that the spectre is disconnected from one clear and distinct origin ("Introduction: Conceptualizing Spectralities" 10). This is because the spectre is undefinable and challenges categorization. This disconnectedness from an origin is visible in the poem where the narrator does not manifest as a reliable source of information. Indeed, the narration loses its reference from a reliable narrator as source where we do not trust all the information divulged as the narrator appears to be unstable. Further promoting this unreliability, the events have occurred many years ago suggesting that elements may have been forgotten. Thus, the narrator's status as authoritative over a text is rejected. The text, therefore, becomes disconnected from a definable "source" that the author embodies. Rather than being dependent on the speaker, the narrative comes to occupy an in-between space without a clear origin. Through the narrator's unreliability, the poem's hauntology is therefore increasingly demonstrated.

Further contributing to the rejection of the origin, it is symbolic that the events we are reading are narrated by a phantom-like character. Indeed, the narrative finds its "origin" in a deathly figure. Thus, the narrator, being spectral, is not 'alive'. Furthermore, not only is the narrator spectral, but what he conveys is a spectral story. Indeed, the mariner reveals a tale of a deathly life. Thus, his tale itself becomes spectral, embodying life and death simultaneously. The work's spectrality is therefore increasingly emphasised, revealing a spectral story narrated by a spectral figure.

6. Ghosts of *Frankenstein*: A Textual Analysis of the Novel

As in Hamlet, the Prince of a rotten State, everything begins by the apparition of a specter. More precisely, by the waiting for this apparition. The anticipation is at once impatient, anxious, and fascinated: this, the thing ("this thing") will end up coming. The revenant is going to come. (Derrida *Specters of Marx* 4)

Frankenstein is a Romantic canonical work written in 1818. Four years ago, the novel celebrated its 200-year anniversary and has a status as a classic in the Western canon. Infused with elements of the Gothic, it tells the story of a scientist who disowns his creature and is made to face the consequences of his actions after disowning the creature he himself has created. The novel has been investigated in numerous forms in the past. However, it has not been examined through a hauntological lens as a response to our dualist paradigm. Drawing on hauntological themes, therefore, provides a new reading to the novel. The novel is also investigated in light of Coleridge's "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner", drawing on the numerous intertextual references and similar themes of haunting the two works posit.

Shelley's novel lends itself well to a hauntological reading. Here, like the mariner, the protagonist is haunted as a result of his actions. In fact, his being haunted by the creature manifests as a consequence of disowning the creature, introducing an ethical aspect of accountability. Further revealing hauntology, the frames of narration dislocate the notion of an origin, promoting the novel's spectrality. Lastly, Shelley was inspired by Coleridge as a writer and maintains numerous intertextual references to "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner". This intertextuality is visible when Walton suggests that he will not kill an albatross (10). Furthermore, the poem "Rime" is quoted by the protagonist the morning after he has created the creature (41). The use of intertextuality suggests a haunting of the poem in the novel where it becomes difficult to distinguish the works from each other. Thus, their ontological boundaries become porous, challenging categorization.

6.1 Anthropocentrism and Haunting

In *Frankenstein*, the perceived superiority of humans as stemming from an "I am" mode of thought is exhibited by the protagonist's altering of nature to fit his own needs.

Indeed, the scientist takes on the role of God in an attempt to create a perfect creature as a parallel to the creation of Adam. Furthermore, the narrator does not hesitate to rid himself of obstacles in his way. Indeed, he kills animals and pillages graveyards to meet his ends (36). Thus, the protagonist shows little respect for other life forms in the process. As in “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”, Frankenstein’s altering of nature and determination to meet his goals promotes his perceived superiority over nature as stemming from the period’s predominance of the “I am” mode of thought. Within this paradigm, humanity has a privileged place in its hierarchy, where animals and nature are inferior. Thus, this enables the protagonist to alter his surroundings for personal gain, disregarding harm invoked on non-human species in the process.

In this section, the theme of anthropocentrism expressed in the characters of Walton and Frankenstein is demonstrated. Thereafter, the protagonist’s haunting is examined as a consequence of his entitled behaviour revealing the larger discourse of anthropocentrism of his time. As hauntology introduces an ethical element, Victor’s haunting by the creature reveals a moral aspect, urging him to learn from his actions. In fact, at times, the character appears to have gained wisdom by admitting the errors of his ways. He acknowledges the dangers of excess ambition (22) and the importance of nature in healing (38). However, by the end of the narrative, he still affirms that the creature must perish (185). Furthermore, the scientist also praises grand ambitions of progress (183). Thus, his being continuously haunted by the creature reveals that he has not yet changed his ways. This section argues that Frankenstein’s entitlement over nature stemming from the anthropocentric discourse of his time results in his haunting. Furthermore, the haunting simultaneously integrates an ethical aspect urging the protagonist to change his ways.

In the Renaissance and throughout the 1800s, the prevalent discourse held that thought rather than action was responsible for development (Butler xxxv). Thus, the idea that the mind is superior to the material reveals a dualist “I am” system. During this time, the conquest of new territories was justified in the name of progress (Ibid.). Revealing the assumed superiority of humanity, the first character we are introduced to in the narrative is Robert Walton who is on an expedition towards the north. The character suggests that the reason for his departure is to: “discover the wondrous power which attracts the needle; and may regulate a thousand celestial observations, that require only this voyage to render their

seeming eccentricities consistent for ever” (6). Thus, Walton is portrayed as overly ambitious, travelling to discover a universal truth as demonstrated by his wish for eternal consistency.

The search for truth and development are central themes in the novel. Walton embodies notions of progress, desiring to discover new lands for the sake of knowledge. The character adds: “I shall satiate my ardent curiosity with the sight of a part of the world never before visited, and may tread a land never before imprinted by the foot of man” (Ibid.). Man’s urge to conquer nature is made evident through Walton’s desire for visiting lands never before claimed by humans. In fact, his referring to land as never having been imprinted suggests a view that nature can be owned. Thus, this simultaneously reveals anthropocentrism and man’s authority over nature with a desire to assert dominance.

In the novel, Robert Walton and Victor Frankenstein mirror each other, the latter being similarly ambitious and driven. Frankenstein initially claims to be inspired by scientists who have “unlimited powers”, being able to “command the thunders of heaven, mimic the earthquake, and even mock the invisible world with its own shadows” (30-31). There is thus a similar attempt at mastering nature. He adds that he wishes to create a great and complex being like man (35). His assertion that man is the most appealing of creatures suggests their superior status. In addition, his assumed superiority is further exhibited in his attempt of taking on the role of God by giving life to the creature. The creature later suggests that he ought to have been his creator’s Adam (77). Thus, this reveals Victor’s attempt at impersonating God. Both Walton and Frankenstein possess similar ambitious traits with grand visions of progress, revealing the anthropocentric discourse of their time as stemming from a dualist “I am” mode of thought.

Revealing contempt for non-human species, when the creature is finally conceived, Victor is appalled, regarding it as a monstrosity (39). He calls his creation a “wretch”, which is how it comes to be referred to throughout the narrative (39). The protagonist engages in a lengthy description of the creature in which he is repulsed, referring to it as “horrid” (Ibid.). Throughout the course of the novel, although the creature wishes to socialize with its creator, the latter refuses to do so (77). Thus, although giving birth to a new life form, he refuses to care for it and provide it with basic needs.

In the narrative, the first and only instance the creature and Frankenstein have a lengthy discussion is when they meet on the summit of Montanvert in France (76). Here,

Victor, upon his father's request, embarks on a trip to the countryside with his family so that they may alleviate their spirits after the deaths they have endured (72). By this time, both William, Victor's brother, and Justine, his housekeeper, have died at the hands of the creature. As the protagonist wanders the mountains alone to gather his thoughts, the creature finds him on the summit (76). The latter admits that if his needs for companionship are met, he will be virtuous again and stop killing the scientist's relatives (78). The creature further admits to feeling lonely and being rejected both by its creator and mankind (78). Following their conversation, although reluctantly, the scientist agrees to create a companion for the creature (122). In exchange for his service, Victor requests that it stay in exile from humans until its death (122).

It is significant that the creature's reasons for having a bride are more humane than the scientist's. Butler suggests that: "Frankenstein's reluctance to marry Elizabeth when the question is raised contrasts with the eagerness of the Creature to have Frankenstein make him a mate" (xliv). In fact, from a young age, it is decided by his parents that Victor will marry Elizabeth who has lived with him growing up as his sister (158). Of significance, on his wedding night, Victor awaits the creature, delaying going to bed with his new bride Elizabeth (165). The creature, however, admits to wanting a bride for companionship and comfort (120). Thus, Victor's delaying going to bed with Elizabeth on the night of his wedding contrasts with the creature's longing for companionship and support. Furthermore, the scientist eventually severs the body of the creature's companion before completing it (139). Thus, his refusal of granting social needs to the creature becomes contrasted with his own marriage. Here, the creature appears more humane than the scientist who shows no empathy.

Contributing to the othering of the creature, it is significant that it is not named throughout the entire narrative. In fact, it is repeatedly referred to as a "wretch" (56), "dæmon" (Ibid.) or "devil" (77), among other names. The non-naming of the creature, therefore, illustrates its dehumanization on a general level, anticipating its treatment by Frankenstein and the rest of mankind. Further emphasising the creature's subordination to humanity is the use of narration. In the novel, there are three narrators, as we are reading Walton's account of Frankenstein's story. However, there are moments when the creature recounts its narrative. Thus, in these instances, we are reading Walton's relaying of Frankenstein's account of the creature. His place as a third narrator is symbolic, as the

creature is given a voice through two humans. The narrative frame, therefore, reveals the creature's lower status on the hierarchical scale, with humans maintaining a privileged place.

According to Fred Botting, Gothic writing is a discourse that brings to light the dark aspects of modernity (2). In fact, the origins of the gothic are both political and aesthetic (Riquelme 586). Riquelme suggests that: "The refusal of conventional limits and the critical questioning of cultural attitudes often proceed within a gothic structuring of elements [...]" (Riquelme 589). Thus, the Gothic genre questions normative values within a culture. Here, the discourse of anthropocentrism is revealed through the protagonist's entitled behaviour, neglecting the creature by refusing to give it companionship, a name, or a voice. These actions are what lead to the haunting the protagonist faces throughout the narrative.

Revealing the dramatic sequence of events the character faces, firstly, on the night of the creature's birth, the narrator has nightmares of his half-cousin Elizabeth dying (39). In this dream, the protagonist kisses his cousin whose lips become livid, dying in his arms (39). Although this death does not take place in reality, it foreshadows the dark events to come. The first death Frankenstein is confronted with is that of his brother William (52) after which he is devastated (53). Ensuing this death, the creature tricks the village into thinking that Justine Moritz, a faithful family servant, is responsible for the murder by placing William's pendant in her pocket. Justine is then sentenced to death as she is pleaded guilty. Proceeding this sequence of events, the narrator's best friend Henry Clerval is murdered by the creature, as is his wife Elizabeth. In addition, Victor's father dies of grief on hearing of his niece's death (168). Thus, the deaths caused by the creature manifest as the creature's haunting of the protagonist.

The excessive remorse expressed by the narrator as a result of the multiple deaths similarly manifests as an aspect of haunting. The protagonist, on countless occasions, refers to his overwhelming guilt. Upon discovering his brother William's death, he feels extreme culpability about having placed the creature into the world (57). In fact, the night he understands the creature is responsible for William's murder, he is unable to sleep due to his fear of the creature striking more victims (57). Despite the cold and rain, all the narrator can think of is the horror that is unleashed on mankind because of his actions (Ibid.). Furthermore, after Justine is sentenced to death, Victor refers to himself as the true murderer (68). Here, he describes a sense of despair to the point of physical illness, revealing a feeling of having a worm inside his chest (Ibid.). His guilt, therefore, haunts the protagonist throughout his life as

a consequence of his rejecting the creature.

The haunting exhibited throughout the novel manifests as a result of Frankenstein's entitled behaviour towards a non-human life form, introducing an element of accountability. According to Blanco and Peeren, the spectral introduces an ethical aspect by demanding responsibility (33). This aspect of accountability is established through the element of haunting, confronting the protagonist to face the error in his ways. In the narrative, this haunting is expressed physically through the multiple deaths, and emotionally through the protagonist's excessive remorse. As the concept of hauntology is both physical and spiritual, transgressing dualities, here, the element of haunting conforms with these aspects.

At times, it appears as though the protagonist has learned the lessons he is made to face through his haunting. In fact, Frankenstein suggests that his passion arose from dark places, revealing that excess ambition is destructive (22). Furthermore, he later warns Walton to "Seek happiness in tranquillity, and avoid ambition" (186). He simultaneously suggests that he forgot to appreciate nature and its beauty when creating the creature as he was too engrossed in his project (38). Here, Victor reveals nature's importance in alleviating and healing the mind. Thus, it occasionally appears as though Frankenstein has learned from his mistakes.

Although the protagonist occasionally admits his errors, he nonetheless commits the same faults. Although praising modesty and admitting that ambition is deceptive (37), by the end of the narrative, the protagonist makes a grandiose speech to Walton and his crew (183). Here, he suggests that they sail further north despite the perilous climate (Ibid.). He adds that facing danger is heroic although putting the lives of many men at risk (Ibid.). By pressuring the crew in a deathly direction for the sake of honour and prestige, he appears not to have learned from his ways. In fact, it is this very trait of ambition that leads the character to create the creature. Thus, he is repeating the same mistakes. Furthermore, the creature remains unnamed, being called numerous derogatory terms until the very end of the narrative. By the end of the narrative, the narrator still believes that the creature must die, where the task is bestowed upon Walton on Frankenstein's death bed (185). Victor's last wish suggests he has not yet realised that his own actions have led to the disastrous consequences of his life.

In terms of the entitlement of humans towards non-human species, the scientist is not the only one to mistreat the creature. In fact, it is shunned on multiple occasions. Indicating this, shortly after its birth, the creature finds comfort in secretly observing a cottage consisting

of an elderly blind father, son and daughter. It provides the family with firewood, leaving it by their home for some time (88). After introducing himself to what it believes are its friends, the creature is beaten by the son who believes it is attacking his father (110). Thus, although treating these with kindness, it is not accepted in the household and is met with aggression. Furthermore, shortly after this occurrence, the creature saves a young girl from drowning in a stream, after which it is shot in the shoulder by her father (115). Thus, it is not only the scientist who exhibits degrading and violent behaviour towards the creature, but others as well.

Walton's mirroring of the protagonist suggests that the former's behaviour is not limited to him only as a character. Throughout the narrative, Walton admires Victor, frequently referring to his manners as "elevated and gentle", even after being acquainted with his story (179). Critic Marilyn Butler suggests that: "For all their superficial differences, the novel's acknowledged scientists are two of a kind – a fact signalled by Walton's immature admiration for Frankenstein [...]" (xxxv Butler). Thus, the two possess similar ambitious traits with grand visions of progress and development. Walton and Frankenstein's similar views of entitlement reveal that these characteristics are not limited to them only. Rather, the mistreatment of non-human species is a tendency throughout society, manifesting as a result of anthropocentric discourse.

The haunting by the creature results from the prevalence of anthropocentrism in Shelley's time and the perceived superiority of humans over non-human species. Indeed, the creature manifests as a spectre of the Gothic genre, bringing to the forefront the "dark side" of our culture (Riquelme 585). Where the "I am" paradigm derived from dualistic discourse enables humans to employ nature in a way that they deem fit for personal gain, this does not come without its consequences. This manifests in the many deaths the protagonist must face and his ensuing guilt. Because Walton and Frankenstein have similar traits of progress and ambition, the 'lesson' to be learned is not restricted to the protagonist only. In fact, many characters reject the creature. Thus, the haunting by the creature manifests as a challenge to 19th-century anthropocentric discourse, as stemming from an "I am" system of thought.

6.2 Spectrality of the Text: Dislocation of the “Origin”

In the novel, the use of unreliable narration suggests a rejection of the origin. Indeed, through the literary device, the text becomes disconnected from a source as seen in the narrator. A hauntological framework rejects the notion of an origin as a singular and identifiable point of reference (Blanco and Peeren “The Spectral Turn/Introduction” 32). As the spectral challenges a clear origin, the use of unreliability similarly problematizes the text’s inheritance in a narrator. Thus, the text becomes spectral, being detached from an origin as revealed in the narrator. Furthermore, the use of overlapping narrators makes it difficult to determine where one narrative begins, and the other ends. Instead, the three narratives overlap with each other, where the characters’ testimonies are given through another voice than their own. Thus, the notion of a clear origin becomes further problematized, as the narrative finds its origin in multiple overlapping sources. This section argues that by problematizing the notion of the origin, the text becomes spectral, being disconnected from a source.

Promoting the unreliability of narration is the novel’s frame, being relayed through a first-person perspective. Here, rather than having an omniscient narrator who is aware of all facts, we are limited to the protagonist’s inner world and perspective. Abrams suggests that the first-person perspective is dependent on the narrator’s experience and what they know (242). Because the narrative is conveyed through the first-person point of view, the events we read are limited to the protagonist's perspective. Thus, we know that all that is narrated may not be reliable.

Further suggesting this unreliability, after we are given the creature’s account of its life, we mistrust Frankenstein. In fact, after gaining insight into the creature’s perspective, we see the narrator in a new light. Initially, we only see the creature through the eyes of the protagonist. Here, it is referred to through derogatory terms such as “wretch” (56) or “devil” (77). Furthermore, it is depicted as dangerous, deprived of humanity and emotional depth. Upon the scientist’s realization that the creature is most likely the culprit of his brother William’s death, the creature is deprived of humanity. However, after witnessing the creature’s narration in chapters three to nine, we realize how deceptive Victor’s account is. We learn that the latter does not have compassion for the creature, nor does he realize his part in caring for it. Furthermore, we also understand that the creature is not a monster as was previously suggested, but has emotional depth. In fact, its reason for killing is because it has

been rejected countless times by mankind. Thus, after reading the creature's version of events, we learn that the protagonist's narration is not fully reliable.

Contributing to the unreliability observed, Frankenstein admits to recording events. He states: "Remember I am not recording the visions of a madman. The sun does not more certainly shine in the heavens, than that which I now affirm is true" upon discovering the secrets of life and death (34). Of significance, here, the character admits that his narrative is a recording of events. Thus, this means that it is not an objective portrayal of reality, but rather, events told from his own perspective. As what we are reading is merely a recording of events, these cannot be fully reliable. Furthermore, after knowing how unreliable he is, his referring to his narrative as "true" becomes all the more unbelievable. Thus, he loses credibility as a narrator. In addition, his asserting to himself as not being a madman is situational irony. In fact, we now know he is mad.

The prominent unreliability in terms of narration brings up the theme of inheritance. Indeed, through the literary device, the text becomes disconnected from a totalizing source of meaning that the narrator embodies. Here, the narrator manifests as unreliable through his instability. Thus, he loses his authority over the text. As the spectral challenges the notion of inheritance and a clear origin, the use of unreliability similarly problematizes the text's inheritance in a narrator. Where a narrative finds its origin in a speaker, here, the narrative becomes disconnected from the totalizing source that Frankenstein embodies. Thus, the narrative becomes spectral, being dislocated from a fixed origin.

Contributing to this unreliability, Victor manifests as a vain narrator which increasingly suggests we cannot trust his recounting of events. Indeed, he has grand visions of progress and values himself highly. This is revealed when the character longs to create a perfect being, suggesting that he wants to create a creature as brilliant as mankind (35). Furthermore, he simultaneously wishes to discover the secrets of life and death (33). The character wanting to discover life's secret and create a "perfect" being appears as arrogant and power-driven. Frankenstein's ambition and vanity lead to scepticism as to the narrative's reliability. In fact, if the protagonist exhibits traits of self-importance, he may alter events to fit his needs, as was previously shown in his depiction of the creature.

Contributing to the unreliability of the narrator, Victor has an unstable personality appearing physically and emotionally unwell. In fact, he admits to losing weight and looking

sickly when creating the creature, neglecting his health (36). The protagonist also confesses that he does not have any contact with his friends during this period (37). Furthermore, his best friend Clerval comments on his physical appearance when meeting him in Ingolstadt after conceiving the creature (42). During this period, the character does not enjoy the nature around him (37) where he works all day and does not get much sleep (39). It becomes obvious that Victor is physically and emotionally unwell, disregarding his health and well being.

Throughout the narrative, the protagonist goes through numerous traumatizing experiences. In fact, he witnesses multiple deaths of loved ones. Initially, his mother dies. After this, there are many deaths at the hands of the creature, including his brother, housekeeper, best friend, wife, and father. As the novel advances, the protagonist becomes increasingly unwell, exhibiting (with good reason) fear and paranoia. Due to the narrator's emotional state, the reliability of the narrative becomes problematized. Romantic scholar Marilyn Butler suggests that:

Frankenstein's viewpoint [...] is, not representative of humanity in any neutral, still less noble way, but typically insensitive and self-absorbed. He is moreover a profoundly unreliable narrator, deceived as well as deceiving, at best a depressive and at worst a hallucinator" (Butler xl).

Thus, the protagonist, due to his instabilities and grand ambitions does not manifest as a reliable source of information. The unstable mental and physical health promotes the unreliability of narration. In fact, if the protagonist exhibits paranoia alongside inflated self-worth, the narrative recounted is likely unreliable.

Here, there is not one objective narrative to fall onto. Rather, what we are reading is a sequence of events relayed by a being who is emotionally unwell. By incorporating a narrator who is as unreliable, the notion of an origin as a totalizing source of meaning is rejected. In fact, as the spectral challenges the notion of a clear and definable source, here, the prominent unreliability dismisses this. The narrator, by being as unreliable, loses his authority over the text. This unreliability in terms of narration comes to embody the text's spectrality, where it becomes increasingly disconnected from its source in the narrator.

Further upsetting the notion of origin in *Frankenstein* is the use of overlapping narrators. In fact, there are three narrators in the novel, as we are reading Walton's recounting of Frankenstein's narrative in his letters to Margaret. Thus, Victor's narrative is transcribed

by Walton who is the amanuensis. Moreover, at times, Frankenstein recounts the creature's story. Here, we are reading an account of three characters, mediated by two individuals. The use of overlapping narrators makes it difficult to determine where one narrative begins, and the other ends. Instead, the three narratives overlap with each other, where the characters' testimonies are relayed through another voice. Blanco and Peeren suggest that: "the twists and turns of haunting manifest as a layering, a palimpsestic thinking together, simultaneously, rather than a thinking against or after" ("The Spectral Turn/introduction" 32). Here, it is clear that drawing on three narrators suggests a palimpsest account of events, where each account is altered through the understanding of the listener. Thus, Shelley drawing on multiple narrators destabilizes the notion of a clear origin. Instead, the body of the text draws from multiple accounts that permeate each other, manifesting as spectral.

The spectral, by challenging categorization, cannot be given a conclusive signified (Wolfreys 70). As the narrative does not comprise one clear truth, as observed through the unreliability of narration, it becomes spectral. In fact, the events recounted are not 'objective' as they are relayed by an unstable narrator. Furthermore, there is not one singular account, rather, we are simultaneously reading three accounts. As their narratives inherit from each other, there is not a unique source, but an overlap between diverging testimonies. By refraining from granting one singular conclusive narrative, the notion of the origin becomes problematized. Indeed, the narrative does not originate from one clear source, rather, it manifests as a layering of multiple accounts.

Despite the use of overlapping narrators, traces of the earlier ones remain visible. Indeed, in the case of the creature, although we are reading a third-person account of its confession, elements from the creature's life remain present in the narrative. Here, we are still relayed the creature's pain and emotional world. We know that it has suffered greatly due to the rejection by its creator and mankind. For the reader, the creature killing humans becomes understood as its suffering in a world where it is not accepted or understood. Furthermore, we also learn about its encounter with the De Lacey family. Thus, although the account is conveyed through two ulterior sources, the creature's emotional world is still relayed. As with palimpsestic writing, the narration, instead of inheriting from one clear source, manifests in layered accounts. Thus, there is not a clear linear progression, but a layering through the use of multiple narrators. Furthermore, Frankenstein's narrative similarly remains in Walton's letters. Indeed, most of the narrative is recounted from Victor's perspective who is the

protagonist of the novel. Thus, although the events are recounted by Walton, there is a haunting of Frankenstein's life story which infuses the narrative. This therefore simultaneously reveals palimpsest writing, as seen in the overlap between the different sources.

According to Blanco and Peeren, hauntology challenges our notion of inheritance suggesting the disjointedness of ontology (“Introduction: Conceptualizing Spectralities” 7). In fact, the concept inhabits areas between our areas of certitude. Here, as the different narratives are layered into one another, there is a similar disjointedness of ontology where it becomes difficult to locate where one narrative begins, and the other ends. Rather, they extend into and are infused into each other. According to philosopher Bernard Stiegler: “Everything we are saying about spectrality is tied to the question of inheritance – they are in fact the same question” (“Spectrographies” 47). Thus, the concept of hauntology challenges our notion of inheritance and origin, by denying one clear origin or point of departure. Here, the blurring of ontological borders between the narratives reveals hauntology by challenging our notion of inheritance, where we cannot pinpoint one clear origin.

Further indicating the loss of the origin, it is striking that the creature refers to Frankenstein as “the author” “of my existence” on the scientist’s death bed (188). The creature suggests that in order to complete his plans, he must execute his creator (Ibid.). In the novel, this is demonstrated when the scientist is eventually brought to his demise by the creature. Although not killing him directly, Victor perishes while chasing the creature in icy arctic regions after catching pneumonia. The death of Victor reveals the death of the origin, as Victor is the father of the creature. Here, by destroying the source of his creation, a rejection of the origin as a totalizing source of meaning is enacted.

By problematizing the notion of the origin, the novel’s spectrality is revealed. Indeed, through the loss of an origin, the notion of a totalizing source of meaning is rejected. Due to the prominent unreliability of narration, Frankenstein loses his authority over his narrative. As he is the narrator of the novel, his role as an origin becomes compromised. Contributing to the loss of the origin, it becomes increasingly difficult to differentiate one narrative from another due to the overlapping narrators. Rather, the accounts we read are inherited from three characters. Due to the overlapping narrators, there is not one totalizing source of meaning as found in a reliable narrator or authorial figure. Rather, the narrative has multiple origins. Furthermore, the creature referring to Frankenstein as its author, and its killing of its creator

simultaneously embodies the rejection of an origin. In fact, the protagonist, as author and father of the creature's life, becomes destroyed. Thus, the notion of an origin as a totalizing source is further problematized. By rejecting the notion of a clear and reliable origin, the novel becomes disconnected from a clear source, revealing its spectrality.

6.3 Intertextuality: “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” and *Frankenstein*

Frankenstein's numerous intertextual references to “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” reveal spectrality by transgressing the ontological borders between the respective literary works. In the novel, there are numerous references to “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” which was written twenty years prior to the novel. The poem is referred to several times, both directly through intertextual references and in the themes integrated throughout the narrative. Furthermore, there are numerous intertextual references to the poem. Through the use of intertextuality, the ontologies of both literary works overlap where it becomes increasingly difficult to locate an origin. Contributing to the overlapping of ontologies, in the narrative, Victor, speaks the words of the mariner in first-person dialogue. Here, the borders between the characters become fluid where their identities overlap, revealing hauntology. Lastly, the use of intertextuality simultaneously permits a rupture between past and future departing from a linear conception of time. Here, the past is in conversation with the future. This section argues that *Frankenstein's* use of intertextuality in relation to “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” reveals hauntology, by blurring ontological borders of space and time.

Many elements from “Rime” are present in Shelley's novel *Frankenstein*. As observed in the previous section of this analysis, this is established when Frankenstein conceives the creature by killing animals and collecting body parts from graveyards. The protagonist, therefore, values human life above other life forms, feeling entitled to kill non-human species. Throughout the narrative, the character's actions come back to haunt him. Indeed, he witnesses the death of most of his close acquaintances at the hands of the creature. Thus, the deaths manifest as a result of Frankenstein's taking on the role of God, determining who will live or die. Similarly, the issue of anthropocentrism is prevalent in “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner” where the protagonist asserts dominance over nature by killing an albatross. In the

poem, his actions similarly come back to haunt him. Here, the protagonist witnesses multiple deaths ensuing his execution of the animal. Furthermore, the remaining of his life is spent redeeming his actions by telling a tale of death. Thus, as with Victor, the mariner's life becomes haunted by death.

Contributing to elements from *Rime* persisting in the novel, it is significant that both settings are similar. In *Frankenstein*, a ship is initially stranded in ice in the arctic region where it cannot break free (12). Shortly after the ship's crew spots the creature, the ice breaks, where the ship is set free (12). Strikingly, this also occurs in the poem. Indeed, the ship is located in northern regions surrounded by ice (lines 55-63). Here, ensuing the appearance of the albatross, the ice is able to break so the ship may sail again: "The ice did split with a thunder-fit" (line 69). There are therefore numerous elements from the poem manifesting in the novel.

Further providing an overlap between both textual worlds, in *Frankenstein*, there are multiple intertextual references to "Rime". In fact, the first allusion is when Walton writes to his sister, arguing that he will not kill an albatross: "I shall kill no albatross, therefore do not be alarmed of my safety" (10). This is an evident reference to the poem, where an albatross is shot by the mariner. In the novel, Walton states this while he is on a ship departing towards the arctic regions. Significantly, in the poem, the shooting of the albatross also takes place on a ship in the arctic. Thus, Shelley is drawing on a similar setting for her novel.

The numerous intertextual references in the novel reveal spectrality by blurring the ontological categories between both textual worlds. Although *Frankenstein* is a separate literary world from "Rime", elements from the poem are integrated throughout, contributing to constructing its reality. M.H. Abrams argues that intertextuality is when "one literary text is in fact made up of other texts" (325). Thus, through the literary device, a literary work becomes shaped by others. Wolfreys argues that spectrality emerges in the space between two ontological categories: "The identification of spectrality appears in a gap between the limits of two ontological categories" (70). What Wolfreys means is that spectrality is identified in the areas between clearly demarcated categories. Here, the ontological categories are those of the poem and the novel. However, by including aspects of the poem into the novel, clear boundaries between the two works become transgressed. Thus, their ontologies are not clearly separated, their spectrality manifesting in their overlap.

Further promoting the interconnectedness of the literary works, Victor utters the mariner's narrative in a first-person perspective. In another intertextual reference to "Rime", after imbuing life into the creature, the protagonist suggests:

Like one who, on a lonely road,
Doth walk in fear and dread,
And, having once turned round, walks on,
And turns no more his head;
Because he knows a frightful fiend
Doth close behind him tread (Coleridge qtd. in Shelley 41)

Here, the scientist is concerned after creating a creature that he deems monstrous. The morning after its creation, when walking in the streets, the character recites this extract to himself. During the night of the creation, Victor dreams of Elizabeth, his cousin, dying (39). Furthermore, the character appears agitated at the thought of perceiving the creature again (40). Similarly, in the poem, this utterance occurs while the mariner is still on the boat (lines 446-451). He reminisces about the sailors who met their death because of his curse, feeling remorse. It becomes clear that Victor recognizes his predicament in the mariner's plight.

When Frankenstein utters the mariner's narration, a blurring of identities between the characters is promoted. In fact, Frankenstein articulates the mariner's words in first-person narration (41). The fact that the dialogue is in first-person narration reveals the interconnection between the two characters. Their identities, therefore, become porous, where aspects of both characters permeate each other. Furthermore, not only do they speak the same words, but they also look similar. It was previously argued that the mariner had a spectral like appearance. Similarly, Frankenstein embodies these traits in his thin and sickly countenance (41). In addition, Victor suggests: "I walked about the isle like a restless specter" (141). Thus, the character also looks like a spectre, revealing the resemblances between them. Through the use of intertextuality and the similar fates of the protagonists, there is a blurring of identities where it becomes difficult to distinguish between them. In fact, not only do they look alike and live similar lives, but they even speak the same words. Thus, their identities overlap. The spectral challenges clearly delineated categories by inhabiting an in-between space. By blurring the boundaries between the protagonists, their identity manifests as spectral.

Contributing to the blurring of ontological worlds and characters, there is simultaneously transgression between the genre of poetry and fiction. In fact, while the earlier poem manifests in *Frankenstein*, this suggests that traces from the poem are infused in the novel. Thus, not only is there a transgression between the works and characters, but also between the genre of poetry and fiction. Spectrality, being a concept that transgresses rigid boundaries, refuses to belong to a singular category (Wolfreys 70). By employing numerous intertextual references, it becomes difficult to determine the nature of the work due to the presence of poetry within the novel. Thus, the genres of poetry and fiction become porous, their ontologies overlapping.

In addition to providing a blurring of ontological categories between textual worlds and characters, the use of intertextuality challenges linear chronology. According to Jean Michel Rabaté, texts are: “haunted” by voices from the past (xvi). The poem “Rime” was published twenty years prior to *Frankenstein*. However, by integrating elements from the earlier piece of writing within the later work, it maintains a conversation with the past. Thus, although it is written later in time, the earlier work persists in the novel. The integration of the poem in the later work permits the past and future to coincide within the same work, ultimately disrupting linear chronology. As the spectral challenges notions of linear progress (Blanco and Peeren “The Spectral Turn/Introduction” 31), the disruption of time similarly rejects a linear time frame, revealing hauntology.

By including intertextuality, *Frankenstein* is able to challenge rigid boundaries, revealing spectrality. Indeed, the ontologies of “Rime” and *Frankenstein* become porous where themes from the earlier work are infused in the novel. Here, it becomes increasingly difficult to localize a definite source where borders between the ontological worlds of the literary works are fluid. Furthermore, the persistence of “Rime” in *Frankenstein* permits the genre of poetry and fiction to merge, refusing to belong to a singular genre. In addition, ontological borders between the two protagonists are blurred as a consequence of their similar identities. Revealing this, both characters are haunted by death after assuming their superiority over nature. Furthermore, Victor speaks the words of the mariner in first person speech emphasising their interconnectedness. Here, they manifest as spectral, their ontologies quivering between one another. Lastly, while the poem infuses the novel, the past maintains a conversation with the future, upsetting linear notions of time. Here, time manifests as a back and forth, rather than functioning in a linear fashion. The numerous intertextual references to

“The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”, therefore, reveal hauntology, by blurring ontological borders of time and space.

7. Conclusion

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the spectrality of selected works of literature, avoiding the pitfalls of a literary criticism relying on dualistic assumptions and discourse. Western culture is haunted by a dualist paradigm that manifests in its metaphysics, religion and ways of approaching knowledge. As suggested previously, dualism was initially founded in Plato's distinction of mind and matter over 2000 years ago, where the world of ideas encompasses transcendent ideals which are superior to the material world. Thus, within this system, the material is an unperfect or defective reflection of the ideal. This ontological distinction between mind and matter leads to a bifurcated system in which hierarchies arise. Derrida's notion of hauntology is well equipped to challenge dualities. In fact, by inhabiting a liminal position between our traditional ontological categories, the concept cannot be limited to a singular ontology. Rather, its ontology manifests as ghostlike, quivering between the material and transcendent, life and death.

Similarly, literature's ontology is spectral and cannot be constrained to the material or the spiritual. In fact, if a copy of a novel is destroyed, the work does not cease to exist. Thus, although maintaining a corporeal aspect, its ontology is not limited to its materiality. Furthermore, due to its non-referentiality to the external world, literature is free to challenge empirical reality. For instance, it may paint images that do not empirically exist, revealing its transcendence. Yet, despite its non-referentiality to the external world, literature is able to spark vivid images within us. Literature, therefore, like a ghost, is hauntological, its ontology quivering between the material and the transcendent.

In this research, five of Samuel T. Coleridge's poems and Mary Shelley's novel *Frankenstein* are investigated as a response to the categorizational thinking noted in the Christian Spinozan debate sparked by McFarland's 1969 book *Coleridge and the Pantheist Tradition*. Here, the works' spectrality is able to challenge dualities and the urge to classify. Firstly, the spectrality of "The Eolian Harp" (1796), "Frost at Midnight" (1798), "Hymn before sunrise, in the Vale of Chamouni" (1802), and "Dejection: an Ode" (1802) is revealed in the ontological quivering between Spinozan philosophy and Christian dualism. In fact, here, the works alternately adopt one system, to eventually reject it and endorse another. Thus, as with the spectral, the ontology promoted quivers between the material and the transcendent. According to Derrida, belief in God must be followed by doubt (Loevlie 338). Doubt is similarly revealed in relation to God where there is no clear resolution to the

uncertainty observed. Hauntology promotes ambiguity, as it cannot be categorized or assigned a final signified. The wavering between opposing philosophical modes therefore similarly parallels this aspect of hauntology.

The intertextuality noted in the literary works challenges dualities by upsetting our traditional ontological conceptions of time and space. In fact, “Dejection: an Ode” which is written 7 years prior infuses “The Eolian Harp”, suggesting the past as being in conversation with the future. Similarly, “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”’s persistence in *Frankenstein* suggests a distortion of a linear time frame. In fact, the poem haunts the novel, where past and future are in overlap. In addition to contributing to upsetting a linear chronology, the haunting of the poems in the later works suggests an ontological blurring between the respective works. Here, their ontologies are not clearly separated, but inform and infuse one another, revealing hauntology.

The persistence of dualism is simultaneously illustrated in the haunting of the discourse of anthropocentrism. As noted by McFarland, the dualistic distinction of mind and matter in “self” philosophy leads to an anthropomorphised conception of God. Based on the superiority of thought over nature, humans are understood as superior to the world around them. Scholar Sarah Boslaugh affirms that many Western religions and philosophies are embedded in anthropocentrism, holding a view that humans are superior to the rest of nature (Boslaugh). In “The Rime of the Ancient Mariner”, anthropocentrism is revealed in the mariner who attempts to assert dominance over nature that he deems threatening. Thus, by killing the albatross, he attempts to gain control over the world around him. However, his perceived superiority and neglect of other life forms in the process leads to the haunting he must face throughout the narrative. Similarly, in *Frankenstein*, the scientist “plays God” by altering nature. After creating a creature that he deems to be horrific, he refuses to care or nurture for it. The actions of the protagonist thus similarly come back to haunt him, confronting the character with his actions.

Here, the element of haunting manifests not only as a metaphysics but also as an ethics. In fact, metaphysically speaking, the character’s haunting suggests that his past actions are still impacting him, where past and future are in overlap. Thus, the future is not dislocated from the past but informed by it. Simultaneously, the act of haunting urges both narrators to change their ways and learn from their mistakes. As suggested by Blanco and Peeren, the spectral introduces an ethical element of responsibility (“The Spectral Turn/Introduction” 33).

In the poem, the mariner changes after being cursed, respecting animals such as the sea snakes (lines 282-285). Frankenstein, although at times displaying traces of self-doubt, mostly remains unchanged. Although only the mariner appears to have learned from his actions, the act of haunting remains a means by which we may notice the consequences of our actions, and, perhaps, eventually, learn from them.

Literature, through its ability to access the spectral, is not obliged to make sense. When giving it limitations as to be rational or choose sides, we are denying its ability to evoke spectral worlds and emotions in a reader. Based on the Spinozan/Christian debate, literature has at times been categorized and made to choose sides. In fact, Coleridge's poems are generally understood as favouring one system over the other, resolving the tension in a tangible way. However, as observed, the poems oscillate between the opposing views, promoting both philosophies and simultaneously rejecting these. Furthermore, it is this very tension that provides Coleridge's poetry with creativity and innovation. Within the frame of this debate, it appears as though we may benefit from opening ourselves to that which we do not always cognitively understand or are not able to categorize. In doing so, we may experience the spectral aspects of literature that cannot be grasped rationally or intellectually.

Further research would benefit from investigating literature's spectrality in relation to progress in digitalisation. As suggested in the introduction, in a world of expanding technology, the question of literature's spectrality becomes increasingly relevant. According to Loevlie, literature's ontology is not limited to its materiality, because if a copy of a book is destroyed, the work continues to exist (342). Thus, its ontology is *in-between* the material and transcendent. Today, due to literature's accessibility on a screen, the aspect of corporeality is further compromised. On kindles, computers, tablets and so on, we are able to access inexhaustible amounts of fiction, where, by clicking on a button, we can switch to the next work. The relation between a literary work and its corporeality, therefore, becomes increasingly spectral.

In relation to Mary Shelley, her work on Spinoza has not been adequately researched. Scholar Eileen Botting argues that while Shelley's husband Percy's Spinozism is well known, the novelist's translation of the philosopher's *Theologico-Political Treatise* has often been overlooked (Botting). However, the philosopher's influence on her writing is prevalent, particularly in her *Journals of Sorrow* (Ibid.). Although investigating Shelley's Spinozism is

not within the scope of this work, investigation of this topic may be relevant for further research.

In addition, supplementary research on Spinoza and the implications of this system on our treatment of non-human species would be relevant to examine. As suggested by McFarland, dualistic philosophy stemming from an “I am” mode of thought leads to an anthropomorphised conception of God. However, Spinozan philosophy does not promote dualities as noted in Christianity or other “I am” axioms. Here the material world is understood as encompassing God, thus, investigating the repercussions this outlook would have on our treatment of non-human life forms would be beneficial. Further research within the field appears all the more critical considering the current ecological crisis.

Lastly, including a reading of J.M.W. Turner’s painting *Morning Among the Coniston Fells* (1798) which is depicted on the title page would contribute to providing an increasingly spectral framework challenging dualities. By investigating poetry alongside fiction, this thesis has broadened its scope in order to distance itself from a binaric reading focusing only on the Coleridge Spinozan/Christian debate. Incorporating the visual arts simultaneously would permit a reading which is increasingly spectral. Hauntology is a concept that is not confined to literature. In fact, Derrida refers to photography as being spectral in his “Spectographies” (38). Loevlie suggests that literature is spectral as it is not in direct reference to external reality, being able to challenge empirical reality (336). Similarly, a painting may also challenge external reality by depicting events which are not really ‘there’, or by modifying what is depicted. Thus, to open up to an even more comprehensive reading challenging dualities, further research could investigate the spectrality of literature alongside the visual arts.

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