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A thematic analysis of Norway's strategy of deterrence and assurance towards Russia during the war in Ukraine

Assessing whether Norway has changed its strategy, and if so, how?

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Abstract

Norway has sought a balancing strategy towards Russia since joining NATO in 1949. Deterring measures through NATO has been followed by assuring measures to ease tensions between both Norway and Russia, and NATO and Russia. During Russian aggression, most notably the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Norway sought greater integration with NATO, and has shifted towards a greater focus on measures of deterrence. Still, Norway has managed to maintain bilateral cooperation with Russia during these periods. This thesis seeks to examine how Norway positions itself between its membership in NATO and its wish for a stable, predictable, and friendly relationship with Russia. My thesis concerns itself with how this is done by Norway when tensions between NATO and Russia is at an all-time high, and with an ongoing war in Europe. My research question is therefore, *has Norway changed its strategy of deterrence and assurance, and if so, how?* My theoretical framework is Joseph Nye's theory of smart power which is the mixed use of hard and soft power to achieve one's goals. To answer the research question, I have conducted document analysis and thematic analysis of publicly available documents presented by the Norwegian government. The documents include two strategic documents published before the war from the Department of Defense and the Department of Foreign Affairs explaining Norway's ambitions for its security and relationship with Russia. These are then compared to press releases showing the reactionary measure taken by Norway during the first six months of the war. I have divided each type of document into two main themes: hard and soft power, with their respective sub-themes. My findings show a clear focus on hard power measures taken by Norway which have a clear multilateral focus, mostly through NATO. Norway has not implemented *new* soft power measures against Russia. The soft power mechanisms still intact have been excluded from hard power sanctions taken by Norway. The soft power mechanisms still in place are primarily bilaterally focused on the relationship between Norway and Russia. I have concluded that Norway has not changed its smart power strategy of deterrence and assurance as a whole but has had a clear shift to a greater focus on deterrence through NATO. The soft power mechanisms still in place have gained increased importance because they have been excluded from hard power measures. One can ask the question of how aggressive Russia can be elsewhere before Norway suspends its bilateral cooperation with Russia. They could also represent an avenue for beginning a normalization and easing of tensions between Russia and Norway, and by extension, NATO and Russia when the war ends.

Key words: Deterrence, assurance, hard power, soft power, the Arctic, NATO, Russia, Norway.

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1 Introduction

Norway is located on the Northern flank of NATO on the border towards Russia. This has motivated Norway to seek a balancing strategy between its NATO membership and its desire for a friendly relation with its neighbor Russia. After World War 2 Norway concluded that it could not realistically be without an alliance and therefore joined NATO (Skogrand, 2004, p. 156). However, Norway still wanted to have a balanced and friendly relationship with the Soviet Union at the time as well, and therefore the Norwegian state implemented self-imposed restrictions along with the membership in NATO (Skogrand, 2004, p. 161). Military exercises with NATO in Norway were a part of a deterring measure towards Russia. However, it was necessary that these exercises were conducted in a predictable manner as to not increase the tension between NATO and the Soviet Union (Børresen et al., 2004, p. 99). Initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev's Murmansk Initiative speech (1987), and on the Norwegian side led by previous Norwegian Foreign Minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg in the early 1990s, the establishment of the Barents Region sought to promote friendly relations and desecuritize the region (Bones, 2012). The ambition for the Arctic to be a low-tension region was also pursued in other arenas such as the establishment of a joint Norwegian-Soviet Fisheries Commission established in 1975 (Eide et al., 2013). The Barents Sea was and is a sensitive area due to the presence of Soviet/Russian nuclear infrastructure. The bilateral cooperation between Norway and Russia on fisheries has therefore contributed to an easing of tension in the area through a bilateral cooperation which is mutually beneficial (Eide et al., 2013, p. 2).

Norway has strived for a predictable and stable Arctic region and relationship with Russia. Assuring measures towards Russia has been implemented to balance out policies of deterrence. However, during recent times of Russian aggression, most notably the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Norway has sought a greater integration with NATO (Tamnes, 2019). As NATO is the main deterrent aspect of Norwegian security policy, Norwegian military activity in the Arctic is argued to be an assuring measure towards Russia as this is part of a predictable pattern of operations from the Norwegian military (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 25). With Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, tensions in Europe, between Norway and Russia, and between NATO and Russia are at an all-time high. Norway's strategy towards Russia, mixing deterrence with assurance measures has been followed since the establishment of NATO in varying intensity in response to security developments. It is in this context my study will examine the measures taken by Norway and

compare them to the desired ambitions laid out in strategic plans from the Department of Defense and Department of Foreign Affairs using document analysis and thematic analysis.

In my primary sources, terms like the Arctic, High North, and Northern-Norway are used interchangeably. Therefore, I have not made distinctions between the use and meaning between Arctic and Northern Norway for example. The Department of Foreign Affairs' strategic document for the High North cover these definitions (Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 10). Northern Norway is seen as a part of the Arctic, while also being very different climatically from other parts of the Arctic. The High North and Arctic cover the same relevant geographical area. However, internationally, Arctic has a more circumpolar focus, and the High North has a more focus on Norwegian border regions (Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 10).

Many of my secondary sources, and all my primary sources are in Norwegian, which I have translated into English myself.

1.1 Research objective and question

This study seeks to examine how Norway positions itself and balances its membership with NATO and its ambition for a stable, friendly, and predictable relationship with Russia. While this has been a discussion for several decades, my research concerns itself with how Norway does this when tensions between NATO and Russia are at an all-time high since the Cold War, and during an ongoing war in Europe. The main object I am studying is Norway's decades old strategy of deterrence and assurance towards Russia. Important factors I am studying is how Norway focuses on multilateral efforts versus bilateral efforts in this strategy.

To successfully meet the research objective and to contribute to the large body of literature on this topic my research question is: *has Norway changed its strategy of deterrence and assurance, and if so, how?*

1.2 Scope of study

My research does not seek to produce answers or results which can be generalized for future situations, but instead provide a deeper insight into how Norway employs reactionary measures when faced with a challenging security situation. I am not focusing on how Russia or other countries perceive Norway and its actions during this period, but instead I am focusing on Norway's efforts to enhance its security. While my study uses literature dating back to 1966, the period I am concerned with researching is the first six months of the war in

Ukraine that began in February 2022. In addition to documents from this period, I am also using the most current government documents that are concerned with Norway's relationship with Russia and its security. Because the war in Ukraine is still ongoing, I decided to have a cut off after 24th of August so that the data was more manageable. Therefore, actions made by Norway relevant for this study after the cut-off date are not included.

1.3 Motivation

The Norwegian strategy of deterrence and assurance was very well known to me before beginning my research. The relationship between Norway and Russia is also a peculiar one. Norway is a founding member of NATO and leads NATO exercises in Northern Norway but has managed at the same time to maintain a well-functioning friendly relationship with Russia. Even after the annexation of Crimea and the following sanctions against Russia several mechanisms for cooperation between Norway and Russia were kept in place. Especially in Northern Norway and on Arctic matters the relationship between the two countries has been different when compared to other matters.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine can be seen as a watershed moment for security in Europe, the relationship between NATO and Russia, and the bilateral relationship between Norway and Russia. Norway has fully backed Ukraine, as with other allied countries and has supported Ukraine with weapons, imposed several sanctions against Russia on a level never seen before. Norway still manages however to maintain a functioning bilateral relationship with Russia on some areas in the Arctic. Providing weapons to Ukraine to be used against Russia is apparently not something that will ruin the co-management of fisheries in the Arctic.

My main motivation for this study is to examine how Norway in a challenging situation as described above still manages to have a functional relationship with Russia in certain areas. A large part of my motivation is also directed at the future. What will happen after a possible peace agreement and a normalization of the relationship between Norway and Russia and NATO and Russia? How important are the different mechanisms and measures taken for the future relationship between Norway and Russia? And how will future strategic documents from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Department of Defense communicate Norway's strategy towards Russia?

1.4 Relevance to peace and conflict studies

The main relevance for this study is related to the security studies in peace and conflict studies. How a state secures itself, and how security is in focus is of great interest to me. While some researchers argue for a larger focus on human security, a more traditional view on security is how a state secures its further existence from threats (Peoples & Vaughn-Williams, 2015). The war in Ukraine has led to fear of the use of nuclear weapons and a new world war. While this is seen in the scale of global politics between Russia and NATO, it is very interesting and relevant to examine how a small state such as Norway positions itself, both during the ongoing conflict, but also how Norway may lay the groundwork through soft power measures for future dialogue and cooperation.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

This introductory chapter outlines the structure of my thesis, where I present my research question and objectives along with the scope of the study, motivation for conducting the study, and its relevance to peace and conflict studies.

In the next chapter I narrow down and review the existing literature on the topic. I also present where my research fits into the existing literature and argue for how my research adds to the existing body of literature. In chapter 3 and 4 I present my theoretical framework and the method of data collection and analysis. In chapter 5 I present my results from the data collection and show my analysis step by step with its key findings. In the last two chapters I discuss the main findings of the analysis while also applying my theoretical framework and relevant literature from the literature review before presenting my conclusion in the last chapter.

2 Literature review

In this chapter I will present and review existing literature in relation to my research question. The objective of this study is to answer my research question of whether *Norway has changed its strategy of deterrence and assurance towards Russia after the war in Ukraine, and if so, how?* Balancing NATO membership and integration with the West and a stable and friendly relationship with Russia has been discussed for several decades in Norway. I will primarily focus on and cover existing literature that discusses this strategy since 2008. I considered this period to be the most relevant because of Russia's aggressive foreign policy with the invasions of Georgia in 2008 and annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the conflict in Eastern

Ukraine leading to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. I will not focus on studies concerning the general relationship between Russia and NATO or the increased difficulty of maintaining a friendly relationship between Norway and Russia, or challenges to Norwegian security in general. Instead, I will review studies examining measures taken by Norway that says something about how the Norwegian strategy has changed after Russian aggression and what measures were made.

The concept of deterrence and assurance was introduced in 1966 by Johan Jørgen Holst (Holst, 1966). Deterrence and assurance is also stated as Norway's main strategy towards Russia in Norway's long-term plan for defense (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 23). In this strategic document from the Department of Defense it is made clear that NATO is the main deterrent against Russia and the cornerstone of Norwegian security policy. The plan also states that at the same time, it is important to seek and maintain a stable and predictable relationship with Russia through assuring measures. The most relevant researchers in this regard come from the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Lindgren and Græger (2017) wrote about how NATO and Russia's policies and actions shape Norwegian foreign and security policies. They note that Norway's bilateral relationship with Russia is not separate from, but connected to, and develops together with the relationship between NATO and Russia (Lindgren & Græger, 2017, p. 106). Russia's annexation of Crimea and aggressive foreign policy has led to Norway strengthening its own military in the northern part of the country. In addition, Norway seeks to include NATO in more exercises and training in Norway as a response to Russian aggression elsewhere. (Lindgren & Græger, 2017). While having a greater focus on NATO presence and military exercise in Norway, some assuring mechanisms are kept in place to maintain the bilateral relationship with Norway and Russia, such as the Incidents at Sea Agreement and keeping an open line between the Norwegian and Russian military to maintain transparency and communication. Lindgren and Græger (2017) show how Norwegian response to Russian aggression elsewhere leads to Norway seeking a more deterring effort, while keeping intact the assuring mechanisms that can maintain a stable and predictable bilateral relationship.

Rolf Tamnes (2019) writes about developments in Norwegian security policy and how Norwegian efforts have over time shifted according to developing situations in international relations. Tamnes (2019, p. 55) explains how Norway has implemented assuring measures to

balance out deterring policies. He exemplifies this with the Norwegian restriction of foreign military bases on Norwegian soil being an assuring measure that came with Norway's NATO membership, and Norway's nuclear policy came along with NATO's nuclear strategy. In contrast to the assuring measures and as Lindgren and Græger (2017) note, when Norway was unsure of allied support along with a more aggressive Russian foreign policy, Norway has looked to strengthen its deterring capacities through greater NATO involvement in Norway. In addition to Norwegian focus on integrating NATO in a greater extent, Tamnes (2019, p. 57) also writes about Norwegian efforts to strengthen the bilateral relations with the USA through Norwegian purchases of American military airplanes, and cooperation agreements with American military forces in Norway on a rotational basis. The period after 2014 is also highlighted by Østhagen (2023) for when Norway sought to strengthen bilateral relations with the USA. Østhagen notes that the decision to have American forces present in Northern Norway on a rotational basis garnered criticism arguing that Norway had moved away from the balance between deterrence and assurance.

Paal Sigurd Hilde (2019) also wrote about how the Norwegian strategy of deterrence and assurance has changed over time. Hilde argues that the balancing of deterrence through NATO and assurance towards Russia through different measures has been stable over several decades. However, more recently, Russian aggression in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 and onwards, has led Norway to seek a strategy that focuses more on deterrence through NATO than assuring measures towards Russia (Hilde, 2019).

Bjur, Hilde, and Eggen discuss how Norwegian policies in the Arctic has changed after Russian aggression in 2007-2008 (Bjur et al., 2020). They, as the other authors above, argue that the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 led to a greater focus on deterrence and both Norwegian and NATO military focus on the Arctic. As Lindgren and Græger (2017), they also note that the Incident at Sea agreement between Norway and Russia has been kept in place and therefore gained importance in the bilateral relationship between Norway and Russia. Furthermore, Bjur et al. (2020, p. 484) argue that this is testament to Norway attempting to maintain the balancing of deterrence and assurance towards Russia. They also state the importance of maintaining some relevant bilateral cooperation agreements because they will become even more important in future scenarios when the tension between Russia and NATO is reduced (Bjur et al., 2020, p. 486).

The theoretical framework I use in this study is the theory of smart power by Joseph Nye. This theory considers the mixed use of hard and soft power to achieve one's goals (Wilson, 2008; Nye, 2009; CSIS, 2007). For this theory I have decided to see deterrence as hard power and assurance as soft power. Combining hard and soft power and turning them into a smart power strategy requires contextual intelligence which is the skill that policy makers use to align tactics with their objectives (Nye, 2009).

While I research the topic of whether and how Norway has changed its strategy towards Russia as the authors above have, I analyze it in the context of being very current and ongoing, and in a specific period. The existing literature on the topic is concerned with a larger period and after tensions have calmed. Therefore, the body of literature available for previous studies is much greater. This study will contribute to the research on Norwegian foreign and security policy regarding deterrence and assurance by examining how Norway positions itself between NATO and Russia during a developing security challenge, and how Norway employs hard and soft power. I will not focus on either hard or soft power separately to examine how Norway positions itself, but as a whole through the lens of smart power.

3 Theory chapter

3.1 Introduction

The main object of study will be Norway's balancing strategy towards Russia - deterrence and assurance. I will discuss this using Joseph Nye's theory of smart power in which deterrence will be synonymous with hard power and assurance will be synonymous with soft power. It is the combination and integration of these aspects of power that makes up a smart power strategy (CSIS, 2007; Nye 2009; Wilson, 2008). In this context deterrence and assurance does not mean separate deterrence or assurance measures taken when it is necessary for Norway, and not affected by developments in international security. It is meant as a strategy which has been actively used by the Norwegian government since the Cold War (Holst, 1967; Oma, 2021; Bjur, 2022) and is a fundamental part of Norwegian military and security policy (Forsvardsepartementet, 2020-2021).

The purpose of this chapter is to review and highlight theories that can explain Norwegian security policy before and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The most notable theories and concepts are smart power and deterrence and assurance as a strategy. Because Norway

and its security policy is the object of study I will define and explain other concepts such as security, traditional security studies, and the security dilemma.

3.2 Security

Some researchers may easily define the concept of security when discussing security for a state in a government's foreign policy or security for individuals in their everyday life. It is however a term that is contested by researchers and has been for a long time. To problematize the concept one can ask questions such as security for whom and from whom or what? It can be to feel secure from natural disasters, economic difficulties, people with hostile intentions or attacks from a neighboring state. The term "security" is fundamentally about reducing or eliminating fear from something or someone and dates back to Cicero in the first century BCE (Gjørsv, 2018).

Another similar way of understanding security is the absence of threats (Booth, 1992, as cited in Peoples & Vaughn-Williams, 2015). Attempting to make the concept of security clearer Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde (1998) argue that threats can arise in several different areas concerning both military and non-military matters, but to regard a threat as an issue of security it must be an existential threat. This threat then threatens the existence of the referent object, whether it is the state or an individual. I will present two different notions of security, a state-centric approach to security where the state is the referent object and human security where the individuals that make up the state is the referent object.

3.2.1 Traditional security studies

Security studies were originally developed with an intention of solving the problem of war and the instability of international politics. Its objects of analysis were states and the goal was to explain why they go to war. This view on security studies originates from neorealist international relations theory and is known by researchers as traditional security studies, or a state-centric view on security studies. While individuals also are important, their security is contingent on the policies and security of the state (Peoples & Vaughn-Williams, 2015). Proponents of traditional security studies are mostly concerned with military matters and the use of military force (Buzan et al. 1998). This realist view on security sees emerging conflicts between states as a result of competition for power because power determines security and the allocation of resources (Miall, 2007).

3.2.2 Human security

Critics of traditional security studies argue that it is too narrow and only concerned with the security of the state from a potential future threat from a different state. These critics argue that the security agenda needs to be widened and also focus on threats and security issues arising from, among others, political, environmental, and economic issues within a state (Buzan et al. 1998). Those living in a particular state should be the referent objects of security, and the different threats they face are issues of security (Peoples & Vaughn-Williams, 2015). Critics of human security argue that this broad view on security leads to every issue becoming a security issue.

The concept of security and the distinction between human or state security are dependent on spatial and temporal conditions and reflect the values of those who have the power of definition of the concept of security (Gjørsv, 2018). While arguments for both views are valid, I will use the state-centric approach to security studies in this thesis. The focus on the state as the referent object of security and threats arising from other states is a better fit when discussing the relationship between Norway and Russia and the measures taken for increased security. While social and economic factors play a role in this relationship, I will focus mostly on military matters, which also resonates well with traditional security studies' view on power.

3.3 Smart power

I will here define the concept of power as a prelude to the other concepts of soft power, hard power, and smart power. Therefore, for this thesis I use Joseph Nye's definition of power as the ability of a state to do things, control others, and to get others to do what they otherwise would not do (Nye, 1990; Wilson, 2008; Nye, 2009). Nye (1990) notes that the ability to control others is often associated with the resources a state possesses. My focus on power in this thesis will be on political power which may include territory, economic size, military forces and political stability. As Nye (1990) states, in close alignment with a state-centric view on security, the power of a state can be measured in its capacity to wage war. However, he further argues that in modern times power can be measured by other factors such as technology, level of education, economic growth which are increasingly becoming more relevant and significant in international society.

Further in this chapter I discuss these different factors that can demonstrate the power of a state. While military power, natural resources, and economic might are factors of hard power

(Wilson, 2008) when used to coerce another actor while soft power seeks to attract actors to achieve desired outcomes (Nye, 2009). In the following sub-sections, I will briefly introduce the concepts of soft and hard power before presenting smart power, which can be seen as a combination of the two concepts.

Hard power is the ability to coerce or command other actors to make them act in ways they would not otherwise act (Nye, 1990). A state's use of hard power emerges in strategies that focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and the use of economic power to enforce a state's own national interests (Wilson, 2008).

In contrast to coercing other actors with hard power to act in your preferred manner, soft power, when it is successful, is when the actor it is directed towards is convinced of what the actor that is applying soft power has to offer (Nye, 1990). Nye (1990) argues that soft power is just as important as the commanding hard power. He further argues that a state will face less resistance from others if its power is perceived as legitimate by others. This aspect of power may be more suited for those already powerful, such as the USA. It is arguably easier for the USA to establish international norms which mirror the ones in American society than it is for Norway. However, Norway has been very successful in applying soft power towards Russia through bilateral and multilateral forums resulting in the influence of a small country over a large region and country (Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021).

Economic measures can then be used as soft power or hard power measures against an actor. Either as for example sanctions against an actor, or as economic aid. The same can be said for a state's military because it can be used to coerce other actors with the threat of invasion, or military capacities can be used during search and rescue missions for example as Norway and Russia have done for several years (Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021).

Using the definition of power stated above, Nye (2009) argues that there are three different ways to exercise power: coercion, payment, and attraction. Coercion and payment are aspects of the commanding hard power, while attraction is soft power. Some critics of Nye's notion of soft power claim that it alone cannot produce a desired foreign policy for a state. To counter this misconception Nye (2009) introduced the theory of smart power in 2003, which combines the tools of hard and soft power. In 2006, led by Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye the theory of smart power was used to attempt to give recommendations for future US foreign policy by the Center for Strategic & International Studies' (CSIS) Commission on Smart

Power (CSIS, 2007). The main point of a smart power strategy in this context was for the USA to invest more in soft power in conjunction with its military and economic power to be better able to tackle future global challenges.

The CSIS Commission gives the following definition of smart power:

Smart power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillful combination of both. Smart power means developing an integrated strategy, resource base, and tool kit to achieve American objectives, drawing on both hard and soft power. It is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action. Providing for the global good is central to this effort because it helps America reconcile its overwhelming power with the rest of the world's interests and values (CSIS, 2007, p. 7).

While this definition provided by CSIS is aimed at American foreign policy, the essence of smart power utilizes actions from both hard and soft power. Ernest Wilson (2008) provides his definition of smart power as the combination of elements from soft and hard power that again are mutually reinforcing the other aspect of exercising power. Furthermore, Wilson provides some core components to smart power and how it should be used in foreign policy:

- The target over which one seeks to exercise power—its internal nature and its broader global context. Power cannot be smart if those who wield it are ignorant of these attributes of the target populations and regions.
- Self-knowledge and understanding of one's own goals and capacities. Smart power requires the wielder to know what his or her country or community seeks, as well as its will and capacity to achieve its goals.
- The broader regional and global context within which the action will be conducted.
- The tools to be employed, as well as how and when to deploy them individually and in combination. (Wilson, 2008, p. 115).

Wilson's definition of smart power along with the recommended required components of a smart power strategy fits well with Nye's (2009) requirement to implement a smart power strategy to achieve one's goals. Nye argues that "contextual intelligence" is the "intuitive diagnostic skill that helps policymakers align tactics with objectives to create smart strategies" (Nye, 2009, p. 161).

The application of a smart power strategy for a powerful nation such as the USA might be a question about the will to implement this strategy. For a much less powerful nation, such as Norway, this implementation can prove to be much more challenging. Unlike the USA,

Norway does not have close to either the economic power or military might to either coerce or attract other actors to act a certain preferred way. However, as mentioned previously Norway has over a long time invested much in people-to-people cooperation in the Barents Region, both bilaterally and multilaterally to achieve a stable and mutually beneficial relationship with Russia (Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021). This is also in line with Nye's (2009) arguments concerning the major elements of soft power which include culture, values, and policies if they can be presented as inclusive, consistently practiced, and legitimate. In this context, for Norway and other small states, hard power will be more dependent on a military alliance such as NATO, and therefore a collaborative effort between Norway and NATO. Soft power however allows for more maneuverability with a bilateral focus.

3.4 Deterrence and assurance

The concept of deterrence and assurance was introduced in 1966 by Johan Jørgen Holst (Holst, 1966). This concept has been used in foreign- and security policy to describe Norway's balancing relationship with the Soviet Union and later Russia. This includes the deterrence of Russian aggression through its membership with NATO and the assurance is used to describe Norway's goal of not provoking and cooperating with Russia in areas deemed suitable.

Deterrence is defined as a strategy based on an assumption of hostile intentions and is aimed at influencing the would-be aggressor to the extent that they consider an attack not to be viable because the probable costs and risks outweigh the expected gains of an attack (Oma, 2021). Oma also explains a difference in direct and extended deterrence. Direct deterrence entails actions to deter an attack on one's own territory, while extended deterrence entails deterring an attack on a third-party, for example a member of one's own military alliance. Deterrence can be understood also as the concept of "peace through strength" dating back to the Roman Empire – if one desires peace, prepare for war. This approach dissuades other states from attacking your state because of the uncertainty of whether they will win the war or not. In modern times this requires massive armaments and is justified as a necessary cost to provide security in a dangerous world (Harris & Morrison, 2013).

Oma also argues that assurance as a strategy also considers that an adversary can have hostile intentions, but that these arise from uncertainty and fear rather than a motivated by gaining territory or resources (Oma, 2021). Assurance is therefore aimed at removing this uncertainty and assuring the would-be aggressor that agreements are respected and that one's own

intentions are peaceful. A measure of assurance can be self-imposed restrictions on military activity (Oma, 2021). Other means of assurance can be broader and include economic, academic, and social cooperation to counter misunderstandings and uncertainty and further help to assure an adversary of one's peaceful intentions and commitment to cooperation.

Norway is a small state, a member of NATO and is geographically placed on a strategic border between two large military powers (NATO and Russia). Having deterrence and assurance as a strategy towards Russia, it is important for Norway to have a foreign and security policy that considers the security interests of both NATO and Russia, while simultaneously seeking to create trust in that the stability of the region will continue (Holst, 1967). Holst argues that it is important for a small state such as Norway to seek a security policy that ensures its own interests, but also not provoke the threat of Russia. Norway's membership in NATO is one factor of deterrence that will help secure its interests while self-imposed restrictions concerning foreign bases and nuclear weapons in Norway and consistent communication with Russia are factors of assurance of its commitment to stability and peace between Norway and NATO and Russia in the region.

The importance of deterrence and assurance as a strategy towards Russia is also highlighted in the strategic plan of the Norwegian Ministry of Defense:

Regarding security policy, Norway is a small state and is dependent on working and stable relations between states. Norway has a fundamental interest to protect an international legal order and international agreements and norms where law triumphs over power. The attachment to the Western security collective remains decisive for the defense of Norway. NATO-membership and the collective security guarantee is the cornerstone in Norwegian security policy. At the same time, a stable and predictable relationship with Russia is important for Norwegian security. A long-term goal will continue to be the balancing of deterrence and assurance in our relationship with Russia, especially in the High North (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 23).

This balancing act which has been Norway's strategy since the Cold War has been relevant for a long time. The focus of the "balance" has been adjusted when faced with changing strategic circumstances. This balancing strategy can create the need for a greater focus on assurance in times when the state has undertaken deterrence measures, and vice versa. However, the word "balance" may lead to an understanding that measures taken to deter Russia must be countered with an equal amount of assurance to maintain the balance between the two (Oma, 2021). The purchase of fighter jets from the USA is a measure of deterrence, but not flying them close to the border with Russia as a restriction on the use of them cannot

be said to even the balance between deterrence and assurance because the “sizes” of the two measures are hardly comparable. Economic and social cooperation programs between Norway and Russia can also hardly be seen as measures “balancing” the scale to a more even point when compared to having foreign military forces continuously present on rotational basis (Oma, 2021; Bjur, 2022).

3.4.1 Security dilemma

The security dilemma depicts a situation in international security politics where the measures taken to increase a state’s own security decreases the security of others. This is because one actor cannot know for certain that the military capacities of the other state are purely for defensive purposes, which leads the other state to increase their security resulting in a self-reinforcing feedback loop where both states are unsure of the other’s intentions, and both are greatly increasing their military capacity (Jervis, 1978). Jervis argues that it is crucial if there is a detectable distinction between defensive or offensive military capacities. If it is detectable and one state acquires purely defensive weapons, it is possible for a state to make itself more secure while not reducing the security of the other state. Tang (2009) however, argues that weapons that are primarily for defensive purposes will still have offensive capabilities. This can then result in the same situation as Jervis explains and may lead to the threat of war.

When both states are arming themselves for defensive purposes, but it still leads to war, the main source of the war is misunderstandings and miscommunications between actors.

3.5 Relevance of smart power in Norwegian security policy

I have in this chapter given definitions and explanations of key concepts and theories that I use in this thesis. While Nye and others developed and used the theory of smart power in the context of the USA’s foreign policy goals, it is still relevant for a small state such as Norway which is located on the Northern flank of NATO, and neighbors of Russia. While Norway is a part of a military alliance with NATO it has maintained a good relationship with Russia. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the security landscape of Europe and the world was changed forever, and for the worse. Norway is again NATO’s front on the northern flank of the alliance in a situation with heightened security concerns.

Smart power theory and its need for contextual intelligence to be strategically implemented in a country’s security and foreign policy (Nye, 2009) is closely linked with deterrence and assurance in the context of Norway’s security and foreign policy towards Russia. The security

landscape of the world is changing, and while Norway is trying to provide both security for its own people and the alliance it is also attempting to keep the tensions low between Norway and Russia and NATO and Russia in the Arctic to counter a possible spillover effect from the war in Ukraine.

4 Methodological framework

4.1 Introduction

The main objective of my study will be to answer the research question of whether Norway's balancing strategy towards Russia has changed, and if so how, after the start of the war between Ukraine and Russia. To answer this question, I have conducted a document analysis and thematic analysis of publicly accessible documents from the Norwegian government. Deeper examination of documentary data gives us a better in-depth understanding of the development in the relationship between Norway and Russia from a Norwegian stance during the first six months of the war. In this chapter I present my considerations and the basis for my choices concerning my approach to best answer this research question. I examine the validity and reliability of this study, ethical and reflexive considerations regarding my position as a researcher, and the challenges and limitations for the methods I have chosen.

4.2 Research design

Deterrence and assurance are not objective units of measurements, and I have therefore chosen a qualitative research approach. I will examine and interpret the Norwegian government's security policy. To best be able to answer this question I have taken an interpretivist epistemological position which is concerned with giving meaning and understanding to the social world through interpretation of data, and a constructionist ontological position, focusing on social phenomena being outcomes of social interactions (Bryman, 2012; Silverman, 2015). This approach to research leads to it being inductive where theory is generated from research. As the aim of my research is to examine whether Norway's security strategy towards Russia has changed after the ongoing war in Ukraine that started on 24 February 2022, and without knowing how long it may last, I decided on a cross-sectional approach to data collection where all the data was gathered at one point in time.

I considered different methods to employ for this research, debating whether to use discourse analysis, focusing on how the Norwegian government communicates their view of the ongoing war in Ukraine with an emphasis on language used, or semi-structured interviews

where I would seek to interview subject matter experts on their understanding of Norwegian security policy. I decided to conduct document analysis and thematic analysis as my methods for answering my research question. Discourse analysis, document analysis and thematic analysis are all closely related in the way they gather historical documents available, review them, note down recurring themes, and interpret them. Discourse analysis as a method is more focused on the language used in these texts and the way they communicate and structure the way we understand social reality (Tonkiss, 2017). Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing, evaluating and interpreting documents in order to elicit meaning and generate knowledge (Bowen, 2009). As a research method, document analysis is applicable to qualitative research as it gives access and produces rich descriptions of phenomena and events. It is also a good way to track changes and developments over time (Bowen, 2009). Conducting interviews for my research would be too time-consuming for me, and discourse analysis did not fit well with my research aim. Document analysis was chosen because of several factors, some of them being: its efficiency, seeing as they require less time for data collection; ease of accessibility – the documents that were relevant to my study are openly accessible and were all gathered from the Norwegian government’s official website; and the content of the documents are not affected by subjective the presence of the researcher. This method was also considered to be the most viable one seeing as the official documents from the Norwegian government is considered to reflect the political plans and ambitions of the government. I have also adopted a hermeneutical approach to the data collected in attempting to bring out the meaning of the texts gathered from the perspective of the Norwegian government, keeping in mind the time and context it was written (Bryman, 2012).

As openly accessible government documents act as my primary sources, I used the Norwegian governments official website to search for Norwegian military strategic plans and documents, Norway’s High North Strategy and press releases connected to the war in Ukraine. While the military strategic plan and High North strategy are strategic documents meant for plans spanning several years were released before the invasion of Ukraine, the press releases of the Norwegian government act as reactions to the war in Ukraine.

From the Norwegian governments official website, I have collected press releases from different relevant departments that are responsible for different factors that may affect Norway’s relationship with, and strategy towards, Russia. The time period I used for searching for relevant documents was between 24 February 2022 and 24 August 2022, the

first six months of the war in Ukraine. In sum, the criteria for my data collection of documents released after the start of the war was:

- Documents released between 24 February 2022 – 24 August February 2022.
- Documents authored and released by the Norwegian government.
- Documents relevant for my research question.

I considered including interviews given to the media but decided to exclude that type of data as the press releases already have comments from the government officials on the relevant topic. I therefore considered the press releases to be sufficient for my data collection and further analysis.

The documents' relevance for my research question are highly contingent on my interpretation of the meaning of the document. It was therefore difficult to set predetermined keywords to search for. Instead, it was necessary to use a hermeneutical approach, where the whole document needed to be assessed to decide whether to include it or not. This was also an iterative process, where after having gained a deeper understanding of the issue, documents were revisited to again be evaluated with new knowledge and understanding of the context and situation.

4.2.1 Method of analysis

In addition to document analysis, I have conducted thematic analysis of the gathered data. Thematic analysis is a method for systematically identifying emerging themes which become categories for further analysis (Bowen, 2009; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Braun & Clarke, 2012). The current Norwegian military strategic plan was approved by the Norwegian government on 16 October 2020 and is valid for the period 2021-2024. However, due to the war in Ukraine the Norwegian minister of defense requested a new long-term plan for the Norwegian military with a planned release on 31 May 2023 (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2022 11 November). The current High North strategy of the Norwegian government was released on 27 November 2020. Both documents were compared to the documents collected between 24 February 2022 and 24 August 2022 to assess any changes in Norwegian security policy towards Russia.

Summed up, the process of analysis included reviewing the data and making notes along the way, reading the documents more thoroughly and categorizing the data into themes, searching for developing patterns and broader and more narrow patterns (Peterson, 2017; Javadi & Zarea, 2016).

4.3 Validity and reliability

Validity of research is concerned with the integrity of the research conducted and the conclusions generated from research. Reliability is concerned with whether the results of a study are repeatable by other researchers and are important when establishing and assessing the quality of research (Bryman, 2012; Silverman, 2015). Internal validity concerns whether the research examines what it is meant to examine. It also has a focus on the causality of whether the collected data and assessment made lead to a logical conclusion when matched with the theoretical ideas used in the research (Bryman, 2012). External validity concerns itself with the question of whether the findings of the research can be generalized and transferred to other situations and contexts. I consider the internal validity of this study to be secure because of the use of international relations theory and the official Norwegian security policy towards Russia. The Norwegian government authored and released the data collected and is therefore considered to reflect the government's ambitions. The external validity however is not intact. This study does not seek to generalize but instead focuses on gathering data and analyzing it for a specific situation, for a specific country, in a specific context, and in a specific time.

As reliability is concerned with the study that can be reproduced by different researchers and produce the same outcome, which is a criterion difficult to meet in a qualitative study. For qualitative research a different way of making the study more reliable is to make the research process as transparent as possible for the reader, both from data collection and analysis, as well as from which theoretical position the interpretation is taking place (Bryman, 2012; Silverman, 2015). From my interpretivist epistemological position and constructionist ontological position my research is highly subjective. What I consider to be deterring or assuring factors may be interpreted differently by another researcher. In an attempt to secure reliability, I have tried to describe my research process in this chapter, how and from where I collected data, and made clear from which theoretical stance I will interpret the data.

4.4 Reflexivity and ethical considerations

4.4.1 Researcher's role and position

All of qualitative research is contextual, where it occurs within a specific time and space. It is assumed that who the researcher is as a person and what values they hold make a difference in the findings of their study – objectivity of the research is not present (Dodgson, 2019).

Having acknowledged that no researcher is devoid of values it is important for me to examine

my own study of biases and assess how my position and values may have affected my findings and analysis. My values and biases have led me to first choosing to study Peace and Conflict studies, choosing which field I would focus on and write my master's thesis, and formulating my research question and choosing the fitting method for the study.

I have chosen a qualitative research approach using document analysis as a method as I consider this to be the best suited method to answer my research question. It also provides a challenge that at least should be mentioned for the reader of this study. Written documents can be interpreted in several different ways, and thus can be challenging for the researcher and the study itself. The interpretation of the texts is highly contingent on the academic skills of the researcher, the background knowledge of the issue being studied, and the trust the researcher gives the author of the texts. I, the researcher of this study, was born and raised in Norway, am interested in international politics and Norwegian security policy and have studied Peace and Conflict Transformation at the University of Tromsø. I also follow Western news where I get my main source of information about the ongoing war in Ukraine and Norway's security concerns and policies. I also have a high degree of trust of the Norwegian government and have worked in the Norwegian military for several years. My bias and interpretation of the data collected is likely to be vastly different than for example a student that is critical of NATO, Western support for Ukraine, and sees aggression from NATO and Ukraine as the lead cause of the war between Russia and Ukraine.

This is my first academic research project and first time employing qualitative research methods in this scope. As Dodgson (2019) claims, if a researcher clearly describes the contextual relationship between the researcher and the data collected it increases the creditability of the findings and deepens the readers understanding of the work. I hope the short introduction above has given the reader a better understanding of my personal stance on the study, the data collected and used, and any biases I bring with me into, and throughout the study. While I consider it to be impossible to rid oneself of bias when interpreting qualitative data, I have tried to be aware of them throughout the study.

4.4.2 Ethical considerations

Ethical factors to keep in mind such as do no harm, lack of informed consent, protection of participants' identities, and deception are less relevant in this particular study seeing as I have not conducted any interviews or interacted with other people for this study but have instead used openly available documents from publicly available sources. I do however recognize the

importance of being aware of my own position in relation to the study to avoid letting them interfere with my research.

4.4.3 Methodological limitations

Deterrence and assurance in this context are not “objective” units of measurements. There is not a single definition of factors and measures that are deterring or assuring. The measures taken can be interpreted as assuring for one actor and deterring for another and affected by their security/political environment. Procurement military equipment by Norway can be thought out to be deterring but may have an assuring effect on Russia because this may lessen the need for allied NATO-forces in Norway. It is therefore challenging to interpret every measure taken and assess whether it is assuring or deterring. Instead, I have focused on what is the likely meant to be the desired effect of different measures. In addition to these challenges, there is no set “amount” of deterrence or assurance in place when this study started or before the beginning of the war in Ukraine. To mitigate these challenges to some degree I have attempted to see the whole picture of Norway and Russia’s relationship and the desired relationship between the two countries from Norway’s stance before the invasion of Ukraine and compare it with changes over time. I consider the sources from the Norwegian government to be of high trustworthiness and a good fit to answer my research question.

As stated previously in this chapter, I have taken an interpretivist epistemological position as a researcher. Therefore, the sources I have chosen and the way I have interpreted them is likely different from how another researcher would interpret them. It is also possible that my interpretation of the data contrasts with the meaning the author intended for the data. The Norwegian government’s publication of policy documents is my main primary source for data. Therefore, it is difficult to conduct triangulation during the data collection, and there is a chance that I have missed out on important data. Interviews of government officials would have been a good way to triangulate data for this research project. However, I considered it to be too time consuming, and for it to add more value to the available documents online the people interviewed would have had to have given more, and new information than has been published online. Due to this subject being highly sensitive it is possible that I as a researcher, and the people being interviewed would have been challenged with classification of government documents not to be released to the public. Ultimately the ease of access to the data material and its efficiency was the deciding factor for conducting document analysis and thematic analysis of government documents. However, regarding triangulation, my secondary

sources will help support or oppose my interpretation of the data analysis and interpretation of the analysis using established theories and concepts.

I examine a currently ongoing situation in Europe and the relationship between Norway and Russia is continuously evolving. Because there is a lack of temporal distance to the situation I am studying, it is imperative to examine it in a larger perspective and with more data available from several different sources. Another challenge related to the temporal factor is that it may be difficult to assess whether a strategy which has been in place for several decades has changed after only six months. On the other hand, much has happened during those first six months, more than the two preceding decades directly affecting the strategy of deterrence and assurance from Norway towards Russia. While this is the set timeframe, it is an artificially set period with relevant data available after the 24th of August as well. However, it is difficult to escape this fact, and it is a situation evolving still, so a cut off time was set to limit the data that I collected, analyzed, and interpreted.

Keeping these challenges in mind and trying to mitigate them as much as I can, I still believe that this study is sufficiently transparent for the reader and structured in a way that the conclusions are logically derived from the presented data and analysis.

5 Results and analysis

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter I present my method of data collection and analysis. I have conducted a thematic analysis of strategic documents from the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Department of Defense as well as press releases from the Norwegian government. The strategic documents were released before the war, communicating how would Norway approach Russia both bilaterally, multilaterally, for deterrence and for assurance. The press releases are in contrast reactionary statements showing what measures Norway implemented against Russia during the first six months of the war. In the following sections I explain how I conducted my analysis step by step for each type of documents. Here I use my theoretical framework in the two main themes of hard and soft power with their respective sub-themes.

5.2 Results of data collection

5.2.1 Norwegian strategic documents

I have decided to use two strategic documents of the Norwegian government that are relevant to explaining Norway's relationship with Russia before the war in Ukraine: The Norwegian military's long-term plan from the Department of Defense and the Norwegian government's High North Strategy from the Department of Foreign Affairs. I chose these documents because they are openly accessible online, and I consider them to represent the actual aspirations and ambitions relevant for Norway's relationship with Russia.

The strategic document for the Norwegian military is published by the Department of Defense and is meant to secure a long-term sustainable development of the Norwegian military based on updated assessments concerning among others security- and military-political surroundings and developments (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021). The plans for this development apply for 4 years at a time before another one is made. I will in this chapter present the relevant plan that was in place before the war in Ukraine started even though there is a new one in development because of Russia's invasion of Ukraine (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2022, 11 November). The High North Strategy is a strategic document focusing on Norway's ambitions in the Arctic (Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021). When reading the two documents I searched with the keyword "Russia" and read the chapters that were relevant for the relationship between Norway and Russia.

5.2.2 Press releases

In contrast to the strategic documents from the Department of Defense and Department of Foreign Affairs depicting Norway's long-term plans regarding the relationship with Russia, the press releases collected reveal Norway's real-time reactions to the developments of the war in Ukraine. Every press release collected were between 24 February 2022 and 24 August 2022 and were communications considered to be of relevance for the war in Ukraine. The press releases will later be compared to the strategic documents to assess whether Norway is changing its long-term strategic plans in relation to Russia, and if so, how.

Before I collected the data, I read through every press release online from relevant departments from the Norwegian government's official website. In total I collected 215 documents that were related to the war in Ukraine. The departments included were: Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Justice and Public

Security, Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Education and Research.

All of these documents had something to do with the war in Ukraine with different focus such as working with NATO, providing humanitarian aid, need for energy cooperation with EU etc. However, several of these were also documents focusing on giving information to the Norwegian public about previously implemented measures and other circumstances which were affected because of the war. After a review of these same documents 142 were considered to be relevant for further analysis.

In the following section I will go through the process of thematic analysis of the two different sources, press releases during the first six months of the war and the two strategic documents depicting Norway's strategy towards Russia before the war.

5.3 Analysis

In this section of the chapter, I present my analysis of the collected material, first from the press releases during the beginning of the war, and secondly from the strategic documents introduced in the previous section. During the analysis I generated codes/categories for the different documents which explained the focus or the meaning of the document. Several different categories and their meaning were later merged into a theme and different sub-themes. A theme in this sense is meant to say something about the data in relation to the research question and represents patterns of meaning (Braun & Clarke, 2006). I have primarily had a deductive and theoretical approach to my analysis where my theoretical framework has helped guide the coding and analysis of the collected data. However, I also had a mixed approach using inductive coding because of the new and deeper knowledge I got from reading and re-reading the documents. From this new categories and sub-themes for analysis were made. Braun and Clarke (2006; 2012) also state that thematic analysis is rarely done in a purely deductive or inductive way when generating codes and themes. The deductive approach guided me in choosing the main themes and some sub-themes for the analysis, while the inductive approach allowed room for the dataset to give new codes and sub-themes for the main themes where it seemed relevant. Another decision I made was to approach the thematic analysis at a latent level instead of at the semantic level. By using a latent approach, I examined the underlying meaning of the content by having a more

interpretative approach to the data instead of focusing primarily on the information that is at the surface level and what is written when using the semantic approach (Braun & Clarke, 2006). I chose the latent approach because I was more interested in the context and deeper meaning behind different measures taken during the beginning of the war than what was explicitly included in the press releases. The latent approach was also better suited when reviewing the strategic documents that applied for the Norwegian strategy concerning Norway's relationship with Russia.

Braun & Clarke (2006) provides a 6-step guide to conducting thematic analysis:

- Step 1: Familiarization with data.
- Step 2: Generating codes.
- Step 3: Searching for themes.
- Step 4: Reviewing themes.
- Step 5: Defining and naming themes.
- Step 6: Producing the report.

I conducted the first step, familiarization with the data before and during the main data collection and before beginning coding and categorizing the different topics present in the data collected. For the second step I had some challenge with determining what is relevant and not. An example of that is donations of weapons to Ukraine from Norway was obviously relevant for me and easy to code. However, financial measures taken, although seemingly not directly related to Russia, but rather for cooperation with the EU on matters not directly related to the war in Ukraine can still be relevant. But it was difficult for me to assess this and therefore excluded. Therefore, As Braun & Clarke (2006) states, coding of the content of the data was necessarily a mix between the descriptive and interpretive.

5.3.1 Norwegian strategic documents

Coding the dataset

Before coding relevant passages of the two strategic documents, I read through the document searching for passages where Russia was a relevant topic and got familiar with the contents of the documents. The relevant chapters used are shown in appendix 1 and 2.

For step two of the analysis process, I generated 10 different codes considered to be relevant. In contrast to the press releases being the result of the developing situation in Ukraine, I used

different chapters and sub-chapters as sections for analysis. Below is a description of the codes I generated from the strategic plans from the Department of Defense and the Department of Foreign Affairs:

1. Russia as an increased threat: This category includes passages where The Norwegian government states that Russia is seen as a threat, and in recent times has become an increased threat mainly because of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014.
2. Importance of deterrence and assurance as a strategy: This category includes passages where the state, mostly the Department of Defense, made it clear that deterrence and assurance has been and will continue to be Norway's strategic approach towards Russia.
3. Deterrence and importance of NATO: This category focuses on NATO being the cornerstone of Norwegian security policy and that Norway's membership in NATO makes up the larger part of military deterrence against other threats.
4. Deterrence through own military: This category focuses on the need of not entirely relying on NATO, but that Norway's own military needs to be a part of the larger deterrence strategy and taking the main responsibility for its own security.
5. Nordic deterrence: This category focuses on passages where it is made clear that Nordic security has become increasingly important. While NATO is a large part of Norway's deterrence, Norway has a close military cooperation with the other Nordic countries.
6. Open communication with Russia: This category mainly focuses on the need for open communication with Russia despite a worsened bilateral relationship and decreased communication because of Russia's annexation of Crimea.
7. Stable and predictable relationship with Russia: This category includes passages where the importance of acting in a manner that promotes predictability and stability in the region is highlighted.
8. Arctic being a peaceful region: This category includes passages where the Arctic is highlighted as a peaceful region because of the multilateral and bilateral cooperation between the countries in the Arctic.

9. Assurance towards Russia: This category includes passages where deterrence and assurance as a strategy is in focus. The assuring factors are highlighted together with the deterring factors.

10. Cooperation with Russia: This category includes the relevant passages where bilateral and multilateral cooperation between Russia and Norway within different focus areas is highlighted.

It is important to note that one section may be relevant for several different codes. An example of this is chapter 2.4.2 on Norway's strategic position in the North

(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021) which is relevant for the following categories:

Importance of deterrence and assurance as a strategy, deterrence and importance of NATO, deterrence through own military, stable and predictable relationship with Russia, and assurance towards Russia.

I decided to not include the categories focusing on Russia as an increased threat because these passages were more in support or a justification for other categories, rather than clearly being a hard or soft power stance (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021; Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021). The category focusing on the importance of deterrence and assurance as a strategy was also excluded from further analysis. This is because, as I have argued in previous chapters, deterrence and assurance is being analyzed as a smart power strategy, and I therefore examine how the combination of hard (deterrence) and soft (assurance) power are being used together as a strategy. The focus on deterrence and assurance as a strategy also state clearly that even though this has been a well-functioning strategy towards Russia for a long time it will change in response to developments with the general security and political situation in Europe and the world (Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 24).

Themes and sub-themes

As the strategic documents used in this analysis have a different intention, and content than the press releases. The strategic documents were relevant and in place before war in Ukraine started and therefore state Norway's ambitions towards Russia within security and foreign relations. In contrast the analyzed press releases convey Norway's reactions to the developing situation in Ukraine during the first six months of the war. I used a deductive theoretical approach to the analysis and decided on two relevant main themes: hard power and soft power. I had a mix between a theoretical deductive and inductive approach when searching

for and defining the sub-themes. The different themes and number of relevant passages where they appear, and from which strategic document are presented below:

Hard power		
Sub-themes	Military strategy	Foreign policy strategy
Deterrence through own military	2	1
Deterrence through allies	6	4

Table 1: Hard power theme and sub-themes

Soft power		
Sub-Themes	Military strategy	Foreign policy strategy
Assurance towards Russia	3	1
Open communication with Russia	2	2
Stable and predictable relationship with Russia	4	5
Cooperation with Russia	1	22

Table 2: Soft power theme and sub-themes

Another circumstance I examined was whether the hard and soft power themes from the Norwegian government had a focus on being a multilateral- or bilateral effort.

Hard Power	Soft power
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Bilateral focus	4	Bilateral focus	25
Multilateral focus	11	Multilateral focus	13

Table 3: Strategic documents - Hard and soft power efforts with bilateral and multilateral focus

The table above show a distinction in how the Norwegian security and foreign policy effort and plans towards Russia is intended. The hard power effort for deterring Russia is mainly focused on a multilateral effort with Norwegian allies, while the soft power effort towards Russia is mainly focused on bilateral effort of cooperation as an assurance.

While the press releases are reactions to ongoing events, the strategic documents say something about how the relationship between Norway and Russia perceived by the government, why the relationship is like it is stated, and what Norway will do in the future to continue developing the relationship. The different chapters and relevant passages in the two documents are relevant for several different sub-themes and main themes. For example, NATO is highlighted as being the main deterring factor for Norwegian security, while also communicating that Norwegian military presence and operations act as an assuring factor because it secures predictability and stability in the region.

Hard power

Deterrence through own military

In the strategic document from the Department of Defense and Department of Foreign Affairs, deterrence through Norway's own military is seen together with deterrence from allied military forces from NATO (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 22, 24; Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 24). In the same sense as it is together with deterrence from allies, Norwegian military presence and deterrence is also highlighted to be an assuring factor because Norwegian presence and operations in the borderland between Norway and Russia is predictable and therefore leads to stability. The Norwegian military is therefore a deterring factor when combined with NATO forces, while simultaneously being an assuring factor because of the predictability and stability the Norwegian military represents in the Arctic.

Deterrence through allies

This sub-theme is focused on the sections where allied military cooperation and presence is seen as being a deterring factor towards Russia. Deterrence through Norway's membership in

NATO and its collective security guarantee is highlighted as the most important factor in Norwegian security policy in the military strategic plan (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 23). This is seen as the main deterring factor against Russia, but military cooperation between the Nordic countries is highlighted as well, also commenting on that a conflict in one of the Nordic countries will likely involve the whole region. While this military cooperation between Norway and its allies in the Arctic is very important, it is highlighted that this needs to be done in a way that reduces any tension and instead promotes stability and predictability (Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 24).

Soft power

Assurance towards Russia

This sub-theme of soft power is focused on the relevant passages where assuring measures from Norway towards Russia is highlighted. Assurances towards Russia are seen as a part of the larger strategy of deterrence and assurance. It focuses on maintaining assuring measures such as restrictions on foreign military activity and nuclear policy (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 22; Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 24). In relation to deterring measures, the focus is also on Norway taking more responsibility in its close area of operations as NATO's northern flank, arguing that if this is not done by Norway, allied countries in NATO will instead fill this gap. Norwegian presence is then argued to be of high importance as this promotes stability and predictability.

Open communication with Russia

In close relation to the other sub-themes of soft power, this sub-theme focuses on the communicated importance in the documents of maintaining necessary open communication with Russia. This is mainly focused on Norwegian and allied military activity in the Arctic as well as communication related to areas of cooperation between Norway and Russia. Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 reduced the communication between Norway and Russia, but important lines of communication between the militaries of the countries remains (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021, p 35; Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 26).

Stable and predictable relationship with Russia

This sub-theme focuses on sections where maintaining and promoting a stable and predictable relationship between Norway and Russia is highlighted. For the military strategic plan this focus is communicated together with hard power sub-themes such as deterrence through Norway's own military. Norwegian military operations in the Arctic are seen as a factor

which supports stability and predictability because these are a part of regular activity which Russia can expect. It is also highlighted that it is important that it is Norway that is the main actor from NATO operating in this region, instead of letting others take control of these operations (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 24). The stability of the Arctic region and Norway's relationship with Russia is also highlighted by the Department of Foreign Affairs, but it focuses more on Norway's effort over several years to promote cooperation through bilateral and multilateral forums to ensure this stability is maintained (Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 10).

Cooperation with Russia

This sub-theme focuses on sections where either bilateral or multilateral cooperation with Russia is highlighted as an assuring factor. The Department of Defense focuses on cooperation with Russia in matters of security in the Arctic (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 35). The Department of Foreign Affairs on the other hand focuses on the importance of the several areas where Norway and Russia cooperate. Bilateral cooperation on sustainable management of fisheries is highlighted as being very important. Other agreements of cooperation include areas of cultural, academic, environmental, health, safety, and economic significance (Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021). These areas of cooperation are not only for ensuring a stable and peaceful relationship with Russia, but also to develop possibilities for the people living in Northern Norway and Northwestern Russia. The Barents cooperation and the Arctic Council are highlighted as arenas for multilateral cooperation ensuring a stable and peaceful region (Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021).

Main findings

The strategic documents from the Department of Defense and Department of Foreign Affairs I used in this analysis communicate the plans and ambitions of the Norwegian government in security- and foreign policy. In this analysis I have used them as the baseline of efforts of the Norwegian government to reach these ambitions before the war in Ukraine.

From my analysis, the main theme of hard power has a clear focus on deterrence through Norway's membership in NATO. The focus on deterrence through Norway's own military is stated as important as well, but in contrast to the deterrence through NATO it is more focused on Norwegian military presence and operations in the Arctic being a factor for predictability and stability in the region. This contradiction brings with it a soft power component into the hard power sub-theme of deterrence of Russia through the Norwegian military. From my

analysis there is also a clear focus on deterrence of Russia being a multilateral effort with NATO as the primary deterrent factor rather than Norway.

In contrast, the soft power theme has a focus on maintaining and developing bilateral cooperation. As argued above, some soft power efforts come forth through hard power efforts such as Norwegian military presence as a deterrence instead of it being allied military presence. While the cooperation and communication between Norway and Russia has been reduced as a consequence of the annexation of Crimea, Norway emphasizes the importance of continued bilateral and multilateral cooperation with Russia mainly through the Arctic Council and Barents Cooperation. These efforts are hailed as being determining factors in securing a long lasting stable, predictable, and peaceful Arctic region. The soft power efforts are spread out over several different lines such as military presence and cooperation, safety, cooperation on environment, health, education, culture, research, and economic development.

The two main themes are in some areas difficult to separate, showing a mix of efforts to both secure the hard power of deterrence and the soft power of assurance.

5.3.2 Press releases

Coding the dataset

For step two, generating codes, I worked primarily with 14 main codes. Each document was not bound to only one code but could entail several different ones. Below I will describe the codes I generated from the data and give a brief description of them.

1. Military equipment donations to Ukraine: This entails documents stating that Norway has donated material either directly to Ukraine, or in cooperation with a different country. However, it is possible that not all donations of military equipment to Ukraine have been released as on June 8 the Department of Defense stated that future donations may not be revealed to the public consecutively (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2022 June 8).
2. Training Ukrainian military forces: Includes documents where it is stated that Norway has or will train Ukrainian soldiers, either for a specific weapon system or in general.
3. Norwegian show of force: Includes documents either focusing on measures taken to increase the Norwegian military or security forces in Norway, or extending deployment of Norwegian forces present at the NATO operation in Lithuania, Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP).

4. Sanctions against Russia: Includes economic sanctions taken against Russia, excluding Russia from multilateral organizations such as the Arctic Council and similar organizations, and expelling diplomats from Norway.
5. Condemnation of Russia: Includes statements condemning Russia's actions both in Russia and in Ukraine.
6. Bilateral cooperation with Russia: Includes statements where the importance of continued bilateral cooperation with Russia in some sectors where it is considered necessary by the Norwegian government. This category from the coding also had different sub-categories focusing on cooperation with Russia within: Fisheries, search and rescue and safety, and research.
7. Importance of open communication with Russia: Includes statements with the emphasis on importance of continued dialogue with Russia. This category also had different sub-categories focusing on: necessary communication with Russia, and communication with and towards Russia highlighting the importance of stability and predictability between Norway and Russia.
8. Humanitarian aid: Includes documents where Norway's humanitarian aid for Ukraine and other European countries are highlighted.
9. Support for NATO: Includes statements giving support to and stating the importance of cooperation within NATO.
10. Support for Nordic countries: Includes statements giving support to and stating the importance of cooperation with the Nordic countries.
11. Support for Baltic countries: Includes statements giving support to and stating the importance of cooperation with the Baltic countries.
12. Support for USA: Includes statements giving support to and stating the importance of cooperation with USA.
13. Support for European Union (EU)/Europe: Includes statements giving support to the EU or Europe as a whole. Some of the statements were focused on energy policy, humanitarian aid cooperation, security etc.
14. Support for international organizations: Includes statements focusing on supporting different international organizations such as the United Nations, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, Arctic Council etc.

Being content with the amount and descriptive value of the generated codes I moved on to the next three steps: searching for themes, reviewing themes, and defining and naming themes.

As introduced earlier, I had a theoretical/deductive approach to this analysis and therefore my two main themes for this analysis were hard and soft power measures taken by the Norwegian government. When searching for themes and sub-themes within the coded data I again had to reassess which of the documents and categories had a thematic relevance. This resulted in a decrease from 142 to 88 relevant documents. The thematic relevant documents for my analysis are presented in appendix 3.

This decrease is mainly due to not including documents which were only condemnations of Russia’s actions, either bilaterally or as a part of a larger condemnation from the international and European community. Other documents that were excluded were press releases where the focus was on providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine and other countries because of the war. While condemnation of Russia can in this context be seen as a way of communicating a new stance towards Russia, I excluded them because the baseline of every press release is a condemnation of Russia and support for Ukraine. A similar consideration was made for providing humanitarian aid for Ukraine. While we can view this aid as helping Ukraine in every way possible, it was considered not to be a measure taken *against* Russia, but rather *for* Ukraine. The categories that focused on giving support for the EU/Europe and international organizations were connected to other measures. Some included condemnations of Russia, sanctions against Russia, military support for Ukraine. However, as I argued previously a condemnation of Russia in the UN security council or giving humanitarian aid through the Red Cross were not considered to be relevant enough as a measure taken to construct a sub-theme.

Themes and sub-themes

My two main themes for the data collected and coded from the press releases were measures taken by the Norwegian government that I considered to be a component of hard power or soft power. For the hard power theme, I developed four different sub-themes. The different sub-themes and the number of times they appear in the press releases are presented below:

Hard power measures – press releases	
Military contribution	14
Sanctions against Russia	23

Force Projection	18
Tightening military alliances	58
Total number of press releases	87

Table 4: Hard power theme and sub-themes.

For the soft power theme, I developed five different sub-themes which are presented below along with the number of times they appear in the press releases:

Soft power measures – press releases	
Urging communication with Russia	6
Cooperation on fisheries	3
Cooperation on safety	4
Cooperation on research	1
Seeking stability and predictability	4
Total number of press releases	10

Table 5: Soft power theme and sub-themes

Table 5 and 6 give an overview of the focus of the press releases collected and considered relevant. It is important to note that often the content of one press-release was relevant for several different sub-themes. A single press release could also have both hard power measures as well as soft power measures. Another circumstance I considered to be highly relevant was whether these measures were taken multilaterally in cooperation with other countries and organizations such as NATO, the Nordic countries, and/or the EU, or if they were taken bilaterally between Norway and Russia. The table below shows the difference between multilateral and bilateral focus for hard and soft power measures taken during the relevant time period.

Hard Power	Soft power
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Bilateral focus	9	Bilateral focus	9
Multilateral focus	78	Multilateral focus	1

Table 6: Press releases - Hard and soft power measures with bilateral and multilateral focus.

The tables above show a clear difference between hard and soft power measures taken and the focus of the Norwegian government during the first six months of the war. Below, the hard and soft power measures are shown over time:




Figure 1: Development of hard and soft power measures over time

As Figure 1 shows, hard power measures were taken continuously during the whole period. The Norwegian government reacted with the most instances of hard power measures during March and then had a steady decline until July. During March, Norway had reacted with donating military equipment and weapons to Ukraine, enacted sanctions against Russia, suspended cooperation with Russia in the Barents Cooperation and Arctic Council, and increased funds for Norwegian military- and security forces. During April, this trend continued with Norway donating more military equipment to Ukraine and enacting new sanctions against Russia. Already in March, Norway had reacted with the harshest hard power measures towards Russia. The following months consisted primarily of continuing,

maintaining, and escalating these measures taken which are presented as the sub-themes of hard power in the next section.

Interestingly, the soft power reactions of the Norwegian government were primarily communicated along with hard power measures taken. As the government is reacting with hard power against Russia it simultaneously communicates the importance of maintaining some important cooperation with Russia. In addition to the soft power measures primarily being a part of hard power measures taken, they are also primarily focused on the bilateral relationship between Norway and Russia. This is shown above in table 5, where the hard power measures focus on the multilateral effort of Norway's allies which are in a clear contrast to the soft power measures that have a bilateral focus.

The section above is meant to give an overview of the main themes, hard and soft power, and their sub-themes. It also gives a brief overview of whether the focus of the measures taken were in cooperation with other allies such as NATO or Nordic countries, or if they were focused on Norway's bilateral relationship with Russia. In the next section I present the different themes used in this analysis more closely and present which codes/categories from step 2 of the analysis make up the theme.

Hard Power

Military contributions to Ukraine

This sub-theme includes donations of military equipment, either for defensive or offensive purposes, and training of Ukrainian soldiers by Norwegian military personnel. The first donation of military contribution to Ukraine was informed on 27 February and included protective gear (Statsministerens kontor, 2022 February 27). The first document informing of donation of weapons to Ukraine was on 28 February. The Norwegian government makes it clear that this is an extraordinary situation, and that Norway is doing this in cooperation with its allies (Statsministerens kontor, 2022 February 28). The donations of military equipment continued to increase during the first six months and Norway also donated artillery (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2022 June 8) to Ukraine, while continuing the trend of emphasizing that it is done in cooperation with other allies.

Sanctions against Russia

Sanctions against Russia include both economic sanctions, expelling diplomats, directing Russia to be investigated by the International Criminal Court (ICC), and excluding Russia

from different multilateral forums. The Prime Minister informed on February 27 (Statsministerens kontor) that Norway would join EU's sanctions against Russia. The Minister of Fisheries also makes it clear that Norway will not sanction Russia alone but is committed to working with the EU (Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2022 March 21). This stance continues throughout the period, but Norway has also expelled Russian diplomats from Norway because of Russia's actions in Ukraine (Utenriksdepartementet, 2022 6 April). Other sanctions also include suspension of cooperation between Norway and Russia in important multilateral forums that have existed for a long time such as the Arctic Council and the Barents Euro-Arctic Cooperation (Utenriksdepartementet, 2022 March 3; Utenriksdepartementet, 2022 March 9).

Force projection against Russia

I considered force projection to include increasing the capacity of Norway's military and security forces, as well as contributions and extensions of ongoing NATO operations such as EFP in Lithuania. The statements on increasing Norway's own military and security capacity are focused on Northern Norway (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2022 March 18; Justis- og beredskapsdepartementet, 2022 March 18). The statements on extending and supporting the ongoing NATO EFP operation in Lithuania Norway highlights solidarity and cooperation within NATO and the importance of NATO's eastern flank (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2022 April 11).

Tightening and focusing on Norwegian military alliances

While the previous sub-themes have focused on actual measures directly taken because of the war in Ukraine, this focuses on statements and agreements made on a political level. The statements are more aimed at assuring NATO, the Nordic and Baltic countries of Norway's support. This also includes the finalizing of agreements that were made before the war, that were communicated in a different context such as a military agreement between Norway and the USA that was agreed upon in 2021 (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2022 April 8). Some of the documents are relevant for several different relevant sub-themes. As a consequence, this one also includes documents that had a focus on donations of military equipment, emphasizing that it is done in cooperation with other allied countries. Because of the focus on it being an allied effort, those documents are relevant for this theme as well. Regarding the political statements they are mostly focused on Nordic security and how Finland and Sweden's applications to NATO will increase both NATO's and Northern Europe's security

(Utenriksdepartementet, 2022 May 23). The statements focus on how the war in Ukraine is a watershed moment in European security and the importance of NATO. Further, they focus on the applications of Sweden and Finland to NATO, emphasizing how this will make the security in the Arctic and the Baltic Sea better, and viewed as one region instead of two separate regions of security concerns (Forsvarsdepartementet, August 9).

Soft power

Urging for, and stating the importance of communication between Norway and Russia Despite the hard power focus, the Norwegian government also urges for- and highlights the importance of continued open communication between Norway and Russia (Statsministerens kontor, 2022 February 24). These statements are primarily in connection to statements focusing on hard power measures taken in cooperation with other countries, but also with a focus on continued communication with Russia (Statsministerens kontor, 2022 June 29). This contradiction is also present in the sub-themes for the strategic documents and several of the different sub-themes. While Norway is cooperating with its close allies, it also attempts to ease the tension in the Arctic region when it is possible and applicable.

Cooperation on fisheries management

There have not been any new soft power measures regarding cooperation on fisheries. Therefore, the statements where this sub-theme is in focus comes from statements which primarily centre on hard power measures. The three statements relevant for this sub-theme all concern sanctions against Russia, but also states that this cooperation will continue despite sanctions (Utenriksdepartementet, 2022 March 5; Utenriksdepartementet, 2022 April 29; Nærings- og fiskeridepartementet, 2022 May 9).

Cooperation on safety

As the tensions between NATO and Russia grew, Norway highlighted cooperation with Russia on safety in the Arctic as being very important. The relevant statements primarily come in connection with other statements where different types of cooperation with Russia is highlighted. It is clearly stated that the cooperation on safety between Norway and Russia is because it is critically necessary (Utenriksdepartementet, 2022 March 5; Utenriksdepartementet, 2022 May 31). The bilateral cooperation on search and rescue in the Barents Sea is also shielded from the sanctions (Utenriksdepartementet, 2022 April 29). I did not find any relevant communications regarding suspension of the Incidents at Sea Agreement

(INCSEA), and therefore consider it to still be valid, and a part of the necessary cooperation related to safety.

Cooperation on research

There is only one press release that concerns cooperation with Russia on research which mainly concerns the suspension of cooperation with Russia on research and education (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2022 March 4). However, in the same statement, the state encouraged for continued researcher to researcher cooperation, and the institutions should themselves make an assessment if bilateral agreements are to be upheld or suspended. Therefore, this measure and sub-theme is more ambiguous than other sub-themes. This measure is also categorized as a hard power measure which fits in under the sub-theme “Sanctions against Russia”, but the ambiguity and communication of the statement reveals the fine line between soft and hard power in this instance. It also shows that they sometimes overlap. This is primarily because of the room that is left open for continued cooperation, while simultaneously expressing the importance of this cooperation with Russian educational institutions. Additionally, research vessels are excluded from sanctions against Russian vessels being allowed to dock in Norwegian ports (Utenriksdepartementet, 2022 April 29). While not restricting research vessels from docking in Norwegian ports may not be a bilateral cooperation, it is still a statement on what types of soft power mechanisms Norway wish to shield from sanctions.

Seeking to maintain stability and predictability in the Arctic

This sub-theme includes statements where the focus is on assuring for and highlighting the importance of maintaining the Arctic as a stable region and that Norway will continue to act in a predictable manner. The four press releases relevant for this sub-theme are all also relevant for hard power sub-themes. This is because the relevant documents are primarily focused on Norwegian military capacity and strengthening of military alliances, while also making assurances towards Russia that Norway is committed to a stable and predictable relationship (Statsministerens kontor, 2022 March 1). While Norway focuses on the importance of Finland and Sweden joining NATO and how this will make the Nordic region more secure, they also highlight the importance of not being a threat to anyone while maintaining peace and stability in the region (Statsministerens kontor, 2022 May 16). This focus is also present when stating the importance of Norway’s relationship with Russia for Norway’s security, while simultaneously assuring that this does not change Norway’s

approach to its relationship with Russia, focusing on stability, predictability, and peace (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2022 April 8).

Main findings

The press releases I collected and analyzed show the reactions of the Norwegian government to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In contrast to the strategic documents that show the efforts Norway will focus on for security and foreign political ambitions, the press releases show reactionary measures taken by the Norwegian government in a developing situation.

My analysis of the press releases shows that the hard power measures taken by Norway have a clear multilateral focus. Hard power measures were quickly taken in cooperation with Norway's allies in the beginning of the war and have been maintained throughout the whole period. While Norway has cooperated with other NATO countries and the EU on supplying Ukraine with weapons and imposed sanctions on Russia, Norway has also had a clear focus on strengthening its ties with military allies, both multilaterally and bilaterally with specific countries, and strengthening its own military and security. While Norway has joined in the economic sanctions led by the EU, it has also joined in on suspending cooperation with Russia in important bilateral and multilateral forums such as the Arctic Council and Barents Euro-Arctic Council, both of which have a long history of successfully contributing to a stable and peaceful region. The hard power stance Norway took in the beginning of the war has been stable through the whole period with a difference in the number of measures taken. Most of them were taken during the beginning of the war, and then maintained and supplemented throughout the period in question.

The soft power measures taken by Norway have a clear focus on the bilateral relationship between Norway and Russia. I found the presence of these measures primarily in connection to hard power measures. Therefore, they are not necessarily soft power measures *taken*, but rather not included in hard power measures taken. This is exemplified in instances where Norway reacts with a hard power measure, but also states the importance of communicating and cooperating with Russia. Norway and Russia's cooperation on fisheries management is also an example of this. It is seen as a soft power measure because of it not being included as a part of sanctions against Russia. It is therefore the absence of it being a hard power measure that makes it a soft power measure. While this is the main trend for the soft power measures, Norway still states that this cooperation and communication is of critical necessity for reasons concerning safety and sustainability. It might then be more suitable to regard these as soft

power factors rather than measures because they are not measures taken, but rather soft power mechanisms that have been left out of hard power measures.

My analysis shows a clear difference in focus on hard and soft power measures. The hard power measures are clearly a part of Western hard power measures, which Norway also makes clear. The soft power measures are in contrast clearly focused on bilateral communication and cooperation. These measures are for ensuring safety in the Arctic region and a necessary minimum of cooperation for economic and environmental reasons.

5.4 Concluding remarks

In this chapter I have presented the collected documents and explained my reasoning for the analysis and the thematic categorization for their content. I have used these two types of documents to answer my research question of if and how Norway has changed their strategy of deterrence and assurance towards Russia. The strategic documents act as long-term plans explaining how Norway seeks to focus their efforts to secure continuation of deterrence and assurance towards Russia. These documents therefore explain Norway's focus before the war in Ukraine. In contrast, the press releases are reactions to the developing war in Ukraine. For both types of documents, I developed two main themes: hard and soft power, each with different sub-themes.

The hard power theme of the strategic documents focuses heavily on Norwegian and NATO military power being the deterring factor against Russia. NATO is also highlighted as the cornerstone of Norwegian security policy. The hard power theme is then focused on a multilateral effort by Norway and its allies. The soft power theme of the strategic documents is more bilaterally focused on the relationship between Norway and Russia. This relationship and the assuring efforts focused on by Norway are made up of several multilateral forums, most notably the Arctic Council and Barents Cooperation, and bilateral cooperation agreements, some of them being economic development, safety in the Arctic region, and research. One difficulty in separating the themes clearly from each other comes forth in Norwegian military power being a deterring effort, while simultaneously being meant as an assuring effort. This is mainly due to the argument of Norwegian military being a known and familiar actor in the region that is a more stable and predictable actor for Russia than a Norwegian military ally operating on its own in the region would be.

As with the strategic documents, the hard power reactionary measures taken by Norway during the first six months of the war show a clear focus on being a multilateral effort in cooperation with Norway's allies. The soft power measures however are focused on the bilateral relationship between Norway and Russia. My analysis also shows that the soft power measures I identified are primarily present in hard power measures. The soft power measures are not necessarily specific measures taken to strengthen and secure the bilateral relationship between Norway and Russia, but rather come forth as assuring factors mixed in with a hard power measure. The soft power factors I identified are not measures *taken* by Norway, but rather excluded from hard power measures taken. Therefore, it might be better to consider them as soft power mechanisms excluded from hard power measures taken.

From this analysis I have a thematic separation of different focus areas concerning the relationship between Norway and Russia. The strategic documents explain the relationship and situation before the war in Ukraine while the press releases show the development of Norway's relationship between Russia and Norway. In the next chapter I discuss this development and examine whether the Norwegian strategy towards Russia has changed, and if so how.

6 Discussion

6.1 Summary and previous literature

My purpose for this study is to assess whether Norway's balancing strategy of deterrence and assurance towards Russia has changed during the first six months of the war in Ukraine, and if so, how. The theoretical framework I have used was Joseph Nye's theory of smart power. A smart power strategy is achieved through combining hard and soft power to realize one's goals (Nye, 2009). I have therefore decided to view deterring measures as hard power and assuring measures as soft power.

The topic of Norwegian deterrence and assurance towards Russia has been extensively discussed by researchers. The term was first used by Johan Jørgen Holst (1996) and is also explicitly stated as the main strategy for Norwegian security policy (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 22; Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 24). While there are many factors one can discuss related to this strategy, my concern and interest with this study has been with how Norway uses and possibly changes this strategy during challenging security situations where Russia is seen as the aggressor. Norwegian researchers on this topic (Lindgren &

Græger, 2017; Tamnes, 2019; Hilde, 2019; Bjur et al., 2020; Østhagen, 2023) have argued that during recent times when Russia was the aggressor (Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 and onwards), Norway has sought a closer integration with NATO in Norway and highlighted the importance of the Arctic. While this is seen as hard power measures to deter Russia, bilateral cooperation agreements and open lines of communication between the Norwegian and Russian military has remained in place. These soft power measures in times of Russian aggression and an increase in Norwegian hard power measure gain increased importance (Bjur et al., 2020).

My analysis shows that the strategic documents and press releases clearly focus on a multilateral effort of deterring Russia through NATO. The Department of Foreign Affairs focus on several different aspects of cooperation with Russia through bilateral agreements for safety and sustainable economic development, and multilateral forums such as the Arctic Council and Barents Euro-Arctic Region cooperation. The soft power measures from both the strategic documents and the press releases have a greater focus on the bilateral relationship between Norway and Russia. My findings from the press releases show that Norway has not implemented any *new* soft power measures. This suggests that they are not well-suited to be referred to as measures *taken* by Norway, but rather soft power mechanisms excluded in the sanctioning of Russia. This does not however suggest that their importance has decreased. These soft power mechanisms are primarily concerned with ensuring safety and stability in the Arctic region between Norway and Russia, while also maintaining resource management in the region. These results are consistent with the previous literature on the topic (Lindgren & Græger, 2017; Tamnes, 2019; Hilde, 2019; Bjur et al., 2020; Østhagen, 2023). During periods of Russian aggression elsewhere, Norway has sought to integrate more with NATO on Norwegian soil. Norway has during the first six months of the war in Ukraine made it clear that hard power measures such as sanctions and donations of weapons to Ukraine have been done in coordination and cooperation with its allies.

During the first six months of the war in Ukraine, Norway has used a mix of hard and soft power measures to integrate more closely with NATO and other allied countries while simultaneously maintaining bilateral soft power mechanisms with Russia. The strategic documents depicting Norway's efforts in relation to the bilateral relationship with Russia also heavily focus on hard power deterrence through NATO and soft power assurance through bilateral cooperation. The sanctions against Russia have however reduced the number of forums for bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the two countries.

6.2 Discussion and interpretation

Deterrence and assurance together are a fitting smart power strategy for Norway when the objective is to balance deterrence through NATO while assuring Russia through mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation. As previously stated, deterrence and assurance has been the main strategy for Norway's relationship with Russia (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 22). Relevant adjustments and response to challenges and developments on security matters of geopolitical importance is also highlighted as very important for Norwegian foreign and security policy (Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 19). These ambitions summarize Norway's plans for how to approach Russia in a situation where Russia again acts aggressively. The security landscape of Europe and the world has drastically changed after the Russia waged war on Ukraine. Norway has responded with several hard power measures for further deterrence of Russia. The results from my analysis strongly imply that Norway has had a clear focus on hard power deterrence of Russia during the first six months of the war. Furthermore, the results also imply that the soft power theme consists of soft power mechanisms that have been left out of hard power measures. Therefore, Norway has not implemented any *new* soft power measures, but rather not (yet) included them in hard power measures.

The strategic long-term plan for the Norwegian military argues that Norwegian military presence in the Arctic is meant to act as deterrence but is also an assuring soft power measure (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 25). The reasoning behind this is that if this presence is not kept by Norway as it is Norway's responsibility, another NATO member will fill this presence, decreasing the stability of the region. Norwegian military operations in the region are known to Russia, and therefore it is argued that it is a contributor of stability and predictability. This view is also argued in the press releases during the war (Statsministerens kontor, 2022 March 1). This is what Bjur (2022) refers to as calibrated deterrence which refers to *how* measures are implemented, not only focusing on which measures are implemented. My findings from the analysis highlight that the measures taken by Norway in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine are focused on hard power deterrence but with soft power reasoning and communication to balance the hard power measures.

My analysis shows a clear similarity with the findings from the previous literature (Lindgren & Græger, 2017; Tamnes, 2019; Hilde, 2019; Bjur et al., 2020; Østhagen, 2023). During Russian aggression elsewhere Norway tightens its relations with and integrates more with

NATO. This is done both through political summits and bilateral and multilateral cooperation and agreements, but also through the common hard power measures such as providing military equipment and employing sanctions against Russia. Simultaneously Norway seeks to maintain some soft power mechanisms that allow for open communication and continued bilateral cooperation with Russia. The soft power mechanisms that are left intact and shielded from the sanctions therefore gain increased importance as Bjur et al. argue (2020, p. 484).

The hard power measures taken by Norway are consistent with the strategic plans and ambitions outlined in the strategic documents used in my analysis (Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021; Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021), as well as measures taken by Norway after Russian aggression in 2008 and 2014. The soft power mechanisms kept in place highlight their importance for Norway but are left intact to only avoid challenges related to the security dilemma (Jervis, 1978; Tang, 2009) rather than intended for attempts at friendly bilateral relations.

My analysis of Norwegian measures shows a clear shift towards hard power deterrence of Russia while also shielding some soft power mechanisms. However, these soft power mechanisms left intact are primarily for Norwegian security by avoiding misunderstandings that could lead to greater conflict between Norway and Russia. They also allow for sustainable resource management of fisheries in the Arctic, an agreement that has been in place since the mid-1970s. Consistent with previous literature on the topic, Norway has sought to integrate and cooperate closely with its allies during Russian aggression. As I have previously presented, the hard power measures have a clear multilateral focus while the soft power measures have a bilateral focus as shown in table 6. This finding shows that Norwegian hard power measures are taken within the framework of NATO and the EU, while the soft power mechanisms, left intact, provide a channel of bilateral communication and cooperation with Russia, albeit limited.

The purpose of my study on this topic was to examine how Norway positions itself and balances its membership with NATO and its ambition of a stable, friendly, and predictable relationship with Russia during a period of Russian aggression in Europe. To meet this objective my research question is: *has Norway changed its strategy of deterrence and assurance, and if so, how?* My interpretation is that Norway has not changed its strategy of deterrence and assurance towards Russia. Norway has however clearly had a shift towards a much greater focus on hard power deterrence of Russia at the expense of soft power assurance

measures. My reasoning for this conclusion is that the strategy and Norway's ambitions for the relationship with Russia and Norwegian security makes it clear that it must always adapt to changing security challenges. Examining this strategy with the theory of smart power, Norway has through the implementation of hard power measures and keeping soft power mechanisms intact demonstrated a mixed use of hard and soft power. As Wilson argues (2008, p. 115), smart power requires self-knowledge and understanding of one's own goals and capacities, as well as the global and regional context within in which the actions are taken.

My interpretation is that Norway's strategy has changed only in the sense of there being a clear greater focus on hard power deterrence than soft power assurance. But as a smart power strategy Norway has not changed its strategy towards Russia as it maintains important bilateral cooperation agreements in place and open lines of communication with Russia. These bilateral cooperations have gained increased importance and can provide an arena for future cooperation when it is deemed suitable to soften relations. Furthermore, by keeping these agreements intact and working, they demonstrate the successful ambitions of Norway to strive for stability and predictability between Norway and Russia during times of high tension, and conflict elsewhere. The hard and soft power actions taken by Norway during the first six months of the war are similar to previous actions during Russian aggression. Norway sought greater integration and cooperation with NATO and imposed sanctions against Russia after the annexation of Crimea. But as stated in the strategic documents used in my analysis, hard power deterrence - mainly through NATO - and soft power assuring measures of cooperation were still the stated strategy of how Norway was to approach Russia.

6.3 Limitations and Implications

Changes in Norwegian foreign and security policy is difficult to examine over a short timeframe and while the conflict that is part of the study is ongoing. Possible changes to this strategy will likely not be clear in this study's timeframe. To more precisely assess any changes, it is likely necessary to have some temporal distance to the events that are being studied and the measures taken in reaction. In addition to the temporal aspect of the study, my interpretations of what constitutes a hard or soft power measure are likely different from other researchers' definitions. However, it was not my intention to strive for a generalization of the findings in this study. My approach to defining efforts from the strategic documents that predate the war in Ukraine and the press releases during the war have also not been

systematically weighted. While the study and analysis are very subjective and dependent on my interpretation, I could have approached the study in a more systematic manner. For example, I could have weighted the importance of different measures of Norwegian soft power and hard power. This would have allowed a deeper analysis of for example cooperation on fisheries between Norway and Russia while Norway simultaneously provides weapons to Ukraine.

I believe the theory of smart power by Joseph Nye is a well-suited theory for analyzing Norway's balancing strategy towards Russia. However, the theory can be interpreted to be all encompassing, making way for the argumentation that as long as Norway balances their hard power focus with some soft power assurances it can be considered a smart power strategy. Still, despite this argumentation, Norway's strategy of deterrence and assurance has a stated necessity to change in accordance with security developments that affect Norway's room for action (Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 19). One can then instead make the argument that it is an absolute necessity for Norway to have this type of smart power strategy, and that it is this smart power strategy that allows it to maintain cooperation on fisheries and safety with Russia while simultaneously donating weapons to Ukraine.

Despite these limitations of my study, the findings highlight important features of hard and soft power measures taken by Norway. These have been put into a larger context of a multilateral and bilateral focus and compared with the desired smart power strategy from the strategic documents from before the war. While I have only studied Norway's measures in a in a six-month period, my analysis shows a clear shift towards a focus on multilateral hard power deterrence with simultaneous focus on bilateral soft power assurance through bilateral cooperation and communication between Norway and Russia.

As previously argued, my findings highlight Norwegian measures that are consistent with previous findings from the existing literature. The measures taken by Norway after the Russian invasion of Ukraine are more severe than during previous times of Russian aggression, most notably the annexation of Ukraine 2014. But the framework within which Norway takes these measures are similar to the previous times of employing hard and soft power measures during Russian aggression. The similarities show a clear pattern of how Norway reacts to Russian aggression which is arguably the greatest threat to Norway's security. The framework that allows Norway to take strong hard power measures against Russia is Norway's membership in NATO, which is also stated as the cornerstone of

Norwegian security policy (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021, p. 23). Still within this framework, bilateral cooperation between Norway and Russia on safety and sustainable resource management in the Arctic have been maintained as soft power mechanisms (Utenriksdepartementet, 2022 March 5; 2022 April 29). These findings imply that the Norwegian bilateral agreements with Russia are of great importance. A question that arises is, how badly does the conflict in Ukraine have to deteriorate before Norway suspends its bilateral cooperation with Russia? Norway's response to Russian aggression may also be dependent on how well-functioning NATO is during Russian aggression. Which of the hard power measures taken by Norway would have been employed if there had been larger divisions within NATO and if the USA especially had distanced itself from the alliance and had a more isolationist focus?

6.4 Directions for future research

Deep and good understanding of Norwegian security policy and focus shifts in the strategy during challenging security developments is of high importance. Future research should focus more on how Norway responds to international security challenges which indirectly involve Norway because of Russian aggression. For this topic, I highlight three areas I find important, interesting and having a need of greater understanding for researchers and students.

My first recommendation would be to do a thorough comparison of how Norway has responded to Russian aggression after the annexation of Ukraine and after the end of the current war in Ukraine. With a greater temporal distance from the conflict, focus should be on whether Norway only implements hard power measures against Russia within the framework of NATO. Research on this topic will give an indication of Norway's room to maneuver for its own security policy.

My second recommendation concerns itself with a very important development - Finland and Sweden's applications to NATO. With both countries joining NATO, Norway will have a new level of security cooperation within NATO in the form of greater Nordic security cooperation. This will likely provide a new framework within which Norway can act out its smart power strategy of deterrence and assurance towards Russia. This framework will also tie the Baltic Sea region closer together with the Arctic region and will allow Norway to form its smart power strategy in close cooperation with its neighbors in the Nordic countries rather than focusing on closer ties with the USA.

An area of great importance for future research would be to examine how important is the bilateral cooperation agreement on resource management with Russia in the Arctic and what the consequences of ending this bilateral cooperation would be for Norway. The consequences of leaving this agreement might imply whether Norway has become too dependent on bilateral cooperation with Russia during record times of tension between the neighboring countries. My final recommendation requires an end to the war and ambitions to normalize the relationship between Norway and Russia and NATO and Russia. Researchers should examine how these relationships can be normalized. Which forums are used for increased communication and cooperation. Perhaps the bilateral agreements kept intact between Norway and Russia will provide the arena for normalization of relations and thus provide increased security for Norway through predictability and stability.

7 Conclusion

My thesis' objective was to gain a deeper understanding of how Norway positions itself and balances its membership with NATO and its ambition for a stable, friendly, and predictable relationship with Russia. Furthermore, this objective was studied in the context of the war between Russia and Ukraine which is still ongoing. To fulfill this objective, I have sought to answer the research question of *has Norway changed its strategy of deterrence and assurance, and if so, how?* I have viewed deterring measures as hard power and assuring measures as soft power. These are the two main concepts that together form smart power. To examine a possible change in strategy I have analyzed hard and soft power efforts stated in strategic documents from before the war that explain Norway's foreign and security policy ambitions for its future relationship with Russia. In addition, I have analyzed hard and soft power measures taken by Norway during the first six months of the war and compared them with the strategic plans.

Norway has not changed its smart power strategy of hard power deterrence and soft power assurance towards Russia. However, as during previous periods of Russian aggression, Norway has changed its focus within this strategy. Norway has shown a clear shift towards more focus on hard power deterrence of Russia through close coordination, cooperation, and communication with its military allies. Some important soft power mechanisms have been excluded from hard power measures. These mechanisms focus on sustainable resource management in the Arctic and to avoid misunderstandings and accidents which can further increase the tension between the two countries. These soft power mechanisms gain increased

importance and represent a potential avenue for future easing of tensions between Norway and Russia.

The smart power strategy of deterrence and assurance towards Russia has a long history of being successful and allowing Norway to integrate closely with NATO, while simultaneously maintaining a stable, predictable, and mutually beneficial relationship with Russia. As this strategy is made up of a mixed use of hard and soft power efforts, an even greater deterioration in the countries' relationship would be necessary for a change of strategy. For this smart power strategy to change, Norway would have to abandon most of these bilateral cooperation agreements which in turn would lead to higher tension and make a conflict more likely. I hope that by answering my research question that I have contributed to a deeper understanding of Norwegian foreign and security policy towards Russia during times of Russian aggression. As I have argued, the strategy is extremely resilient to complex security challenges that indirectly involve Norway and how it positions itself internationally. Therefore, there is a need for more research on the topic in the future. I have provided recommendations for future research concerning comparison of this conflict with previous similar conflicts, how Finland and Sweden's potential NATO memberships will provide a new framework for Norwegian security, a greater focus on the bilateral cooperation between Norway and Russia during conflicts, and how a normalization between the countries could take place. These recommendations for future research require an end to the ongoing war in Ukraine and a greater temporal distance to the topic of research. As I have argued, the current war in Ukraine has forced a clear shift in focus within Norway's smart power strategy towards Russia, but not a change of Norway's strategy towards Russia as a whole.

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Appendix 1 – Department of Defense strategic document

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Appendix 1: Relevant chapters used in my analysis (Forsvarsdepartementet, 2020-2021)

Appendix 2 – Department of Foreign Affairs strategic document

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Appendix 2: Relevant chapters used in my analysis (Utenriksdepartementet, 2020-2021)

Appendix 3 – Press releases of thematic relevance

Department	Title	Date
Statsministerens kontor	Norge med sterk fordømmelse av russisk angrep	24.02.2022
Statsministerens kontor	Norge øker støtten til Ukraina og gir militært utstyr	27.02.2022
Statsministerens kontor	Norge gir våpen til Ukraina	28.02.2022
Finansdepartementet	Statens pensjonsfond utland skal ut av Russland	28.02.2022
Statsministerens kontor	Det første norske maritime patruljeflyet er på plass i Norge	01.03.2022
Olje- og energidepartementet	Styret i IEA besluttet å frigjøre oljelagre som følge av situasjonen i Ukraina	01.03.2022
Utenriksdepartementet	Uttalelse fra de nordisk-baltiske utenriksministrene	02.03.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Forsvarsministeren til Stockholm 8. - 9. mars	03.03.2022
Utenriksdepartementet	Historisk henvisning av situasjonen i Ukraina til Den internasjonale straffedomstol (ICC)	03.03.2022
Utenriksdepartementet	Nordisk ministerråd fryser samarbeidet med Russland	03.03.2022
Utenriksdepartementet	Russland suspenderes fra Østersjørådet	03.03.2022
Kunnskapsdepartementet	Regjeringen fryser forsknings- og utdanningssamarbeidet med Russland	04.03.2022
Utenriksdepartementet	Forholdet til Russland påvirkes av krigen	05.03.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Diskuterte krigen i Ukraina og konsekvenser for transatlantisk sikkerhet	07.03.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Vil styrke NATOs evne til å forsvare medlemslandene	16.03.2022
Utenriksdepartementet	WTO-medlemmer med sterk fordømmelse av Russland	16.03.2022
Statsministerens kontor	Regjeringens tiltak knyttet til krigen i Ukraina	18.03.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Regjeringen med strakstiltak for å styrke Forsvaret	18.03.2022

Justis-beredskapsdepartementet	og	Styrker sivil beredskap	18.03.2022
Utenriksdepartementet		Sanksjoner mot Russland innført i norsk rett	18.03.2022
Utenriksdepartementet		Tydelig solidaritet i Litauen	18.03.2022
Nærings-fiskeridepartementet	og	Diskuterte Ukraina-krigen med Rederiforbundet	21.03.2022
Statsministerens kontor		Nato-toppmøtet viser et sterkt transatlantisk samhold	24.03.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet		Nordiske forsvarsministre til Cold Response	24.03.2022
Olje- og energidepartementet		IEA-landene fordømmer Russlands invasjon og ber om økt produksjon av olje og gass fra andre land	24.03.2022
Utenriksdepartementet		Nye sanksjoner mot Russland innført i norsk rett	24.03.2022
Statsministerens kontor		Statsminister Jonas Gahr Støre besøkte Cold Response	27.03.2022
Statsministerens kontor		Støre i samtale med Ukrainas statsminister	30.03.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet		Norge har gitt ytterligere våpen til Ukraina	30.03.2022
Statsministerens kontor		Trygghet i en ny sikkerhetspolitisk virkelighet	01.04.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet		Foreslår investeringar for over to milliardar	01.04.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet		Regjeringen vil styrke forsvarssektoren med 3 milliarder i 2022	01.04.2022
Justis-beredskapsdepartementet	og	Regjeringen foreslår nye 200 millioner kroner til økt digital sikkerhet i 2022	01.04.2022
Justis-beredskapsdepartementet	og	Regjeringen vil styrke beredskapen på sivil side	01.04.2022
Statsministerens kontor		Vil styrke samarbeidet med Sverige om forsvar og grønn omstilling	05.04.2022

Statsministerens kontor	Norge og Estland er nære partnere og allierte	06.04.2022
Justis-beredskapsdepartementet og	Regjeringen vil styrke sikkerheten, særlig i nord	06.04.2022
Justis-beredskapsdepartementet og	Regjeringen stiller med bidrag fra Kripos i etterforskningen av mulige krigsforbrytelser i Ukraina ved Den internasjonale straffedomstolen	06.04.2022
Utenriksdepartementet	Norge erklærer tre russiske diplomater for uønsket	06.04.2022
Utenriksdepartementet	Russland suspendert fra FNs menneskerettighetsråd	07.04.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Forsvarssamarbeidet mellom Norge og USA er svært viktig for vår sikkerhet	08.04.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Regjeringen varsler om utfordringer i gjennomføringen av langtidsplanen for forsvarssektoren	08.04.2022
Olje- og energidepartementet	Energipolitikk for arbeid, omstilling og trygghet i urolige tider	08.04.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Forlenger det økte bidraget til eFP i Litauen	11.04.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Norge har donert luftvernssystem til Ukraina	20.04.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Norge bidrar til våpenfond for Ukraina	25.04.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Vil koordinere våpenstøtte til Ukraina tettere	26.04.2022
Statsministerens kontor	Statsminister Støre i samtale med Kinas statsminister Li Keqiang	29.04.2022
Utenriksdepartementet	Nye sanksjoner mot Russland innført i norsk rett	29.04.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Forsvarsministeren besøkte Estland	03.05.2022
Statsministerens kontor	Statsministeren deltok på nordisk-indisk toppmøte i København	04.05.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Nordisk forsvarsministermøte i Kirkenes	09.05.2022

Nærings- fiskeridepartementet	og	Havneforbudet har trådt i kraft	09.05.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet		Styrket hjemlig beredskap	12.05.2022
Utenriksdepartementet		Første ministermøte i Østersjørådet på ni år	12.05.2022
Statsministerens kontor		Johnson og Støre diskuterte Ukraina-krigen og grønn omstilling	13.05.2022
Utenriksdepartementet		Uttalelse fra utenriksministeren om Finlands beslutning om å søke medlemskap i Nato	15.05.2022
Statsministerens kontor		Felles nordisk støtte til Finland og Sverige	16.05.2022
Utenriksdepartementet		Uttalelse fra utenriksministeren om Sveriges beslutning om å søke medlemskap i Nato	16.05.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet		Forsvarsministeren besøkte norske styrker i Litauen	19.05.2022
Utenriksdepartementet		Ber Stortinget godkjenne Sverige og Finland som nye Nato-medlemmer	23.05.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet		Finsk og svensk Nato-medlemskap vil øke potensialet for nordisk sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitisk samarbeid	24.05.2022
Utenriksdepartementet		Østersjørådet møttes for første gang på ni år	25.05.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet		Møtte lederen av forsvarskommisjonen	30.05.2022
Utenriksdepartementet		Norsk-russisk atomkommisjonsmøte	31.05.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet		Norge har donert artilleriskyts til Ukraina	08.06.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet		Fortsatt behov for å støtte Ukraina	08.06.2022
Utenriksdepartementet		Generalkonsulatet i Murmansk stengjer mellombels	08.06.2022
Utenriksdepartementet		Canada, Finland, Island, Danmark, Norge, Sverige og USA gjenopptar arbeidet uten Russland	08.06.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet		EU and Norway hold second Dialogue on Security and Defence	10.06.2022

Statsministerens kontor	Støre møter Niinistö og Stoltenberg i Finland	12.06.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Ukraina preget NATO-møtet	16.06.2022
Utenriksdepartementet	Flere sanksjoner innført mot Russland	17.06.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Forsvarets internasjonale innsats i 2023	22.06.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Norge forlenger sitt styrkebidrag i Litauen	28.06.2022
Statsministerens kontor	Et historisk toppmøte	29.06.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Norge og Storbritannia gir langtrekkende rakettartilleri til Ukraina	29.06.2022
Statsministerens kontor	Norge øker støtten til Ukraina med 10 milliarder kroner	01.07.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	USA donerer NASAMS til Ukraina	01.07.2022
Statsministerens kontor	Norge godkjenner svensk og finsk Nato-medlemskap	05.07.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Norge donerer pansrede patruljekjøretøy til Ukraina	29.07.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Møte om sikkerhet i Østersjøen	09.08.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Styrker det nordiske forsvarssamarbeidet ytterligere	11.08.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Norge vil bidra til opplæring av ukrainske soldater	11.08.2022
Statsministerens kontor	Norge vertskap for nordiske statsministtermøter i Oslo	14.08.2022
Statsministerens kontor	De nordiske landene styrker forsvars- og sikkerhetssamarbeidet ytterligere	15.08.2022
Statsministerens kontor	Norge og Tyskland sammen om grønn omstilling og sikkerhet	15.08.2022
Forsvarsdepartementet	Kjøper norsk-utviklet drone til Ukraina	24.08.2022

Appendix 3: Thematic relevant press releases used in my analysis

