

Israel in the international society of states

An analysis of Israel's relationship to the values, norms and practices of international society 1955-1974

—
Kris Aleksander Mikkelsen

Masteroppgave i statsvitenskap STV- 3900 - May 2014

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the following people:

My supervisor, Associate Professor P. Stuart Robinson, for his feedback and guidance in completing this thesis.

My family, for their patience, love and support, in particular my mother Elin., but also Maja, Ruben, Ann-Karin, Inger, Eva, Tina and her boys.

Tone Toft, for providing me with much needed support, and the proper tools to navigate the desert.

I would also like to thank all those who have endured and helped me at “Lesehus Øst” at the University of Tromsø. A special thanks, to those who you who provided read-throughs and technical assistance on this thesis; Magnus, Vasco and Margrethe.

Last but not least, a special thanks to my love Diana, who has believed in me and supported me throughout.

Abstract

This thesis is a document analysis of Israel's actions in the international society of states, as restrained and enabled by the common values, norms and practices, in the timeframe of 1955 to 1974. The analysis was conducted using the theoretical framework of Hedley Bull and his study of the Anarchical Society.

INNHOLD

Table of contents

.....	i
1 Introduction	1
1.2 Research questions:.....	2
1.3 Research purpose.....	2
1.4 Research design	3
1.5 Structure of the Thesis	4
2 Theory	5
2.1 Choosing Bull	5
2.2 Hedley Bull's International society.....	10
2.2.1 Balance of Power	13
2.2.2. International law.....	15
2.2.3. Diplomacy	17
2.2.4 War	19
2.2.5 The Great Powers.....	21
2.3 Summary.....	25
3 Methodology	26
3.1 Qualitative Research Design	26
3.2 Document Analysis	27
3.2.1 Literature review – Access and Limitations	28
3.3 Data reliability and validity	29
3.4 Ethical considerations	31
3.5 Summary.....	31
5 Background.....	33
5.1 Anti-Semitism, Zionism and the Balfour declaration	33
5.2 British Rule 1918 – 1948.....	34
5.3 War of Independence – al-Nakba (Arabic: The Catastrophe) 1948-1949.....	36
5.4 Conclusion.....	37
6 Document Analysis	38
6.1 Introduction.....	38
6.2 Israel in the International Society 1955 – 1964.....	41
6.2.1 Israel's relations to the Institutions of Balance of Power and Great Powers... 41	
6.2.2 Israel's relation to the institutions of International Law, War and Diplomacy51	
6.3 Israel in the international society 1965 – 1974	63

6.3.1 Israel's relations to the Institutions of Balance of Power and Great Powers ...	63
6.3.2 Israel's relation to the institutions of International Law, War and Diplomacy	75
7 Discussion.....	89
7.1 Forged and Shaped in the international realm	89
7.2 From Israel's perception	90
7.3 The Great Power Management.....	94
7.4 Israel relationship towards Africa.....	97
7.5 A brief look at tendencies in the current international realm	99
8 Conclusion.....	102
8.1 Review of the Research Objectives.....	102
8.2 Evaluation of the Research Project and suggestions for Future Research	104
9 Resources	106

1 Introduction

Israel was established in the former Ottoman Empire districts of Damascus and Beirut in 1948, as Britain withdrew from its Palestinian mandate. It was attacked the day after it declared itself independent and has since then been the arena of several wars, and much dispute. In spite of Israel's dramatic history and its involvement in much international controversy, I was during my studies at Western Cape University in South Africa, astonished to learn about the military and political collaboration that existed throughout the 70's and 80's between the apartheid state of South Africa and the state of Israel. Having read "*The Unspoken Alliance*" by Sasha Polakow-Suransky (2010), it made me wonder what brought about this unlikely collaboration of the Jewish state and the once Nazi-friendly and racist regime. The book also explained Israel's strong efforts to build friendships towards post-colonial African states and nations in the 50's and 60's.¹ This paradox made me want to take a closer look at Israel and its international conduct. What would bring Israel to the drastic step of cooperating with the apartheid state? Was it the actions of an internal policy, the result of some external pressure or both? This initial curiosity made me question why Israel has acted as it has done, not just in relation to Africa, but in general. To anyone studying political science, or who is remotely interested in international affairs, it is obvious that Israel is often in conflict with its neighboring states and it is often the recipient of much international criticism.

I wanted to investigate Israel's actions not just as the outcome of its internal policy but as developed through its interaction with the international environment. In spite of Israel's short history, there is a lot of material available on Israel's history and its development. I tried to limit the research to a timeframe that I hoped would provide the most amounts of relevant data. I choose the period of 1955 to 1974, in which Israel was involved in much conflict, but also many other interesting events that shed light on both Israel's actions and its relationship towards the international realm.

After assessing competing theories of international relations and foreign policy I chose Hedley Bull theoretical concept of the "International Society" as a framework for the thesis. Bull's International Society was built on the concept of a society of sovereign states recognizing the mutual beneficial gains of cooperating to maintain a framework of values,

¹ Polakow-Suransky , Sasha (2010): *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York)

rules, norms and practices. The states provide this framework decentralized by giving their consent to it, mobilizing to enforce it or to change it. Together the states secure the elemental values of all social life; “life, truth and property”, through five institutions providing international order. A precondition for the international society is a functioning balance of power maintained by a great power management. “Balance of Power” and “Great Powers” are two Bull’s institutions. They enable the other three of Bull’s institutions; “International Law”, “War” and “Diplomacy”.

This provides the theoretical backdrop of the international realm as a society where states are the primary actors collaborating and interacting with one another, which is necessary when looking at how Israel can have been influenced by its surroundings, not just vice versa. I will explain Bull’s institutions and how they provide order, in greater detail in the theory chapter.² The choice of theory and the limitation of the timeframe shaped the following research questions.

1.2 Research questions:

- 1. What do the actions of Israel in the international society of states from 1955 to 1974 reveal about Israel’s relation to the framework of norms, rules and practices of the international society of states?**
- 2. How can Israel’s relationship towards the international rules, norms and practiced be said to influence its relationship towards Africa in the timeframe?**

1.3 Research purpose

There are several reasons to conduct this research project. The case in itself can provide increased understanding of Israel’s choices and development seen in the international social setting of states of the timeframe. Israel was established under extraordinary circumstances in a period of colonial collapse and a great power shift following World War II. As the international realm was normalizing after the war, Israel maneuvered through several dramatic events while relating to the norms and practices of the state society of the time. The Middle East was an arena of much conflict and great power contest. For that reason Israel may represent a special case. As a geologist takes core samples by drilling to understand the

² Bull, Hedley: *The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics* (Palgrave, New York 3ed. 2002)

composition of the rock, he can get a clearer picture of the geological developments of that particular area. If the core samples revealed that area to once have been the impact zone of a massive meteorite, the geologist may have obtained data that offers explanations locally as well as of geological findings on a global scale. In this thesis our core sample spans from 1955 to 1974. It can reveal what happened locally by reflecting Israel's way of relating to social rules, norms and practices at the time, but can also have explanatory effects beyond Israel's situation. It might shed light on similar events in other areas or even globally as the vast majority of states relate to common rules, norms and practices. It may also speak to our current situation in the international society of states. We are able to observe that material war and even armed interventions violating sovereignty is still conducted, despite lacking the necessary approval from the UN Security Council. I hope that Israel's actions in this period of 1955 to 1974 can shed some understanding on current developments.

1.4 Research design

This thesis will as explained deal with Israel's interaction with the international realm from 1955 to 1974. 1955 catches the events leading up to the Suez war of 1956 and 1974 includes the developments following the Yom Kippur War of 1973. To ensure an evenly distributed balance of data throughout I separate the timeframe into two ten year periods, 1955-1964 and 1965 to 1974. Each period will be analyzed in light of the theoretical indicators based on Bull's five institutions Balance of Power, International Law, War, Diplomacy and the Great Powers. This enables a clear understanding of how Israel interacted with the rules, norms and practices that these institutions enveloped. This period is quite extensive in order provide a coherent development in order to rule out the potential bias of being based on a few incidents. This also requires me to choose selectively among the many events, actions and policies. The separation into two periods will also facilitate to point out any major developments, changes or patterns.

This thesis is a single-case study requiring a qualitative research. The method that I will apply is document analysis as observation and interview is not applicable or practical. I will analyze documents such as Israeli state archives, the biographies of key Israeli decision-makers, analytical work conducted by political scientist and accounts of historians as well as journalist works. The goal is to achieve a broad and nuanced document selection consisting of primary, secondary and tertiary documents. I will be limited by the requirements of the thesis and by

what is physically available to me.³ In the method chapter will explain more of the features of qualitative method and document analysis and how I intend to apply it for this thesis.

1.5 Structure of the Thesis

In chapter two, I explain in greater detail, my rationale for choosing Bull's theory and the theory in itself. The theoretical concepts of Bull's Institutions, Balance of Power, International Law, War, Diplomacy and Great Powers provide the basis for my theoretical indicators which I present in the document analysis.

The third chapter explains the method I have applied to conduct this research, my process of selecting the document material and how I have done my best to maintain validity and reliability in the process of selection and analysis.

The fourth chapter contains the relevant historical background to provide the reader with a better understanding of the case, the context of the research and the document selection.

The fifth chapter marks the beginning of the analysis as I bring theory and method together to derive the relevant data from the document selection. While separating the document data from my opinions, this operation requires interpretation to indicate how I perceive those data before analyzing further. I begin the chapter by explaining how I will apply Bull's institutions as theoretical indicators to reveal Israel's relationship to the framework of values, norms, rules and practices of international society.

In chapter six I draw upon my document analysis, conducting a discussion aimed at answering the research questions, looking at how Israel's relationship to the values, rules, norms and practices enabled and restrained Israel's actions.

In chapter seven I seek to draw a conclusion upon the findings and make suggestions for further research.

³ Lyngaard, Kenneth, *Kvalitative Metoder; En Grundbog* (Hans Reitzels Forlag, København, 2010)

2 Theory

This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the thesis; which links the research question with data gathering and analysis. A fitting theoretical frame enables a good analysis of the document selection. After I have justified my choice of theory, I will explain its contents. I have chosen Hedley Bull's conception of the international society which is upheld by a common need for order. Order in Bull's international society is provided by five institutions that enable the established rules norms and practices of international society. I will define and explain so that the reader may better understand the choice of data selection.

2.1 Choosing Bull

Hedley Bull's conception of the international society as the theoretical framework for analyzing this case is legitimized partly by the limitations of competing international relation paradigms. Realism sees international relations as directly linked with the fundamentally selfish human nature in which conflict and competition is unavoidable. States are the primary actors driven by self-interest and survival in an international anarchy. The international realm is anarchical as states are sovereign with no external authority and hence, are in a constant state of war. In Realism, the absence of war and conflict can only be explained by a balance of power. Realism views interstate relations as potentially positive for short term selfish gain, but is primarily skeptical about any cooperation. In Realism, states must fend for themselves and Realism is therefore not be the right tool to provide our case with the answers we seek.⁴

Kenneth Waltz is arguably the most influential neorealist. His book "*Theory of International Politics*" from 1979 is fundamental to the neorealist paradigm. As in classic Realism states are the sovereign and primary actors in an international anarchy. However in Neorealism, states are also rational actors seeking maximum utility among different options, weighing gains against costs. Though they differ in capabilities and distribution of power the outcomes follow a predictable pattern, according to Waltz. In Neorealism, which Waltz calls system theory, the structure of the international system

⁴ Colin Hay: *Political Analysis*, (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2002), p 17-19.

of states will determine the optimal course of action and prescribe behavior. War and conflict occur when states seek their national interest within the anarchy, but it can be avoided provided with a functioning, preferably bi-polar, balance of power. Waltz is not saying that balance cannot fail; he states simply that a bi-polar balance is the preferred condition in bringing stability. Sometimes internal conditions may cause a state not to keep balance, for which its security and prosperity will suffer. Stanley Hoffman points out the lack of multipolar considerations. "*Concerned almost exclusively with the 'state of war', Waltz, in discussing the international system, does not go beyond a binary classification – bipolar versus multipolar systems.*"⁵

Referring to what he calls reductionist theory Waltz argued, that to focus on the behavior of the parts is insufficient.⁶ "*The international system, if conceived at all, is taken to be merely an outcome.*"⁷ Waltz contends that international politics can only be understood if the effects of structure upon actors are taken into consideration. System theory explains the organization of the realm as the international system constraining and disposing the units within it. This gives some predictability of behavior that enables survival and prospering.⁸

Neorealism introduces the view of states seeking relative gains in accordance with structure. It takes into consideration the hierarchical placement of states and their different capabilities. It can be complimented by unit-level analysis to provide better understanding.⁹ But it never claimed to be, nor sought to be, a theory that could explain the developments of a particular state's policy. To Waltz, this is the same with all balance-of-power theory. "*To expect it to do so would be like expecting the theory of universal gravitation to explain the wayward path of a falling leaf. A theory at one level of generality cannot answer questions about matters at a different level of generality.*"¹⁰

Neorealism can contribute with some expected outcomes based on the general rules of its international system, but this is not enough to provide us with the basis for the analysis we seek as it do not pay attention to the framework of rules norms and shared

⁵ Stanley Hoffmann: Foreword to the second ed. of Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002,) p xxv.

⁶ Robert O. Keohane; *Neorealism and its critics*, (Columbia University Press, New York 1986) p 47.

⁷ (ibid, 47)

⁸ Richard K. Betts: *Conflict after the cold war – Arguments on causes of war and peace*, (Pearson Longman 3.ed, New York 2008) p 89.

⁹ Colin Hay: *Political Analysis*, (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2002) p 20-21.

¹⁰ Robert O. Keohane; *Neorealism and its critics*, (Columbia University Press, New York 1986) p 121.

understandings on which the international society depends.”¹¹ Waltz’s structural scope is too general for the kind of case analysis I wish to conduct and deals mostly with the structural restraints on rational state interaction. It might be worthwhile having a look at what other theorists can offer. Could such unit-level analysis, as it is branded by Waltz, complete the picture?

Graham T. Allison used the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962 to develop three models as tools for creating competing explanations for a given foreign policy. The Rational Action Model (Model I) sees governmental actions as the actions a rational man would adopt to achieve his ends, choosing the biggest payoff. Assuming the state is a unitary actor this can be applied to understand the actions of a given state. It is arguably an unrealistic comparison as an individual man may lack the perfect information to make rational choices. But states are not individual men, rather clusters of organizations that also act on imperfect information and limited time in accordance to procedures. To provide a base for improved explanation and prediction Allison added model II and III as alternatives.

The Organizational Process Model (Model II) sees decisions as the products of government department routines. Tasks are distributed to different organizations within the state. Each organization is expected to fulfill certain tasks, and will have defined operating procedures in acquiring information, defining options, and implementing programs. The organizations rely on previous experience and even previous orders to complete task regardless if that was the intent of those giving orders. Through identifying the relevant organizations and the displayed pattern of organizational behavior, events can be explained. This model may shed light on some of the actions that cannot be mapped out in the Rational Action Model.

The Governmental Politics model (Model III) sees state action as a result of bargaining games among key players in the national government. The analyst must focus on how the key players influenced the decision in question, what were the key player’s perceptions, what established channels were available for creating competing

¹¹ Andrew Hurrell, Foreword to the third ed. of Hedley Bull’s *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002,) p viii.

preferences, and how the players performed. In this model all government action is a result of bargaining among players that are organized in a hierarchy.¹²

Allison's three models provide three conceptual frameworks for analyzing foreign policy. However it is not the purpose of my analysis to conduct an analysis of foreign policy development alone. I wish to understand how the particular state of Israel maneuvered in relation to the international realm for the achievement of its goals in the period of 1955-1974, and how this affected its relation to Africa. Insight on the bureaucratic process and the bargaining among key players provide an image of how internal processes gave a certain outcome but do not provide an explanation of how interaction with other states and the international arena in general shaped policy and events. The Rational Actor model alone does not give a sufficiently nuanced insight on Israel's interaction with its surroundings as states do not always act "rationally" as a unified actor seeking maximum payoff. Furthermore this model does not provide a sufficient understanding of what would be the rational choice while it does not try to explain the functioning's and dynamics of the international further than seeing states as rational actors acting upon imperfect information.¹³

Unlike Waltz, Allison's models take no external structural considerations in explaining a state's relations to the international. There is no attempt to explain how structure affects the development of a state's foreign policy or its international politics. What the models can in fact explain requires much information and detailed insight. Hence his models are better at analyzing specific actions or events, as snapshots of history shot through three different filters, provided the researcher has sufficient information. For our analysis over a 20 year period, one could in theory make many such snapshots attempting to make a film. Each shot would represent individual cases, demanding massive amounts of insight on each model of analysis. The almost insurmountable data that would entail aside, Allison's focus on specific events does not explain how and why international relations are possible to begin with and the greater context of the state's relation towards the international. Waltz also criticizes the models, arguing that Allison confuses

¹² Allison, Graham (2012): *The Cuban Missile Crisis*. In: Dunne, T. Hadfield, A. and Smith, S: *Foreign Policy Affairs: Theories, Actors, Cases* Second Edition. Oxford, Oxford University Press. (02.05.14)

¹³ Allison, Graham (2012): *The Cuban Missile Crisis*. In: Dunne, T. Hadfield, A. and Smith, S: *Foreign Policy Affairs: Theories, Actors, Cases* Second Edition. Oxford, Oxford University Press. (02.05.14)

foreign policy as international politics. Only the first model is in fact a study in international politics, while the others, changing actor from state to bureaucratic and individual unit, is foreign policy under the realm of national politics.¹⁴

Methodologically, Allison has been criticized for simplifying the rational actor's model. His models are criticized as not being models at all, rather analogies or meta-theories that generate no prediction or hypothesis and hence are not falsifiable. The models have also been criticized for not being easily separable as well as deterministic upon the evidence. Allison also varies in his metaphysics, epistemology and classification system throughout his analysis and weavers between the contextual and deductive form of analysis. In spite all this Allison's models still have great of explanatory power and provide useful insight in many cases where information is easily accessible.¹⁵

Waltz's structural theory alone is too broad and limits the understanding of state interaction to the mere structural restraints. Allison's focused analysis is too narrow providing insight mostly on internal processes, but offer little understanding of international relations beyond the rational choice of a unitary state actor. For the purpose of this thesis we need a more manageable tool that envelops structural considerations whilst taking into consideration the individual context of the state we are analyzing. Having explored what may seem the extremes on the "ladder of abstraction",¹⁶ from the external system forces all the way down to key-individual psychology and performance, I would like to explain why Hedley Bull conception of the international society and his focus on the state-actors relationship to international institutions is applicable for this case where I investigate Israel's relationship to the established rules norms and practices of the state society.

¹⁴ Robert O. Keohane: *Neorealism and its critics*, (Columbia University Press, New York 1986) p121-122.

¹⁵ Steve Smith: *Allison and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review of the Bureaucratic Politics Model of Foreign Policy Decision-Making*, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 1980 9: 21, (Millennium Publishing House) (05.05.14)

¹⁶ Giovanni Sartori: *Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics*, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (American Political Science Association, 1970) pp. 1033-1053.

2.2 Hedley Bull's International society

Bull's theory and definitions are presented here in its essence and aimed at answering my research question; focusing mainly the central concepts of the theory. I will complement Bull's theory with contributions from Michael Waltzer in regards to the principle of "just war", and Alan James in regards to the principle of sovereignty.¹⁷

Order in Social life

Hedley Bull argued that order is a fundamental condition for the basic elemental or primary values of all social life; life, truth and property. The primary value; "life" means the security from violence. "Truth" is ensured through the keeping of promises and by ensuring that agreements are fulfilled. "Property" is secured through creating a stable possession of things free from constant challenge.¹⁸ *"By order in social life I mean a pattern of human activity that sustains elementary, primary or universal goals of social life such as these."*¹⁹

International order through international society

According to Bull any social life, including the modern international system, builds on some pattern sustaining the mentioned elemental values. *"By International order I mean a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society."*²⁰ Bull defines a state as an independent political community that possesses government and sovereignty over a territory and people. A system of states is established when; two or more states have sufficient contact between them to impact on each other's decisions, becoming part of one another's calculations.²¹ Bull argues that the reality of the modern international system is interaction beyond that of states simply calculations action and in accordance to each other. *"A society of states (or international society) exist when a group of states, conscious of certain common interest*

¹⁷ Michael Waltzer: *Just and Unjust Wars — A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, (Basic books, New York 2006 4 ed.)

UN.org. UN charter: CHAPTER II: MEMBERSHIP (02.05.14)

Alan James: *The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society*, Political Studies Association 1999, XLVII, (Blackwell Publishers, Malden) (02.05.14)

¹⁸ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society — A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 3-8.

¹⁹ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society — A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 4.

²⁰ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society — A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 8.

²¹ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society — A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 8-13.

and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relation with one another, and share in the working of common institutions."²² The states form a society based on common rules, norms and practices that enable the mutual interest of enabling the elemental values through common rules and institutions. Bull argues that there has always been an element of society in the modern international system.

Bull's theory is partly built on the perception that there are three main traditions of international relations; Realist (Hobbesian), Revolutionist (Kantian) and the Rationalist (Grotian) traditions. Realist tradition view international politics as the state of war in a system of states, where the interest of one state excludes the interest of another. The Revolutionist tradition sees international relations as the potential arena for creating a community of mankind in a transnational world society where the most typical international activity is transnational ideological conflict that eventually overthrows the state system becoming a universal state. The Rationalist tradition see international relations as a rule governed international society. Rationalist tradition agrees with the Realist tradition that the members of international society are principally states, not individual men. But it is not ideological conflict or a state of war which dominates international activity, rather social and economic interaction and cooperation. Rules and institutions and common values and interest limit the Hobbesian state of war. The states also relate to morality and law, but moral imperatives do not overthrow the state system as mutual respect for sovereignty enables the international society.²³ Bull argues that while international order is best maintained by securing the elemental values through an international society, the modern international system reflects all three traditions. In different locations, historical periods and policies, one of these may predominate the others without elimination of the other two. International society competes with the other two basic elements of modern international politics, state of war and transnational solidarity and conflict. International events must therefore not be interpreted as if international society was the only element.²⁴ With that consideration in mind, this thesis

²² Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics* (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 13.

²³ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 22-26, 38-44.

²⁴ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics* (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 39-49.

will through document analysis look closer at Israel's behavior in the modern international system in the period between 1955 and 1974. Behavior that cannot be explained as serving international society may be explained by a Realist or Revolutionist perception.

International Society as Anarchy

Bull pointed to the way established norms, rules, shared understandings and mutual expectations influenced and shaped power politics. He did not agree with what he calls the "domestic analogy" that had been used to describe international relations by many theorists in the field. This analogy based itself on the "state of nature" concept by Thomas Hobbes described in his book *Leviathan* of 1651. In this "state of nature" individual men fight for survival without the protection of a central power. The analogy indicates how the individual states interact in the international anarchy towards one another, under the lack of central authority in a constant state of war. Constant state of war is also the disposition or readiness for war. Though agreeing with the concept of the international realm as an anarchy lacking central authority, Bull argued that states do not need central government like individual men to survive. Anarchy is tolerable in the international realm in a way that among individuals it is not.²⁵ Though the states are in constant disposition to war, security issues do not exhaust the state as it would the individual man. Security is provided by the state and enables the other refinements of life. For a state, violent attacks are easier to defend, than for individual men. Insecurity is not equally distributed among states, as great states are safer than smaller ones. Among men this is not necessarily the case. The economy of states also provides them with an economic self-sufficiency individuals do not have. All in all, states can tolerate a looser form of society among them than within state. Bull points out that there have always been elements of society in the modern international system. Mutual interest, a sense of community, habit, will and apathy also play part.²⁶

Institutions

²⁵ Hedley Bull: *Society and Anarchy in International Relations*, in H. Butterfield and M. Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (George Allen and Unwin, London 1966).

Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics* (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 44-49.

²⁶ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 45-50.

In the international society, states are responsible for the functions that make rules effective i.e. states are the principal institutions of the society of states. States make or legislates the rules by giving consent to them. The rules are communicated through state action and official statements. Rules of international society are administered by the state through executive acts of the state itself or international organizations responsible to it.

States are also rule-enforcers while there is no central government. This may involve use of force to defend legal, moral or operational rights. Because states differ in ability to defend these rights, enforcement of rules is uncertain. States protect the rules by maintaining the conditions of the system where respect for the rules can flourish.²⁷ *"In carrying out these functions, states collaborate with one another, in varying degrees, in what may be called the institutions of international society: the balance of power, international law, the diplomatic mechanism, the managerial system of great powers, and war."*²⁸

2.2.1 Balance of Power

Definitions

Bull quotes Vattel when defining "the balance of power" as; *"a state of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is predominant and can lay down the law to others."*²⁹

Bull makes several theoretical distinctions on balance of power, three of which are more relevant for this thesis. By "simple balance of power" Bull means balance among to powers that require equal distribution of power such that if one is falling behind it must strengthen its efforts to regain balance. "Complex balance of power" is balance among three powers or more, and don't require equally distributed power because it allows for alliances. Bull claims that while there was in the 1950's simple balance, the 1960's was a time of transition. In the 1970's it took the form of a complex balance. Another distinction must be made on general or local balance of power. A "general balance of

²⁷ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 68-71.

²⁸ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 71.

²⁹ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 97.

power” is simply the absence of a preponderate power, and -” local or particular balance of power” is either limited to a geographical area or segment of the system. I also want to bring attention to the difference between the dominant and subordinate balance of power. The dominant balance of power exists between the most powerful states can be exemplified by cold-war US and Soviet. Balance of power existing locally in for instance Asia or the Middle-East is a subordinate balance to the dominant balance.

Functions in international order

A general balance of power throughout the international system prevents predominant powers from achieving a universal empire. Local balance of power prevents the predominant power of the region from absorbing or dominating the smaller states. Together; general and local balance of power provides the conditions for the other institutions of international society to exist. Its main function is not to preserve peace but the system of states itself. Balance of power must therefore at times disregard international law to create the conditions that enable the institution of international law, as the interest of order is prior to the interest of law, smaller nations, and the keeping of peace. Balance of power is the fundamental institution of international society and order. It tends to favor the great powers that from time to time absorb or partition of smaller states as the needs of the dominant balance come before that of the subordinate balance. War fought to maintain the dominant balance does not depend on the legal legitimacy of international law that other wars require. Balance of powers fundamental role makes it prior to that of law.³⁰ *“The chief function of the balance of power, however is not to preserve peace, but to preserve the system of states itself. Preservation of the balance of power requires war, when this is the only means whereby the power of a potentially dominant state can be checked.”*³¹

Bull describes the mutual nuclear deterrence existing between United States of America (USA) and the Soviet Union helped preserve nuclear peace as nuclear war became an irrational option. It also prevented non-nuclear hostilities in fear of a nuclear escalation. This stabilization of the dominant balance contributed to the general balance. Bull does not explain how the acquisition of nuclear weapons of a smaller state impacts the

³⁰ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 102-105

³¹ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 103.

dominant balance or the local balance of that state. As the local balance is subordinated to the dominating balance it is not unreasonable to assume that the local state in question would be forced to compliance or be destroyed for the greater good of the system if it was considered to be a threat or in direct violation of the greater good of the dominating balance.³²

2.2.2. International law

Definition

*“International law may be regarded as a body of rules, which binds states and other agents in world politics in their relations with one another and is considered to have the status of law.”*³³ International law govern the mutual interaction of states and other agents such as individual humans, groups, international or intergovernmental organizations, that are all subjects of international law with rights and duties. These rules are by all agents regarded as binding on one another. International law exists without the threat of force from central government as coercion and force is delivered decentralized by the individual members of the society according to principles of self-help, using reprisal and war. It can be exercised by the victim of the violation or by other states coming to its aid, often centralized as the will of collective security mechanisms such as the UN. The effectiveness of international law depends on a functioning balance of power.³⁴

Functions in international order

International law identifies as a supreme normative principle the idea of a society of sovereign states. International law provides the basic rules of coexistence among states, restricting violence, establishing the rules and conditions of agreements, and cementing the principles of sovereignty and independence. It also facilitates mobilization of compliance with the rules. Combining restriction of violence and the mobilizing for compliance when law is broken offers a paradox. So what is a just cause for war (*jus ad*

³² Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 115-121.

³³ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 122.

³⁴ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 122-126.

bellum)? Morality is a language of justification, and what is cruelty and what is justice is essentially within the world of discourse. Political philosopher Michael Waltzer argues that; “..if I claim that I am fighting justly I must also claim that I was attacked (..), or threatened with attack, or that I am coming to the aid of a victim of someone else’s attack.”³⁵ Interpretation and perception may also lead way for hypocrisy, and Waltzer warns that the hypocrite will be judged by those who are not. Waltzer also adds that massacres within sovereign states such as the Cambodian genocide 1975 to 1979, is also *jus ad bellum* for interventional war.³⁶

Another paradox arise when we take into consideration that International Law is to cement the principle of sovereignty, while sometimes mobilizing and disregarding it when creating compliance for the rules. Alan James, another important contributor to the English School like Bull, defines a state as sovereign when it possesses the sufficient capacity to participate in international relations, which it can only do if it has what he calls constitutional independence. Sovereignty is a legal condition as it is based on the state’s constitution that has the force of law. James argues that international law presupposes sovereignty as it only applies to sovereign states, regulating their mutual relations. Sovereignty is absolute and cannot exist in degrees. A state may be weak politically but that does not change its constitutional status which either is or is not.³⁷ Sovereignty is also unitary, meaning no other entity can take decisions on “(...) *the internal or the external affairs of the territory in question.*”³⁸ A sovereign state may be adherent to powerful states and is also free to pass over to organizations or other states legal rights to take decision that are binding on the sovereign state, but the decision always lay with the sovereign state itself. Like international law, the principle sovereignty must sometimes yield in overriding concerns of preserving order. Unless the state’s constitution is completely absolved, and its state territory is absorbed by another state under its constitutional scheme, the state remains sovereign even when

³⁵ Michael Waltzer: *Just and Unjust Wars — A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, (Basic books, New York 2006 4 ed.) p 12.

³⁶ Michael Waltzer: *Just and Unjust Wars — A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, (Basic books, New York 2006 4 ed.) p 3-20.

³⁷ UN.org. UN charter: CHAPTER II: MEMBERSHIP (02.05.14)

Alan James: *The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society*, Political Studies Association 1999, XLVII, (Blackwell Publishers, Malden.) p 457-473.

³⁸ Alan James: *The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society*, Political Studies Association 1999, XLVII, (Blackwell Publishers, Malden) p 461.

occupied.³⁹

Rules will certainly not be followed at all times, if they were, they'd be unnecessary. Conformity may come partly by habit, as an extension of following the rules from internal processes, by seeing international law as valuable in itself or as part of a wider set of values, or obligatory as legally required. Obedience can come from coercion or by threat of it, or by the acceptance of mutual gain in preservation of rules, or general acceptance by the parties of the values and goals underlying the agreement. These factors exist independently of legal commitments and create the foundation under which legal commitments can operate. The order-conforming functions of international law are more important than the existence of the laws themselves.⁴⁰

Often but not always, rules will be disregarded if they do not match self-interests. A breach of law may be done by a state that has previously respected the law or rule in question, and that conforms to other rules of international law. Making the breach of law some sort of exception from state practice, the state may still respect the same rule of law in other or later occasions hoping to rebuild trust from its surroundings. What is violation and what is conformity is subject to interpretation of rules and construction of facts. Violation of agreements may also be attempts to preserve and restore an agreement that actions from other actors put into challenge. Regardless of the true intent, the offending party tends to display that it does in fact respect the rule by denying the breach, or by attempting to legitimize the action by referring to some goal or principle of overriding importance. The cause given is not as important as the state's need to give one. Lack of conformity to rules is not as problematic as a lack of legitimacy of the rules themselves.

2.2.3. Diplomacy

Definitions

³⁹ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 128-139.

⁴⁰ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 128-139.

Bull defines diplomacy in its broadest sense as; *“The conduct or relations between states and other entities in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means.”*⁴¹

Bull focus on the conduct of relations in world politics by persons who are official agents of a state or another recognized entity. By other entities of world politics Bull refers to political entities such as the UN or other international general organizations or regional international organizations. Political organizations may choose representatives for negotiation although they are not recognized as states. Traditionally, diplomacy has also been made with vassal states or other regional representatives not recognized as representing legitimate states, but the core diplomacy is that of official relationships between sovereign states.⁴²

Diplomacy presupposes the existence of an international system where parts interact under no central authority. In its current institutionalized form it presupposes the existence of international society, as it is made possible only by acceptance of complex rules of conventions. The diplomatic mission may not interfere with the internal affairs of its host and the host must respect the diplomatic immunity of the diplomats, their staff, their mission and communication, allowing them to operate free of constraint as a part of maintaining continual negotiation; an elemental task of diplomacy.⁴³

Functions in international order

First and foremost Diplomacy facilitates communication between state leaders and other entities in world politics as messengers protected by immunity. Immunity of envoys and the sovereignty of their extra-territorial mission enable free communication. Secondly it facilitates the negotiating of agreements by finding the field of overlapping interest, using reason and persuasion to bring this to the attention of the parts. Diplomacy therefore can only succeed if the states involved see foreign policy as the rational pursuit of interest, where interest can be, at least at times, mutual.⁴⁴ *“Diplomacy can play no role where foreign policy is conceived as the enforcement of a claim to*

⁴¹ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 156.

⁴² Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 157-158.

⁴³ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 158-163.

⁴⁴ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 163-164.

universal authority, the promotion of the true faith against heretics, or as the pursuit of self-regarding interests that take no account of the interest of others."⁴⁵ Thirdly, gathering information or intelligence of other states and developments in the world is paramount for shaping good external policies. Diplomats will often be held from obtaining some information whilst being exposed to other information by its host state in order to give them a certain impression. A fourth function is the minimizing of friction in international relations. When common interest clash tension must be sought avoided as maintaining good relations is important. Tact and modesty along with persuasion and reasoning can be applied for advancing or defending the view of the state and people one represent. Threats must be avoided as drawing attention to common interest is often more fruitful. Being truthful must not come at the expense of being sensitive to what might offend as such is harmful to relations. The final task of diplomacy, according to Bull is to symbolize the very existence of an international society. Diplomatic relations presuppose a mutual recognition of rights and sovereignty, equality and independence.⁴⁶

In periods of low consensus in international society, tact and intelligence can be replaced by 'political warfare', 'loudspeaker diplomacy' and 'diplomacy by insult'. Such hostile diplomacy is not aimed at their counterpart in attempting to find common ground for collaboration; rather it's aimed at convincing third parties whose support they should seek.⁴⁷

2.2.4 War

Definition

*"War is organized violence carried on by political units against each other."*⁴⁸ Bull defines war in its strict sense war as only waged by sovereign states, and only this kind of international war has been legitimate in the modern state system. The sovereign state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. War in the material sense differs from war

⁴⁵ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 164.

⁴⁶ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 163-166.

⁴⁷ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 163-168.

⁴⁸ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 178.

in the normative legal sense. The former is the actual hostilities; the latter is when state of affairs is brought about legally through a declaration of war. Actual war happens quite often without there being a normative war, and in some cases due to the lack of peace declaration there might be normative war with no material war. Material war is harder to define than the normative war. When is a blockade an act of violence, and when is a rebel band a political unit? Nevertheless, when engaged in material activity called war strict rules of conduct apply to the same degree as if it was normative declared.⁴⁹

Functions in international order

In the international society war functions as both an instrument and a threat. War manifests disorder bringing with it the threat of international society breakdown. As an instrument of state policy war shape the international system by enforcing international law, preserving the balance of power and even promoting just changes in law. Restriction of war is a goal, not just because it's a threat to the international society, but because states are bound by common rules and institutions and therefore war cannot be fought for just any given reason. War can be restricted by limiting what war conduct is allowed. The geographical spread of war must be restricted by respecting rights and duties of neutral states.⁵⁰ Legitimate causes for war must also be restricted, as it is today through the UN charter.⁵¹ However, international society depend on war as means for enforcement of international law, which can only be enforced if states are willing and capable to raise arms in order to do so. Preservation of balance of power requires war, or the threat of it, in order to avoid the emergence of a preponderate state. Bringing about "just" change may also require war, as peaceful change mechanisms can be lacking or inefficient. Consensus to provide change through war, or rather, the lack of protest against a violent change may be seen in the international society if there is a feeling that the change is just.⁵²

With the spread of nuclear weapons it was argued that war could no longer shape the

⁴⁹ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 178-180.

⁵⁰ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 181-182.

⁵¹ UN.org. UN charter: CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION (03.04.14)

⁵² Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 182-183.

characteristics of the international system and enforce international law in the same way as before, as nuclear war is not the continuation of policy but the breakdown of it. But as Bull argues; war or the threat of it has not lost all political utility. The presence of nuclear weapons affects conflicts of non-nuclear states by ending them quickly. Bull used Israel and its wars with its Arab neighbors (1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973) as an example that war and the threat of war had not outplayed its political role after the introduction of mutual nuclear deterrence in the dominating balance. War by smaller powers must be fast and avoid or postpone great power intervention or otherwise limit the effectiveness or ability of great powers to intervene, and to make due if great powers cuts arms-supplies. For a nuclear power to attack a non-nuclear power with nuclear weapons is irrational as the international reaction for such an act would outweigh most gains. Hence such threats are not efficient, other than for deterring attacks. Bull refers to Israel, South Africa and Australia as potential nuclear powers that argue for such deterring application against attacks from non-nuclear powers, superior in numbers. As discussed above, Bull saw mutual nuclear deterrence as a means of stabilizing the dominating balance and hence the general balance. Even in a nuclear balance force may still be used in foreign policy between those powers if conditions can be somehow agreed upon. Fear of escalation towards nuclear measures, deters much direct confrontation. Threats of force do have political influence if one side seems more resolved in the use of it than the other. Such “brinkmanship” or “crisis management” was successfully demonstrated by the USA in the Cuba crisis, revealing that nuclear weapons have not made war irrelevant as an institution.⁵³ *“The range of political objects war can serve has become narrower, the cost of resorting to it greater.”*⁵⁴

2.2.5 The Great Powers

Definitions

Bull defines great powers as two or more powers existing together as a club with a rule of membership. A state defined as a great power must belong to the elite of international

⁵³ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 184-187.

⁵⁴ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 187.

military capability, comparable to each other in strength. The dynamics changed somewhat with nuclear weapons. Powers that previously could defend themselves without allies against the world was now vulnerable like they had not been before. Bull points out that no state can “.. *prevent the other power from attacking. In this sense no state today can assure its own security unilaterally.*”⁵⁵ Deterrence, resolving conflicts, and arms control agreements can reduce the risk of such attacks. Middle and small powers, can manage their own security for periods of time without allies, but their success depends on the maintenance of the general balance of power, unlike great powers that are less fragile. Great powers enjoy special rights and duties which are recognized internally by their people and leaders as well as externally by their surroundings. They have a right to take part in determining key issues affecting peace and security of the international system and they have a duty to modify their policy in accordance with their managerial responsibilities. The concept of great powers, presuppose the idea of an international society bound by common rules and institutions, interaction and contact. Bull identifies only the USA and the Soviet Union as great powers in 1945. At the time of writing in 1977 he also considered China to be a great power, while Japan had potential to become one. Britain, France and Germany were inferior middle powers or secondary powers throughout 1955-1974. What is clear is that possessing strategic nuclear weapons is not sufficient for great power membership.⁵⁶

Functions in international order

The inequality of states enables the great power to assert force in the contribution to international order. Great powers can use their strength to maintain international order through preserving the general balance of power and avoid, contain or limit conflicts and war with each other. The great powers can exploit their local preponderance, respect each other's sphere of influence, and take part in joint action, all aimed at contributing to international order. Great powers can like smaller powers work to promote the opposite goals, creating disorder if they for some reason find it fruitful. ⁵⁷ Bull lists six main functions of great powers in maintain order.

⁵⁵ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 195.

⁵⁶ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 194-199.

⁵⁷ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 199-201.

First, balance of power the precondition of the system of states is best preserved by great powers by managing their relations to each other. This provides the basis for the recognition of their special rights and duties.

Secondly by avoiding and controlling crisis great powers provide order. Recognizing that crisis can be constructive, the avoidance of it is essential to great power management.

Also when closely associated with opposing parts of a conflict great powers seek to restrain their respective associates. Conflict is also avoided in the development and respect of operational rules for each other's spheres of influence.

Thirdly, limitation of war is also a great powers task in their collaboration for order.

Other than maintaining the general balance of power, and avoiding and controlling conflict, great powers seek effective communication to avoid miscalculation, accident or misinterpretation. They use negotiation to settle political disputes among themselves and limit arms race. Great powers limit conflicts amongst smaller powers, and if conflict occurs they limit the geographical spread of conflicts and end them quickly.⁵⁸

As a fourth feature great powers can further maintain order by exercising local preponderance. Through "dominance" a great power can use habitual force on the lesser states, disregarding rights of sovereignty, independence and equality of the states. Force or threat of force can be used, but not habitual and unlimited as other means are preferable due to the political cost. Violations of equality, liberty and sovereignty can be justified by overriding principles.⁵⁹ *"In so doing they reflect the primacy of norms of order over norms of justice in the positive law and practice of international society."*⁶⁰

5. By agreeing on spheres of influence and hence reducing friction, great powers contribute to international order. Distinction must be made on recognition of preponderance and recognition of moral and legal rights in an area. *"A sphere of influence, moreover, which in one country's view exists as a matter of right, may in another country's view exist only as a matter of fact."*⁶¹ Great powers may see each other having rights by operational rules of the game. This in turn gives foundation for expectations of behavior that in a sense is a mutual recognition of rights. Some agreements can be made

⁵⁸ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 199-207.

⁵⁹ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 207-212.

⁶⁰ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 212.

⁶¹ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 213.

by giving specific and limited rights to each other, keeping certain activities away from each other spheres.⁶² Unclear spheres of influence are not unusual as understandings are informal and tacit. By challenging each other's sphere through struggle and competition spheres of influence are both established and changed.⁶³ There are operational rules of conduct in regard to respecting other great power spheres of influence, such as prohibition of overflying other great powers territories, or prohibition of sabotage, arming subversive groups with nuclear arms, deploying offensive missiles in states close to competing great powers etc. Though great powers can follow these rules, it's not necessarily so that leaders are conscious of them or that there is an actual agreement on these. The precise content of operational rules is hard to identify.⁶⁴

6. Great Powers can contribute to order by promoting common policies in the international system.

Great powers need to preserve this legitimacy or consent of their special role, as it's the only way in which they can fulfill their managerial functions. Great powers must also avoid responsibility for disorderly acts as order is prior to justice, and undermining both will mean loss of support. In addition great powers should try to meet some of the demands for "just" change in their policy. If demands can't be met, attempting to do so must be done regardless as not to lose support. The responsibility of great powers prevents them from ignoring such demands. In some areas secondary powers greatly affect the political position of the great power. Such secondary powers can wisely be brought in as partners of the regional management of balance as well as partners in the global management, to avoid the potential threats of middle powers uniting against great power arrogance.⁶⁵

Theoretical indicators

The theoretical framework provides the thesis with theoretical indicators for each institution.

⁶² Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 213-215.

⁶³ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 216-220.

⁶⁴ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 202-205.

⁶⁵ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002) p 220-222.

On Balance of Power, I look at Israel's relationship to the local balance of power considerations as subordinated the general balance of power. I also look at Israel's use of deterrence in this respect. In regards to International Law I investigate how Israel acted towards the principles of state sovereignty, the keeping of agreements and the restriction of violence. On Diplomacy this thesis focuses on how Israel related to the diplomatic arena in general. How did it use communication and negotiation? As for Israel's relationship to the institution of War we know that war can be both a threat to international society as well as a means of preserving of it. What can Israel's material war conduct be said to be in this period, and what reasoning was used to legitimize its actions? In relation to the institution of Great Powers I will look at how the great powers managed their relationship in the region. How did Israel act as the great powers; managed their relations, establishing and competing for spheres of influence and using their local preponderance to stop and limit war? These indicators are contextualized further in the introduction of the analysis chapter.

2.3 Summary

In this chapter I have explained my choice of theory; Hedley Bull supplemented with Alan James and Michael Waltzer. I have mapped out the main features of Bull's theory and the institutions of international society. Using these features I have shaped broad indicators which can revealed how Israel acted in accordance to the rules, norms and practices of international society. We now have the tool for conducting a qualitative research using document analysis. The following chapter explains my choice of method and a definition of what qualitative research is. I also explain my reason for choosing document analysis, what that entails and how I conducted the research of this thesis.

3 Methodology

As this thesis is a single case study of political historical events I will start by explaining why I think a qualitative research design using document analysis is the best way forward for my analysis. I will then go on to explain the document selection process. I will also review the limitations of the document selection, its validity and reliability.

3.1 Qualitative Research Design

Choosing a research design is to make a plan for how the analysis is to be conducted. My research problem calls for a qualitative research design as it allows for an in-depth analysis, looking closer at processes and meanings which cannot be measured in quantity or frequency.

Through qualitative methods of observation, interview and text analysis we can investigate smaller selections of cases and get closer to informants than we are able to through quantitative research is able to. A qualitative research design provides a basis for understanding social phenomena's through thorough data of persons and situations. The method of observation is not applicable to historical cases, and I do not have access to relevant interview objects. This thesis will therefore be based on a broad and nuanced document selection.

A neutral interpretation of the documents is important for achieving a valid analysis. This is complicated as we cannot describe and categorize events without infusing them with meaning. It is therefore often difficult to achieve the perfect understanding of what was actually meant. The subjective nature of the qualitative method also requires careful ethical considerations. The researcher may be overly influenced by some sources through the analysis. As I have been exposed to the very personal writing style of many key decision-makers biographies I have had to reflect upon that possibility. The researcher is also in danger of influencing the research with his or hers respective, inherent opinions or persuasions, something I also have kept in mind. The qualitative research process is flexible, allowing the researcher to work on different parts of the research process simultaneously. This is crucial when collecting, analyzing and

interpreting because it enables the process of gathering data to be adapted towards the most relevant findings for the thesis.⁶⁶

3.2 Document Analysis

Using the appropriate theoretical frame, document analysis can be used to uncover different processes. For instance; uncovering political agendas, or norms and practices within organizations, changes within networks or the establishment of power relations, or developments in national and ethnic identities. Document analysis can also reveal stability and change in decision-makers opinions on social and political matters and techniques of power usage.⁶⁷ As the research problem dictates, we are interested in uncovering Israel`s relations to established norms and practices of the society of states from 1955 to 1974. I will divide the data into two ten year periods, 1955-1964 and 1965-1974 in order extract data more evenly without focusing too much on particular events, providing us with a more complete set of data. Each period is analyzed by using the theoretical frame of Hedley Bull`s five institutions of international order. Each institution had its own features of contribution to the international order.⁶⁸ The relevant features will be used as indicators within each of the two periods to reveal Israel`s relationship to the rules, norm and practices in general. These indicators are presented in the introduction of the analysis.

Documents must, for analytical purposes, be divided into three categories; primary, secondary and tertiary documents, based on author, level of access and for what audience it was meant. Primary documents are documents that have been circulated to a limited number of actors within a restricted forum, and often contain sensitive information. Secondary documents are in principle available to all, though not aimed at the general public, but still available to those interested. Tertiary documents are also available to all, but are characterized by being written in order to shed light on a specific

⁶⁶ Thaagaard, Tove: *Systematikk og Innlevelse – En innføring i kvalitativ metode*, (OZGraf SA: Fagbokforlaget Vigmostad & Bjørke AS, 2002) p 11-23.

Lynggaard, Kenneth: *Kvalitative Metoder – En Grundbok*. Sven Brinkmann & Lena Tanggaard. (red.) (Hans Reitzels Forlag, Kjøbenhavn 2010).

⁶⁷ Lynggaard, Kenneth: *Kvalitative Metoder – En Grundbok*. Sven Brinkmann & Lena Tanggaard. (red.) (Hans Reitzels Forlag, Kjøbenhavn 2010) p 137. "

⁶⁸ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002)

situation or incident. Memoirs, biographies, journalistic and academic articles, reports or books are examples of tertiary documents that offer analytical insight into events and situations after they have occurred. The contexts in which a document was written, at what particular time, and for whom it was meant are important factors to be aware of when analyzing. This thesis will be combining all three categories for a more nuanced analysis through a triangulation of source categories.⁶⁹

3.2.1 Literature review – Access and Limitations

After my interest in Israel's conduct in the international society was sparked by reading "The Unspoken Alliance" (2010) by former senior editor at "Foreign Affairs" and doctorate in modern history from Oxford University, Sasha Polakow-Suransky, I began the process of seeking out more literature on the field through the so-called snowball-method. With "The Unspoken Alliance" as a "mother-document", its references led to many other relevant documents.⁷⁰ Using the snowball-method, the researcher in principle follows the references until it leads to no other references in order to obtain the complete document material. Much of the material is not available to me; for instance official documents that are only available physically in other states. Another limitation on the ability of investigating all references of the mother document is the limits imposed by the size of the master thesis and the timeframe for completion. This not only affects the source tracking of the mother document, but the entire document material investigation. Needless to say; there is a massive amount of material on Israel, its political and historical development. The researcher must therefore aim to choose the most relevant sources. Some are more central by covering the entire timeframe and offering expertise and useful insight. In this thesis sources are mostly written between 1955 and 1974, or after in retrospect of that period.

When seeking out relevant and central sources, the researcher must also make sure the document selection is nuanced representing several views. To represent the Israeli state perspective, both primary documents as well as tertiary documents such as biographies of key decision-makers will be relevant. For a nuanced analysis I wanted to use Israeli-

⁶⁹ Lynggaard, Kenneth: *Kvalitative Metoder – En Grundbok*. Sven Brinkmann & Lena Tanggaard. (red.) (Hans Reitzels Forlag, Kjøbenhavn 2010) p 138-140.

⁷⁰ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010).

critical historians that might bring forth other or competing facts and conditions. I also relied on secondary documents such as the analytical works of Professor Michal Brecher and Associate Professor Joel Peters.⁷¹ Some document material came from other sources. In regards to theory I received several suggestions for literature in the field by my supervisor Associate Professor Robinson. After reading up on competing perspectives, the choice fell on Hedley Bull's concept of the International Society. Through a lecture held by Professor in history, Hilde Waage at UiT – The Arctic University of Norway in March 2013, my attention was drawn towards the Israeli State Archives.⁷² By also referring to herself as Israel critical at that lecture, her new book "*Conflict and power politics in the Middle East*" was a fitting counterweight to the perspective of the Israeli state and decision-makers.⁷³ As the Israeli State Archives⁷⁴ available to me (at the time) only covers the period of 1956-1960, I used the historical documents available at the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMF) website to complete the timeframe until 1974. The IMF documents contain a selection of Israeli state records and diplomatic documents and are edited by Dr. Meron Medzini, covering the years 1947-2001.⁷⁵

3.3 Data reliability and validity

Qualitative method requires that the data's are reliable, and that they are of good quality. It is therefore crucial that I separate between what is data, and what is my interpretation of this data as a researcher during the document analysis. The document analysis consists mainly of paraphrases and direct quotations. By paraphrasing, interpretation is required which I must keep as neutral as possible. To create a sufficient flow of the text and to make clear my interpretation of the facts the document analysis is also part of the main analysis as opposed to a quantitative thesis that may keep its empirical segment completely apart from the analytical. A deeper analysis is conducted in the discussion,

⁷¹ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972).

Joel Peters: *Israel and Africa: The problematic Friendship*, (The British Academic Press, London 1992).

⁷² UiT.no. Guest lecture by Hilde Henriksen Waage: *Why is there no peace between Israel and the Palestinians?* at University of Tromsø – Norway's Arctic University (05.05.14)

⁷³ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013).

⁷⁴ Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13*, ed Baruch Gilead, (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001).

Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, January-October 1956 – Companion Volume 11*, ed Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2008).

⁷⁵ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: *Israel's Foreign Policy - Historical Documents* (08.05.14)

separated from the document analysis, clearly stated as my perception of the facts that are derived from the documents.

The data I have chosen also need to be valid, meaning relevant for the research I am conducting. I have explained the validity of my central sources in the literature review in accordance to limitations, the need for a theoretical framework and the goal of a nuanced document selection. I have (to the best of my ability) tried to assure the reliability of the data I have gathered by reflecting on the authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning of the document material. The “authenticity” of the document depends on how likely it is that the document is of the origin and written by the author that it claims to be. If the source is less secure, like a blog or a webpage, reflections on its centrality to the analysis is always healthy. The “credibility” of a source is decided by the level of uncertainty or bias connected to the set of documents. Did the selection of a certain timeframe or a specific source or even several documents make the conclusion biased? I have already reflected upon the matter of Israel as special case, exploring the limits of norms, rules and practices of the international society of states. As for the timeframe it makes up a third of Israel’s lifetime. This is arguably the most dramatic 20 years of Israel’s existence, though there has certainly been turmoil, conflict and war in the remaining two thirds. Nevertheless, this does not represent a bias of the thesis but a deliberate consideration taken, conducted in the interest of gathering relevant data.

As for the sources, I have explained how I have tried to maintain a nuanced document selection by triangulation the type of sources (primary, secondary and tertiary), and by balancing Israel-critical historians against Israeli state records and the memoirs of Israeli key decision-makers. In this thesis I have applied the use of footnotes, as direct sources in the text would make damage the flow of the document analysis chapter. The use of footnotes also partly explain the large word count.

On the matter of the document material being “representative” of the phenomenon, the change or break of discourse that we’re researching, we must find out to what degree the selection of documents is complete. I have done my best to make sure that the selection is complete, but the limitations of this analysis force me to choose that which is central and physically available. When reflecting on “meaning” we must consider the

language used in the documents, if it can be seen as unclear, vague or with several possible interpretations, and how we choose to interpret it. Technical terms or older language often pose challenges that we must be aware of. If there is obvious doubt on the interpretation of key statements or issues, I explain how I interpret them in the analysis.⁷⁶

3.4 Ethical considerations

Israeli statehood and its history, its conflicts in particular is in itself a sensitive matter to many, and any interpretation of history and events in this field are certain to offend one or several other views on the matter. That is not my intent. My aim is to make a neutral analysis based on a given theoretical framework and by using document analysis of a nuanced document material. As for myself I am certainly influenced by my western cultural perspective of history and as a student at a European university, schooled in a specific scientific tradition of thought. Norway has previously had a central mediating role in the Middle East, but has lately been critical of increased Israeli settlements in occupied territory and of other Israeli matters regarding the Palestinians. In addition the home town of my University, Tromsø, is a friendship town of Gaza. The Palestine issue receives a lot of national, as well as local, media attention. Locally the debate is quite influenced by the stance taken by Mads Gilbert, leader of the emergency medical department at the University Hospital of Tromsø, politician and profiled Palestine solitarian.

3.5 Summary

In this chapter I have explained why I chose qualitative method and document analysis for the analysis of my research problem and how I selected the data material. I have aimed at avoiding bias through transparency and reflection throughout the analytical process, as well as by making sure that the data is reliable, authentic, credible, and to the best of my ability interpreted as intended by the writer. Using the theoretical framework of Bull's institution that I mapped out in the theory chapter, I have identify Israel's

⁷⁶ Lynggaard, Kenneth: *Kvalitative Metoder – En Grundbok*. Sven Brinkmann & Lena Tanggaard. (red.) (Hans Reitzels Forlag, Kjøbenhavn 2010) p 146-149.

relationship to the norms, rules and practices of the society of states in the document analysis. I have then conducted a discussion on the background of the analysis to answer the research questions.

5 Background

In this chapter I'll make an attempt to summarize the most relevant events and conditions regarding Israeli statehood and development from the beginning of the Zionist idea until the establishment of the state in 1948. I will explain how Zionism came as a reaction to modern anti-Semitism and how the Jewish people came to seek a home in Palestine. I will explain how the British administration of the area came about, and how the British gave their promise to the Jews in the Balfour declaration which eventually led to the Israel's claim for independence in 1948 as the British withdrew from their mandate. I'll then map out the four Israeli-Arab wars of this era, and the most important power dynamics relating to it.

5.1 Anti-Semitism, Zionism and the Balfour declaration

What we consider modern anti-Semitism, started with the assassination attempt on Tsar Aleksander II in Russia in 1866. The attempt weakened the liberal tendencies within Russia and the region. Nationalistic movements in Ukraine and the Slavic region grew forth using anti-Semitism to gain support. "The Protocol of the Elders of Zion" was an anti-Semitic hoax that was used for the propaganda purposes of radicalizing and spreading anti-Semitism in Europe. This "document" proved that a secret Jewish power was plotting to control the world. As the tsar was assassinated in 1881 massive anti-Semitism "pogroms" was initiated, as destructive and murderous raids that were led against the Jews throughout Eastern Europe where Jewish houses were burned and their property seized. Soon the anti-Semitism spread west to Austria that had received much Jewish immigration as a result of the pogroms in the East.⁷⁷

Inspired by the surge of Nationalism and as a response to the increased anti-Semitism, Zionism developed during the 19th century. Instead of being an unwanted and scattered global minority, the Jews were to seek their own state. Theodor Hertz is by many considered the founding father of Zionism after he published "*Der Judenstaat*" in 1896 in which he gave a detailed outline of a Jewish state. The first Zionist congress was held a year later where the decision was made to work actively towards a Jewish home in Palestine. The world's Zionist Organization had been established. In 1901 the first Jewish national Fund was established by the organization to finance land purchase for settlement and agriculture. The founding of the world Zionist organization, marked a breach with traditional Jewish "Messianism" which was based on the belief that the Messiah would at some point emerge and secure the Promised

⁷⁷ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 26-31.

Land for the Jewish people.⁷⁸ Jews were encouraged by the organization to go to Palestine and start settlements. But as Golda Meir pointed out “*the idea of Jewish resettlement of Palestine had been urged by Jews and even some non-Jews long before the word “pogrom” became part of the vocabulary of European Jewry*”.⁷⁹ Labor Zionism and the Kibbutzim (a village based settlement approach that was based on hard work divided equally and by socialist ideals) inspired thousands in the early 1900`s, like Golda Meir who later was to become the Prime Minister of Israel. She left USA to go to live in a Kibbutz in Israel in 1921.⁸⁰ During WW1 Charles Weizmann, at the time a Jewish chemist with an astonishing diplomatic network was working in London while seeking British support for the Zionist project. In return he argued that the British would get better relations to Russia and USA while weakening the Ottoman Empire. A Jewish Palestine would also secure British interest in the Middle East. November 2nd 1917 Weizmann had managed to get British foreign minister Arthur Balfour to declare British support for the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine in the form of a letter to the leader of the British Zionist movement Lord Rothschild⁸¹; “*His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of the object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious' rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country*”.⁸²

5.2 British Rule 1918 – 1948

The area of Palestine had been under the administration of the provinces of Damascus and Beirut, which belonged to Syria under the Ottoman Empire. It was called Palestine by the Arabic population that resided there, but had no clearly defined borders. The promises made by the British in the Belfour declaration of a Jewish national home made the mandate of the Palestine area—which they received in the post WW1 negotiations—very difficult. Britain had military control of the area by 1918. Within two years deadly riots erupted; which the British saw in correlation with Palestinian disappointment of not obtaining independence, and Palestinian fear of the political and economic influence of the Jewish settlers. Much of

⁷⁸ Dan Cohn-Sherbok and Dawoud El-Alami: *Israel – Palestina, Konflikten sett fra begge sider* (Oneworld Publications, London 2002) p 3-24.

Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam`s Sons, New York 1975) p 24-25.

⁷⁹ (ibid., 24)

⁸⁰ (ibid., 71)

⁸¹ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 26-31.

⁸² UN.org. UNISPAL United Kingdom letter regarding Palestine (02.09.13)

Palestinian land was owned by rich merchants living in Lebanon, Syria or other more central parts of the former empire. Palestinian farmers could not always compete with the Jewish settlers who purchased land privately or funded by the Jewish National fund. Riots soon escalated to such a degree that Colonial minister Churchill published a white book in 1921 attempting to explain British plans for the mandate. Unfortunately the white book was vague and stirred more unease. As the Jews demanded access to the Wailing Wall in 1929 clashes broke out again. When the Nazis took control in Germany in 1933 over 170.000 Jews immigrated to Palestine within three years. Again heavy confrontation broke out in 1936 as a consequence. The British assembled a commission (the Peel commission) to find solutions. In its 1937 rapport it concluded that the British mandate had to end. At the time Jewish settlers owned 5,6% of the Palestinian land through private ownership. The Peel commission recommended a division of the territory giving 33% to the Jews as a national home, while the rest of Palestine was to be absorbed into Transjordan. For the following two years, Palestine was the scene of guerrilla-like warfare. Not just between Arabs, Jews and the British, but also among different Palestinian-Arab fractions. A new commission (the Woodhead Commission) was set in 1938 which concluded that the Peel commission's division-plan was not practical. Oil dependency meant that the British needed goodwill in the Arabic countries. A conference was held in London in 1939 which resulted in a white-paper that stated that the promises made to the Jews in the Belfour declaration had been kept, and Jewish immigration and land purchase was now to be limited. To the Jews this was a big betrayal and the Arabs rejected it as well, as it still allowed for immigration and some land-purchase. In October 1944 the Jewish union organization Haganah and different Jewish terrorist organizations joined forces in armed rebellion against the British, striking oil-refineries, telephone centrals and police stations.⁸³

The Jewish cause had a lot of sympathy in USA and in the world in general following WWII, and not without cause. *“By May 1945, the Germans and their collaborators had murdered six million European Jews as part of a systematic plan of genocide—the Holocaust.”*⁸⁴ President Truman was pushed on the immigration issue by American Zionists who used it against him in the ongoing election governor and congress election. On Yom Kippur 1946 Truman decided to mobilize voters in the by announcing support for division in Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state. Britain was weakened financially and militarily after WWII

⁸³ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 72-90.

⁸⁴ United States Holocaust Memorial Museum: Timeline of Events (08.05.14)

and was facing liberation movements in many areas of imperial interest. September 1947 Britain announced they would leave the Palestine question to the UN. United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was given the task to find a solution. UNSCOP concluded that the British mandate had to end and that the area was to be divided into a Jewish and a Palestinian state while Jerusalem and Bethlehem was to be administered by the UN. The Arab Palestinians refused this solution and got massive support from its Arabic neighbors and the Arabic League. Jewish settlers who now had private ownership of 8,6% of Palestine, was in the UNSCOP plans going to receive control of 56% of the territory. Not satisfied with the UNSCOP plans Israel still chose to accept. Truman gave the UNSCOP plans his support and it was acknowledged in the UN November 1947. The British decided to pull out completely from the area by May 15th 1948. Israel announced their Independence on the 14th of May 1948 and immediately received recognition from USA and the Soviet Union.⁸⁵

5.3 War of Independence – al-Nakba (Arabic: The Catastrophe) 1948-1949

The day after Israel's announcement the first Arab-Israeli war began. In the first phase of the war; Palestinians and their Arab allies consisting mainly of forces from of the Arabic liberation Army, Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon were successful though lacking coordination and proper training. Within four weeks the Arab coalition held most of what was to be the Palestinian state according to UN division plans. Egypt began focusing on securing their share of Palestinian land in competition with Transjordan. Transjordan also had a secret agreement with Israel that it would only hold the Palestinian areas of the partition plans, and not advance further. USA wanted UN to take responsibility in solving the conflict. UN Peace negotiators managed to get a four week truce which was mainly used by the participants to re-arm. Israel was the most efficient at getting new arms and mobilizing more troops. UN had implemented a weapons embargo that struck the Arab nations the hardest. Unlike Israel who obtained their arms illegally from Czechoslovakia, USA and France, the Arabs went through the formal channels under the embargo. The UN suggestion of making Palestine a part of Transjordan was rejected by all parties. Another truce was achieved in July, but the UN negotiator Bernadotte was killed by Jewish terrorists. His new peace plan was also rejected by all sides including by votes within the UN. Israel then attacked in October. Egypt who was

⁸⁵ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 91-112.

now fighting alone as the Arabic alliance had unraveled, were defeated and chased into Egypt by Israeli forces by January 1949. Britain had a defense agreement with Egypt and demanded immediate retreat by Israel and was backed by USA in their demands. Israel aborted its raid and a new cease-fire was in place on the 7th the same month. During the peace talks Israel used its military superiority to continue to push the Arabic League and Jordan out of areas that Israel wanted to control. Israel created the facts on the ground and created the conditions for its negotiations with the Arab states. Armistice agreements were negotiated with one Arab state at the time February 24th –July 20th 1949 on Rhodes. Israel expanded the territory it controlled with 22% more than the UN division plan had intended.⁸⁶

5.4 Conclusion

The goal of this chapter has been to provide background knowledge of events and conditions that has shaped and developed the state of Israel and its surroundings. The history of the area and the Jewish people as well as the international power struggle that led to Israel`s statehood, all contributes to an contextualization of the document analysis.

⁸⁶ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 112-126. (Appendix Figure 1)

6 Document Analysis

6.1 Introduction

This chapter contains the relevant data derived from my chosen document selection, and is aimed at answering the research questions. The document material describes Israel's interaction with the values, norms and practices of the society of states.

This 20 year period will be divided into two 10 year periods; 1955-64 and 1965-1974. I have chosen to divide the material into two periods in order to have a more balanced analysis providing an even amount of data from each period. By this division I avoid focusing on particular events that could make the data biased. Hedley Bull's theoretical concept of an international society, maintained decentralized by its member states providing order through the five institutions; Balance of Power, International Law, War Diplomacy and Great Powers, will be applied as theoretical indicators to reveal how Israel related to the framework of rules, norms and practices of the international society. I present the institutions drawing out their most relevant features for that purpose. Other than providing an impression of how Israel related to the institutions, special attention will be given to Israel's interaction with Africa.

The institutions of Balance of Power and Great Powers are closely intertwined as the maintenance of balance of power is a task of the great power management. I therefore choose to present their findings together. Great powers further exercise their management by enabling the institutions of International Law, War and Diplomacy. Acquired data on these three institutions will be presented following Balance of Power and Great Powers. I begin with a short specification the theoretical indicators, explaining what data I will be looking for in the document selection on each institution.

Balance of Power: The data I select explain how Israel related to the local balance of power dynamics of the Middle East, which was subordinated the dominating balance of power between the great powers. In addition I seek sources revealing how Israel used

deterrence, particularly Israel's effort to obtain a nuclear deterrent. The data must also provide insight on whether Israel can be said to be acting power maximizing or not.⁸⁷

Great Powers: Nuclear capability and military might was not evenly spread between the permanent members of UN Security Council throughout 1955-1974. USA had its first nuclear detonation in 1946, the Soviet Union in 1949 and Britain in 1952. France had their first test in 1960 and China in 1964.⁸⁸ Bull's theory ideal requires a state to match the strength of the other great powers in order to achieve and sustain membership. In his study of world politics in 1977, Bull only identifies China, USA and the Soviet Union as great powers.⁸⁹ The focus of this analysis will be on the USA and the Soviet Union as China had no real influence in the region. The former great powers Britain and France played a crucial role in the Middle East region up to and during our timeframe (1955-1974) and will receive attention in that respect. Using the document selection I will present data to shed light on how Israel related to the great powers and their management of the region; in preserving the balance of power and their relationship with one another, and their efforts to limit and contain conflict and war. It must be determined what sphere of influence Israel may be said to belong to in the timeframe. By sphere of influence we are referring to Bull's definition of the great power management in which a great power manage and stabilize geographical areas/regions under their control using their local preponderance.⁹⁰

International Law: Bull explained how International Law is a body of rules considered to have the status of law. In the modern state system these rules are to a large degree, formalized and facilitated through the United Nations (UN), an international organization working amongst other things for the maintenance of sovereignty, the keeping of agreements and the restriction of violence. Israel was accepted into the United Nations on the 11th of May 1949. "*Noting furthermore the declaration by the State of Israel that it 'unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to honor them from the day when it becomes a Member of the United*

⁸⁷ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002,) p 97-121.

⁸⁸ Encyclopædia Britannica Online: Nuclear Reactor (02.05.14)

⁸⁹ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002,) p 195-197.

⁹⁰ UN.org. Current permanent and non-permanent members of UN Security Council (14.03.14)

Nations."⁹¹ This of course includes; Article 2, stressing the principle of sovereign equality of all members, Article 33 demanding the exhaustion of all peaceful options to conflicts, and Article 39 to 42 referring to the role of the UN Security Council as determining the existence of threats and deciding what sanctions may be implemented.⁹² The documents must reveal if there are situations in which Israel can be said to disregard international law by not respecting bilateral or multilateral agreements, with states or with relevant organizations such as the UN. The data must also reflect Israel's relationship with the principle of sovereignty and the principle of restriction of violence. Do the sources reveal if potential breaches are legitimized by Israel by overriding concerns such as self-help or contested as facts altogether? Also, does Israel contribute to the mobilization for the enforcement or maintenance of international law?⁹³ Who enforces and who breaks law will always be subject to interpretation. Continuous border confrontation and other conflicts fog the role or identity of both law-enforcer and law-breaker. It is complicated further when states provide non-state guerilla warfare combatants with support, training and arms. Providing proof of such support is often difficult and will be disputed.

War: War can be a threat against the existence of international society. It can also be an instrument for the purposes of international society. The documents must reveal if wars Israel participate in is a threat or an instrument for the purposes of international society. The main focus will be on the material acts of war occurring between Israel and other sovereign states as war is only legitimately waged by sovereign states in the modern states system according to Bull. I hope to present sources that reveal the cause of war or at least Israel's legitimization of it; be it balance of power considerations, law enforcement, or to achieve just change. It is also interesting to see if the data indicate how Israel meets the requirements of the restriction of war.⁹⁴

Diplomacy: Through this document analysis I hope to find sources providing insight on how Israel related to diplomacy. I will not focus on the specific methods for gathering

⁹¹ UN.org. THE PLAN OF PARTITION AND END OF THE BRITISH MANDATE (13.01.14)

⁹² UN.org. UN charter index (03.04.14)

⁹³ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002,) p 122-155.

⁹⁴ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002,) p 178-193.

information or the Israeli ability to do so. Nor will I investigate the process of formulating the external policy. The documents will reflect how Israel worked the diplomatic arena in general. Did Israel see negotiation as a rational pursuit of interest where interest could be mutual, or only as an arena of self-interest? Are there examples of hostile diplomacy, or any data indicating that Israel abused its diplomatic privileges or otherwise interfered with the internal business of its host?⁹⁵ Diplomacy facilitates communication and cooperation among states. It offers room for perception and deception and diplomatic action may be seeking to portray a different picture than actual events in order to obtain some advantage for interests of overriding concerns or interests.

6.2 Israel in the International Society 1955 – 1964

6.2.1 Israel's relations to the Institutions of Balance of Power and Great Powers

The local balance of power situation of Israel in the Middle East

The general balance of power situation between the Soviet Union and the USA, who were engaged in a global battle for friendship and allies, strongly determined the subordinated balance of power situation in the Middle East of 1955. Abba Eban Israel's Ambassador to the USA (1950-59) wrote in his memoirs; "*The United States was trying to build a ring of bases around the Soviet Union, in the course of which it would make "so-called defense treaties" with Middle Eastern states. The Central imperative of Soviet security was to frustrate this design.*"⁹⁶ Both sides wanted Egypt on their side of the balance, preferably through a defense treaty. Egypt had since 1948 implemented a general blockade of Israel by stopping its ships, and searching all other ships passing through the Suez Canal⁹⁷ for contraband, meaning any supplies to Israel. Gamal Nasser the informal leader of Egypt since a coup in 1952 became president by 1956. Egypt had

⁹⁵ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002,) p 156-177.

⁹⁶ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 195.

⁹⁷ The Suez Canal is a canal linking the Mediterranean Ocean and the Red Sea.

refused Israeli ships to sail through the Strait of Tiran⁹⁸ since the War of Independence and until 1957, when UN forces took charge of the area enabling Israeli passage. Following a series of minor clashes on the Gaza border, Israel raided Gaza on the 28th of February 1955 in the bloodiest confrontation since the Independence War. According to Waage; that event in particular made Nasser more concerned with security issues, making him turn to the Soviet Union for arms.⁹⁹ Eban described the event. On the 27th of September 1955 Egypt announced the arms deal; *“A turning point came when the Soviet Union authorized a massive arms transaction with Egypt through Czechoslovakia. Weapons of a destructive capacity hitherto unknown in the Middle East poured into Egypt at a rate beyond all previous experience. (...)The Balance of power in the Middle East would now be a function of East-West relations.”*¹⁰⁰ The Soviet Union did not see Israel as a likely ally, hence a friendship with Egypt was much more valuable, as the Israeli state archives reveals; *“Since the mid 1950`s, the Soviet union regarded Israel as totally committed to the Western Bloc. The fact that Israel was not officially affiliated to any Western pact or organization was of no significance to the Russians or their allies.”*¹⁰¹

Israel was not confident in its security situation. On all borders were enemies from the Independence War; Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and also Saudi Arabia and Yemen who sent combatants.¹⁰² The USA was reluctant to balance out the Soviet-Egyptian relations with arms-supplies and support, as to damage their relations to Egypt and the Arab nations. But the USA who would not arm Israel itself had no objection that its allies did, and Israel was able to secure arms from France who also saw Nasser as an enemy. According to Waage, Egypt provided aid and training to Front de Libération Nationale (FNL), the Algerian liberation organization that was fighting the colonial power of France in the Algerian war (1954-1962).¹⁰³ Israel received 12 Mirage fighter-planes in April 1956. In June they signed a massive arms deal in for another 72 fighter

⁹⁸ The Strait of Tiran is a strait between the Sinai Peninsula and Saudi Arabia, the only waterway to Israel's southern port Elat.

⁹⁹ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 159-172, 343.

Simcha Dinitz: *The Legal Aspects of the Egyptian Blockade of the Suez Canal*, The Georgetown Law Journal, Volume 415 Winter 1956-57 nr 2, (17.03.14)

¹⁰⁰ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 173.

¹⁰¹ Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13*, ed Baruch Gilead, (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p. xxxvi.

¹⁰² Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 112.

¹⁰³ (ibid., 173, 182-200)

jets, 200 tanks and large amounts of ammunition that was delivered a month later.¹⁰⁴ The same month, Britain pulled out from Suez as it had promised to Egypt 20 months earlier. This meant the removal of an important buffer for Israel.

Nasser was angry after the USA and Britain who had agreed to finance the Aswan project in December 1955, withdrew their support six months later as a reply to Egypt's recognition of the Communist regime in Beijing in March 1956. The Aswan dam was a massive irrigation project that would improve Egyptian agriculture and industry. Shimon Peres, an Israeli defense official at the time, claim it was Egypt's parallel negotiation with the Soviet Union for funding that made the Americans change their decision. Nasser replied by nationalizing the Suez Canal the 26th of July. With the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the blockade of the Tiran Strait, Egypt's military coordination efforts with Syria, and the guerilla attacks from Sinai and Egypt controlled Gaza; Israel interpreted it as Nasser's intent to attack, according to Golda Meir.¹⁰⁵ In September 1956 France invited Israel in on their plans to invade Egypt to regain control of the canal in what was later known as the Suez Campaign or Suez War. France and Britain had strongly disliked Nasser's pan-Arabic efforts in the region as well as the nationalization of the canal. The British also blamed Nasser for their loss of influence in Jordan. The plan was that Israel would invade Sinai in order to stop Fedayeen attacks. France and Britain was then to intervene in the conflict, take control of the Suez Canal and provide a responsible management of the canal.

The attack was launched 29th of October and proved quite successful until USA applied pressure to stop Britain, France and Israel. The Soviet Union suggested in November to USA that they should undertake a joint action in order to stop the war, but USA declined. The Soviet Union applied pressure towards France and Britain by indirectly threatening to apply nuclear weapons to stop the war. This led the USA to announce that it would

¹⁰⁴ Shimon Peres: *Erindringer*, (Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo 1995) p 127-128.

Michael Karpin: *The Bomb in the Basement – How Israel went nuclear and what that means for the world*, (Simon & Scuster, New York 2006) p 68.

¹⁰⁵ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 182-208.

Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 204-209.

Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1975) p 296.

Shimon Peres: *Erindringer*, (Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo 1995) p 128-137.

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Aide-memoire from Egypt to the United States regarding Passage through the Straits of Tiran, 28 January 1950. (18.03.14)

protect its allies against attacks. The USA applied pressure on the aggressors by stopping the shipping of oil to Europe. Britain was soon unable to stabilize the Pound and the USA also stopped Britain's money reserves from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to apply additional pressure. France and Britain was forced to end the campaign, but Israel was not willing to withdraw from Sinai and Gaza which it had managed to occupy. Only after the USA threatened to stop all aid to Israel as well as seize to protect Israel from UN sanctions, did Israel retreat to the armistice borders of 1949. Meir claims that for Israel, threats of direct Soviet Union intervention were the source of greatest pressure for an Israeli withdrawal. By January 1957 the war was ended, cementing the Soviet Union's view of Israel as a western allied.¹⁰⁶ Egypt had lost the pre-war arms advantage, at least temporarily. Michael Brecher, currently Political Science Professor at Yale, points out in his analysis of Israel's foreign policy system of 1948-68; *"The Sinai Campaign of 1956 restored the balance."*¹⁰⁷ According to Brecher; other than destroying the Egyptian military capability and gaining confidence, Israel obtained large amounts of abandoned Soviet Union arms, and gained access to the Red Sea through the strait of Tiran once again.¹⁰⁸ *"The Egyptian Army was mauled in the Suez-Sinai War its Air Force decimated. Vast quantities of equipment fell into Israeli hands. Within two years, however, the balance of military capability was restored, largely through Soviet bloc aid."*¹⁰⁹

Israel had not increased its popularity among the Arabs after the Sinai War and now looked for friendships elsewhere to improve its strategic situation. In Europe, Israel went as far as reaching out to West Germany to buy arms in December 1957.¹¹⁰ But it was not only in Europe new friendships were sought. Israel wanted to befriend the

¹⁰⁶ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 182-208.

Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 204-209.

Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1975) p 296, 301.

Shimon Peres: *Erindringer*, (Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo 1995) p 128-137.

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Aide-memoire from Egypt to the United States regarding Passage through the Straits of Tiran, 28 January 1950. (18.03.14)

¹⁰⁷ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972) p 60.

¹⁰⁸ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972) p 60.

¹⁰⁹ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972) p 86.

¹¹⁰ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972) p 415-420.

“periphery” surrounding the Arab states. Historian Polakow-Suransky wrote; *“The Brainchild of Mossad leaders Reuven Shiloah and Isser Harel, the periphery strategy was a crucial part of Israel’s plan to check the expansion of Nasser’s pan-Arabism as well as Soviet influence in the period.”*¹¹¹ The new and developing post-colonial states were perfect candidates. Israel State Archives states the policy at the time; *“Israel wished to prevent the new states in Africa from forging strong ties with the Arab states, by exploiting the fear most of them had of Egypt. The economic ties Israel had with the developing nations played an important role in this.”*¹¹² Golda Meir, Israel’s Foreign Minister at the time began Israel’s “International Cooperation Program”—later named the MASHAV collaboration program in 1958, which focused on collaboration and development of post-colonial African countries.¹¹³ However as the Israeli State Archives mentions; *“Israel’s fervent desire to strengthen its ties with the newly independent nations of Africa, and those on the verge of becoming independent, did not prevent it from continuing its ties with their greatest adversary—South Africa. The reason for this was twofold: the presence of an important Jewish community there and the fear that if these relations cooled there was a possibility that South Africa would be drawn closer to Egypt (...).”*¹¹⁴

The Israeli state archives describe 1958-1959 as dominated by *“(...) efforts to obtain security guarantees from the western powers and to find increased sources for the purchase of arms. Furthermore, attempts were made, which were not successful, to find ways to affiliate with NATO.”*¹¹⁵ The goal was to even the balance of Nasser’s increased military power of Soviet Union weapons that Egypt had received after the Suez War. Egypt and Syria also formed a political union in 1958 called the “United Arab Republic” (UAR), but it was dissolved only three years later.¹¹⁶ According to Brecher, Israel obtained an important arms-agreement from West Germany in 1960 but France was

¹¹¹ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 28.

¹¹² Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13*, ed Baruch Gilead, (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p I.

¹¹³ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. About MASHAV (31.03.14)

Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York 1975) p 318-319.

¹¹⁴ Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13*, ed Baruch Gilead, (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p lii.

¹¹⁵ Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13*, ed Baruch Gilead, (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p. xi.

¹¹⁶ Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13*, ed Baruch Gilead, (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p. xi-xxvii.

unquestionably the most important arms source.¹¹⁷ “During the years prior to the Sinai Campaign, and even after it, France was the main source of supply of arms to Israel, especially fighter planes and tanks.”¹¹⁸ With the independence of Algeria in 1962 the relations between France and the Arab world improved. Yitzhak Rabin, the IDF chief of Operation Branch stressed the need for breaking the American arms blockade in the early 60’s as the Arab’s seemed to strengthen their position.¹¹⁹ 1964 saw a series of Arab summits in the attempt to create greater Arab unity. In this process the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) were founded to fight the Palestinian cause. Other than this, the “new” Arab unity proved to be short lived. Egypt was tied up spending heavy resources in the Yemen civil war (1962 – 1967) where it had committed 1/3 of its army.¹²⁰

Nuclear Deterrence

September 1956 had also marked the beginning of French assistance for the Israeli nuclear program as France entered a verbal agreement to sell Israel a nuclear reactor as a reward for creating the pretext for the Suez War. France also depended on Israeli help and intelligence in the Algerian War (1954-1962). The reactor-deal with France was formalized after the Suez war in 1957. Peres claim Israeli prime Minister, Ben-Gurion saw nuclear power as a necessity for a nation blessed with few resources, situated in a difficult security situation. A deal was signed a year later, that France would deliver enriched plutonium and, a 24 megawatt reactor. Construction began in Dimona in 1960 under the cover of making a textile factory. The USA soon became aware of the plans, but Israel convinced them it was for peaceful purposes. In 1962 Kennedy agreed to sell Israel a Hawk anti-aircraft missile system to protect the Dimona nuclear reactor. The reactor was completed by 1963.¹²¹ By 1964 Israel was also improving its conventional military and looked to strengthen it further. As Eban noted; “*Although relations with*

¹¹⁷ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972) p 86.

¹¹⁸ Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13*, ed Baruch Gilead, (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p xxxii-xxxiv.

¹¹⁹ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin memoirs*, (Little, Brown and Company, Toronto 1979) p 54.

¹²⁰ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972) p 61-62.

¹²¹ Michael Karpin: *The Bomb in the Basement – How Israel went nuclear and what that means for the world*, (Simon & Scuster, New York 2006) p 81-190.

Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 40-41.

Shimon Peres: *Erindringer*, (Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo 1995) p 140-150.

France still seemed cordial and the supply belt was moving smoothly, we had reached the stage where we could not maintain a balance of power without an American component in armour and aircraft.”¹²²

Power maximizing

I argue that on the basis of the data presented above that Israel was acting power maximizing in the local balance, resisting the restraints of the general balance to improve its security situation. Israel's main priority was to avoid being destroyed or absorbed by other states which in Bull's theory can occur if the general balance calls for it.¹²³ While unsuccessfully trying to achieve formal security guarantees to prevent its destruction, Israel power maximizing to such a degree that it acquired the technology and assistance to initiate its own nuclear program. However, Israel was adherent to the demands of the dominant balance as it depended on the good will of the great powers, particularly the USA.

The Middle East as a sphere of influence

The Middle East was the field of an ongoing battle for influence. Spheres of influence were not fully established; in fact the region was under radical change. Britain and France were no longer the dominating great powers globally that they once were. Now they worked to a certain degree together with the USA to prevent the influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. At the division of the Ottoman Empire in the Versailles negotiations in 1919, Britain had received the mandate for Iraq and Palestine (Israel, Palestine, Jordan), while France had the mandate for Syria and Lebanon. After World War II both Britain and France were forced to withdraw from their colonies and other areas of influence, leaving open a power vacuum for the two new global powers, the USA and the Soviet Union to compete for. As for the sphere surrounding Israel, the USA sought to befriend most of these states but was faced with pan-Arabic sentiments and the anti-west, anti-colonist movement in the region. In addition Israel mobilized the Jewish-American population against the development US-Arab relations, swaying election results and pressuring American decision makers.¹²⁴ In 1955 Britain, Iraq,

¹²² Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 299.

¹²³ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002,) p 103.

¹²⁴ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013), p 57-180,

Turkey and also Iran and Pakistan came together to form a defense alliance known as the Baghdad pact. The USA had signed a defense agreement with Iraq the year before, but remained at least formally an observer to the pact. After the Iraqi military coup in 1958, Iraq left the Baghdad pact seeking a closer collaboration with Egypt and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union exploited the post-colonial resentment of the West and gained friendships by providing arms to Egypt and later Syria. USA replied by formalizing its new Middle East policy in 1957 as a part of its global efforts against Communism. It was known as the Eisenhower doctrine. History professor Peter L. Hahn describes its purpose; "*The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 declared that the United States would distribute economic and military aid and, if necessary, use military force to stop the spread of communism in the Middle East.*"¹²⁵ As Egypt got its arms in 1955 and later nationalized Suez, the USA slowly gave up befriending Egypt.¹²⁶ In Syria pan-Arabism was more deep-rooted than in Egypt. After French rule until 1946 Syria underwent five years of dictatorship before a democratic election gave the Baath party the control in 1954. Syria feared Israeli expansionism and Western colonialism more than Communism. In spite of the failed United Arab League of 1958-1961 Syria's close ties to Egypt and Soviet continued.

Lebanon, also a part of the former French mandate, was considered by the West to be more progressed and Western than Syria. President Chamoun (1952-58) kept good relations to the West, and received both aid and weapons from USA in 1953. Lebanon did not wish to join either side in a defense pact, but signed a trade-agreement with USA in 1955. During the Suez War, Lebanon maintained diplomatic relations to the West which aggravated its Arab neighbors. Facing increased internal dismay with its Western ties, Chamoun used the Eisenhower doctrine to get American support to stop the internal revolt in 1958. A new president was instated as a result, but Lebanon remained friendly to the West, though internally tense throughout this first period of 1955-1964.¹²⁷

207.

¹²⁵ Peter L. Hahn: *Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957* Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1, Presidential Doctrines (Mar., 2006), p 38-47. (19.03.14)

¹²⁶ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 66-70, 174-177.

¹²⁷ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 210-285.

Jordan had enjoyed close ties to Britain since its establishment and competed with Egypt for leading role amongst the Arabs. By 1956 Jordan's relationship to Britain would change following demonstrations by the large numbers of Palestinian refugees that was now part of Jordan. On the 1st of March 1956 the British were thrown out of Jordan. Free elections were held for the first time, and it was decided that the economic and military collaboration with Britain was to end. Instead, Jordan would seek closer ties with Syria and Egypt. Jordan's King called upon the USA to enforce the Eisenhower doctrine, claiming a military coup was about to unfold in order to get rid of the prime minister and the parliament. As a result Jordan became a police state with a pro-American government.

Together with Turkey who had been a NATO member since 1951, Israel, Jordan, Iran and to some degree Lebanon belonged to the American sphere of influence during this first period. The Soviet Union sphere of influence in the region consisted of Egypt, Syria and after 1958 also Iraq.¹²⁸

Israel's relation to the Great Power management

According to Waage Israel declined an American offer in February 1955 for a mutual defense treaty, which would provide that much sought after Great Power guarantee for Israel's safety. She claims it was the American demand for Israel to stop its retaliation strategy and cease to use force to change its borders that made the tempting suggestion unacceptable. By ending the Suez War America demonstrated its ability to restrain the former great powers of the region, France and Britain. The USA also demonstrated the willingness to restrain the regional power of Israel from completing its objectives, and hence maintaining regional stability, and acting out its local preponderance. The relationship between Israel and USA was much improved already by 1957 following the Suez war. In 1958 following the military coup in Baghdad 14th of July, the USA turned to Israel for help in order to stabilize Jordan and Lebanon. According to Israeli State Archives, Israel had become an important and stable regional support for the West.¹²⁹

¹²⁸ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 176-177, 288-349.

¹²⁹ Israel State Archives: *Israel Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13*, ed Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p. xi – xxvi.

Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 174.

Britain and the USA asked permission to use Israel's airspace in the operation to stabilize Jordan and Lebanon in the unrest following Iraq's coup. The USA was granted permission without too much deliberation, while Britain did not enjoy the same treatment. The Israeli State Archives describes the situation; "*Reactions of the opposition both in Britain and in Israel had to be considered as well as fears that the countries of Africa and Asia would brand Israel as a collaborator with imperialism; and above all apprehension of the reaction from the Soviet Union, whose threats against Israel during the Sinai Campaign had not been forgotten.*"¹³⁰ Israel asked for American permission to grant the British use of Israeli airspace symbolizing the American predominance. Israel also used the situation to bargain with Britain that Britain would no longer intervene in Israeli-Jordanian border clashes. Britain agreed and received permission to use Israel's airspace. From the Soviet Union, Israel received the following response according to the Israeli State Archives; "*(...)by putting its airspace at the disposal of Britain and the United States it bears responsibility for the increase in tension in the Middle East, which could develop into a conflict of most serious consequences to the national interests of Israel.*"¹³¹ It was in light of this threat that Israel's ambassador to Washington Abba Eban, received from the American Secretary of State, Dulles, reassurance that USA would intervene if Israel was attacked by the Soviet Union. "*He added that the Soviet Union is well aware of this and therefore the fears of a Soviet attack are groundless.*"¹³²

The USA supported the freedom of navigation principle in regards to the Suez channel, but also approved the Arab boycott towards Israel in terms of the sovereign right of each nation to contain the commerce within its borders. In the border-conflicts in 1958/59 with Syria, Israel did not receive the support it expected by the USA in the Security Council. Also the USA did not recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, and kept its embassy in Tel Aviv encouraging other states to do the same, according to the Israeli State Archives.¹³³ "*Since the United States determined its attitude while taking into consideration its relations with the Arab states, Israel did not always gain satisfaction*

¹³⁰ Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13*, ed Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p. xii-xiii.

¹³¹ Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13*, ed Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p. 31.

¹³² Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13*, ed Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p 35.

¹³³ Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13*, ed Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p. xxvii-xxix.

from Washington."¹³⁴ Nevertheless, Israel's relationship with the USA only improved between 1960-1964. In spite of hiding its Dimona activities from America, Israel received missiles and other technology to protect the Dimona facility.

Since the mid 1950's Israel's relations to the Soviet Union had been at a standstill. Ben-Gurion had suggested to the Soviet Ambassador in Tel Aviv in 1958 a change of relations, including the possibility of a Soviet Union arms supply to Israel and an active role as an intermediary between Israel and the Arab states. There was no response to the suggestion, and when Israel allowed the USA and Britain use its airspace Soviet's response was threatening. The Soviet Union also made statements in their official documents of support for the legal rights of the Palestinian Arabs whom had been "expelled from their homeland". Israel feared at the time that the Soviet Union plotted with Nasser to reduce Israel's territory to the 1947 borders.¹³⁵

6.2.2 Israel's relation to the institutions of International Law, War and Diplomacy

Israel's relation to the principle of Sovereignty

Abiding to the principle of state sovereignty is fundamental as a weakening of its stature may threaten the entire society of states. Israel protected its people, territory and ultimately its constitutional independence from its surrounding states. When attacked by guerilla groups, Israel held any host state or states supporting that group directly responsible. Israel's raids into Egypt controlled Gaza in 1955 was by Israel legitimized as self-help against attacks from both the Egyptian Army and guerilla groups operating from Egyptian territory. An Israeli raid into Syria in 1955 known as the Kinneret operation was also legitimized by Israel as self-help to protect Israeli sovereignty. Waage questions the legitimacy of the self-help claim, arguing the size and efficiency of the operation revealed it as a planned and conscious effort by Israel to provoke an Egyptian-Syrian attack. According to Waage, an Arab attack could legitimize a war with Egypt before it became too powerful. This tactic was aimed at avoiding the label of

¹³⁴ Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13*, ed Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p. xxix.

¹³⁵ Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13*, ed Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001) p. xxxvi-xxxviii.

aggressor if war was initiated.¹³⁶ In the planning phase with France and Britain before the Suez War, Israel stuck to this tactic. It was important to legitimize the Israeli attack as a reaction to the recent Guerilla attacks from Gaza and Sinai as not to be violating the territorial sovereignty of Egypt, but as advancing to protect the sovereignty of its own territory and people through self-help.¹³⁷ According to Israeli author and journalist Michael Karpin, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion made himself clear on the matter. “*Israel will not start the war, and will not play the aggressor, while England and France appears as the angels of peace.*”¹³⁸ Israel also pointed to the Egyptian blockade of Suez, the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba as inhibiting on Israeli trade and security interests. Free access through the latter two was by Israel considered as something close to an extension of its territorial rights.

Therefore, following the Suez War Israel’s access to the Gulf and the Strait received much attention and debate. According to Ann Ellen Danseyar’s paper; *Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran*: “*Subsequent to the Commission’s work, the Secretary-General of the U.N. General Assembly, in 1957, recognized what were and continued to be the claims of various world powers: that the Gulf of Aqaba was an international waterway, through which innocent passage could not be suspended.*”¹³⁹ At the 1958 Geneva Law of the Sea Conference, most nations also considered the Strait of Tiran to be an international waterway, open to all ships.¹⁴⁰ Israel signaled very clearly that a further prevention of Israel’s access to the Strait was to be seen as an act of war.¹⁴¹ One consequence of the Suez War was that the international society sought to establish law that could help to avoid a repetition of events. The areas legal status was to be considered international waterways and in this respect the Suez war, regardless of other intent, turned out to have law changing or law-establishing consequences, at least in this location.

¹³⁶ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 168-179, 198-199.

Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 172.

¹³⁷ Shimon Peres: *Erindringer*, (Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo 1995) p 127-139.

¹³⁸ Michael Karpin: *The Bomb in the Basement – How Israel went nuclear and what that means for the world*, (Simon & Scuster, New York 2006) p 84.

¹³⁹ Ann Ellen Danseyar: *Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran: From Customary International Law to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty*, 5 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 127 (1982), (24.03.14)

¹⁴⁰ (ibid.)

¹⁴¹ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 343.
Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 326-328.

Israel called upon its sovereign rights for more than legitimizing military self-help. It called upon its to avoid the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections in 1961 in spite of signing a treaty that allowed it.¹⁴² Yet it was another case in this period that really called to the attention the role of sovereignty. On the 11th of May 1960, Adolf Eichmann, known as one of the most significant architects behind the Jewish Holocaust was captured in Argentine. The news was announced by Israel on May 23rd along with expressions of regrets over any violation of Argentinian law. Stressing Eichmann's unique position, Israel hoped Argentine would overlook the violation. Argentine demanded Eichmann would be returned along with those who had taken him, and argued that the violation of their sovereign rights was a threat to the principle rights of international coexistence. According to Argentine, The Eichmann incident should be used to create precedence for similar matters allowing no exception to the principle of sovereignty. Foreign Minister Meir argued that this was an isolated violation of Argentine law which had to be seen in the light of Eichmann's position. Lippman argues that Israel claimed the abduction had been done by private individuals not Israel, hence Israel had no responsibility and the UN Security Council had no jurisdiction. Israel apologized again and after the two governments exchanged their ambassadors with new ones, a joint communique was issued stating that the issue of Israeli national's violation of Argentinian fundamental rights was closed.¹⁴³

Israel's relation to the principle of Respecting Agreements

The respect of agreements, is a basic rule of coexistence that all members of international society should respect and benefit from. Israel had as any member of the United Nations promised to follow the UN Charter. Israel claimed that it acted in accordance to UN Charter Article 33, when it filed complaints the Armistice Control Commission about Egypt's violation of the armistice agreement. But Israel did not receive a Security Council legitimization to initiate the Suez War, and hence was in breach with article 39.¹⁴⁴ The Suez War was legitimized in public by the overriding

¹⁴² Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 47.

¹⁴³ Matthew Lippman, *Houston Journal of International Law. The Trial of Adolph Eichmann and the Protection of the Universal Human Rights under International Law*, Volume 5 autumn 1982, Nr 1.

¹⁴⁴ UN.org. UN charter: CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION (03.04.14)

UN.org. CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (03.04.14)

concern of state survival, regardless of this claim was real, just perceived to be so, or if it was a planned deception to create the condition for the French and British intervention.¹⁴⁵ This was not the first time Israel circumvented international agreements. According to Waage, Israel had used illegal channels for the acquisition of arms since the War of Independence.¹⁴⁶ Israeli Journalist Michael Karpin described the situation; “*Israel’s greatest difficulty was the embargo on the sale of arms to the Middle East instituted by the United states, Britain and France in 1952.*”¹⁴⁷ According to Polakow-Suransky, Shimon Peres the Director General of the Defense Ministry saw it as his task to break the embargo that was suffocating Israel. “*In this spirit, Peres created a parallel Foreign Ministry behind the back of Foreign Minister Golda Meir.*”¹⁴⁸ Together with France, Israel broke the embargo in 1956. Peres claims the French insisted that both Israeli and French Foreign Ministry was kept in the dark. It was kept between the Defense Ministries.¹⁴⁹

US president Eisenhower assumed nuclear capability would spread beyond the USA and the Soviet Union and chose a diplomatic strategy to deal with this challenge. In his “Atoms for Peace Speech” in 1953 he called for a peaceful international nuclear research collaboration, which led to the creation of the IAEA in 1957 and the “Atoms for Peace Program” where selected governments received research reactors if agreeing to certain conditions of peaceful use. This was done to absorb new sovereign states in their American sphere of influence and was also used for bargaining, obtaining resources and bases in areas of strategic interest. America signed an agreement in 1955 to give Israel a 5000 kilowatt research reactor, but as a restriction Israel was not permitted to produce plutonium. It is possible that the USA did not believe Israel had the know-how to do so. The nuclear program Israel had with France was in violation with this agreement.¹⁵⁰ As

¹⁴⁵ Shimon Peres: *Erindringer*, (Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo 1995) p 128-137.

Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam`s Sons, New York 1975) p 296, 300-301.

¹⁴⁶ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 115-116.

¹⁴⁷ Michael Karpin: *The Bomb in the Basement – How Israel went nuclear and what that means for the world*, (Simon & Scuster, New York 2006) p 26.

¹⁴⁸ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 24.

¹⁴⁹ Shimon Peres: *Erindringer*, (Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo 1995) p 127-130.

¹⁵⁰ International Atomic Energy Agency. Atoms for peace speech. Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly *Tuesday, 8 December 1953* (02.04.14)

David Fischer: *History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: the first forty years*, (The Agency, Vienna 1997) p50. (02.04.14)

John Krige: *Atoms for Peace, Scientific Internationalism, and Scientific Intelligence*, Osiris, Vol. 21, No. 1, Global

a member of IAEA since 1957 Israel agreed; *“To establish and administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic energy;”*¹⁵¹ Israel purchased 10 tons of enriched uranium from South Africa which was reported to IAEA in 1962/1963. But as mentioned, Israel refused IAEA inspections since 1961, a responsibility that was outsourced to American inspectors after much negotiation.¹⁵²

The UN Security Council resolution 181 of August 1963 contained a volunteer (mandatory by 1977) weapons embargo against the apartheid regime of South Africa. *“Solemnly calls upon all states to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition of all types and military vehicles to South Africa;”*¹⁵³ According to Polakow-Suransky, Israel supported the volunteer embargo. *“In 1963, Meir told the U.N. General Assembly that Israelis could not condone apartheid due to Jews historical experience as victims of oppression and went on to pledge that Israel “had taken all necessary steps” to prevent Israeli arms from reaching South Africa, directly or indirectly.”*¹⁵⁴

Between 1955 and 1964 the documents reveal that Israel had a selective relationship to the keeping of agreements and the principle of sovereignty, though abiding to them more often than not. Israel clearly saw the value of being or seeming law abiding, hiding their law-breaking behavior when possible, and explaining them if exposed as exceptions based on overriding principles of state survival. The Eichmann case is hard to legitimize as relating to state survival, representing maybe the most obvious breach of sovereignty in the period. Its obligations to international law were seen as secondary to their security concerns and balancing efforts towards Egypt. At the same time Israel depended on a functioning international law for those same concerns.

Power Knowledge: Science and Technology in International Affairs (2006), pp. 161-181. (18.03.14)

Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 24-26, 40-41.

¹⁵¹ International Atomic Energy Agency. ARTICLE IV: Membership (02.04.14)

¹⁵² Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 42, 47.

¹⁵³ UN.org. 181 (1963). Resolution of 7 August 1963 (05.05.14)

¹⁵⁴ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 32.

Israel`s relation to the principle of restricting violence

In 1952 Israel adopted a new military strategy to deal with border conflicts with its surrounding neighbor`s. The Arab “needle prick” strategy designed to exhaust and demotivate the Israeli`s was to be met with massive retaliation each time. The massive violence was applied with the intent to restrict violence in the long run through deterrence by eliminating enemies and causing deterrence against future attacks.¹⁵⁵ This preemptive strategy was an attempt at expanding the notion of defense or self-help. As we cannot assume Egypt would have attacked Israel it is hard to know if the Suez war restricted violence in the sense of being preemptive. Golda Meir would later argue that the American intervention made that mission incomplete.¹⁵⁶ Israel`s ambiguity about its the nuclear program was also intended to be deter attacks. Israel`s dealings with the Syrians on the 1964 National Water Carrier program showed a continuation of the massive retaliation tactics.

Israel`s relation to the Institution of War

Material war

Material war means actual combat and may include any form of military clashes among sovereign states. If we take this to include border conflicts, Israel engaged in material war often throughout this period. What will not be sufficiently reflected here are the guerilla attacks that led to many of Israel`s operations. If any guerilla group launched an operation in or into Israeli territory, Israel held the neighboring state from which the group operated, directly accountable. According to Abba Eban; Moshe Sharett, Israel`s Prime Minister at the time authorized a raid on Gaza in February 1955, following six months of forty armed clashes and twenty-seven raids on Israeli territory. To Israel and Eban, Egypt and Nasser were responsible. *“There had been no incursions by Israel into Egyptian territory, and Egypt had been condemned by the Armistice Commission twenty six times.”*¹⁵⁷ The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) was responsible for overseeing the Armistice agreements and receiving complaints and reports of hostilities. UNTSO sent their recommendations for further action to the UN Security Council. Frustrated by facing veto`s against any sanctions or intervention towards Egypt

¹⁵⁵ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 167.

¹⁵⁶ Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam`s Sons, New York 1975) p 296, 300-301.

¹⁵⁷ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 179.

in the Security Council, and what Israel saw as an overall ineffective Armistice Commission, the Israeli forces raided Gaza on the 28th of February leading to 37 Egyptian deaths. From Israel's point of view, peaceful negotiations was attempted and proved unfruitful due to the inefficiency of the Armistice Commission and the veto situation in the UN Security Council. Hence, negotiation led to no real change in the situation.¹⁵⁸

In the end of August Israel led a new attack into Gaza on Khan Yonis, killing another 37 Egyptians, and in November, Israel took control of the demilitarized El Auja zone killing 81 Egyptians on the Egyptian side of the zone.¹⁵⁹ In December, Syria fired on Israeli fishing vessels on Lake Tiberius according to Eban. This violation of sovereignty led Israeli forces to enter Syria the following night killing seventy-three Syrians, and losing six of their own. This was later known as the Kinneret operation and ruined the ongoing efforts to obtain US arms.¹⁶⁰ According to Ambassador Eban; *"There was a clash between two military needs—the need for retaliation and the long-term need for defensive arms."*¹⁶¹ Hilde Waage claims that the fishing-vessel was a police-boat and the provocation towards Syria was a planned effort by Israel to create legitimacy for crossing the Syrian border in hopes of stirring a confrontation with Egypt and Syria before they became too powerful with Soviet Union arms.¹⁶² Throughout 1956 there was shelling to the north between Israel and Syria. Shooting also occurred frequently between Israel and Jordan. The Jordanians made raids into Israel that was retaliated by Israel on the 10th of October, resulting in more deaths. According to Waage these conflict were part of a smokescreen to blur the upcoming Sinai-campaign. By drawing attention to the Jordanian conflict, the world was less prepared for an Israeli attack on Egypt.¹⁶³

Foreign Minister at the time Golda Meir, later wrote in her memoirs; *"Israel's own strike against the Egyptians in 1956 had one goal and one goal only—to prevent the destruction*

¹⁵⁸ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 18 Statement to the Security Council by Ambassador Eban on the Gaza incident- 23 March 1955 (06.05.14)

¹⁵⁹ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p169-173.

UN.org. UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) Background (03.04.14)

UN.org. UN charter: CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES > (03.04.14)

¹⁶⁰ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p179, 198-199.

¹⁶¹ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p199.

¹⁶² Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p172.

¹⁶³ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p178-182, 201-202.

of the Jewish state."¹⁶⁴ However the Suez War was also a preemptive war by Israel who saw this as an opportunity to deal with Egypt at a strategically important time. The nationalization of the Suez Canal provided Israel with British and French support. Other than dealing with the guerilla activists on Sinai and in Gaza, Israel wanted to weaken the Egyptian military capability and obtain access for its ships through the Suez. Egypt had prevented Israeli access since 1948, based on the argument that there was still a state of war between them.¹⁶⁵ Israel would also receive arms and nuclear help from France as a reward.¹⁶⁶ Golda Meir explained her understanding of the reasons for the war; "*But we hadn't fought the Sinai Campaign for territory, booty or prisoners, and as far as we were concerned, we had won the only thing we wanted: peace, or at least the promise of peace for a few years. (...) This time we would insist that our neighbors come to terms with us—and with our existence.*"¹⁶⁷ The war begun October 29th and was over with the Israeli announcement of retreat from Gaza and Sinai 1st of March 1957.

In 1964 conflicts arose during the National Water Carrier project towards Syria. Yitzhak Rabin was Chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces; "*In the course of 1964, the Syrians kept the border in turmoil by employing artillery and armor.*"¹⁶⁸ Syria began work to divert the water before it reached Israel. Shelling from Syria's Golan Heights increased mid-November and Israel responded with air-strikes. To stop the Syrians from diverting water, Rabin trained tank-crews to operate long range to take out their earthmoving vehicles. As Israel was able to strike the Syrian machines at two and a half miles range, it meant the end of Syria's sabotage endeavors by 1965.¹⁶⁹

Disposition to war

Israel had been to war with all its neighboring states. Perceived or real, Israel saw itself in immediate danger throughout this period. The Holocaust of World War II, the War of Independence in 1948, the Suez War and all the border confrontations occurring at the time suggest that Israel was in a constant disposition to war if not directly engaged in war. It is my opinion that although Israel may have perceived itself to be waging just war

¹⁶⁴ Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1975) p 296.

¹⁶⁵ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p169.

¹⁶⁶ Shimon Peres: *Erindringer*, (Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo 1995) p134-139.

¹⁶⁷ Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1975) p300.

¹⁶⁸ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin memoirs*, (Little, Brown and Company, Toronto 1979) p 62.

¹⁶⁹ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin memoirs*, (Little, Brown and Company, Toronto 1979) p 62-63.

as an instrument for the maintenance of the society of states, Israel was in fact posing a threat to it.

Israel's relation to the Institution of Diplomacy

Israel's strategy since the War of independence had been to achieve armistice agreements with its Arab-enemies once its objectives was reached militarily, but also to avoid peace agreements that meant bowing to Arab demands through compromise.¹⁷⁰ Israel spent more diplomatic resources on influencing the great powers, the UN, and the world opinion to obtain arms, support and resources than time seeking peace with its neighbors. Abba Eban was sent to Washington in the end of 1950 to function as ambassador to both Washington and the UN.¹⁷¹ *"I made a definition of my aims: In Washington to strive for a viable, if not an affectionate relationship with the Eisenhower administration; at the United Nations to use the international platform to give some special resonance to Israel's cause;"*¹⁷² To Eban the most important thing was to establish good relations with Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.

In 1955 Eban met with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, in San Francisco in relation to the 10th anniversary of the UN. Molotov explained the sales of arms to Egypt; *"The Soviet Union was supplying military and other aid to Egypt not for the purpose that Egypt should make war against Israel. It followed therefore that the arms would not be used for that purpose."*¹⁷³ Israel did in the end launch what they called a preemptive attack, legitimizing Egypt's use of Soviet arms, but more relevant in this context is the fact that there was diplomatic communication on this level and on these subjects. Professor Michael Brecher noted that; *"More inept was the rejection of an approach from Peking early in 1955 to establish formal ties."*¹⁷⁴ China later developed a pro-Arab policy but it's difficult to know if it could have been otherwise. Rejecting China was partially a result of fear for undermining American security guarantee.

¹⁷⁰ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk i Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 114-123.

¹⁷¹ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 152.

¹⁷² Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 174.

¹⁷³ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 193.

¹⁷⁴ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, Oxford University Press, London 1972, p 560.

To level the balance of the Middle East, Israel had to rely on diplomatic ties to France. Shimon Peres, an official agent of the Defense Ministry at the time claim that France insisted that the Foreign Ministries of both governments was kept out of the arms deals.¹⁷⁵ *“The French diplomats thought that Egypt could be appeased and were afraid of a rift between themselves and their American and British allies, hence their reservations about drawing too close to Israel.”*¹⁷⁶ But as Ben-Gurion made clear in Knesset October 15 1956, Israel was, thanks to France much better equipped than a few months ago. Israel’s ambassador to France, Jacob Tsur, was not informed of the full extent of the collaborations between the Defense Ministries but understood his role and continued lobbying for arms as if Israel received none.¹⁷⁷

The Eisenhower administration sent Robert Anderson on a mission to the Middle East trying to negotiate a peaceful solution between Nasser and Ben-Gurion before the war. Abbas Eban noted; *“Ben-Gurion had succeeded in conveying a strong and sincere impression of Israel’s desire for peace,(...) It’s possible that Nasser’s lack of cooperation with the Anderson mission played a part in the dramatic change of heart by the United States on the issue of the Aswan high dam. (...) On direct instructions from Jerusalem we joined in helping to frustrate Egypt’s ambition for American aid in the Aswan Dam project.”*¹⁷⁸As the war drew closer Eban received new instructions in Washington. *“Indeed, I was puzzled by directives from Jerusalem in late October urging me to sharpen the conflict with Jordan and, indirectly, with Britain about the position on our eastern frontier.”*¹⁷⁹ As Israel mobilized on the 29th of October Eban received orders to *“describe the situation as arising from “security measures” and to stress that there was no connection between what we were doing and the conflict of other powers.”*¹⁸⁰ When the war broke out, Eban spoke to the Security Council; *“I stated categorically that we did not intend to acquire new territories, but merely to eliminate threats to our security arising from the murder gangs and hostile armies.”*¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁵ Shimon Peres: *Erindringer*, (Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo 1995) p128.

¹⁷⁶ Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, January-October 1956 – Companion Volume 11*, ed Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2008) p xx-xxii.

¹⁷⁷ Israel State Archives: *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, January-October 1956 – Companion Volume 11*, ed Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2008) p xxiv-xxii.

¹⁷⁸ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited) Toronto 1977, p 204.

¹⁷⁹ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited) Toronto 1977, p 210.

¹⁸⁰ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 211.

¹⁸¹ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 215.

Diplomatic relations in Africa

Professor Brecher pointed out Israel's anti-apartheid policy; *"Since 1955 Israel had supported UN General Assembly resolutions "deploring" or "condemning" South Africa's policy of Apartheid."*¹⁸² Golda Meir, Israel's Foreign Minister since 1956 turned her attention to making new friendships after Israel retreated from Sinai. *"We couldn't offer Africa money or arms, but on the other hand, we were free of the taint of the colonial exploiters because all that we wanted from Africa was friendship."*¹⁸³ As Ghana got its independence in 1957 Ehud Avriel, Israel's ambassador to Libya, suggested Meir participate at the first anniversary of Ghana's independence in 1958. That was the start of Meir's initiative to visit several African countries. By 1963 she had visited 12 African independent states or independence seeking nations. Ghana was hosting the first All-African People's Conference during Meir's 1958 visit, and Meir was introduced to the African leaders before the conference. The Algerian representative questioned how Israel could justify their relationship with France, to which Meir replied; *"Our neighbors (...) are out to destroy us with arms that they receive free of charge from the Soviet Union and for very little money from other sources. (...) If De Gaulle was the Devil himself, I would regard it as the duty of my government to buy arms from the only source available to us. (...) If you were in that position what would you do?"*¹⁸⁴ The representatives seemed to appreciate the honesty. Over the next years Israel created projects and education in Africa on irrigation, health, agriculture and security, using Israeli experts participating hands-on on projects. Courses on these subjects were also held in Israel where they received Africans for training. Historian Sasha Polakow-Suransky points out; *"Israel may have wanted support at the U.N. but it did not demand that African states take sides in the Cold war."*¹⁸⁵

Though not concerned with the battle between communism and capitalism, Israel and Egypt were certainly engaged in a diplomatic battle for African friendship. Egypt and the Arab league warned the young nations about "Israel's real intent" to become the new colonial power on the continent. At the 1958 First Conference of Independent African

¹⁸² Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972) p 234.

¹⁸³ Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1975) p 318.

¹⁸⁴ Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1975) p 326-327.

¹⁸⁵ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 29.

States held in Accra, Egypt sought to brand Israel as a racist and imperialist power. At the Second Conference in Addis Ababa 1960, Egypt proposed that all African states sever ties with Israel. Ghana, Mali and Guinea eventually signed a treaty in 1961 known as the Casablanca treaty, denouncing Israel as an instrument of imperialist and neo-colonialist efforts in the Middle East as well as in Asia and Africa. The African states were however quick in signaling to Israel that they should not worry about the resolution and that their action would prove this. An Egyptian effort to raise the Israel questions at the Organizations of African Unity (OAU) establishment in 1963 was shut down. The same thing occurred at the OAU Second Heads of State meeting in 1964.¹⁸⁶

Israel had since its friendships developed in Africa denounced South Africa's apartheid. In 1960 Israel 'relations to South Africa was strained, though a low-level diplomatic mission was maintained in Pretoria.¹⁸⁷ The Sharpsville massacre in 1960 where 69 people got killed, led to worldwide demonstrations and as the South African Foreign Minister spoke in the UN General Assembly in October 1961; "(...) Israeli diplomats, along with those from many countries, protested at the U.N. Israel voted with the African nations to censure South Africa and its leading anti-Semite before the eyes of the world."¹⁸⁸ Israel also supported the UN general Assembly's sanction resolution of November 1961 calling for South Africa to abandon the apartheid policy.¹⁸⁹ Meir followed through with supporting the volunteer arms-embargo against South Africa before the General Assembly in 1963 and denounced the apartheid system, as Prime minister Ben-Gurion also did at the Organization of African Unity's founding convention the same year. In addition, Israel went as far as to recall their Ambassador from Pretoria.¹⁹⁰ According to Levi Eshkol, Israel's Prime Minister since 1963, South African leadership understood that the criticism came with the Israeli need for friendship with the newly independent African states. Condemning South Africa was also important as Israel could not support the African states on the matter of Algeria or French atomic tests.¹⁹¹ But some trade was

¹⁸⁶ Joel Peters: *Israel and Africa: The problematic Friendship*, (The British Academic Press, London 1992) p 21-25.

¹⁸⁷ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 29-36.

¹⁸⁸ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 31.

¹⁸⁹ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972) p 234.

¹⁹⁰ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 32-38.

¹⁹¹ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972) p 234-235.

maintained also in 1960 when South Africa sold Israel an insignificant amount of uranium in 1960 and 10 tons of Yellowcake uranium compound in 1962¹⁹². The relationship to France was much more important for Israel in this first period, and as the French-Algerian war ended in 1962, concerns emerged that the relationship would change. French President de Gaulle eased this tension by assuring the current Israeli President Eshkol that Israel was both a friend and an ally.¹⁹³

Israel proved its diplomatic brinkmanship in this period in many different settings, obtaining arms, technology, friendship and even—in more ways than one—enemies. Eban who had attended the Argentine independence celebrations in 1960 on the instructions of Israel's Cabinet later admitted that Eichmann was put on his plane as he returned to Israel. "*His capture by Israeli intelligence agents was a brilliant enterprise.*"¹⁹⁴ Through diplomacy the insult to Argentinian sovereignty was later repaired. Diplomacy was used to communicate intent, mutual interest and justify action. Diplomacy was used for self-interest, mutual gains and as an arena for deception.

6.3 Israel in the international society 1965 – 1974

6.3.1 Israel's relations to the Institutions of Balance of Power and Great Powers

The local balance of power situation of Israel in the Middle East

Michael Brecher describes the balance of power in the region up until 1968 as being heavily influenced by the general balance of power situation; "*This process, with multi power involvement, continued unabated through the sixties, assuming the proportions of an inflationary arms race. The Soviet Union equipped the armed forces of Egypt and Syria; France was the principal supplier of Israel's Air Force; the UK and the US shared responsibility for Jordan and the US fed the Saudi Arabian military machine.*"¹⁹⁵ The Yemen War had since 1963 drained Egypt's resources and divided the Arabs. Since the

¹⁹² Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 42.

¹⁹³ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited Toronto 1977) p 305.

¹⁹⁴ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 277.

¹⁹⁵ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972) p 62.

Suez War Nasser had tried avoiding further war with Israel, seeking to develop the Egyptian economy and military.¹⁹⁶ Israel, as Brecher pointed out; in reality belonged to no formal alliance. *"Thus Israel's policy makers may be credited with a unique achievement—all the disadvantages of non-alignment and none of the benefits of alignment!"*¹⁹⁷ Israel's main concern in 1964 was the increased cooperation between The Soviet Union and Syria. *"There was more chance of enlisting the Arabs against the West than of utilizing Israel for that cause."*¹⁹⁸ After the coup in 1966, Syria was led by an aggressive anti-Israeli government. The struggle for control of the demilitarized areas on the Israeli-Syrian border had been fought since 1948. Israel would take small pieces of these areas and hold on to them until they became Israeli territory, in turn provoking Syrian attacks. According to Waage Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Defense Minister (1967-1974), admitted this was a conscious tactic.¹⁹⁹ Foreign Minister Eban and Yitzhak Rabin the Chief of Staff at the IDF saw the conflicts as the result of Syrian border provocations and support of the guerilla group Fatah. Syria's continuous attacks throughout 1966 Rabin later called a blessing in disguise that forced Israel to improve its military strength and intensified Israeli efforts to obtain tanks and military aircrafts from USA.²⁰⁰ Israel had worked hard to achieve security guarantees, especially from the US. President Johnson was the first American President to supply Israel with offensive weapons in the shape of 210 tanks and 48 Skyhawk planes in 1966.²⁰¹ *"By 1966 the armed strength of Israel in relation to any Arab force likely to be pitted against us was no less formidable than it had been ten years before."*²⁰²

In 1966 Egypt joined Syria in a defense pact in hoping to deter the aggression that had been escalating between Israel and Syria. Instead of creating deterrence, this alliance committed Nasser to take action if Israel went too far in its conflicts with Syria. When Israel shot down six Syrian fighter aircrafts in 1967, Nasser according to Waage, felt he

¹⁹⁶ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) 335, 339.

¹⁹⁷ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972) p 561.

¹⁹⁸ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 314.

¹⁹⁹ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 339-341.

²⁰⁰ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, (Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979) p 62-66.

Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 312-313.

²⁰¹ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 345.

Maoz, Jason (27.08.2008): *LBJ and Israel*. Jewish Press.

Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 306.

²⁰² Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 305.

had to act to not seem weak. After ordering the UN troops away from Sinai a few days earlier, Nasser announced a blockade of the strait of Tiran for Israeli vessels on the 22nd of May.²⁰³ Eban claimed it was the Soviet Union that had convinced Nasser that an Israeli invasion of Syria was imminent, which then led to the blockade. Eban argued that the Soviet Union misled Egypt for the defense of Syria by providing false information.²⁰⁴ According to Israel's Ministry of Foreign Affairs Historical Documents Egypt misled itself. "*But Nasser probably understood the Soviet information as a hint that the Soviet Union was persuaded that timing and circumstances were propitious for an assault on Israel (...)*"²⁰⁵ Though Israel had warned its surroundings that a blockade of Israeli vessels through the Strait of Tiran would lead to an Israeli use of force, the French made it clear that any state launching a new war would lose French support. France had since the end of the Algerian war in 1962 sought improved relations with the Arab world, which had been difficult as Israel's main arms supplier. When the Egyptian blockade went into effect, USA urged Israel to await an attack until diplomatic channels was exhausted. According to Eban USA was reluctant to act alone and tried to assemble an international fleet to lift the blockade while working on diplomatic solutions with Egypt. Israel feared going to war without American support, especially because of the threat of Soviet Union intervention.²⁰⁶ As it became clear that USA would not be able to remove Nasser's blockade, Israel launched a preemptive attack on Egypt, Jordan and later Syria.²⁰⁷

In spite of a crushing defeat in the Six Day War the Arab quantitative superiority in manpower and weapons was soon restored. "*Within days of the end of hostilities the Soviets began to rush replacement weapons to both Egypt and Syria; and by May 1968, the*

²⁰³ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitik i Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 339-348. Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1975) p355-356.

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Egypt-s Statement on Troop Movements into Sinai- 15 May 1967 (04.04.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Egypt Reimposes a Naval Blockade on the Straits of Tiran- 23 May 1967 (04.04.14)

Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 326-330.

²⁰⁴ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 318.

²⁰⁵ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. THE SIX-DAY WAR-INTRODUCTION (07.04.14)

²⁰⁶ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitik i Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) 339-349.

Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 326-330.

Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1975) p 358.

Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 51, 56-57.

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. THE SIX-DAY WAR-INTRODUCTION (07.04.14)

²⁰⁷ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, (Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979) p 67-118.

twentieth anniversary of Israel's independence, the disparity had been eliminated."²⁰⁸ The French, who had warned Israel to start the war, followed through on their threat and ceased the supply of Mirage fighters. They eventually placed an embargo on weapons sale to Israel.²⁰⁹ But Israel had two other gains in its balancing efforts; *"Israel acquired control over territory more than three times the size of the state when the war began and, with it, a marked improvement in the defensive frontiers—the Jordan River, the Canal and the Syrian (Golan) Heights. Secondly, as in 1948 and 1956, victory enhanced the sense of security of Israeli society as a whole."*²¹⁰

The border bombardment continued in the canal-zone after the Six Day War, and became known as the War of Attrition, lasting until July 1970. To Rabin the War of Attrition was a waged by Egypt and the Soviet Union to weaken USA's position in the Arab world. Equally; USA saw Israel's gains as a loss for the Soviet Union.²¹¹ Waage saw Nasser's maintained bombardment and aggression as an attempt to avoid a situation in which the canal became the new border. In 1970 Israel was frustrated with the amount of casualties suffered in the War of Attrition, and began to strike deeper into Egyptian territory with numerous air-raids, making significant impact on Egyptian infrastructure. USA used the raids and the threat of arming Israel further, to pressure the Soviet Union towards a cease-fire. To counter this, Nasser received ground-to-air missile systems, brand new MIG fighters with 200 trained pilots and new radar systems from the Soviet Union. As a consequence Israel had to stop its raids by April. USA managed to broker a peace agreement that Israel accepted by the end of July, by amongst other means, promising more economic and military supplies.²¹² *"(...) at the end of 1970 Israel was in a condition of near total dependence on the United States."*²¹³

²⁰⁸ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972) p 63-64.

²⁰⁹ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 51, 57.

Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972) p 61.

²¹⁰ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972) p 64.

(Appendix Figure 2)

²¹¹ Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1975) p 375, 381.

Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, (Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979) p 143, 148, 151.

²¹² Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) 373-377.

Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p165-173.

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Israel Accepts the United States Initiative- Government Statement- 31 July 1970 (04.04.14)

²¹³ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, Oxford University Press, London 1972, p 565.

Egypt was equally dependent on the Soviet Union. In September 1970 Nasser died and Anwar Sadat took charge in Egypt. According to Waage, Sadat felt that the Soviet Union kept the most advanced weaponry from Egypt in order to control them. She also claims that USA and the Soviet Union sought to maintain the status quo, preventing further confrontation. USA promised Israel after much negotiation that Israel would not be forced into making a peace-deal and took steps to improve Israeli military capability by providing large amounts of Skyhawk's and Phantom aircrafts. In 1971 Sadat entered a formal friendship and cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union which now was committed to the defense of Egypt. In December Meir was promised another 42 Phantoms and 92 Skyhawk aircrafts from the USA that would be delivered within three years, without any American demands for troop withdrawals.²¹⁴ "(...) Mrs. Meir was assured that there would be no deal with the Soviet Union to exert pressure on Israel."²¹⁵ Waage claims Nixon by this time saw Israel as a strategic advantage in the Cold War. In a meeting between the two heads of state of The Soviet Union and USA, the powers agreed to maintain status quo. Sadat was so infuriated by this that he ordered all Soviet Union personnel out of Egypt. But the relations improved quickly and Sadat received large amounts of advanced military technology and arms. In January 1973 Sadat aligned his forces with the Syrian army, putting them under joint command. Saudi Arabia was also frustrated with Israel's expansion of territory and gave financial support to Sadat. The 25th of September Jordan warned Israel of an imminent Syrian attack.²¹⁶

Nevertheless, Israel was caught off guard on Yom Kippur when the attack came. Once Israel after a while got the upper hand in the war, the Soviet Union began work to obtain a truce. According to Waage; Kissinger stalled this process in the Security Council so Israel could advance. USA had in the beginning been slow to react, not realizing the emergency of the situation for Israel. Both the Soviet Union and USA resupplied their respective allies, until Egypt yielded on October 19. Syria could not continue the war against Israel alone.²¹⁷ According to Golda Meir, President Nixon promised on the 19th of

²¹⁴ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 378-382.
Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 478-479.

Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, (Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979) p190, 208-210.

²¹⁵ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, (Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979) p 209.

²¹⁶ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) 382-391.

²¹⁷ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 389-392.

October to continue the rebuilding of Israel military capability. She quoted his commitment in Knesset; *“To maintain a balance of forces and thus achieve stability, the United States Government is currently providing military material to Israel to replace combat losses. This is necessary to prevent the emergence of a substantial imbalance resulting from a large-scale re-supply of Syria and Egypt by the Soviet Union”*.²¹⁸

Negotiations between the Soviet Union and USA were initiated, but Israel continued to advance. *“Moscow decided to embark on global intimidation.”*²¹⁹ USA eventually pressured Israel to accept a truce on the 25th of October. Israel won the war but lost its psychological advantage as undefeatable. Meanwhile the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), consisting of mainly Arab and African states, had decided to raise the price of oil during the Yom Kippur War in order to pressure USA and the West. The high oil price made these Arab states wealthy, while the West rationed oil, dealt with economic crisis, and unemployment.²²⁰

Egypt turned its back on the Soviet Union after the Yom Kippur War, seeking a calm relationship with Israel in order to rebuild. USA's Foreign Minister, Henry Kissinger took charge of the post war peace effort, but was, according to Waage, slowing the process. He made it seem as he was working for a return to the 1967 borders, while dividing the Arab unity; negotiating with one state at the time. In January 1974 Kissinger managed to get an agreement between Israel and Egypt where Israel withdrew from territory west of the Suez Canal. It was the beginning of a step by step withdrawal process that would last until 1978 when Egypt recognized the state of Israel, and Israel withdrew from all of Sinai. In this agreement known as the Sinai I agreement USA also promised to be adherent to Israel's security needs on a long-term basis. In the end of May, Kissinger also facilitated an agreement between Israel and Syria stabilizing the cease-fire on both fronts. USA erased a large amount of Israeli debt in order to finalize the deal.²²¹ Rabin, Israel's new Prime Minister by 1974 focused on acquiring arms and military equipment. *“Only a very powerful IDF could convince the Arab leaders that the only course open to*

Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 484, 527.

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir- 23 October 1973 (04.04.14)

²¹⁹ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 535.

²²⁰ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 391-396. Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 528-535.

²²¹ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 396-400. Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1975) p 424-429, 434-436.

them was political negotiations.”²²² Shimon Peres argues that the Yom Kippur War changed the balance in two significant ways. It had given Sadat a sufficient victory to negotiate peace built on compromise, and a sufficient defeat to realize that Egypt could never force its will on Israel.²²³ This facilitated further negotiations, and in September 1974 Rabin agreed to withdraw Israeli forces another 30-50 km in return for a “(...) delivery of \$750 million worth of arms.”²²⁴ The central role of USA in the peace process gave it an advantage in the region.²²⁵

In Africa throughout this second period, Israel’s prime strategic concern focused on the Horn of Africa. In order to ensure free Israeli navigation through the Red Sea, Israel assisted the Ethiopian government in fighting Eritrean rebels. In return Israel was allowed to build naval bases on some islands off the Eritrean coast. In 1966 the Israeli army was the second largest foreign delegation in Ethiopia after the Americans.²²⁶ “After Ethiopia, the second largest Israeli military presence was in Uganda.”²²⁷ Israel trained the Ugandan army since 1965 and instructed their air force. Uganda was important mainly for its border against Sudan where Israel was assisting the south-Sudanese. The Sudanese government supported and received support from Egypt. According to Joel Peters, Israel was using the Sudanese conflict to drain or potentially drain Egyptian resources until 1972 when the civil war ended.²²⁸ Israel did however also contribute in the economic and commercial development of many African states by initiating joint ventures with integrated training programs aimed at having local personnel taking over those ventures. In return, Israel gained access to new markets, exporting medicine, agricultural machinery etc. while importing primary products such as diamonds and uranium. Most of the ventures were successful and helped build the economic infrastructure in many states; including Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.²²⁹ Uganda did eventually sever all ties with Israel in 1972, and in January 1973 Niger, Chad and Congo-Brazzaville followed after pressure from Libya and Algeria.

²²² Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, (Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979) p 242.

²²³ Shimon Peres: *Erindringer*, (Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo 1995) p 302.

²²⁴ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, (Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979) p 247.

²²⁵ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, (Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979) p 243.

²²⁶ Joel Peters: *Israel and Africa – The Problematic Friendship*, (The British Academic Press, London 1992) p8-9.

²²⁷ Joel Peters: *Israel and Africa – The Problematic Friendship*, (The British Academic Press, London 1992) p9.

²²⁸ Joel Peters: *Israel and Africa – The Problematic Friendship*, (The British Academic Press, London 1992) p9-10.

²²⁹ Joel Peters: *Israel and Africa – The Problematic Friendship*, (The British Academic Press, London 1992) p10-11.

Twenty more African States severed ties with Israel during the Yom Kippur War.²³⁰ Facing this loss of influence in this part of Africa Israel began to expand its relations with South Africa and the states surrounding it. By 1974 Peres initiated a cooperation with South Africa's defense ministry and arms industry officials.²³¹

Nuclear Deterrence

Israel continued the work that was initiated with French help at Dimona in 1960. In spite of condemning South Africa for its apartheid policy and the Israeli support for the ongoing arms embargo against South Africa, Israel and the apartheid state entered a bilateral agreement in 1965 that would enable Israel to purchase uranium compound. This new agreement was a safeguard agreement in which Israel agreed to stockpile the uranium and not use it for military purpose. It also contained annual South African inspections of Israel's facilities and operating records. Israel tried to hide its true capability and advances in the field of nuclear weaponry from USA. At the same time Israel remained ambiguous about its capacity in order to deter enemies. Before the Six Day War Israel had built its first nuclear devices. USA became more or less aware of this after the war, but did not realize the extent. In 1968 Mossad smuggled an additional 200 ton yellowcake uranium compound into Israel. By the time of the Yom Kippur War Israel had approximately a dozen nuclear weapons. Polakow-Suransky claims that Israel, desperate after heavy losses, contacted USA on the 9th of October where they threatened to deploy the nuclear arsenal.²³² *"The Nixon administration abruptly reversed course and agreed to resupply Israel the next day despite opposition from Pentagon officials, who believed Israel would eventually win the war and did not want to antagonize the Arabs."*²³³ As Israel's post-colonial friendships ended, diplomatic ties to South Africa grew warmer. Polakow-Suransky claim it the American reluctance to deliver arms in the beginning of the Yom Kippur War convinced Israel to expand the domestic arms industry. This industry grew fast, quickly becoming Israel's biggest export with South Africa as a perfect customer. In November 1974 Defense Minister Peres met secretly with South African leaders to build defense cooperation.²³⁴ *"Beginning in 1974, the two governments*

²³⁰ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 72.

²³¹ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 32, 74-81.

²³² Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 42-45, 49-51, 70-71.

²³³ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 71.

²³⁴ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 74-81.

began holding biannual gatherings for Defense Ministry and arms industry officials. Likewise, military intelligence officials convened annually, alternating between Tel Aviv and Pretoria, to discuss strategic cooperation."²³⁵

Power maximizing

Israel was in this second period engaged in either war or military border clashes more or less constantly. As a consequence Israel was in my opinion power maximizing in all aspects in order to match its enemies, even more so than in the first period. This was evident after the Yom Kippur War in particular, when Israel initiated defense cooperation with South Africa and put a lot of resources into building its own arms industry. It was a constant battle to obtain more arms, better nuclear capability and security guarantees from America. "*.. Israel has responded to her geographical liabilities and maximized her countervailing assets.*"²³⁶

The Middle East as a sphere of influence

In this second period spheres of influence seemed more settled in the region than what it had been 1955-1964. The Baghdad pact was operational throughout this period and the spheres of influence in the Middle East remained largely unchanged until after the Yom Kippur War when Egypt turned its back on the Soviet Union and Israel was shunned in post-colonialist Africa.²³⁷ Lebanon, which had remained friendly to the West now experienced new inner turmoil after Israel's victory in the Six Day War and the following occupation. Lebanon had received many Palestinian refugees since 1948, and its own Arab population was sympathetically to their cause. The Six Day War radicalized many of the Arabic nationalist in all of the Middle East. With large demonstrations erupting in 1968, bloody confrontation occurred between Lebanese military and Palestinian forces. The Palestinians established forces in South Lebanon from where they launched attacks into Israeli territory. Israel replied with an attack on the airport of Beirut signaling to Lebanon that it was held accountable for attacks from Lebanese territory. As the Christian Lebanese President held the Palestinians responsible and not

²³⁵ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 81.

²³⁶ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, Oxford University Press, London 1972, p 90.

²³⁷ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 67-73.

Joel Peters: *Israel and Africa – The Problematic Friendship*, (The British Academic Press, London 1992) p 10.

Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 271.

the Israelis he provoked the non-Christian population. By 1969 Lebanon asked Nasser for help to stop clashes between the Palestinian militants and the Lebanese army. The result was known as the Cairo agreement and allowed PLO to attack Israel from Lebanese territory and gave them control of the Palestinian refugee camps. Opposing the increasing influence of the PLO, different Christian militias was forming, seeking a Christian state and a pro-Western government. In 1970 more Palestinians immigrated to Lebanon in large numbers as King Hussein of Jordan had chased them out. By 1974 the tension in Lebanon was escalating beyond control resulting in a civil war the following spring.²³⁸

Waage claims that in spite of its close ties to the Soviet Union, Syria never was a Soviet Union satellite state. Syria was simply using Soviet Union assistance to achieve its goals in a mutual dependence relationship. Syria had no interest in Communism regarding it as a dangerous rival to the pan-Arabic cause. According to Waage the Soviet Union had to balance its needs for more bases and influence in the region, the Arabic need for weaponry and the danger of provoking USA and Israel. Syria did not provide the Soviet Union with the influence in its internal affairs or the region that it sought. The humiliating defeat of the Six Day War was unacceptable to Syria who immediately started to build its strength. It convinced the Soviet Union to provide vast amounts of arms and by 1973 Syria had quadrupled the size of its standing army. As Egypt turned its back on the Soviet Union after the Yom Kippur War, Syria remained in the alliance.²³⁹

Jordan enjoyed Western support and progress in almost every aspect until 1967. Egypt and Syria had pressured Jordan into allowing PLO to operate from their territory. The Six Day War led to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and large amounts of Palestinian refugees into Jordan. In 1970 King Hussein of Jordan launched an operation against the increasingly powerful Palestinian guerilla groups operating within Jordan in what later was known as "Black September". Syria sent armored units to assist the Palestinian groups and King Hussein reached out to Israel through USA, asking for Israeli air-force assistance against Syria. Rabin claim Kissinger stated that the operation had US government approval and support. IDF mobilized reinforcements on the Golan

²³⁸ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 223-227.

²³⁹ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 262-271.

Heights and Syria cancelled their advance into Jordan and soon withdrew their forces that had already crossed the border.²⁴⁰ Rabin quotes Kissinger from a phone call 25th of September; *“The president will never forget Israel’s role in preventing the deterioration in Jordan and in blocking the attempt to overturn the regime there. He said that the United States is fortunate in having an ally like Israel in the Middle East. These events will be taken into account in all future developments.”*²⁴¹

Israel and Jordan established themselves well within the American sphere of interest in this period. Egypt left the Soviet Union sphere, seeking to move forward by improving its relations to the West. The Soviet Union had made a large achievement by its Egyptian arms deal in 1955, and was equally weakened by Sadat new decision. Lebanon became the most unstable state in the region while Syria remained in its alliance with the Soviet Union.

Israel’s relation to the Great Power management

In the stages leading up to the Six Day War USA urged Israel not to apply military action as long as political contacts were still in place. When USA’s efforts to gather an international fleet for intervention towards the blockade failed, Israel clearly calculated their further action based on how the great powers would react. ²⁴²*“Eban described our political position succinctly: we were isolated; none of the powers would come to our assistance. If a cease fire resolution were introduced in the Security Council, there was good reason to believe that it would be passed without any objections. He estimated that if we went to war, the IDF would have from twenty-four to seventy-two hours before international intervention halted operations. Consequently, time was the decisive factor. An army does not go to war without the fundamental conviction that it is capable of achieving its objectives.”*²⁴³ Israel warned USA that they were launching an attack in fear of being shunned. *“And without the United States to keep Soviet involvement in check, Israel would be in a tough predicament.”*²⁴⁴

²⁴⁰ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p 186-189.

Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 304-313.

²⁴¹ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p 189.

²⁴² Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. THE SIX-DAY WAR-INTRODUCTION (07.04.14)

²⁴³ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p 72.

²⁴⁴ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p 78.

The Prime Minister of the Soviet Union used the “red line” (a direct telephone-line connection between USA and the Soviet Union established after the Cuba-crisis), in an attempt to stop the Six Day War. The Soviet Union wanted to arrange an immediate truce and demanded USA condemned the Israeli aggression. 10th of June the Soviet Union threatened with military force and the Americans began pressuring Israel to stop its actions. USA sent a naval fleet to Mediterranean to show force, but the war was over before the situation escalated. In the negotiations the Soviet Union first demanded Israeli withdrawal to the pre-war borders. As Israel became increasingly successful on the ground the Soviet Union dropped the withdrawal demand and sought to end hostilities first and foremost.²⁴⁵ During the War of Attrition, Rabin observed a change in the American view of Israel’s role after the successful deep penetration air-raids into Egypt. During the War of Attrition, Golda Meir was skeptical about the Security Council’s ability to achieve a just solution in the matter. *“How could it? The Russians were feeding and manipulating the entire Egyptian war effort; the French were almost as pro-Arab as the Russians; the British were not far behind the French ; only the Americans were at all concerned with Israel’s survival.”*²⁴⁶ USA made promises to resupply Israel in its balancing efforts against Egypt, but demanded a cease fire. Later USA turned to Israel for military assistance during “Black September” and was very appreciative of the Israeli efforts for that cause.²⁴⁷ During the Yom Kippur War Israel was frustrated by USA’s late commitment to bring the arms that Israel felt it depended on. Israel’s move to threaten with deploying the nuclear arsenal indicate both desperation but also arguably an advanced brinkmanship in their great power management.²⁴⁸ Other than forcing its allied great power into action we must also consider Israel’s ability to stand up to the great power of the Soviet Union throughout this period facing continuous indirect and direct threats of destruction. Only the formality of Egyptian ownership of the aircrafts was between direct confrontations with the Soviet Union itself who provided planes, pilots and support staff. The good relationship to France was destroyed with the launch of the Six Day War as Israel disregarded the French warning to attack first. Insult was added to injury as Israel retrieved the missile boat from French territory.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁵ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013, p 356-357.

²⁴⁶ Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York 1975) p 383.

²⁴⁷ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p 166-170.

²⁴⁸ Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York 1975) p 381.

Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 42-45, 49-51, 70-71.

²⁴⁹ Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York 1975) p 430-431.

6.3.2 Israel's relation to the institutions of International Law, War and Diplomacy

Israel's relation to the principle of Sovereignty

If enemy states were behind the success of guerilla operations and sabotage within Israel it may not have been possible to prove easily, and in turn legitimize a state on state attack. By provoking attacks from its enemies Israel could claim some legitimacy for a response towards a legitimate state opponent. Waage claims that Israel's continuous border confrontation with Syria was to a large degree a conscious effort to take control of the demilitarized areas and provoke attacks to which Israel could react. Israel shot down six Syrian fighter jets and humiliated Syrian airspace and military by flying low over Damascus in April 1967. Nasser replied by closing the Strait of Tiran, an act of war in the view of Israel, who had warned their intent to protect their access through the strait which was considered an international water-way. Israel's launched the Six Day War in 1967, claiming it was fending off an imminent attack, referring to the Egyptian mobilization on Sinai, the Jordanian mobilization on the West bank and the Syrian mobilization on the northern border.²⁵⁰ Closing the Strait of Tiran was not a direct violation of Israeli territorial sovereignty and launching an attack claiming that an attack is imminent, is not the same as defending against an ongoing attack. Once again the roles of aggressor and defender are blurred. The result of the war was an Israeli occupation of Sinai, Gaza, the Golan Heights, and West Bank, as well as a closure of the Suez Canal. Israel held on to its new territorial gains, using it as bargaining to achieve agreements that would secure its people and territory. *"But this time, the price for our withdrawal was going to be very high, higher than it had been in 1956. This time the price would be peace, permanent peace, peace by treaty based on agreed and secured*

Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013, p 373-376.

Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, Pantheon Books, New York 2010, p 57-58.

²⁵⁰ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 339-351.

Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, (Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979) p 84-100.

Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1975) p 354-356.

Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 326-328.

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement by President Nasser to Arab Trade Unionists- 26 May 1967 (07.04.14)

Ann Ellen Danseyar: *Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran: From Customary International Law to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty*, 5 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 127 (1982) (24.03.14)

borders."²⁵¹ The War of Attrition that followed and ultimately the Yom Kippur War must be seen as a direct consequence of this occupation. Israel was occupying the sovereign territories of its enemies in order to secure its own. To Meir, Nasser's mobilization on Sinai and the closing of Tiran in 1967 had proved that Israel should never have retreated in 1956 without obtaining definite pacts of non-aggression and regional disarmament.²⁵²

Israel continued to hold its neighbors directly responsible for attacks on Israeli territory as it had done with Syria in 1966-1967.²⁵³ This was signaled very clearly by the bombing of the Beirut International airport in 1968. Israel demonstrated the same willingness to cross borders to reach its enemies in Jordan, as in the Karameh battle the same year proved.²⁵⁴ But Israel was as the Eichmann case demonstrated, not afraid to seek up its enemies on a global scale. Other than operating in its hostile neighboring countries, Mossad struck targets in Nicosia, Paris and Athens during 1972-1973.²⁵⁵ These very successful operations ended in failure with the murder of an innocent man in Lillehammer in 1973 after a failed identification. The operation was very damaging to relations between Norway and Israel. Israel denied responsibility, claiming it was done by private individuals. Former Mossad leader Mike Harari admitted for the first time in a very recent interview with the Israeli paper "Yedioth Aharonoth" that the state of Israel was behind the murder.²⁵⁶ Could such acts qualify as self-defense if we assume these targets would strike again against Israel? Or if we assume the assassinations have a deterring effect? It is nevertheless undoubtedly breaches of sovereignty towards states Israel sought friendly relations with.

Israel's relation to the principle of Respecting Agreements

USA started the supply of offensive weapons to Israel by 1966, thus ending the American embargo. The arms sales were made conditional on Israel disclosing their nuclear activities, but USA was deceived as Israel fooled their inspectors. As for the war itself,

²⁵¹ Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1975) p 367.

²⁵² Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1975) p 354-355.

²⁵³ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 312-314.

²⁵⁴ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 223-227, 305-307.

²⁵⁵ Jewish Virtual Library. *Israel Counter-Terrorism: Targeted Killings of Terrorists* (07.04.14)

²⁵⁶ Hercz, Roger (05.04.2014): *Mossad innrømmer drapet på Bouchiki*, Dagsavisen (05.04.14)

Israel may argue that peaceful solutions were sought in accordance to the Charter (Article 33), and failed with USA's inability to mobilize an international fleet to lift the blockade of the Tiran Strait. Nevertheless, Article 39 of the UN Charter clearly states that; "*The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.*" Israel's decision to launch the attack had little to do with any UN approval. But Israel was frustrated with UN after the UN retreat from Sinai and the constant vetoing by the Soviet Union against Israel. Israel claimed legitimacy for the war as an act of self-defense against imminent danger and as law-enforcing on the grounds of the international support it had received for the status of the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba as international waterway.²⁵⁷

The Six Day War also marked the beginning of the French arms embargo, which Israel to some degree managed to circumvent using backdoor channels and connections within the French defense establishment and arms manufacturers. France also refused to deliver five Missile boats that Israel had already purchased, in turn breaking their agreement with Israel. Israeli Navy crews were sent to France in 1969 on an undercover operation and retrieved the ships from the harbor of Cherbourg. These members of the Israeli Navy violated French territorial sovereignty, forcing France into keeping its arms-deal.²⁵⁸

Israel itself however was no closer in honoring its agreement with the IAEA not to produce nuclear material for military purposes, or its agreement with the USA not to produce plutonium.²⁵⁹ USA and IAEA were not informed about Israel's 1965 bilateral

²⁵⁷ Ann Ellen Danseyar: *Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran: From Customary International Law to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty*, 5 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 127 (1982), (24.03.14)

²⁵⁸ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 345.
Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London 1972) p 61.

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Israel Defense Forces 31 May 1997 (26.03.14)

Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 48, 57-58.

²⁵⁹ International Atomic Energy Agency. Atoms for peace speech. Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly Tuesday, 8 December 1953 (19.01.14)

International Atomic Energy Agency. *History of The International Atomic Energy Agency: The first forty years*. By David Fischer p 50 (19.01.14)

John Krige: *Atoms for Peace, Scientific Internationalism, and Scientific Intelligence*, Osiris, Vol. 21, No. 1,

safeguard agreement for uranium sale with South Africa, nor the stockpiling of uranium that followed. *"It included detailed provisions forbidding the use of South African uranium for atomic weapons or weapons research (...)"*²⁶⁰ Based on Polakow-Suransky's interview of South Africa's former administrator of the Atomic Energy Board's uranium enrichment program, it was the initial 10 tons of uranium compound bought in 1961 that was used to create Israel's first nuclear weapons, not the stockpile accumulated by the agreement. Israel had produced nuclear devices already by the Six Day War and USA became more or less aware of Israel's capabilities after the Six Day War.²⁶¹ Israel's relationship to South Africa was blooming in the early 70's in sharp contrast to UN's increasingly hostile stand against apartheid as was re-announced in 1968; *"The General Assembly requested all States and organisations "to suspend cultural, educational, sporting and other exchanges with the racist regime and with organisations or institutions in South Africa which practice apartheid."*²⁶² According to Polakow-Suransky UN's Special Committee Against Apartheid was collecting evidence in 1974 that Israel was assisting the Apartheid state in avoiding the European boycott of South African products such as textiles and fruits. The same year Israel had begun holding biannual meeting with South African Defense Ministry and arms industry officials, a clear violation of any UN resolution or request calling for a stop of trade and cooperation with the apartheid state. Golda Meir's promise in 1963 at the UN General Assembly, that Israel would uphold the Security Council Resolution 181 to cease the sale and shipment of arms, ammunition and military vehicles to South Africa seemed endangered by Israel's need to export arms from its booming arms-industry and from and the new defense cooperation.²⁶³

Israel's relation to the principle of restricting violence

The amount of aggression in this period does not indicate that a restriction of violence was prioritized. In the Six Day War Israel had not been willing to stop its campaign until it had achieved its desired objectives. The arms race and violence spiral that followed do little to hide the fact that restriction of violence was subordinated other considerations. If Israel's can be said to be violence restricting, then the argument must be found in

Global Power Knowledge: Science and Technology in International Affairs (2006), pp. 161-181. (18.03.14)

²⁶⁰ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 42.

²⁶¹ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 42-52.

²⁶² UN.org. The United Nations: Partner in the Struggle against Apartheid (26.03.14)

²⁶³ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 32, 74-81.
UN.org. The United Nations: Partner in the Struggle against Apartheid (08.04.14)

Israel's conviction that forcing the Arabs into recognizing Israel as a state and respecting its borders was the only way to secure peace and security ahead. One could also argue that Israel was violence restricting by not implementing its nuclear arsenal during the Six Day War, and in particular during the Yom Kippur War when Israel was under heavy pressure. It may be argued that Israel's acquisition of nuclear weaponry in itself was violence restricting, first as an ambiguous deterrent towards enemies, and later as it forced USA to provide arms and pressure for a quick Israeli victory. All in all in this second period of 1965-1974, Israel's application of violence seem to be based on provoking an enemy state attack in order to get to those they saw as responsible for both the internal security threats as well as border shelling and insurgency. The method was not violence restricting regardless of intent.

Israel's relation to the institution of War

Material War

Israel was engaged in material acts of war almost continuously throughout this second period. Waage claim there was around 100 attacks on Israel between January 1965 and June 1967 by various terrorist organizations.²⁶⁴ This was mostly limited to the Israeli-Syrian clashes in the demilitarized zones to the north and on the Jordanian border where Fatah guerilla activist operated, but it was also carried out deep within Israeli territory.²⁶⁵ " Israel continued its policy of keeping its neighbors responsible. (...) *sometimes the Jordan authorities lost control of areas in which terrorists operated against Israel. In November 1966 the village of Samua, near Hebron, suffered havoc when Israeli forces moved to clean out terrorist bases.*"²⁶⁶ Waage describe this attack as a revenge on the inhabitants of the village for hiding Fatah members. It was also meant to pressure Jordan's King Hussein to not let Fatah operate on Jordanian soil. The operation failed and became much more extensive than planned, leading to UN Security Council condemnation. It also failed to act deterring upon the Jordanian King who now was convinced Israel was going to take the West-bank regardless of how he dealt with the guerilla groups on his territory.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁴ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013, p 336.

²⁶⁵ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977, p 313.

²⁶⁶ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977, p312.

²⁶⁷ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013, 336-338.

To Eban it was Syria's competition with Egypt for Arab leadership that was the cause of border confrontations to the north, which ultimately led to the Six Day War. Israel was to be destroyed through what Syria called "revolutionary activism", now manifested through constant guerilla operations within Israel and by bombardment of the northern settlements. Israel responded by shooting three Syrian aircrafts in 1966 while suffering attacks on the Sea of Galilee.²⁶⁸ According to Waage, Moshe Dayan, Israel's Defense Minister since 1967 admitted Israeli provocation in the northern demilitarized zones were part of a deliberate effort to provoke an military response from Syria. Syria pressured Egypt to take responsibility as the leading force of the Arab world and to join them in a defense pact. Such a pact was established in November 1966 and Egypt was now obliged to react to escalations to the conflict. *"In fact, it was a clash in which our planes downed six Syrian aircraft in April 1967 that sparked the process that climaxed in the Six Day War."*²⁶⁹ Nasser did not react with force to the situation, claiming Egypt would aid only if Syria suffered sustained warfare, not spasmodic incidents. Syria constantly pressured the Soviet Union for arms and assistance. The Soviet Union in turn pressured Egypt to come to Syria's assistance, and even falsely reported an Israeli mobilization towards Syria.²⁷⁰

Nasser mobilized part of his army towards Sinai on May 15th as Israel went into heightened awareness.²⁷¹ *"Had we failed to react—giving the Egyptians the impression that we were either unaware of their moves or complacent about them—we might be inviting attack on grounds of vulnerability."*²⁷² May 17th Egypt raised the stakes and demanded the removal of UN forces from Sinai and their retreat to Gaza. As a reply UN Secretary General U Thant challenged Nasser with a dilemma. All UN forces stay in current position, or all are removed. Nasser ordered them to leave, in Rabin's opinion to

²⁶⁸ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977, p 312-315.

Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitik i Midtøsten*, Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013, 265-267, 336-338.

²⁶⁹ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p 64.

²⁷⁰ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitik i Midtøsten*, Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013, 261-267, 332-341.

Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977, p317.

²⁷¹ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p67-68.

²⁷² Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p68.

save face.²⁷³ UN forces retreated by 19th of May, but; “(...) *the Egyptians had still not presented us with a concrete casus belli to justify launching a full scale war.*”²⁷⁴ Threats alone were not valid as a declaration of war. In a speech to Arab trade unionist on the 26th of May 1967 he stated; “*The battle will be a general one and our basic objective will be to destroy Israel.*”²⁷⁵ Israel had communicated very clearly its intent to regard the closure of the Tiran Strait as a declaration of war. *There can be no doubt that these warnings reached Cairo. One thing was now clear. If Nasser imposed a blockade, the explosion would not ensue from “miscalculation” but from an open-eyed and conscious readiness for war.*”²⁷⁶

May 23rd the Strait of Tiran was blocked by Nasser. To the north Syria was mobilizing its troops. America was committed to the survival of Israel in the events of an Egyptian attack but this assistance was not guaranteed if Israel initiated military action. Nevertheless, Israel launched its War on the 5th of June after USA’s international endeavor to assemble a fleet to lift the blockade failed.²⁷⁷ Waage points out that the UN had not registered a single Israeli ship through the passage the last two years.²⁷⁸ “*If we don’t face that challenge the IDF’s deterrent capability will become worthless. (...) Which power will bother to support a small state that has ceased to be a military factor? (...) We’re going to war over freedom of navigation. Nasser has threatened Israel’s standing; later he will threaten Israel’s very existence.*”²⁷⁹

As the name would indicate the Six Day War was short and fought with great efficiency by Israel. With its massive territorial gains of the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights and the West Bank, Israel developed a new strategy of holding on to the conquered territory in order to achieve permanent borders. Israel wanted the pre-war borders with Egypt and Syria to become permanent in exchange for withdrawing from Sinai and the Golan Heights. Egypt and Syria both rejected the proposal. Within a few weeks bombardment began at the new Suez line between Israel and Egypt. The hostilities kept escalating

²⁷³ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p67-71.

²⁷⁴ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p71.

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement by President Nasser to Arab Trade Unionists- 26 May 1967 (08.04.14)

²⁷⁶ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977, p328.

²⁷⁷ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p88-95.

²⁷⁸ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013, 343.

²⁷⁹ Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p81.

towards October 1967 when the Israeli destroyer Eliat was sunk by Egyptian artillery. Artillery battles were fought throughout the fall of 1968, and Israel began striking deeper into Egypt striking vital infrastructure. Israel dug in on its side of the canal, building the Bar Lev-line consisting of 35 massive defense fortresses.²⁸⁰ Brecher points to Israel's success as being rooted in an existential awareness. *"In 1969 Chief of Staff Bar-Lev noted three advantages over the Arabs—human material, firepower, and the strategic depth of the administered areas. All these Israeli assets were important. But the most important the pervasive and deep-rooted consciousness of "ein breirah"—"no alternative"; the price of defeat was universally held to be extinction."*²⁸¹

After many casualties throughout 1969 and massive shelling back and forth Israel decided to change strategy. With American blessing Israel began January 1970 with extensive bombing of Egypt, counting 3300 air-raids. As a reply, Moscow sent large amounts of personnel and military equipment including 200 pilots, radar systems and MiG fighters. The Soviet Union pilots were so efficient that Israel stopped its raids by April. By the end of July a truce was installed²⁸²

While the War of Attrition had been waged with Egypt more or less constantly since the Six Day War until 1970, Israel continued holding its other neighbors accountable for attacks by guerilla group operating from their territories. In Jordan, Israel attacked the village of Karameh in 1968. In Lebanon, Israel struck the Beirut international Airport the same year.

Since the truce in 1970 Israel felt relatively safe in its security situation. *"Yet while it was evident that terrorism would increase, the general feeling in Israel was that the favorable military balance, the strong support of Israel by the United States, and the weakening of Egyptian-Soviet relations, all made the outbreak of war with our neighbors a remote contingency."*²⁸³ In 1972 Abba Eban was worried by the confident tone of Rabin and the Israeli leadership. *"The logic was that if the Arabs were unable to get their territories back*

²⁸⁰ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013, 361-367, 372-375.

²⁸¹ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, Oxford University Press, London 1972, p 93.

²⁸² Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013, p 364-379. Golda Meir: *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York 1975) p 381-382.

²⁸³ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977, p 484.

by war or by Great Power pressure, they would have to seek negotiation and to satisfy some of Israel's security interests. This view made no provision for a third Arab option - neither docility nor negotiation, but a desperate recourse to war in the hope that even an unsuccessful attack would be more rewarding than passive acceptance of the cease-fire lines."²⁸⁴ Waage also see the Yom Kippur War as resulting from this attitude. Israel and USA rejected all of Sadat's initiatives for peace and negotiation in 1971, giving him only one option.²⁸⁵ . The confidence of Israel was also demonstrated by other events. 1972-1973 was the period in which Mossad was most active in hunting down Israel's enemies abroad. Nevertheless Israel still took potential threats very serious. The 21th of February 1973 Israel shot down a Libyan airliner that due to sandstorms and equipment error flew inn over the Sinai Peninsula. The Israeli's took no chances fearing it was headed for the Dimona facilities. Most of the 108 dead were Egyptians and Libyans.²⁸⁶ In September Israel shot down 13 Syrian aircrafts in an incident that according to Eban made him think of the events leading up to the Six Day War. Both Israeli and American intelligence however were not worried.²⁸⁷ As Kissinger told Eban; *"In any case, nothing dramatic is going to happen in October."*²⁸⁸ Egypt and Syria launched its attack October 6 on Yom Kippur. It ended on October 25th after yet another victory to Israel. In spite of Israel advancing far into Syria and Egypt towards their capitols, the Arabs celebrated the war as a victory that had proven that Israel was not invincible.

Israel's relation to the Institution of Diplomacy

In 1966 there had been few developments in Israel's contact with the Arab world since The Suez War. According to Eban, Ben-Gurion saw no chance of reconciliation until Israel reached sufficient stability and strength to convince the Arabs of their permanent presence.²⁸⁹

Towards the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact states, Prime Minister Eshkol was seeking a more conciliatory line than Ben-Gurion, at least up until the Six Day War.

²⁸⁴ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*; Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977, p 488.

²⁸⁵ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitik I Midtøsten*, Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013, 379-381, 396.

²⁸⁶ Omer-Man, Michael (25.02.2011): *This Week in History: IAF shoots down Libyan Flight 114*. The Jerusalem Post. (11.04.14)

Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*; Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977, p 490.

²⁸⁷ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*; Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977, p 490-500.

²⁸⁸ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*; Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977, p 498.

²⁸⁹ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977, p 306.

Eshkol stated that Israel was not a part of any “Cold War” and went on to point out similarities in Israel’s and The Soviet Union’s policy. A symbolic payment of compensation for Tsarist property in Jerusalem was also made. Relations were also improved with Romania and Poland. Eshkol paid necessary tribute to France, but saw US as more reliable and important partner. He also tried improving diplomatic ties with China which he saw as a rising power. “(...) he frequently expressed an interest in diplomatic relations with Peking, acknowledging China’s significance in global politics.”²⁹⁰ Ties were also greatly improved with Germany as Eshkol called for reconciliation. But he was not foreign to calling the past to the West German attention when he saw fit to apply pressure, reminding the Germans that relations was still under some evaluation.²⁹¹ “Finally, in this catalogue of power assets and liabilities, there was Israel’s victory in securing diplomatic relations with West Germany in the spring of 1965, despite persistent efforts by the UAR-led group of Arab states; they not only failed to thwart this link but also revealed power weakness and disunity in the process.”²⁹²

Abbas Eban, Israel’s top diplomat, had lost his faith in the UN. “I took a hard look at our situation in Western Europe. My belief was that the United Nations had lost its importance, and that the Arab preponderance against Israel had made it impossible for us to avoid hostile decisions there. The real weight of international relations was moving into regional channels.”²⁹³ Eban was referring to regional organizations such as NATO, the Organization of American States (OAS) and The European Economic Community (EEC) where he saw states seeking military and economic security.

Waage claim that as events escalated before the Six Day War, Eshkol sent Eban to Washington with strong demands for American support and an exaggerated portray of the potential of an Arab attack. Israel wanted an American statement that an attack on Israel was an attack on USA, and a coordination of American troops in the Middle East with Israeli troops to resist potential attacks. USA declined as Israel had hoped

²⁹⁰ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, Oxford University Press, London 1972, p 299.

²⁹¹ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, Oxford University Press, London 1972, p 297-300.

Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977, p 306-3.

²⁹² Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, Oxford University Press, London 1972, p 62.

²⁹³ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977, p 308.

according to Waage, as this would be the Israeli rationale for attacking first. USA made it clear that an Arab attack was not imminent and warned Israel from striking first. When the head of Mossad returned from a meeting in Washington with CIA and Pentagon he had received strong signals that an Israeli attack would not involve the loss of American support. In his memoirs, Rabin does not conceal that there was eager for war among many members of the military leadership, but he also claim he and many others in the political leadership struggled immensely with the decision, to the brink of exhaustion. Eshkol finally made the decision to go to war as they feared the diplomatic work in Washington between the Egyptians and USA would lead them to a compromise that was less than optimal for Israel.²⁹⁴

Israel depended on slow progress in the UN Security Council, delaying a cease-fire resolution in order to achieve its military goals. Israel's UN ambassador Gideon Rafael contacted his American equivalent asking him to be unavailable for the Soviet Union UN Ambassador on the first day of the war. The Soviet soon dropped its previous demands in the Security Council for condemnation of Israel and a total withdrawal of Israeli forces, on the 6th of June. As Israel went on to take the Golan Heights the 10th of June, the Soviet Union gave up on diplomatic relations with Israel.²⁹⁵ *"On 13 June, the Soviet Union having broken off diplomatic relations with Israel three days previously, followed by Bulgaria, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Guinea, asked that a special emergency session of the General Assembly be convened."*²⁹⁶ As a consequence, Eshkol abandoned attempts of diplomatic friendship towards the East, denouncing the repression of Jews in the USSR and the supply of arms to Israel's enemies. In its peace negotiations with the Arabs, Israel demanded to negotiate with one state at the time. Israel would not withdraw without getting recognized borders. A withdrawal from Jerusalem was non-negotiable, while the Palestinian refugee problem was to be solved through negotiation and peace-agreements. USA promised not to support any Security Council decision in this matter that would go against Israel's demands. In the end of November the Security Council agreed upon Resolution 242. Israel did not see Arab

²⁹⁴ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013, 347-352.
Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p 84-99.

²⁹⁵ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013, 356-359.

²⁹⁶ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. THE SIX-DAY WAR-INTRODUCTION (14.04.14)

recognition of the resolution as a sufficient recognition of its borders and refused to withdraw.²⁹⁷

Waage claim Sadat went far in 1971 to achieve diplomatic solutions with Israel after the War of Attrition. He offered to re-open the Suez Canal if Israel withdrew 48 km east from the canal. At the same time UN negotiator Gunnar Jarring tried to force the parts closer to a solution. In these talks Egypt was willing to sign a peace agreement, but demanded Israel also gave up Gaza and returned to its pre-war borders with Syria and Jordan, meaning an exit of Israeli forces from East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Israel responded by refusing the deal. By December all negotiation was stranded as Israel was promised that USA would not pressure Israel into any deals. To Eban It was this failure to offer Egypt any diplomatic victories that gave Sadat the realization that he had little to lose by launching a new war.²⁹⁸

Diplomatic Relations in Africa

*“As to the third world, he was the only Israeli Prime Minister to visit Africa (in May-June 1966); and while there, as well as in his assessment of his tour of seven new states, he indicated that Africa loomed large in his global image.”*²⁹⁹ In spite of Eshkol’s continuation of Meir’s friendly policy towards post-colonial Africa, the events of the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur war in particular would change this blooming relation.

Diplomatic relations between Israel and South Africa had been minimal throughout the 60’s. This changed with the closure of the Strait of Tiran in the Six Day War aftermath. The war branded Israel as a colonial outpost of the West where the Arabs were the underdogs. All the East African states were struggling financially with the closure of Suez, and were soon blaming Israel who would not retreat from Sinai. South Africa, on the other hand, experienced a boom in shipping activity and trade—as vessels had to be

²⁹⁷ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013, 360-364.

²⁹⁸ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013, 378-384.

Yitzhak Rabin: *The Rabin Memoirs*, Little, Brown and Company, Boston 1979, p 190-211.

Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*; Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977, p 488.

²⁹⁹ Michael Brecher: *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, Oxford University Press, London 1972, p 298.

re-routed around the African Horn. In 1969 Israel sent Yitzhak Unna to South Africa to become the new Consul General, working subtly on improving relations.³⁰⁰

*“By the early 1970s, with Israel’s image as a socialist bastion tarnished by occupation and Arab states attempting to lure African countries to their side with promises of cheap oil, Meir’s dream of a staunchly Zionist African continent was fading. (...) Peres, Dayan and Rabin saw Israel’s security as paramount and they were willing to make moral compromises in order to ensure it. It was precisely this worldview that gave birth to the alliance with South Africa.”*³⁰¹ South Africa supplied Israel with coal and rough-stones for Israel’s diamond industry and in 1972 an official South African mission opened in Tel Aviv. The same year Uganda’s Idi Amin cut all ties to Israel, turning to Libya and the Soviet Union while Israel changed its focus and opened Missions in Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho, states in geographical proximity and economic dependency of South Africa.³⁰² On the 25th of September Israel informed South Africa that they would no longer vote against South Africa in the UN nor take the initiative on denouncing Pretoria.³⁰³

In the beginning of 1973 Libya and Algeria pressured members of the OAU to sever ties with Israel, which Chad, Niger and Congo-Brazzaville did in January. Eban managed to get an aid and cooperation agreement in place with Burkina-Faso in September before the Yom Kippur War in October. After the Yom Kippur War, Israel was the military victor, but it had lost the propaganda war.³⁰⁴ *“Egypt framed the Yom Kippur War as a Zionist invasion of the African continent, and twenty more African states severed ties during the fighting.”*³⁰⁵ But as Peters points out it was also a matter of Israel’s military presence in Ethiopia, Uganda and other African states. *“By involving itself in many of the regional conflicts on the continent, Israel managed only to foster a negative image of its presence in Africa. (...)In November 1973 a meeting of the African Heads of Missions and*

³⁰⁰ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, Pantheon Books, New York 2010, p 45-46, 53-59.

³⁰¹ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, Pantheon Books, New York 2010, p 64.

³⁰² Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, Pantheon Books, New York 2010, p 65-67.

³⁰³ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, Pantheon Books, New York 2010, p 67.

³⁰⁴ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 67-73.

³⁰⁵ Sasha Polakow-Suransky: *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York 2010) p 72.

OAU representative in Europe issued a statement expressing their concern at the role played by Israel in assisting secessionist movements in Africa."³⁰⁶

³⁰⁶ Joel Peters: *Israel and Africa – The Problematic Friendship*, (The British Academic Press, London 1992) p10.

7 Discussion

In this chapter I will conduct a discussion based upon the document analysis, aimed at answering the research questions. The discussion reflects how Israel relations to the norms rules and practices of international society has enabled and restrained Israel, influencing its actions.

Research questions:

- 1. What do the actions of Israel in the international society of states from 1955 to 1974 reveal about Israel's relation to the framework of norms, rules and practices of the international society of states?**
- 2. How can Israel's relationship towards the international rules, norms and practiced be said to influence its relationship towards Africa in the timeframe?**

7.1 Forged and Shaped in the international realm

I would like to begin this discussion by returning to the events which led to the creation of the modern state of Israel. The idea of Zionism, the Jewish quest for a state, came in part as a result of the nationalistic impulses of the nineteenth century. It also came as a solution for the Jewish people whom had existed scattered throughout Europe like a stateless pariah-people. If Events called for it the Jews represented a convenient scapegoat.³⁰⁷ When facing persecution the Jews received no protection from any great powers, states or organizations. The goal of finding a Jewish state was set by the Zionist organization in 1897 as the Ottoman Empire was crumbling. By convincing the British Foreign minister Arthur Balfour, that the establishment of Jewish national home in the Middle East region was beneficiary to the interest of the British Empire, the organization received a written document promising Britain's support in that endeavor. This was not easily combined with the British mandate of Palestine, and thus began a long political battle between Israel, the Arab population within the mandate, and the great power Britain. In my opinion, the Balfour deceleration or its interpretation towards implementation represents a failure by the responsibility of Britain as a great power. A "national home" does not automatically imply as sovereign state as Hannah Arendt also pointed out. She blamed the British Mandate for reinforcing the nationalistic identities of both Arabs and Israeli's by mediating between and separating

³⁰⁷ Ron H. Feldman: *Introduction* in Hannah Arendt - *The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age*, (Grove Press, New York 1978) p 28.

them. As both sides focused on getting rid of the British Mandate, they neglected the permanent reality of each other's presence.³⁰⁸ Nevertheless, Britain failed their local preponderance when proving unable at obtaining lasting peaceful solutions and regional stability in the mandate. Britain had painted itself into a corner in the Middle East, while its colonial empire deteriorated on a global scale. When Britain withdrew from its mandate and left the responsibility to the UN, UN was also unable to achieve a peaceful solution, and its division plans was declined by both sides. After WWII, the Holocaust and the international attention to the Jewish suffering also the new emerging great powers was influenced. The USA and the Soviet Union, both immediately recognized Israel as a sovereign state upon Israel's declaration of independence.³⁰⁹ The incidents of WWII became forever intangible from the Jewish consciousness and proved to them the strong necessity of achieving a sovereign state that could enable their security. This sovereign state, Israel, was a product of international society.

7.2 From Israel's perception

"Small nations do not have a foreign policy. They have a defense policy." – Moshe Dayan³¹⁰

The conditions under which the Israeli state was created; the special history and psychology of the Jewish people, along with the security threats posed by its neighbors to the ancient dream that the state of Israel materialized; all shaped Israel's application, perception and interpretation of the established rules, norms and practices of international society. In most cases, and most of the time Israel was acting abiding to these principles that according to Bull was provided by the institutions of international society.³¹¹ In many cases however, the opposite was also true. Israel was efficient, pragmatic and creative in maintaining its security and balance of power locally. This success often came at the cost of breaking with the rules, practices and norms of international law, war, and diplomacy, which were secondary concerns to the maintenance of state sovereignty and the local balance of power. What good would the maintenance of these rules be to Israel if there was no state? When bending or breaking

³⁰⁸ Ron H. Feldman: *Introduction* in Hannah Arendt - *The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age*, (Grove Press, New York 1978) 35-37.

³⁰⁹ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 26-124.

³¹⁰ Polakow-Suransky , Sasha (2010): *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York) , p75.

³¹¹ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002)

these rules Israel was very concerned with still being perceived as obedient. The document analysis reveals that Israel would cover up and also resort to untruthfulness to deny any such action. In the Eichmann case of 1960, Israel first claimed the operation was a private initiative.³¹² When or if, the situation was no longer possible to deny, Israel might, as in the Eichmann incident, apologize the incident and explain the event as a special exception from the normal law-abiding behavior. After the attack on the Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics, Mossad began a global hunt for the men responsible. At that time Israel saw revenge and the deterrence of similar operations, as having a higher priority than the fundamental principle of sovereignty. Israel was willing to break international law and risk the potential humiliation of being caught while violating sovereignty.³¹³ Yet by denying the facts even when caught red handed, Israel demonstrated the central importance of rule abiding behavior. For instance; Mossad denied the responsibility for the assassination of an innocent man in Lillehammer 1973, until April 2014.³¹⁴

Between 1970 and 1973 Israel violated the territorial sovereignty of several European and Arab states by assassinating terrorist and conducting operations on foreign territory. Israel also forced a civil Lebanese airliner to land on an Israeli military airport on the suspicion of carrying a high ranking Palestinian terrorist leader, in August 1973. Such a violation of aerial freedom damaged Israel's effort to build the immunity of civil aviation, particularly in regards to hijackings. It made Abba Eban, The Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs; "(...) wonder if our government was still in full contact with international reality."³¹⁵ Eban was also concerned with the Israeli refusal to negotiate with Sadat in the same period. Israel's tactic was to wait until Egypt and Syria agreed to the Israeli solutions for permanent peace, as they had no real option but a continuation of the occupation. This "diplomacy" towards the Arabs built on the successful recipe of 1948 when Israel only agreed to cease-fires and armistice lines, thus avoided direct peace negotiations in which they were forced to permanent solution that was non beneficial to

³¹² Matthew Lippman, Houston Journal of International Law. *The Trial of Adolph Eichmann and the Protection of the Universal Human Rights under International Law*, Volume 5 autumn 1982, Nr 1.

³¹³ Black, Ian (19.02.14): *The truth about the Mossad*. The Guardian (12.05.14)

³¹⁴ Hercz, Roger (05.04.2014): *Mossad innrømmer drapet på Bouchiki*. Dagsavisen (05.04.14)

³¹⁵ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 491.

Israel. This in turn led to confrontations that Israel again used to better their position seizing control of demilitarized zones or destroying its enemy's military capabilities.

In the early 1970's, Eban was according to himself of the impression that the Israeli leadership behaved overly confident in its military capabilities and arrogant towards Egypt and the willingness of Sadat to negotiate peace after he became President. Defense Minister Dayan's suggested in 1971 to withdraw from the canal for strategic and diplomatic concerns. His suggestion was to retreat 30 km from the canal and by such removing the tension with the Soviet Union, and Arab and African states which were depending on an open canal for trade. Eban thinks this could have avoided the Yom Kippur War. Dayan's suggestion did however not receive consensus, and the matter was dropped. In retrospect, Eban saw the Yom Kippur as resulting from the overall failed diplomacy with Sadat from 1971 to 1973.³¹⁶

As Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, East Jerusalem and the Golan heights in 1967, a return to the UN division plan seemed long forgotten. Israel had been forced to retreat in 1956 during the Suez War due to American political pressure and Soviet Union threats. In 1956 as in 1967 Israel lacked a Security Council approval of its war. On both occasions Israel claimed preemptive war for self-help, which in itself is no legitimate cause according to the UN charter.³¹⁷ If we remember Michael Waltzer's war concept from the theory chapter however, just war may be fought also if threatened with an attack.³¹⁸ We are then left to the world of discourse where the hostile statements of Arab decision-makers promising Israel's destruction, Arab military mobilizations and the blockades of Tiran must be interpreted as warnings, threats, or actual intent to attack. The legitimacy of war in international society, under the preconditions of a functioning balance of power and great power management, is ultimately decided by the great powers and other state members of international society's willingness to stop or support the war. Israel had made it perfectly clear after the Suez war that a renewed closure of the Suez would be interpreted as a declaration of war.

³¹⁶ Abba Eban: *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto 1977) p 471-476.

³¹⁷ UN.org. CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES (03.04.14)

³¹⁸ Michael Waltzer: *Just and Unjust Wars — A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, (Basic books, New York 2006 4 ed.) p 12.

To some Israeli decision makers the American reluctance to resupply Israel during the Yom Kippur War may have been more proof of a Realist reality of international cooperation. After the Yom Kippur War, Israel developed its arms industry into becoming one of its major export industries. This certainly indicates a higher priority of obtaining self-reliance of arms. If we assume that Polakow-Suransky³¹⁹ was right when he argued that Israel used the nuclear weapons as leverage to acquire more arms and support from USA during the Yom Kippur, it must have confirmed to Israeli decision-makers the value of bending or breaking the rules. Realism oriented acts such as the secret nuclear weapons program had contributed to secure Israel's sovereignty in time of crisis. It is however not impossible that Israel always observed and abided the rules, norms and practices of international society from a Realist understanding, where being perceived rule-obedient was the best option, as it was most likely to provide maximum payoff.

I argue that, regardless of periods dominated by a Realist world perception among key decision makers, Israel as a state-actor in the timeframe 1955 to 1974, acted as if the framework of norms, rules and practices were desirable goals in themselves, secondary only to the principles of sovereignty and security. The goals were desirable for the sake of the society of states, but also as means to maintain Israel's sovereignty and achieve just change from an Israeli point of view. At the same time the common norms and rules put limitations on Israel's behavior, while Israel did its best to resist these limitations and influence matters to its advantage. The rules norms and practices of international society both restrained and enabled Israel's goals through balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and the great power management. Israel saw it as its task to power maximize its utility of those institutions bending and breaking the rules norms and practices, for securing the state. I argue on basis of the document material, that Israel's power maximizing, its bending and breaking of international rules, norms and practices went further than what was rational in the long term. Israel's international reputation was damaged; it had lost its favor even in much of the Western "audience". While enjoying much sympathy after WWII, Israel by 1974 was no longer seen as a victim. To many, Israel had become an oppressor, an international bully which did as it

³¹⁹ Polakow-Suransky , Sasha (2010): *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York)

pleased. It had by many been branded a hypocrite, which Waltzer³²⁰ warns against. Its short term security focus had come at a great cost. While seeking to save the Jewish people from its status as a pariah people, the Israel state had arguably become a pariah state, an outcast of international society. Israel seemed to be unable to act sufficiently rule and norm abiding to avoid damaging its reputation. Limiting Israel's norm breaking behavior and holding it accountable was however also the task of the great power management.

7.3 The Great Power Management

What then, of the great power management of the region and its task of maintaining order and local preponderance? To what degree was Israel controlled and held accountable? Israel broke with the framework of norms and rules and practices when it perceived it necessary, and whenever the gains outweighed the disadvantages. From the documentation, I get the impression that Israel's willingness to do so did not only stem from the amount of perceived danger or security concerns. Violations seem to increase with the amount of great power support and the level of confidence in Israel's defense establishment.

The Soviet Union and the USA managed to stop Israel in the 1956 Suez War by using threats and political pressure. Before the Six Day War USA had warned Israel from attacking first, warning that Israel could not rely on American support if they did. When the Soviet Union pressured USA to obtain a truce during the Six Day War, the Americans hesitated before eventually pressuring Israel. Only after Israel had obtained its most important goals of the war did USA begin to cooperate with the Soviet Union for an immediate UN truce resolution. The War was over 10th of June, but the Security Council was unable to agree on the peace terms. USA would only support a full Israeli retreat if the Arab countries recognized Israel as a sovereign state. US President Johnson promised Israel that USA would not back any resolution that Israel resisted. According to Waage, Johnson demanded in return a mobilization of the Israel supports to secure his candidateship in the upcoming US election.

³²⁰ Michael Waltzer: *Just and Unjust Wars — A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, (Basic books, New York 2006 4 ed.) p 13-20.

Israel announced that it annexed East Jerusalem regardless of any Arab recognition. The result was Resolution 242 which was so vaguely formulated that it led to no solution. Israel would not retreat until receiving formal recognition, and the Arabs would not negotiate until Israel withdrew. With this US “carte blanche” given to Israel, it is possible that Israel after the Six Day War, perceived their balancing efforts to align with the American general balance concerns, at least to a large extent. All negotiation in the UN eventually failed and the war of Attrition slowly escalated. It ended after an American initiative in June 1970 managed to bring both sides to the negotiating table, but once again with American guarantees that Israel would not have to retreat from the occupied areas until a peace agreement was found that Israel could accept.³²¹ The same year, USA asked Israel for assistance in the Jordanian civil war, even at the potential cost of the newly regained peace with Egypt and Syria. By now it would not be unreasonable for Israel to consider itself as acting as something of an extension of the US balancing power, battling Egypt and the Soviet Union interests, by proxy for the USA. Was it no longer bound by the same rules as other states, enjoying all the rights of a great power, while less of the responsibility?

It is my opinion that USA seized the opportunity which the occupation of the Six Day War represented, to force the Arabs towards recognition of Israel. I argue that this was seen by the Americans as the path of least resistance towards some sort of stability in the Middle East which also maintained the interest of its regional partner. When providing Israel with unconditional support in the peace negotiations, the continued armament of Israel through the War of Attrition was both a way to battle the Soviet Union by proxy, and a continued investment in the American path or policy towards regional order. Demanding an Israeli retreat without any Arab recognition of Israel would have hurt both Israeli and American prestige and invited a continuation of the conflict on the Arab claims of Israel’s illegitimacy. By giving a guarantee to Israel that it did not have to retreat until it had obtained peace the way it wanted, Israel had no need to negotiate with Egypt and could enjoy the territorial buffer that the occupation of Sinai and Golan offered. USA had achieved temporary peace by this agreement and avoided a confrontation with the Soviet Union.

³²¹ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 356-377.

Some responsibility can be placed with the Soviet Union who was unable to end the occupation by exerting sufficient pressure on USA and Israel. The Soviet Union supplied Egypt with arms and experts, and was also fighting Israeli forces in air-battles on behalf of the Egyptian army. I argue that the Soviet Union contributed as much as possible while avoiding direct confrontation between the great powers. Mutual nuclear deterrence has raised the bar for direct confrontation among great powers, and created the conditions where battle was waged by proxy states. The American proxy (Israel) was simply more efficient than the proxy's fighting for the Soviet Union. Eventually, in spite of Egyptian forces being more successful than what was expected during the Yom Kippur War, the Soviet Union lost its influence in Egypt after the war.

The Yom Kippur War created a great power crisis. The Soviet Union was aware about the Arab war plans two days ahead of the attack, but failed their great power management responsibilities when not alerting the USA. When the war was initiated, both the Soviet Union and the USA, falsely assumed Israel would obtain a new swift victory. Initially USA also failed to understand the urgency of Israel's situation. By putting Israel in jeopardy, the Soviet Union threatened Americas material and psychological investment in Israel and the American regional influence. This created a strong incentive for American intervention. The massive American arms supply that followed likely put Soviet Union decision makers on high alert.³²² By the 10th of October Israel had the gained the advantage in the war and while both the Soviet Union and the USA shuttled arms to their partners, Sadat had to admit defeat only nine days later. Nixon was preoccupied with the Watergate scandal and Henry Kissinger the Jewish American foreign Minister had supplied everything Israel needed to battle Communism. Israel continued its advance. Soviet Union threats to mobilize were ignored by the USA, and the Soviet Union began mobilizing. The USA had to force Israel, whose forces were deep into Syrian and Egyptian territory to retreat. Both the USA and the Soviet Union went into heightened nuclear readiness the 24th to 25th of October before Israel accepted a truce and pulled back its troops.³²³

³²² Robinson, P. Stuart (1996): *The Politics of International Crisis Escalation: Decision-making under pressure*, (Tauris Academic Studies, London 1996) p 105-123.

³²³ Hilde Waage: *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand 2013) p 391-400.

Michael Brecher argued, with the advantage of historical hindsight, that a policy of non-alignment might have been the most rational choice in order to obtain the maximum amount of great power support for Israel. Israel's security focus or eager to obtain American support, led to this missed opportunity. Brecher points to how non-alignment would have avoided Israel the brand as a Western patron, a brand that according to Brecher led to Israel's failure in obtaining a lasting and natural link with the Third World states. It was to Brecher, natural in the sense of the Jewish people and the former colonies were both unfairly and cruelly treated. He argues it would not have come at the cost of military and economic aid. "(...) *Non-Alignment is not an obstacle to assistance from the super-powers; if anything, it leads to more aid! Once more a power asset was wasted, for Israel possessed the conditions of Non-Alignment par excellence.*"³²⁴ If Brecher is right, then Israel's strong efforts to achieve US or Western security guarantees was certainly not the result of a Realist rational actor, utility maximizing among several options.

7.4 Israel relationship towards Africa

How can Israel's relationship towards the international rules, norms and practiced be said to have influenced its relationship towards Africa? Israel's massive push to obtain new friends and allies in post-colonial Africa was the result of several factors. In relation to local balance of power it was of strategic importance to befriend the states surrounding Israel's Arab enemies, particularly after the Suez Campaign in which Israel was seen as the henchman of the former colonial powers Britain and France. All votes in the UN General Assembly are counted equally, and by investing in African nations before their gained their independence Israel secured a lot of votes in the years to come. Israel also established military presence in African states to obtain access to strategically important areas and drain Egyptian resources in regional conflicts. Israel-African friendships also provided new markets and access to natural resources. From a diplomatic perspective the initiative was clearly image building. The Israeli Kibbutzim style of the cooperation, focused on training and making the Africans self-sufficient which proved to have lasting positive effects. Israel also displayed itself as being one of the South African Apartheids regime biggest critics, but always maintained some level of

³²⁴ Brecher, Michael (1972): *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London) p 561-562.

relations and trade with the regime. There was a large Jewish population in South Africa, and South Africa supplied much of Israel's diamond industry and later also Israel's uranium deposits.

The Arabs worked hard to destroy Israel's influence in post-colonial Africa. The first Arab efforts to brand Israel as a Western imperialist following the Suez War was unsuccessful. Nevertheless the Africans observed Israel's assistance as non-exploitative and it even came without ideological strings. With the occupation of Jordanian, Egyptian, and Syrian territory following the Six day War Israel was once again labeled as a colonial imperialist. With the closure of the Suez Canal most of the African states suffered economically, except South Africa which was thriving under the renewed shipping traffic around the southern Cape of Africa. By 1972 the post-colonial African states began turning away from Israel one by one, and most of them severed diplomatic ties with Israel before the Yom Kippur War was over. Israel lost much of its incentive to avoid further collaboration with the South African apartheid regime. By 1974 a defense agreement was established between the two states. Document gathered by Sasha Polakow-Suransky indicate that Israel was willing to sell the Apartheid regime nuclear warheads already by 1975. This certainly represents a sharp shift in relation from the volunteer arms embargo against South Africa which Israel committed to in 1963.

Israel's cooperation with the post-colonial states had been the pride of Israeli foreign relations since 1958. Golda Meir could not hide her disappointment in her memoirs with the African's decision to sever ties in 1973. Other than by Arab pressure and financial aid, this severance of ties came as a consequence of Israel's continued occupation, its rigid stance in its negotiation towards Egypt, and its military success in the Yom Kippur War in which it advanced far into Syria and Egypt. Israel now had little to lose by enforcing ties to South Africa who was also considered an international pariah state. In addition its natural resources, South Africa were also a good market for Israel's booming weapons industry. What may seem an unlikely alliance of the Jewish state and the once Nazi-sympathetic South African leadership developed into a mutually beneficial partnership of outcast pariah states.

7.5 A brief look at tendencies in the current international realm

Can Israel's actions relation to the rules, norms and practices at the time explain current state interaction under the present framework of rules, norms and practices? Material war is still, at times, waged without the proper Security Council approvals. Following the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA, the Security Council authorized USA to overthrow the Taliban regime.³²⁵ But the American and British invasion of Iraq in 2003 which was attempted legitimized by the search for weapons of mass destruction, received no Security Council approval, and was eventually explained as a massive American intelligence error.³²⁶ The American's war on terrorism is continued on a global scale today, and USA is receiving increasing criticism of its use of armed drones. However, as these drone attacks are conducted in Arab, African and Asian states they do not seem to evoke the same reactions in the West as the Israeli assassinations on European streets in the early 70's.³²⁷

The last two months we have seen a Ukrainian crisis unfold. Russia's President Putin denied in March that there were Russian troops on Ukraine's Crimean Peninsula. Later in April he admitted that there in fact were Russian troops present, before and during the Crimean referendum for the Russian annexation.³²⁸ Ukraine had a right to defend its sovereignty through self-help, but seemed reluctant to mobilize, as to create the pretext of an escalation. No other state came to Ukraine's assistance, most likely based on a perception of Ukraine as a part of the Russian sphere of influence. An intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would mean a large possibility for confrontations between NATO and Russia. Professor Paul W. Khan of Yale Law School argues that we are back to a Cold War situation in which states are controlled by one great power or the other. *"These four principles — the prohibition of the use of force, the respect for borders, the Security Council responsibility for maintenance of peace and the requirement of public transparency — were the basis for international law among independent states. Those principles have all been cast aside, with little effort even to offer*

³²⁵ Global Policy Forum: *UN involvement in Afghanistan*, (05.05.14)

³²⁶ Taylor, Peter (18.03.13) ; *Iraq war: the greatest intelligence failure in living memory*, The Telegraph (14.05.14)

³²⁷ Whitlock, Craig (22.10.13): *Drone strikes killing more civilians than U.S. admits, human rights groups say* The Washington Post (14.05.14)

³²⁸ Lally, Kathy (17.04.14): *Putin's remarks raise fears of future moves against Ukraine*, The Washington post (15.05.14)

a legal justification. Russian action in Ukraine tells us clearly that international relations based on law instead of violence remain fragile and under threat."³²⁹ Putin has several times pointed to the Western hypocrisy, which he now seems to be participating in.³³⁰ It is difficult to predict the future of international law or the way states and great powers relate to the established framework of rules, norms and practices. In my opinion there has been an increased awareness and communication around the subject of international law and state-hypocrisy since the Iraq invasion. This is however not the same as an increase of states acting law-disrupting as a matter of fact. Revolutions in Arab states have kept the debate most relevant as there has been much frustration with the subject of intervention. There is still however a strong respect of spheres of influence. NATO is at the time of writing demonstrating its commitment to its Baltic and East-European members through the ongoing "Steadfast Javelin 1" military exercise in Estonia.³³¹ According to US President Obama, USA only perceives Russia to be a regional power, who would struggle to compete with USA's global influence. I would however, argue that the mutual nuclear deterrence between Russia and USA is sufficient to maintain a general balance that facilitates the preconditions of a society of states, avoiding a situation where USA is allowed to act as an unchallenged predominant power.³³² I also argue that in addition to a general balance there is a great power management in place facilitating what Bull calls the institutions of international society. Diplomacy also has the conditions it requires, and war is in my opinion both limited and controlled. Some material war may be unable to meet the requirements the international society has set in order to be perceived "just", but what is "just" is also essentially, decided by the willingness to mobilize.

It is my opinion the four principles of international law presented by Khan has not been cast aside any more today than it was for instance from 1955 to 1974. This thesis reveal, in my opinion, that the bending and breaking of international law, and other norms rules and practices in the society of states has been a constant condition occurring with shifting intensity throughout modern state history since WWII. As Bull points out law breaking is not as bad as a rejection of the society itself, the latter of which is only the

³²⁹ Khan, W. Paul (05.09.14): *What Putin learned from the U.S. invasion of Iraq*, Al Jazeera America (15.05.14)

³³⁰ Aziz, John (04.03.14): *No, the Iraq War does not give Putin the right to invade Ukraine*, The Week (15.15.14)

³³¹ *North Atlantic Treaty Organization (14.05.14): NATO's "Steadfast Javelin 1" exercise underway in Estonia (14.05.14)*

³³² McDonald-Gibson, Charlotte (26.03.14): *Ukraine crisis: Russia is a regional power – but US is most powerful nation in the world, Obama warns Putin*, The Independent (15.05.14)

practice North Korea to my knowledge. Also, crisis or the threat of war is not just a threat to international society; it can also be used for its maintenance. Even the threat of crisis or collapse may serve a purpose as it may remind actors that it is contrary to the common interest.³³³ I do not believe that the Ukrainian crisis will lead to a collapse of international law or the norms, rules and practices of the modern society of states. In my view this is an adjustment of the general balance and the great power management, where Russia is displaying strength. The open discourse of hypocrisy may very well lead to a reaffirming or strengthening of commitment to international law in regards to legitimate war, interventions and annexations. Such an adjustment may come in the aftermath of material war or as an alternative to it. I do nevertheless agree with Professor Khan's assessment of future challenges of blurred lines in regards to war and international law; "*This is what future wars will look like: not the massed armor of battalions on the move, but a close intermeshing of targeted violence and information control in pursuit of political ends. International law is not at all prepared for this future. It never even mastered its past.*"³³⁴

³³³ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002)

³³⁴ Khan, W. Paul (05.09.14): *What Putin learned from the U.S. invasion of Iraq*, Al Jazeera America (15.05.14)

8 Conclusion

This chapter concludes upon the research objectives and the results. It also contains a brief evaluation of the research project, and suggestions for further research.

8.1 Review of the Research Objectives

The first research question was aimed at investigating the actions of Israel in the international society of states from 1955 to 1974, in order to unveil Israel's relation to the framework of norms, rules and practices of the international society of states. I would not have been able to obtain such data using Neorealist theory, focusing solely on the structural restraints of the system of the states as the output of the behavior of the parts, as it cannot account for the mutual beneficial collaboration of states in maintaining common rules, values norms, and practices. Allison's three models would have been unable to look at foreign policy development as something beyond the result of internal processes, and hence also not suitable for our purposes. To uncover the relationship I used Hedley Bull's institutional framework as indicators upon the document material. By analyzing Israel's actions in relation to balance of power, international law, diplomacy, war and the great powers, I obtained a good understanding of how Israel related to this framework.

My analysis reveals that Israel, most likely due to its special history and psychology, was too absorbed with power maximizing in its goal achievements. In most of the timeframe this priority was first and foremost based upon the goal of obtaining and maintaining, security and sovereignty. Upon reaching a relatively secure situation after 1970, Israel continued to power-maximize, partly by habit, partly because Israel felt it was in control and partly as it was perceived to be the best investment for Israel's future security. Israel perceived that its best option to secure sovereignty and security was to achieve great power support from the USA. This policy led to several missed opportunities for Israel. Michael Brecher argued that Israel would have profited the most by practicing non-alignment. This would have created great power competition for Israel's friendship and a better relationship between Israel and the Third World states.

The power maximizing approach led Israel to bend and break the framework of rules, norms and practices of international society when it perceived it necessary or sufficiently profitable. Nevertheless, the central value of the framework for Israel is

evident in the evidence that reveals how far Israel went to be perceived as abiding or conforming, by sometimes denying the violation, or rationalizing it. Israel was also mostly acting in accordance to the framework and contributed to the maintenance of the norms, rules and practices by demanding its surroundings do the same. Hence while the rules, norms and practices acted restricting upon Israel, Israel worked to use the framework to its perceived advantage. I use the term “perceived advantage” as the document material reveal several decisions that did not work solely for Israel’s advantage. For instance, the unwillingness to negotiate with Sadat became a major cause for the Yom Kippur War. Also, Israel’s short term security thinking involved violations of sovereignty and came at the cost of Israel’s image in the general Western public. Israel lost support in many states including its friendships in post-colonial Africa.

The relationship between Israel and the international society developed as Israel was both restrained and enabled by the framework of norms, rules and practices. I argue that Israel proved very skilled at applying this framework for its goal achievements, and was not sufficiently restrained. Some responsibility must therefore be placed with USA, which I argue; failed to act rationally in accordance to its responsibility to maintain the general balance and the great power management. Though the peace negotiations following the Yom Kippur war eventually led to an Egyptian recognition of Israel and permanent borders, it is my opinion that USA failed at creating the regional stability in a violence restricting and efficient manner.

The USA failed at demanding an Israeli withdrawal after the Six Day War. It also failed by providing Israel with little incentive to negotiate, while continuing to arm and support Israel in the War of Attrition. It failed its responsibilities further, when asking for Israel’s assistance in the Jordanian Civil war and by its action during the Yom Kippur War. In the Yom Kippur War context it must be mentioned that USA might have perceived itself as preventing a nuclear escalation by arming Israel with conventional arms. This overall American great power failure was not of such nature that the general balance or the great power management collapsed, but it created unnecessary crisis between the great powers as well as regionally in the Middle East. As a consequence of its supportive Israel politics, USA alienated many Arab states which contributed to the OPEC boycott which created crisis also internally in the US. It is my opinion, based on

the document analysis that USA was too concerned with Israeli needs compared to that which would have been reasonable in accordance with a great powers rights and duties. Bull's theory states that part of the great power management is to avoid being seen as contributing to disorder, in order to have legitimacy for its special rights and duties.³³⁵

The second research problem was aimed at analyzing how Israel's relationship to the framework of norm, rules and practices, influenced Israel' relationship towards Africa. From the document analysis I learned how the periphery strategy of befriending post-colonial Africa came in part as a reply to the unpopular Suez War, and partly as a necessity of limiting the Arab influence in the African region. Hence the policy was to some the degree the result of the restriction or necessity of having international support. At the same time this policy was enabled, by of the possibility of states emerging in the international society from the former colonial rule. Though the Arab nations applied heavy pressure to destroy this relationship, Israel was in the end responsible for the collapse. Though the Suez War and the Six day war were unpopular in Africa, the occupation of Sinai, the closure of Suez and The Yom Kippur War which in the end tipped the scale, could have been avoided. With the breakdown of all prospects in the former colonies, Israel lost its biggest rationale for developing further ties with South Africa. The collaboration with the apartheid regime was enabled as part of the restriction that Israel's new unpopularity represented.

8.2 Evaluation of the Research Project and suggestions for Future Research

In this thesis I have analyzed Israel's interaction with the rules, norms and practices of the international society from 1955 to 1974. The document analysis was conducted on a extensive document material, which was necessary to obtain a nuanced analysis with a balanced triangulation of sources. I was careful in the beginning with my potential bias for the Arab cause, but after reading many biographies of key Israeli decision-makers, I had to reflect upon to what degree I was influenced with the very personal portrayal of events by these individuals. I believe that I have managed to conduct a neutral analysis that can provide insight on Israel as a special case in regards to state interaction with the framework of norms, rules and practices, but also as a case that can provide

³³⁵ Hedley Bull: *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York 2002,)

understanding on the subject in general. Not just on other historical cases, but perhaps even more relevant as a measurement on current affairs. Particularly, when there is an increased concern with the sustainability and future of international law and other rules, norms and practices of international society.

My suggestion for further research within the field would be to first look at other important historical cases to broaden the basis for understanding current events. It is of course both tempting and perhaps possible to jump directly ahead to conduct an analysis of state interaction with the framework, using events from for instance year 2000 and towards today. Such a case on relatively recent events will not have the same in depth documents available such as memoirs, thorough analysis such as that of Michael Brecher³³⁶, or primary-type publicized government documents. The news coverage has however improved since the 1950's and there is a lot of material available through thorough journalism, and also academic papers and books, quickly available in digital form. There might also be a great potential of resources by leaked government documents, such as made available through Wikileaks, a recognized internet drop box for, for instance government officials that want to share secret information.³³⁷ Edward Snowden, a former CIA contractor also published documents revealing the extent of American surveillance, and has promised to publish more material.³³⁸ These sources in themselves pose a new problem for the great powers and all other states acting in breach with the framework of norms, rules and practices of international society.

³³⁶ Brecher, Michael (1972): *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London)

³³⁷ Wikileaks.org (05.07.11): *About – What is Wikileaks* (15.05.14)

³³⁸ BBC.com (17.01.14): *Edward Snowden: Leaks that exposed US spy programme* (15.05.14.)

9 Resources

Allison, Graham (2012): *The Cuban Missile Crisis*. In: Dunne, T. Hadfield, A. and Smith, S: *Foreign Policy Affairs: Theories, Actors, Cases* Second Edition. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

<<http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/CMC50/GrahamAllisonThe%20CubanMissileCrisis.pdf>> (02.05.14)

Aziz, John (04.03.14): *No, the Iraq War does not give Putin the right to invade Ukraine*, The Week <<http://theweek.com/article/index/257342/no-the-iraq-war-does-not-give-putin-the-right-to-invade-ukraine>> (15.15.14)

BBC.com (17.01.14): *Edward Snowden: Leaks that exposed US spy programme*

<<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-23123964>> (15.05.14.)

Betts, Richard K. (2008): *Conflict after the cold war – Arguments on causes of war and peace*, (Pearson Longman 3.ed, New York)

Black, Ian (19.02.14): *The truth about the Mossad*, The Guardian.

<<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/19/ian-black-mossad-dubai>> (12.05.14)

Brecher, Michael (1972): *The Foreign Policy system of Israel – Setting Images, Process*, (Oxford University Press, London)

Bull, Hedley (1966): *Society and Anarchy in International Relations*, in H. Butterfield and M. Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics* (George Allen and Unwin, London 1966).

Bull, Hedley (2002): *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York)

Cohn-Sherbok, Dan and El-Alami, Dawoud (2002): *Israel – Palestina, Konflikten sett fra begge sider* (Oneworld Publications, London)

Danseyar, Ann Ellen (1982): *Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran: From Customary International Law to the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty*, 5 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 127 (1982), <<http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol5/iss1/5>> (24.03.14)

Dinitz, Simcha (1956-1957): *The Legal Aspects of the Egyptian Blockade of the Suez Canal*, The Georgetown Law Journal, Volume 415 Winter 1956-57 nr 2, <<http://heinonline.org/HOL/Print?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/glj45&id=195>> (17.03.14)

Eban, Abba (1977): *An Autobiography*, (Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto)

Encyclopædia Britannica Online: Nuclear Reactor <<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/421763/nuclear-reactor/307288/Growth-of-nuclear-programs>> (02.05.14)

Fischer, David (1997): *History of the International Atomic Energy Agency: the first forty years*, (The Agency, Vienna) <http://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1032_web.pdf > (05.05.14)

Global Policy Forum: *UN involvement in Afghanistan*, <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/afghanistan.html>> (05.05.14)

Hahn, Peter L. (2006): *Securing the Middle East: The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957* Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1, Presidential Doctrines (Mar., 2006), p 38-47. <<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/27552745.pdf?acceptTC=true&acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true>> (19.03.14)

Hay, Colin (2002): *Political Analysis*, (Palgrave Macmillan, New York)

Hercz, Roger (05.04.2014): *Mossad innrømmer drapet på Bouchiki*, Dagsavisen. <<http://www.dagsavisen.no/verden/mossad-innrømmer-drapet-pa-bouchiki/>> (05.04.14)

Hoffmann, Stanley (2002): Foreword to the second ed. of Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York)

Hurrel, Andrew (2002): Foreword to the third ed. of Hedley Bull's *The Anarchical Society – A Study of Order in World politics*, (Palgrave 3.ed, New York)

International Atomic Energy Agency. ARTICLE IV: Membership
<<http://www.iaea.org/About/statute.html#A1.4>> (02.04.14)

International Atomic Energy Agency. Atoms for peace speech. Address by Mr. Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States of America, to the 470th Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly *Tuesday, 8 December 1953, 2:45 p.m.*
<http://www.iaea.org/About/atomsforpeace_speech.html> (02.04.14)

International Atomic Energy Agency. *History of The International Atomic Energy Agency: The first forty years.* By David Fischer <http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1032_web.pdf> p 50 (19.01.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement to the Security Council by Ambassador Eban on the Gaza incident- 23 March 1955
<<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/18%20Statement%20to%20the%20Security%20Council%20by%20Ambassador.aspx>> (24.04.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Letter from Ambassador Eban to the President of the Security Council- S-3603
<<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/25%20Letter%20from%20Ambassador%20Eban%20to%20the%20President%20of.aspx>> (15.04.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 18 Statement to the Security Council by Ambassador Eban on the Gaza incident- 23 March 1955
<<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/18%20Statement%20to%20the%20Security%20Council%20by%20Ambassador.aspx>> (06.05.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. About MASHAV

<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/mashav/AboutMASHAV/Pages/Background.aspx> (31.03.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Aide-memoire from Egypt to the United States regarding Passage through the Straits of Tiran, 28 January 1950.

<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/2%20Aide-memoire%20from%20Egypt%20to%20the%20United%20States%20reg.aspx> (18.03.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Ceasefire Lines Following the 1967 Six-Day War

<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/Ceasefire%20Lines%20Following%20the%201967%20Six-Day%20War.aspx> (07.04.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Egypt Reimposes a Naval Blockade on the Straits of Tiran- 23 May 1967

<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/4%20Egypt%20Reimposes%20a%20Naval%20Blockade%20on%20the%20Straits.aspx> (04.04.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Egypt-s Statement on Troop Movements into Sinai- 15 May 1967

<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/1%20Egypt-s%20Statement%20on%20Troop%20Movements%20into%20Sinai-.aspx> (04.04.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Israel Accepts the United States Initiative- Government Statement- 31 July 1970

<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/18%20Israel%20Accepts%20the%20United%20States%20Initiative-%20Go.aspx> (04.04.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Israel's Foreign Policy - Historical Documents

http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Pages/Documents_Foreign_Policy_Israel.aspx (08.05.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. IX- THE SINAI CAMPAIGN- INTRODUCTION

<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/IX-%20THE%20SINAI%20CAMPAIGN-%20INTRODUCTION.aspx> (18.03.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement by President Nasser to Arab Trade Unionists- 26 May 1967

<<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/7%20Statement%20by%20President%20Nasser%20to%20Arab%20Trade%20Unio.aspx>> (07.04.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Meir- 23 October 1973

<<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/12%20Statement%20to%20the%20Knesset%20by%20Prime%20Minister%20Meir.aspx>> (04.04.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Israel Defense Forces 31 May 1997

<<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/State/Pages/The%20Israel%20Defense%20Forces.aspx>> (26.03.14)

Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. THE SIX-DAY WAR-INTRODUCTION

<<http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/THE%20SIX-DAY%20WAR%20-%20INTRODUCTION.aspx>> (07.04.14)

Israel State Archives (2008): *Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, January-October 1956 – Companion Volume 11*, ed Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2008)

Israel State Archives (2001): *Israel Documents on the Foreign policy of Israel, 1958-1959 – Companion Volume 13*, ed Baruch Gilead (Keter Press, Jerusalem 2001)

James, Alan (1999): *The Practice of Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society*, Political Studies Association 1999, XLVII, Blackwell Publishers, Malden.

<<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9248.00212/pdf>>

Jewish Virtual Library. **Israel Counter-Terrorism**: Targeted Killings of Terrorists

<<http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Terrorism/hits.html>> (07.04.14)

Joel Peters (1992): *Israel and Africa: The problematic Friendship*, (The British Academic Press, London)

Karpin, Michael (2006): *The Bomb in the Basement – How Israel went nuclear and what that means for the world*, (Simon & Scuster, New York)

Keohane, Robert O. (1986): *Neorealism and its critics*, (Columbia University Press, New York)

Khan, W. Paul (05.09.14): *What Putin learned from the U.S. invasion of Iraq*, Al Jazeera America. <<http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/5/international-lawrussiaukraineiraqinvasion.html>> (15.05.14)

Krige, John (2006): *Atoms for Peace, Scientific Internationalism, and Scientific Intelligence*, *Osiris*, Vol. 21, No. 1, *Global Power Knowledge: Science and Technology in International Affairs* (2006), pp. 161-181. (The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science Society)
<<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/10.1086/507140.pdf?acceptTC=true&acceptTC=true&jsdConfirm=true>> (18.03.14)

Lally, Kathy (17.04.14): *Putin's remarks raise fears of future moves against Ukraine*, *The Washington Post*. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/putin-changes-course-admits-russian-troops-were-in-crimea-before-vote/2014/04/17/b3300a54-c617-11e3-bf7a-be01a9b69cf1_story.html> (15.05.14)

Lippman, Matthew (1982): *Houston Journal of International Law. The Trial of Adolph Eichmann and the Protection of the Universal Human Rights under International Law*, Volume 5 autumn 1982, Nr 1.

Lynggaard, Kenneth (2010): *Kvalitative Metoder – En Grundbok*. Sven Brinkmann & Lena Tanggaard. (red.) (Hans Reitzels Forlag, Kjøbenhavn 2010).

Maoz, Jason (27.08.2008): *LBJ and Israel*. Jewish Press.
<<http://www.jewishpress.com/indepth/front-page/lbj-and-israel/2008/08/27/>>

McDonald-Gibson, Charlotte (26.03.14): *Ukraine crisis: Russia is a regional power – but US is most powerful nation in the world, Obama warns Putin*, The Independent.

<<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-cannot-hope-to-match-global-might-of-america-says-barack-obama-in-warning-to-vladimir-putin-9215305.html>>

(15.05.14)

McGreal, Chris (24.05.2010): *Revealed: how Israel offered to sell South Africa nuclear weapons*, The Guardian. <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/23/israel-south-africa-nuclear-weapons>>

(15.05.14)

Meir, Golda (1975): *My Life*, (G.P. Putnam`s Sons, New York 1975)

NATO.int *NATO's "Steadfast Javelin 1" exercise underway in Estonia*

<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_109929.htm?utm_source=plus&utm_medium=smc&utm_campaign=1405116+exercise+javelin&utm_term=javelin+exercise+estonia>

(14.05.14)

Omer-Man, Michael (25.02.2011): *This Week in History: IAF shoots down Libyan Flight 114*.

The Jerusalem Post. <<http://www.jpost.com/Features/In-Thespotlight/This-Week-in-History-IAF-shoots-down-Libyan-Flight-114>>

(11.04.14)

Peres, Shimon (1995): *Erindringer*, (Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, Oslo 1995)

Polakow-Suransky , Sasha (2010): *The Unspoken Alliance*, (Pantheon Books, New York)

Rabin, Yitzhak (1979): *The Rabin memoirs*, (Little, Brown and Company, Toronto 1979)

Robinson, P. Stuart (1996): *The Politics of International Crisis Escalation: Decision-making under pressure*, (Tauris Academic Studies, London 1996)

Sartori, Giovanni (1970): *Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics*, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (American Political Science Association, 1970) pp. 1033-1053.

Smith, Steve (1980): *Allison and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review of the Bureaucratic Politics Model of Foreign Policy Decision-Making*, Millennium - Journal of International Studies 1980 9: 21, (Millennium Publishing House)

<<http://mil.sagepub.com/content/9/1/21.full.pdf>> (05.05.14)

Taylor, Peter (18.03.13); *Iraq war: the greatest intelligence failure in living memory*, The Telegraph.

<<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/9937516/Iraq-war-the-greatest-intelligence-failure-in-living-memory.html>> (14.05.14)

Thaagaard, Tove (2002): *Systematikk og Innlevelse – En innføring i kvalitativ metode*, (OZGraf SA: Fagbokforlaget Vigmostad & Bjørke AS)

UIT.no. Guest lecture by Hilde Henriksen Waage “Why is there no peace between Israel and the Palestinians?” at University of Tromsø – Norway's Arctic University

<http://uit.no/ansatte/organisasjon/tavla/artikkel?p_document_id=329470&p_dimension_id=8157&p_menu=28723> (05.05.14)

UN.org. 181 (1963). Resolution of 7 August 1963

<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/181%281963%29> (05.05.14)

UN.org. Current permanent and non-permanent members of UN Security Council

<<http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/>> (14.03.14)

UN.org. THE PLAN OF PARTITION AND END OF THE BRITISH MANDATE

<<http://www.un.org/depts/dpi/palestine/ch2.pdf>> (13.01.14)

UN.org. The United Nations: Partner in the Struggle against Apartheid

<<http://www.un.org/en/events/mandeladay/apartheid.shtml>> (26.03.14)

UN.org. UN charter index < <https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter>> (03.04.14)

UN.org. UN charter: CHAPTER II: MEMBERSHIP

<<https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter2.shtml>> (02.05.14)

UN.org. UN charter: CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

<<https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter6.shtml>> (03.04.14)

UN.org. UN charter: CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

<<https://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml>> (03.04.14)

UN.org. UNISPAL United Kingdom letter regarding Palestine (02.11.1917)

<<http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/e210ca73e38d9e1d052565fa00705c61?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,balfour>> (02.09.13)

UN.org. UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) Background

<<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/untso/background.shtml>> (03.04.14)

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Timeline of Events

<<http://www.ushmm.org/learn/timeline-of-events/after-1945>> (08.05.14)


Waage, Hilde (2013): *Konflikt og Stormaktspolitikk I Midtøsten*, (Cappelen Damm AS, Kristiansand)

Waltzer, Michael (2006): *Just and Unjust Wars — A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 4 ed. (Basic books, New York)


Whitlock, Craig (22.10.13): *Drone strikes killing more civilians than U.S. admits, human rights groups say*, The Washington Post. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/drone-strikes-killing-more-civilians-than-us-admits-human-rights-groups-say/2013/10/21/a99cbe78-3a81-11e3-b7ba-503fb5822c3e_story.html#no_link1> (14.05.14)

Wikileaks.org (05.07.11): *About – What is Wikileaks* < <https://wikileaks.org/About.html/>> (15.05.14)

United Nations Partition Plan
 UN Resolution 181



Rhodes Armistice Line



Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA)

³³⁹ <<http://www.passia.org/>> (10.05.14)

Figure 2³⁴⁰



³⁴⁰ <<http://www.passia.org/>> (10.05.14)