Centre for Peace Studies

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Counter-radicalisation Policies

Are the Policies of the EU, Norway and the Basque Country effective?

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Abstract

This study examines the effectiveness of 11 counter-radicalisation policies presented by the European Union, Norway, and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country in Spain. In order to do so, two tasks are carried out, where the first is to analyse the overlapping between the measures proposed in the policy documents and the contributing factors of the radicalisation phenomenon. The second task is to discuss the compatibility of the aforementioned measures and the liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy. The study makes use of a conceptualisation of radicalisation based on contemporary scholarly literature on the topic together with content analysis, Boolean logic and fuzzy set logic in order to accomplish these tasks. The main findings of the study are that out of a potential maximum of 1 grade of membership, the policies COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2 and ColSec have a 0.89 grade of membership in the effectiveness notion and 0.11 in the exacerbation notion. Concerning the RAN documents, they have a membership grade of 0.78 in effectiveness and 0.11 in exacerbation. The PPC has a grade of 0.67 in effectiveness, whilst the policy COM 3 has 0.56 in effectiveness and 0.11 in exacerbation. The policies COM 2 and NorCOM 2 have a grade of membership of 0.45. In addition, NorCOM 2 has 0.11 in exacerbation, and finally, NorCOM 1 has a grade of membership of 0.23. Further, the second main finding is that the policy documents are context specific.

Keywords: Counter-radicalisation, radicalisation, extremist, extremism, terrorism, terrorist, public policy, European Union, Norway, Basque Country, Spain.

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Introduction

This study examines the effectiveness of 11 counter-radicalisation policies presented by the European Union, Norway, and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country in Spain. In order to carry out this examination, two tasks will be done: firstly, the overlapping between the measures proposed in the policy documents and the contributing factors of the radicalisation phenomenon are analysed. In order to do so, the study identifies, on the one hand, 158 measures present in these policy papers and on the other builds on previous scholarly research on the radicalisation phenomenon to itemise a series of nine contributing factors that could potentially push an individual forward on the radicalisation path. Secondly, the compatibility of the aforementioned measures and the liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy are discussed. To carry out this second task, the study identifies 25 measures which are potentially incompatible with these liberties and draws from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and the constitutions of both countries.

Effectiveness is therefore examined through a conceptual perspective focusing on the design level of the policies. The study acknowledges the importance of discourse as idea generators, especially in political realms such as this particular one concerning counter-radicalisation, where the majority of society cannot relate such a topic to their personal experiences. In addition, the study also recognises that the institutionalisation of ideas tends to vary between organisations and countries. Taking this into account, the language used in the policy papers is analysed and the variations and evolution in the utilisation of the language is shown.

The study deems the topic as relevant not only due to major events such as those of Madrid in 2004, London in 2005 as well as the more recent happenings of Oslo and Utøya, but also for the myriad of small-scale incidents that could potentially divide and polarise society, making group boundaries impermeable and exacerbating intergroup animosity.

Chapter 1

In September 2005, in the wake of the Madrid, Holland and London attacks, the European Commission (2005) forwarded a communication to the European Parliament and the European Council concerning terrorist recruitment. The paper outlined the measures to be taken in order to address violent radicalisation and the factors and root causes that prompted these processes.

The gravity of the issue and the relevance of the presented measures were emphasised through the linkage of radicalisation and terrorism, and the pronouncement that terrorism has "the potential to subvert the very founding principles of the European Union" (European Commission [EC], 2005) i.e. human dignity, freedom, equality, and solidarity as defined by the *Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union* (2000).

Efforts to guarantee these principles became linked to that of fighting radicalisation and in this regard new strategies were presented. The *European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism*, delivered in November 2005, and the inclusion of the PREVENT section in the *European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy* of November 2005 were examples of this.

Understanding radicalisation was also emphasised by the European Union (EU) as can be seen in paragraph 7 of the aforementioned Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment of 2005: "To ensure our responses [to radicalisation] remain effective and appropriate, we will work to develop our understanding of the problem [...] we will engage in dialogue with governments which have faced this problem, academic experts and Muslim communities in Europe and beyond" (Council of the European Union [CEU] 2005a). Knowledge of the processes of radicalisation was by then acknowledged as necessary to design effective counter-radicalisation policies.

Following this precept, in 2006 the EU financed under the Sixth Framework Programme the project *Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law* which focused among other things on researching radicalisation, recruitment, the root causes of terrorism, and counter-radicalisation strategies. Later on, in 2011 the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) was launched with the intention, as stated in its charter, of encouraging "community members, practitioners, law enforcement and academics to share and discuss best practice in spotting and addressing radicalisation and recruitment leading to acts of terrorism" (p. 1)[1].

The EU has defined itself as a supporter of the member states in addressing radicalisation processes and has put the emphasis on the notion that counter-radicalisation policies are ultimately the responsibility of the member states (CEU 2005a; EC, 2010). This has resulted in multiple and different national strategies with a more or less developed preventive sections (Transnational

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[1] http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/docs/ran_charter_en.pdf (29/11/2013)

Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law [TTSRL], 2008a)[2].

1.1 Aim, Objectives and Scope

This study seeks to examine the counter-radicalisation initiatives, strategies and policies proposed by the European Union and the governments of Norway and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country in Spain in order to show to what extent these policies can be considered effective.

A definitive statement about the effectiveness of preventive policies can be challenging and controversial. Therefore part of the results of this project will be debatable. In an attempt to bypass this difficulty, the following premise is adopted: for a counter-radicalisation policy to be effective it has to address the contributing factors of the radicalisation processes. The author understands that when a policy has design defects or incoherencies (the measures do not address the diagnosed causes), the output of these policies will not be positive and therefore they will not be deemed effective. At the same time, maintaining the liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy is vital when designing context specific and effective preventative policies. Consequently the analysis of a policy's effectiveness can be achieved by responding to these questions:

- To what extent do the counter-radicalisation policies presented in the EU, Norway and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country address the contributing factors of the radicalisation process?
- To what extent do the counter-radicalisation policies presented in the EU, Norway and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country guarantee the liberties surmised in a western liberal democracy?

This project sets its focus exclusively on counter-radicalisation policies as defined by the United Nations Working Group on Radicalisation and Extremism: "A package of social, political, legal, educational, and economic programmes specifically designed to deter disaffected (and possibly already radicalised) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists" (United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, 2008, p. 2). De-radicalisation policies aimed at already radicalised people and disengagement initiatives aimed at people who have already been recruited will not be considered.

1.2 A Note on the Methodology

The methodology used to fulfil the aims and objectives of this study will be comparative in nature. For this comparison to be possible three intermediate steps are necessary: first, the

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[2] The TTSRL deliverable, *Mapping Counterterrorism: A Categorization of Policies and the Promise of Empirically-Based, Systematic Comparison*, offers a good overview of the variety of this strategies. http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/WP6%20Del%2011.pdf (30/11/2013)

conceptualisation of the radicalisation process and the factorisation of the causes behind this phenomenon has to be conducted. Second, the counter-radicalisation policies presented at the European, Norwegian, and Basque level have to be compiled and analysed in order to be able to discern the measures they propose. And, third, the possibility of some measures that do not guarantee the liberties surmised in a western liberal democracy will be discussed.

1.2.1 Conceptualising radicalisation. Radicalisation is a complex phenomenon and many reasons, theories, and models have been presented to explain it (see Victoroff, 2005). There is no one generally accepted definition or conceptualisation, and debate on this matter is still one of the main topics in scholarly articles, official documents, and reports. It is for this reason that in order to conceptualise this phenomenon the study will draw upon previous scholarly research on the subject with the aim of presenting a compilation of the contributing factors proposed by contemporary social scientists.

1.2.2 On the European Union, Norway, the Autonomous region of the Basque Country and their policy papers. The original idea behind the project was to analyse the counter-radicalisation policies proposed by the European Union. However, because final responsibility for addressing the radicalisation phenomenon lies with individual states, the inclusion of two states was considered. The possibility of analysing the policies proposed by two countries with different levels of EU integration was chosen to provide a more complete vision of contemporary counter-radicalisation policies in Europe.

According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005) and Jason Seawright and John Gerring (2008), case selection should not only be guided by personal interest, availability of data, or pragmatic considerations. The relevance, representativeness, control and appropriate variation required by the research purpose needs to be taken into account (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 83; Seawright & Gerring, 2008, p. 295). In this vein, Norway and Spain were chosen for various reasons: first they share some similarities that makes comparisons possible without losing connotative precision, i.e. European countries, consolidated liberal democracies, biggest terrorist attacks on European soil, but at the same time they have divergences, other than their level of integration, that could possibly influence the way counter-radicalisation is perceived and therefore conducted. Among these, one could note the previous existence of terrorist groups in Spain (ETA, GRAPO), the different motivations behind the events of Utøya and Madrid, or the different economic situation among others.

Despite the initial idea to analyse the counter-radicalisation policies of both countries, the

lack of non-classified official strategies or white papers on counter-radicalisation in Spain[3] led to two possible courses of action: the first being to select a different country with a known policy addressing radicalisation, and the second, to look for policies in other realms that could be comparable to the counter-radicalisation initiatives proposed by the EU and Norway.

This second option entailed bringing a new layer of complexity. Due to the territorial organisation of Spain many competencies are transferred to the regional levels and therefore these strategies could also exist in a sub-national sphere. Looking at policies at the sub-national level would elevate the project up the abstraction ladder, but at the same time conducting the analysis at three levels, namely the supra-national (EU), the national (Norway), and the sub-national (the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country) would, once again, offer a wider overview of current initiatives in Europe. Since offering a wide vision of contemporary counter-radicalisation policies in Europe was one of the driving premises of the study, this second option was favoured.

The selection of the policy documents responds greatly to the lack of transparency regarding counter-radicalisation initiatives. In this matter, Statewatch (2013)[4], a working group led by the University of Durham that conducted an EU-funded research project on the EU's counter-terrorism legislation, mentions that despite the opposition of the Swedish presidency when the *Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism* was presented "all of the specific actions were redacted from the publicly available text. All of the other key documents relating to the EU's radicalisation and recruitment strategy received the same treatment" (p. 10). It also emphasises that due to the lack of transparency "it is impossible [for the public and civil society] to even attempt to ascertain its legitimacy or effectiveness or otherwise play any part in the democratic process" (p. 10).

In an attempt to overcome this difficulty the study made use of all the documents that could be accessed, including the available action plans and communications in order to build an image of counter-radicalisation measures that is as complete as possible.

The result of the search is presented in the following list:

Policy papers of the European Union

1. *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council concerning terrorist recruitment – Addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalisation* (21 September 2005)
2. *The European Union Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism* (24 November 2005)
3. *The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy* (30 November 2005)

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[3] http://www.osce.org/es/fsc/100719?download=true (25/05/14)
[4] http://www.statewatch.org/news/2013/dec/SECILE-sw-summary.pdf (25/05/14)

4. *Revised EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism* (14 November 2008)

5. *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe* (22 November 2010)

6. *Proposed Policy Recommendations from the RAN Working Groups* (December 2012)

7. *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism: Strengthening the EU´s Response* (15 January 2014)

Policy papers of Norway

1. *Transforming Terrorists: International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism* (3 May 2011)

2. *Collective security – a shared responsibility Action plan to prevent radicalization and violent extremism* (9 May 2011)

3. *Ny strategi for å forebygge og bekjempe radikalisering* (4 November 2013).

Policy paper of the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country:

1. *Plan de Paz y Convivencia 2013-16* (November 2013)

Each of these documents is an official policy paper available on the web pages of the organisations that present them. The authenticity of the documents is not in question and therefore will be deemed as valid to conduct this study.

1.2.3 A note on policy documents. Although there is a lack of one unified definition of what public policy is (Fernández, 2006, p. 499) and it has been defined as widely as "[…] whatever governments choose to do or not to do (Dye, 1972, cited by Knoepfel, Larrue, Varone & Hill 2011, p. 23), there is, however, a requirement that co-occurs through most of the definitions: the presence of a governmental authority (Fernández, 2006, p. 499). This conception of the necessity of involvement of a governmental authority can be problematic for the inclusion of the aforementioned *Proposed Policy Recommendations from the RAN Working Groups*, the most extensive and explanatory set of documents at the European level regarding counter-radicalisation measures. Understanding that the elimination of the RAN documents from the analysis would make it difficult to acquire a good picture of the proposed counter-radicalisation measures at the EU level, the definition of public policy adopted in this study is that proposed by Peter Knoepfel, Corinne Larrue, Frédéric Varone and Michael Hill (2011) that defines public policy as "a series of intentionally coherent decisions or activities taken or carried out by different public – and sometimes – private

actors, whose resources, institutional links and interest vary, with a view to resolving in a targeted manner a problem that is politically defined as collective […]" (p. 24). This would de facto enable the classification of the RAN documents as public policy documents.

1.2.4 Liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy. Defining what are the presupposed liberties of a western liberal democracy could have been conducted in a way similar to the one used for the conceptualisation of radicalisation. However, the author understands that unlike radicalisation, liberties are coded and can be found, *inter alia,* in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFREU) and the constitutions of both countries.

Although the UNDHR is not directly binding on the states, or supra-national entities for that matter, it could be said that it has long been regarded as customary international law (Mendel & Salomon 2011, p. 9). The ICCPR and the ECHR, however, are legally binding for the countries that have ratified them (Norway and Spain included)[5]. In addition, CFREU has been legally binding since December the 1st 2009 for the institutions of the European Union.

1.2.5 The importance of discourse. Language has the power to make meaning of things and this, in turn, influences how people think and act towards that specific thing (Mehan, 1997, p. 250). In a political realm such as this particular one, where the majority of society cannot relate it to their personal experiences, the discourse through which the topic is presented to society becomes the only link between the two.

The study also recognises that the institutionalisation of ideas tends to vary between organisations and countries, and thus, taking this into account, it analyses the language used through the policy papers and shows the variations and evolution in the language.

1.2.6 Analysing the overlapping. In order to discern if the selected counter-radicalisation policies address the contributing factors of the radicalisation process, the overlapping between these factors and the proposed measures will be analysed.

This analysis will be accomplished in three steps: the first will make use of Boolean logic to define what contributing factors are addressed by what proposed measures, e.g. if measure X^1 of a policy paper addresses the contributing factor Z^1, but not Z^2, then measure X^1 will be given the value (1) for Z^1 and (0) for Z^2. The repetition of this process with every measure of the 11 policy

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[5] https://www.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/content/education/hr_explained/download/FS5_International.pdf (15/05/14) and
http://www.globalgovernancewatch.org/security/the-european-court-of-human-rights (15/05/14)

papers will produce a truth table that will enable the next step to be conducted.

The second step will use fuzzy set logic to express the degree of membership of the policy within the previously defined effectiveness conception. The effectiveness conception in this study breaks with the classical concepts that present membership in a dichotomous fashion where a variable is a member when it meets all the pre-defined characteristics or not a member if it fails to meet one or more (Marsteintredet 2007, p. 2). The study will consider effectiveness as a radial concept that defines the characteristics of a full member prototype and allows categorising the rest of the variables in regards to the similarities shared with that prototype (Collier & Mahon, 1993, p. 848; Marsteintredet 2007, p. 5).

When fuzzy set scores and radial concepts are used, the possibility of an arbitrary membership ascription to the variables, as well as the difficulties that this arbitrariness may pose for the replicability of the membership value ascription process in subsequent studies, have to be taken into account.

In order to avoid this valid critique (Marsteintredet 2007, p. 10), the process of analysis and the ascription of membership values will be made as transparent as possible. In this manner, if the truth table shows that a policy paper overlaps with all the contributing factors of the radicalisation phenomenon the value (1) will be ascribed to it, if in turn it fails to overlap with all the factors the value (0) will be ascribed. In the case that it overlaps with part of the factors a value of (>0 and <1) will be ascribed in relation to the occurrence of the overlapping, i.e. if a policy paper overlaps with 60 % of the contributing factors through the measures it presents then the membership will be 0.6, if in turn it overlaps with 30 % then the membership grade will be 0.3.

The third step will serve to calibrate the membership degrees of the policy papers within the effectiveness notion, taking into account the possibility that jeopardising the standards of the liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy could have in the membership degrees ascribed in the previous stage.

1.2.7 The researcher´s role. Due to the nature of the topic, a few words are necessary on the matter of reflexivity. Some researchers have claimed (see for example Brannan, Esler & Anders Strindberg, 2001; Silke, 2010) that terrorism studies has approached its field of study and the subject of research antagonistically, with the predisposition to defeat it and not to understand it (Brannan et al., 2001, p. 4). This section does not pretend to investigate the validity of this claim, but it should serve as an exploration and a reminder of where I stand on the subject of this thesis.

When doing research, social scientists have to make a reflective exercise to discover their position as a person and as a researcher in relation to the context and vice versa. Through this process of self-inquiry and personal conversation a researcher will be able to identify the lenses

through which the research has been conducted, and the possible biases she/he might have incurred (King & Horrocks, 2010, p. 126, 127; Longhofer, Floersch & Hoy 2013, p. 140).

Following this precept I have to agree with Jongman and Schmid (1988) that the role of the researcher is "not to fight the terrorist fire; rather than a firefighter he should be a student of combustion" (as cited in Brannan et al., 2001, p. 8). Therefore, regardless of the implications, connotations and nature of the phenomenon of radicalisation and terrorism, this thesis will be conducted from an impartial position, and will take Mark Jürgensmeyer´s (2000) words as a guiding principle: "Although it is not my purpose to be sympathetic to people who have done terrible things, I do want to understand them and their world views" (p. 7).

1.3 Thesis Structure

This thesis is divided in five chapters. The first chapter serves as an introduction and contextualisation of the project, and as an explanation on how the research will be conducted. In chapter two a literature review on radicalisation is conducted and the contributing factors of this phenomenon are itemised. In chapter three the different counter-radicalisation policies are presented and operationalised. Chapter four is dedicated to the analysis of overlapping between the aforementioned factors and the proposed measures. Chapter five presents the conclusive remarks.

Chapter 2

The narratives developed by the media about "home-grown" terrorism after the assassination of the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in 2004, and the terrorist attacks in London in 2005 brought the term "radicalisation" into lay discourse. Later, the implementation of counter-radicalisation policies by governments institutionalised the term (Githens-Mazer & Lambert, 2010, p. 889; Sedgwick, 2010, p. 480; TTSRL, 2008b, p. 5). But what is radicalisation?

Due to the various meanings, nuances and connotations the term has, when encountering this word one needs to contextualise it. Then, the question of how or why it happens can be answered. The European Commission defines radicalisation as "the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism" (EC, 2005, p. 1; TTSRL, 2008b, p. 11). In addition, the same document acknowledges that not all individuals in contact with radicals end up radicalised, that not all radical groups end up committing terrorist acts and that even though illegitimate methods are used the goals being pursued could be legitimate (EC, 2005, p. 4).

From this definition one could draw that any opinions, views and ideas could serve as a vehicle towards terrorism (King & Taylor, 2011, p. 603). In this chapter, however, the focus will be on second and third generation Muslim immigrants in Europe.

This chapter will take the reader through some proposed explanations for the radicalisation phenomenon. The psychopathological theory will first be presented as an example of a theory that denies the understanding of radicalisation as a process (section 2.1). In opposition to the psychopathological theory, the models proposed by Randy Borum (2003), Quintan Wiktorowicz (2004), Fathali Moghaddam (2005), Silber and Bhatt (2007), Marc Sageman (2008) and Petter Nesser (2010) as well as Clark Mcauley and Sophia Moskalenko (2008) will be explored as illustrations of radicalisation understood as a process (section 2.2). Although these models present significant differences in the conceptualisations of the phenomenon, they also share certain commonalities regarding the contributing factors of radicalisation, and are in consonance with the frameworks explaining radicalisation proposed by several other authors. The last part of the current chapter (section 2.3) will examine these shared commonalities and itemise the contributing factors of radicalisation.

2.1 The Psychopathological Theory

Terrorists are often labelled indiscriminately as mentally sick, evil, or as not normal human beings. This has been, and in some circles still is, the explanation why some individuals become involved in terrorism (Sageman, 2008, p. 15; Sedgwick, 2010, p. 480).

The psychopathological theory is often used as the validation of this viewpoint on terrorism. From the 1980´s, as with Jerrold Post (1984), and now into the 21st century, e.g. Michel Gottschalk

and Simon Gottschalk (2004), scholars have argued that terrorists have pathological personality defects that drag individuals towards the "terrorist vocation". In this regard, feelings of hostility against parents, childhood humiliating experiences, narcissism, low self-esteem, antisocial disorders or pathological hatred have been proposed as causes for becoming a terrorist (Brannan et al., 2001, p. 6; Gottschalk and Gottschalk, 2004, p. 50; Martens 2004, p. 52; Post, 1990, p. 25; Ruby 2002, p. 16, 17). At this moment, however, there is no research that shows there is a higher rate of mental illness among terrorists than within the rest of society (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 161; Ruby, 2002, p. 23; Sageman, 2008, p. 17; Silke, 2008, p. 103; Taylor & Horgan, 2006, p. 585; Victoroff 2005, p. 12-13; Weatherson & Moran, 2003, p. 700-701).

The definition of psychopathology that the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 5* (DSM-5), published by the American Psychiatric Association (2013), presents, would be most appropriate to offer a contemporary understanding of the term. Thus, psychopathology should be understood in the following way:

> A mental disorder is a syndrome characterized by clinically significant disturbance in an individual's cognition, emotion regulation, or behaviour that reflects a dysfunction in the psychological, biological, or developmental processes underlying mental processes. [...]. An expectable or culturally approved response to a common stressor or loss, such as the death of a loved one, is not a mental disorder. Socially deviant behaviour (e.g., political, religious, or sexual) and conflicts that are primarily between the individual and society are not mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict result from a dysfunction in the individual, as described above (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, p. 20).

From this definition one could draw the conclusion that participation in terrorism cannot be considered a mental disorder *per se* since socially deviant behaviours and conflicts that are primarily between the individual and the society is not to be regarded as such. Nevertheless, it is possible, as some researchers have pointed out, that individuals with psychopathological traits are involved in terrorist activities (Ruby, 2002, p. 22; Silke, 2008, p. 104; Victoroff, 2005, p. 12, 17; Weatherson and Moran, 2003, p. 701).

Willhelm Martens (2004) works on this last idea, when pointing out that "many terrorists show some antisocial and (comorbid) narcissistic traits" (p. 52). Gottschalk and Gottschalk´s (2004) research also supports this, noting that terrorists, "regardless of their gender, political, religious or ethnic affiliation", have higher scores on depression or paranoia than the control group they refer to (p. 42).

Nevertheless, even if this were the case, it still would not be proof enough to support the claim that terrorists have mental disorders prior to initiating the terrorist activity, and neither would it prove the causality of it as the psychopathological theory claims. Charles Ruby (2002) points out that the particular lifestyles of individuals who are part of a terrorist organisation might prompt the

development of psychological idiosyncrasies that could later develop into pathologies, as defined by the DSM-5 (p. 23). He carries on, however, to say that other lifestyles derived from or related to activities such as policing or military engagement, could also generate these pathologies, e.g. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, anxiety or desensitisation (Ruby, 2002, p. 23-24; Weatherson and Moran, 2003, p. 702, 704).

Sageman (2008) offers significant insights into the use and abuse of the psychopathological theory. He defines it as a reaction known in social psychology as the fundamental error of attribution, which points to a human predisposition to attribute other people´s behaviour to their personal qualities and proclivity, while justifying one´s own behaviour with situational factors (p. 18; Silke, 2008, p. 104). Andrew Silke (2008) complements Sageman´s idea by bringing an illustrative example from the World War II period:

> [...] 16 of these Nazi leaders were assessed by an Allied psychologist. The psychologist concluded that their scores were those of violent, power hungry, obsessed [...] Years later, however, the same Nazi scores were inserted among a selection of scores from a group of average Americans. This mix was given to a panel of experts who failed entirely to identify anything unusual about the Nazi leaders, and instead concluded that all of the scores reflected stable and healthy personalities (p. 103-104).

When faced with episodes of violence or extreme behaviour like that of the Nazis or terrorists, and in order to protect one´s understanding of what ordinary people are and how they act, one tends to find explanations that draw clear boundaries between the terrorists in this case and the rest of society (Sageman, 2008, p. 15). These explanations create an "us" and "them" discourse that simplifies a very complex phenomenon.

To sum up, lack of proof validating the causality of psychopathologies condemns this theory to be dismissed or even forgotten. Jeff Victoroff (2005) mentions that this, however, does not mean psychological, motivational or emotional processes do not occur on the individual level during radicalisation, and thus, personal factors should not be obviated from a radicalisation analysis (p. 17). In addition, the simplification of the phenomenon could potentially be regarded as an obstacle to the process of implementing appropriate antiterrorism and counter-radicalisation policies (Korteweg, Gohel, Heisbourg, Ranstorp & De Wijk, 2010, p. 29-30).

2.2 Radicalisation as a Process

2.2.1 Borum's pathway to terrorism. Although Borum (2003) does not mention radicalisation specifically in his model, nor limit the model to a specific group of people. He explains that the process of reaching the point where any individual or group justifies terrorism occurs in four separate stages. The process begins with an individual or group "framing some unsatisfying event or condition as unjust" (p. 7). An injustice, real or perceived which can be as

diverse as economic deprivation, poor living conditions or government imposed restrictions on liberties, is then the starting point of the radicalisation process (Borum, 2003, p. 7; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 604).

The second stage of the model is reached when the individual or group puts the aforementioned injustice in perspective with the situation of a relevant other and deems it unfair and illegitimate (Borum, 2003, p. 8; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 604).

The third stage is reached when the individual or group holds another person or group responsible for their unjust and unfair situation. At this point a narrative is developed in which blame is attributed to a person or an out-group is identified as a target while the in-group is depicted as a victim (Borum, 2003, p. 8; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 604). The fourth and final stage is reached when the deprived individual or group claims "good people would not intentionally inflict adverse conditions on others" (Borum, 2003, p. 8). It is at this point where the distancing between the in-group and the out-group peaks, and de-humanisation can occur, making violent responses easier to conduct and justify (Borum, 2003, p. 8; King & Taylor 2011, p. 604).

Summing up, Borum's (2003) model discerns injustices (such as economic deprivation, poor living conditions and restrictions on liberties) as important factors in radicalisation. In addition, it could be argued that the conception of relative deprivation and group relative deprivation is introduced in the second stage and with it, identity becomes visible as well. The two last stages introduce narrative as a contributing factor.

2.2.2 Wiktorowicz's four stage model. Wiktorowicz (2004), in a similar way to Borum (2003), does not mention radicalisation per se, nevertheless he presents the journey which an individual undergoes before joining an extremist organisation as involving an "extensive socialization process that includes exposure to movement ideas, debates and deliberation, and even experimentation with alternative groups" (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 1), and proposes a four phase model to explain it.

The first phase is that of the cognitive opening, where, due to a personal crisis or some triggering event such as blocked mobility, racism or political discrimination, ideas that the individual would not have considered previously begin to have a place in her/his imagination. This personal crisis can also be generated by outreach activism, through debate and interaction, sponsored by an organisation (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 8).

The second phase is that of religious seeking and frame alignment. In cases where religion is part of the identity of the individual or the milieu, the individual may resort to religion in order to make sense of their surroundings. This could happen in two different ways: in the first, the individual will start the search by herself/himself and will shop around in a "religious marketplace

of ideas" (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 9); the second way, more likely to happen when the cognitive opening has occurred in relation to outreach activism, a group will guide the individual through the market (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 9). When the frame presented by a religious group resonates with the experiences of the individual, frame alignment is possible and therefore she/he might accept the group´s ideas as their own (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 8-10).

The final phases are socialisation and joining. Through the socialisation process the individual meets other members, new social networks are created and a new identity revolving around the group membership is constructed. In the joining phase the individual becomes a full member of the group (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 10).

In brief, Wiktorowicz (2004) introduces in the first phase injustices (such as blocked mobility, racism or political discrimination) and social networks (present in the rest of the phases) as contributing factors in the radicalisation process. It could be argued that narrative is introduced as another factor in the second phase, while the explanation of the final phases introduces identity-related factors in regards to in-group and out-group identification construction and reconstruction.

2.2.3 Moghaddam's staircase allegory. In a similar fashion to the previously presented models, Moghaddam (2005) does not mention radicalisation, but presents a five step staircase allegory model ranging from the base were all the population is located towards the apex where a terrorist action is committed. In each step of the staircase, and in response to specific factors, the individual decides if she/he is to climb to the next step or remain where they are (p.161; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 606).

The model presents feelings of injustice, such as economic or political conditions, inequality or threats to identity, and relative deprivation, or fraternal relative deprivation more specifically (group relative deprivation), as the seminal factors prompting radicalisation (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 162-164; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 606). It is in reaction to those feelings that the individual climbs to the first floor seeking for a solution.

In the first step, Moghaddam (2005) identifies factors that could influence the individual up the ladder as the perception of social mobility and procedural justice, or the decision-making process, to improve their situation. The key question in this first floor is "whether there are doors that could be opened by talented persons motivated to make progress up the societal hierarchy" (p. 163). If legitimate possibilities for addressing their initial grievances exist, the chances of the individual climbing to the next floor are reduced (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 163; King & Taylor 2011, p. 606).

The second step is similar to Borum's (2003) third stage. It is characterised by the displacement of aggression towards a selected enemy, nurtured by an "us" versus "them" narrative

(Moghaddam, 2005, p. 162, 164). From here, the jump to the next step is taken by those "individuals who develop a readiness to physically displace aggression and [...] actively seek to do so eventually leave the second floor and climb" (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 164).

On the third step (the last one before formally joining a terrorist organisation), individuals find like-minded people who share their grievances. Mutual radicalisation commences, terrorist narratives and the distance between the group and the other is maximised in this stage. In the subsequent two floors the individual is formally a member of a terrorist organisation where radicalisation continues (Moghaddam, 2005, p. 165; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 606).

Summing up, Moghaddam (2005) introduces as part of the ground floor, feelings of injustice produced by economic and political conditions, inequality, threats to identity, and fraternal relative deprivation among others as seminal factors contributing to the radicalisation process. In the second step, social stagnation and trust in procedural justice are stressed as possible instigators to take the individual to the next step. In the second step, narrative and social categorisation are presented as factors that could prompt an individual to jump to the next level. In the third step, narrative and identity continue to be present, but social networks are the contributing factor that is stressed.

2.2.4 Silber and Bhatt: the New York Police Department model. The New York Police Department Model is the first of the analysed models using radicalisation as an independent concept and it is divided into four different stages. Ideology is one of the clear focuses of this model as it is "the driver that motivates young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out autonomous jihad" (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 6).

The first stage, similar to Moghaddam's (2005) ground floor, is that of pre-radicalisation. According to Silber and Bhatt (2007) this stage represents the "life situation before they were exposed to and adopted jihadi-salafi Islam as their own ideology" (p. 6).

The radicalisation process begins in the second stage, named self-identification. It is in this stage where due to factors such as blocked mobility, alienation, discrimination, international conflicts involving Muslims or the death of relative, a personal crisis arises and the individual turns to Islam in search for answers. It is during this search that the individual might stumble upon the jihadi-salafi ideology. A new identity founded in the jihadi-salafi narrative begins to appear and the individual seeks likeminded people in order to fulfil her/his needs of affiliation (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 6-7; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 607).

The third stage, indoctrination, is characterised by the individual wholly adopting the aforementioned narrative as his/her own. What previously was a religious matter becomes political, and world events are interpreted through the lenses of the adopted narrative. Silber and Bhatt (2007) stress that in this stage it is the group that becomes the driver of the radicalisation process as

opposed to the second stage (p. 7; King & Taylor 2011, p. 607).

During the final stage, jihadisation, individuals become committed to waging jihad and will start operational planning (p. 7; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 607).

To sum up, Silber and Bhatt (2007) point towards a personal crisis caused by blocked mobility, alienation, discrimination, and international conflicts, among other possible reasons, as the initial point of radicalisation, and this narrative then becomes the driving force behind further radicalisation. The third stage continues to point at the narrative factor. However, at this stage, social networks are stressed. After this stage the individual will begin planning their "autonomous jihad".

2.2.5 Sageman's four-prong model. Sageman (2008) proposes a model where the radicalisation process is not necessarily conceived as a linear progressive pathway as in the previously presented models, but as a process influenced by four different dimensions that can appear at different times, develop at different speeds and relate to each other without having to follow a specific order (p. 72; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 605). A sense of moral, personal resonance, the "single narrative" and socialisation are identified as those four prongs.

Sageman (2008) explains that moral outrage has motivational effects on the radicalisation processes. Moral outrage arises when physical injustice, such as killing, injury, rape, arrest, or foreign intervention is perceived as a moral violation by an individual (p. 72-73; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 608).

The "single narrative" refers to the ideological construct based on the idea that Islam is under attack. This narrative offers a frame to interpret events in the world. Through this, the invasion of Iraq, the Israel-Palestine conflict, or the killing of a child are connected and understood as an organised campaign by the West to eliminate Islam (Atran, 2008, p. 7; King & Taylor 2011, p. 608; Sageman, 2008, p. 81-82).

Through the prong of personal experience, Sageman (2008) supports the idea of the individual being an active actor in her/his own radicalisation process. Therefore, it is her/him who has to relate the moral outrage or the "single narrative" to her/his own personal experience (p. 75, 83) and a parallel is set between images coming from foreign countries, narratives explaining world dynamics, and local grievances such as relative deprivation, discrimination and lack of opportunities (Sageman, 2008, p. 83-84, 100, 101; King & Taylor, 2008, p. 608).

Sageman (2008) identifies socialisation through networks as the fourth prong and emphasises that many studies have shown the role that kinship relations and friendship bonds have played in the radicalisation phenomenon and the joining of terrorist groups (p. 66-67, 84-86). When an individual joins a group of like-minded people, ones ideas might get validated by another and a

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third one could end up endorsing them as well (Sageman, 2008, p. 84; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 608).

In brief, Sageman (2008) presents the sense of moral outrage provoked by events such as the invasion of Iraq as the first prong. The second would be related to the "single narrative" where among other things western foreign policy is perceived as attempting to eliminate Islam. The individual's personal experience with discrimination, lack of opportunities and relative deprivation is presented as the third prong, and finally the fourth prong is identified as the influence of networks.

2.2.6 Nesser's multiple-path model. Nesser (2010) mentions that the seminal contributing causes to radicalisation are related to personal problems, social grievances and deprivation, and identity related factors, among others. However, he emphasises that different people show different motivations as well as different radicalisation paths (p. 87). Inspired by the typologies of right-wing extremists, he distinguishes four main ideal categories of radicalised "cell members": entrepreneurs, protégés, misfits and drifters (Nesser, 2010, p. 88, 92-94).

The first two archetypes (who hold different positions within the cell) undergo a gradual radicalisation process "through intellectual processes, activism, idealism and a call for social and political justice". In a similar way to Sageman (2008), Nesser (2010) argues that entrepreneurs and protégés actively direct their radicalisation process (p. 93, 108). The main factors initiating the radicalisation of these two archetypes are frustration with political affairs, both locally and internationally, especially in relation to "fellow" Muslims such as those of Chechnya and Iraq, the perception of not being able to influence decision making by legal means and the influence of action-oriented religious narratives (Nesser, 2010, p. 88, 92-93; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 806).

At a different level are the drifters and misfits. Nesser (2010) emphasises that these individuals are not as ideologically committed as the entrepreneurs and protégés. While the driving motives for the misfits to join a radical group are, in many cases, a troublesome past or personal problems, the drifter joins due to their commitment to specific social networks and to a lesser extent due to "youth rebellion, search for adventure and lack of viable options" (p. 93-95; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 806-807).

To sum up, Nesser (2008) mentions personal problems, social grievances and deprivation and identity related factors as overarching causes of the radicalisation process. However, he points towards political frustration especially in relation to those matters that affect fellow Muslims, i.e. Chechnya and Iraq among others, the perception of not being able to influence decision making, and narrative as contributing factors for entrepreneurs and protégés; and personal problems, networks, youth rebellion and a lack of viable options for misfits and drifters.

2.2.7 McCauley and Moskalenko's pyramid radicalisation. McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) picture the process of radicalisation as a pyramid where the section of society that supports and shares the beliefs and feelings of the terrorists is at the base and terrorists themselves are on the apex. The authors distinguish between individual, group and mass radicalisation and, accordingly, identify different pathways. In addition, the authors stress that the pathway of the radicalisation process varies from individual to individual (p. 417-18, 429). Following the path marked by the previous model, this section will focus on the individual's radicalisation process and not, therefore, the pathways proposed for groups and masses.

According to McCauley and Moskalenko (2008)an individual does not suddenly move from the base of the pyramid to the apex, on the contrary, they argue that a sympathiser will radicalise in a slow and gradual manner by the means of four different mechanisms, namely personal victimisation, political grievances, self-persuasion and personal connections on the individual level (p. 418, 419).

Personal victimisation is a mechanism related to negative personal experience at the individual level, such as physical violence and unjust treatment by the authorities or the government (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p. 418). McCauley and Moskalenko (2008), however, stress that this mechanism is more likely to push the individual up in the pyramid if it is perceived as a grievance of the individual's reference group (p. 419). In a similar way and relatively intertwined, the second mechanism responds to the individual's perception of political trends or events (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008, p. 419). Once the individual has started the radicalisation process the third mechanism proposes self-justification through the individual's own actions. This justification occurs, according to the authors, as an "effort to reduce inconsistencies between positive self-image and bad behaviour" (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p. 420). Finally, the fourth mechanism builds on the influence of social networks and friendship bonds (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008, p. 420-21).

Summing up, McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) present negative personal experiences, such as physical violence and unjust treatment, as contributing factor to the radicalisation process. They emphasise that when these personal grievances are linked to the grievances of the individual's identity group the chances of escalating through the pyramid will increase. In addition, political grievances, social networks and friendship bonds are mentioned as additional factors.

2.3 Explanatory Elements of the Radicalisation Process

In the models presented many factors are proposed as possible instigators of the radicalisation process. Identity-related issues are proposed by Borum (2003), Wiktorowicz (2004), Moghaddam (2005), Silber and Bhatt (2007), Nesser (2010), McCauley and Moskalenko (2008). Lack of

opportunities, such as poor living conditions or blocked social mobility is also emphasised by Borum (2003), Wiktorowicz (2004), Moghaddam (2005), Silber and Bhatt (2007), Sageman (2008) and Nesser (2010). Discrimination-related issues are mentioned by Wiktorowicz (2004), Silber and Bhatt (2007), Sageman (2008), Nesser (2010) and McCauley and Moskalenko (2008). Lack of trust in the political system derived from not being able to influence decision making or unjust treatment by authorities is mentioned by Borum (2003), Wiktorowicz (2004), Moghaddam (2005), Nesser (2010) and McCauley and Moskalenko (2008). Relative deprivation and more specifically group relative deprivation is mentioned by Borum (2003), Moghaddam (2005) and Sageman (2008). Further, the influence of narratives is pointed by Borum (2003), Wiktorowicz (2004), Moghaddam (2005), Sageman (2008) and Nesser (2010). Social networks, in turn, are mentioned by Wiktorowicz (2004), Moghaddam (2005), Silber and Bhatt (2007), Sageman (2008), Nesser (2010) and McCauley and Moskalenko (2008). Finally, the international sphere and the importance of foreign policy and interventions are emphasised by Silber and Bhatt (2007), Sageman (2008) and Nesser (2010).

The social identity theory, developed through the 1970´s by Henry Tajfel and John Turner, proposes that social identities are part of the conceptualisation of the self-made by an individual that derives from the perceived membership of a group. In other words, an individual builds his own conception of the self in relation to the traits, ideological position, behaviour, experiences, and history of the group she/he belongs to. Thus, belonging to a group with a clearly defined identity is crucial in developing a clear personal identity, which in turn is important in achieving personal psychological well-being (Brannan et al., 2001, p. 17; Brewer, 1991, p. 476; Usborne & Taylor, 2010, p. 884; TTSRL, 2008b, p. 25).

Therefore, when an individual is alienated from the main society or even multiple societies (i.e. when an individual is unsure of the group she/he belongs to or when the group one identifies with rejects one´s membership), the sense of belonging is lost, and with it the personal identity clarity. This has been identified as a possible cause for an identity crisis (Korteweg et al., 2010, p. 30; Choudhury, 2007, p. 4; TTSRL, 2008b, p. 25; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 612; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 800; Barlett & Miller, 2012, p. 8). And it is this identity crisis that has been pointed out by many scholars (Atran, 2008; Barlett & Miller, 2011; Beutel, 2007; Choudhury, 2007; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Huband, 2010; Jordán, 2009b; Khosrokhavar, 2005; King & Taylor, 2011; Kirby, 2007; Korteweg et al., 2010; Ranstorp, 2010:5; Slootman & Tillie, 2006; TTSRL, 2008b; Waldmann, Sirseloudi & Malthaner, 2010; Wiktorowicz, 2004) as an explanatory element in the radicalisation phenomenon.

The *Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalisation Strategy* paper, presented by the TTSRL (2008b), explains that in some cases second and third generation young

European Muslims are westernised enough to not feel part of, or not be accepted in, their parents' community, but at the same time they feel that their country does not recognise them as full members, and consequently a double sense of non-belonging can appear, prompting an identity crisis (p. 25).

In consonance with the TTSRL (2008b), some other scholars (Alonso 2010; Barlett & Miller, 2012; Bjørgo, 2005; Choudhury, 2007; Clutterbuck, 2010; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; King & Taylor, 2011; Kirby, 2007; Korteweg et al., 2010; Ranstorp, 2010; Slootman & Tillie 2006; TTSRL 2008b; Waldmann et al., 2010,) have also stressed the importance of a sense of belonging or alienation in the radicalisation process.

Regarding the individual's alienation due to rejection by the group she/he identifies with, Tufyal Choudhury (2007) mentions that "experiences of discrimination and racism, a sense of blocked social mobility and a lack of confidence in the [...] political system" (p. 4) can intensify the disenfranchisement of the individual from society (Choudhury, 2007, p. 4). The radicalising qualities of discrimination, blocked social mobility, lack of opportunities and lack of confidence in the political system are also mentioned by several other scholars (Moghaddam, 2005; Barlett & Miller, 2011; Clutterbuck, 2010; Nesser, 2010; Jordán, 2009b; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Korteweg et al., 2010; Ranstorp, 2010; TTSRL 2008b; Kirby, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004). Injustices, real or perceived, have also been mentioned by many scholars (Jordán 2009b, Kirby 2007, Sageman 2008, Bakker 2010, Slootman and Tillie 2006, Moghaddam 2005, Clutterbuck, Dalgaard-Nielsen, Korteweg et al. 2010, Ranstorp 2010, Nesser 2010, Atran 2008) as an important instigator of the radicalisation process.

In an attempt to overcome the identity crisis and recover a clearly defined identity, which as mentioned before is important for achieving personal psychological well-being, individuals undergo a cognitive opening (a state of mind where ideas that the individual would not have considered previously begin to have a place in her/his imagination) and begin a search for a new identity and group of belonging. (Beutel, 2007, p. 1; Choudhury, 2007, p. 4; Nesser, 2010, p. 91; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 607; Waldmann et al., 2010, p. 55).

Olivier Roy (2004) says it is during the cognitive opening that the concept of *Ummah*, (a de-territorialised community that defines membership on the basis of Islam and does not discriminate by origin, sex, age or race) comes into the picture. The *Ummah* offers the necessary template for an individual to rebuild their sense of self, as well as a clear set of rules that specifies specific behaviour and a frame to understand the world (p. 309; Choudhury, 2007, p. 4; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 612; Kirby, 2007, p. 420; Khosrokhavar, 2005, p. 185; Slootman & Tillie, 2006, p. 54; TTSRL, 2008b, p. 25).

The importance of narrative in the radicalisation phenomenon has been mentioned by a

number of authors (Alonso, 2010; Atran, 2008; Barlett & Miller, 2011; Beutel, 2007; Choudhury, 2007; Clutterbuck, 2010; Huband, 2010; Jordán, 2009b; King & Taylor, 2011; Korteweg et al., 2010; Moghaddam, 2005; Nesser, 2010; Ranstorp, 2010; TTSRL, 2008b; Sageman, 2008; Sedgwick, 2012; Waldmann et al., 2010; Wiktorowicz, 2004). Narratives should be understood in the manner the concept was originally proposed by Erving Goffman in 1974 as an "interpretative schemata that simplifies the world out there by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences and sequences of actions within one´s present or past environment" (as cited in Snow, D., Burke Rochford, E., Worden, E., & Benford, R. 1986, p. 464), i.e. the lenses through which an individual sees the world.

All social movements in general have their own frames to understand "the world out there". These collective frames are built in order to justify, legitimise, and inspire the movement and the group. When an individual approaches a group, two frames that of the individual and the one held by the group begin an interaction and a negotiation of meanings and views. Two outcomes may result from this interaction: incompatibility or complementarity of frames. Complementarity of frames (frame alignment) occurs when the collective frame resonates with the individual's frame and the latter becomes the individual's reference frame. (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 801-802; Choudhury, 2007, p. 21, 23; Wright, 2009, p. 18; Ranstorp, 2010, p. 4; Bjørgo, 2005, p. 4; Sageman, 2008, p. 81-82).

Sageman (2008) is more specific regarding the exemplification of narrative. As has been mentioned before, he refers to the "single narrative", an ideological construct based on the idea that Islam is under attack, as a factor that might push the radicalisation process forward. This narrative offers a frame to interpret events in the world. Through this, western foreign policy and interventions are connected and understood as an organised campaign to eliminate Islam (p. 81-82; Atran, 2008, p. 7; Barlett & Miller, 2011, p. 12; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 608).

Social networks are emphasised by several authors (Alonso, 2010; Atran, 2008; Beutel, 2007; Choudhury, 2007; Clutterbuck, 2010; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Huband, 2010; Jordán, 2009b; King & Taylor, 2011; Kirby, 2007; Korteweg et al., 2010; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008; Moghaddam, 2005; Nesser, 2010; Ranstorp, 2010; Sageman, 2008; Slootman & Tillie, 2006; TTSRL, 2008b; Victoroff, 2005; Waldmann et al., 2010; Wiktorowicz, 2005). Sageman (2008), for example, points to the fact that "about two thirds of the people in the sample [of his study] were friends with other people who joined together or already had some connection to terrorism" (p. 66). These findings concur with those of Javier Jordán (2009a); and Donatella della Porta (1988) among others (as cited in Victoroff, 2005, p. 13).

Social networks are tools for integration and social participation, which facilitate contact between individuals with similar situational characteristics, interests, or normative, cognitive and

affective frames. As mentioned in the TTSRL (2008b) report on *Radicalisation, Recruitment and the EU Counter-radicalisation Strategy,* similarity breeds connection, and individuals tend to look for and invest in relationships with like-minded people, which subsequently increases cohesion within the group. Later, social norms that regulate members´ behaviour are established. A group with these characteristics will have the capacity of changing the perceptions and behaviour of group members (p. 26, 27; Jordán, 2009b, p. 209).

Research has shown that "homegrown" terrorists usually emerge from a group of action-oriented friends. They live in the same neighbourhood, attend the same school or mosque, or share the same hobbies. They do not join these groups because they are radicals but rather they become radicals as a result of their membership in the group (Atran, 2008, p. 3; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010, p. 805; Jordán, 2009b, p. 208, 210-211; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 613; Sageman, 2008, p. 140).

The linkage between networks, identity and narrative creates a discourse of "us" versus "them" that helps create distance between the in-group and the out-group and facilitates carrying out violent actions (TTSRL, 2008b, p. 25; Moghaddam, 2005, p. 165; Borum, 2003, p. 8; Slootman & Tillie, 2006. P. 4; Grossman, 1995, p. 101, 106; Wright, 2009, p. 19).

Another frequently appearing factor in the literature regarding radicalisation is deprivation. Jitka Malečková (2005) mentions that "Despite much evidence to the contrary in the scholarly literature, a common stereotype of terrorist is [...] that of a poor (usually male and often Muslim) youth with low education" (p. 33). In a similar fashion, other scholars (TTSRL, 2008b; Sageman, 2004; Waldmann et al., 2010; Atran, 2008; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; King & Taylor, 2011; Kirby, 2007; Wiktorowicz, 2004; Moghaddam, 2005) also point out that this stereotype is problematic.

The oversimplification of the debate on the causes of terrorism has produced substantial discussion on the validity of relative deprivation as predictor of radicalisation or terrorism due to the failure of separating absolute deprivation and relative deprivation (King & Taylor, 2011, p. 610; Kirby, 2007, p. 422; TTSRL, 2008b, p. 20). It has to be noted that relative deprivation refers to the discrepancy between what an individual believes that she/he is entitled to obtain and what she/he obtains. Perceptions of relative deprivation are built in relation to a relevant other, the individual's expectations or previous fulfilments. This means that even if the basic needs of an individual are met, a feeling of relative deprivation is still possible (Kawakami and Dion, 1995, p. 553; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 609; TTSRL, 2008b, p. 29).

An illustrative example is given by Michael King and Donald Taylor (2011) that emphasises the subjectivity of relative deprivation: during Second World War a survey of US military personnel showed higher discontent among the Air Force regarding promotions than within other branches of the military, despite the fact that at the time more promotions were being awarded within the Air Force as compared to other troops. The researchers argued that the many promotions reminded

those who were not promoted about the lack of progress in their own careers, showing that an "isomorphic relationship between material conditions and subjective experience" is not always the case (p. 609; Moghaddam, 2005, p. 163).

Through the 1960´s, relative deprivation was applied to a group context and subsequent research showed that individuals perceive a higher level of discrimination against the collective than against the self. While personal relative deprivation (as experienced by the US Air Force members) affects the individual's behaviour, group-based relative deprivation was a better predictor of collective mobilisation (Kawakami & Dion, 1995, p. 556; King & Taylor, 2011, p. 610). Not only these authors, but some others (Borum, 2003; Bjørgo, 2005; Choudhury, 2007; Sageman, 2004; TTSRL, 2008b; Beutel, 2007) have also emphasised the radicalising effects that relative deprivation can have.

In brief, this section has shown that there is wide academic support for the selected contributing factors. Thus, identity, lack of opportunities, lack of trust in the political system, relative deprivation, narrative, social networks, foreign policy and interventions will be units of reference to analyse the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation policies.

2.4 Wrapping up chapter 2

This chapter has argued that there is a lack of proof to validate the psychopathological theory. In addition, it has been mentioned that accepting such a theory could be problematic for the design and implementation of appropriate antiterrorism and counter-radicalisation policies.

The chapter has presented seven models that explain radicalisation as a process. Although the process is explained in slightly different ways, they share many of the contributing factors that serve to explain the phenomenon. After contrasting these factors with those proposed by other scholars and noting the wide acceptance in the related literature, the chapter has selected identity, lack of opportunities, lack of trust in the political system, relative deprivation, narrative, social networks, foreign policy and interventions as the contributing factors into which Chapter 4 will delve.

Chapter 3

In this chapter the reader will find a presentation of the counter-radicalisation policies mentioned in section 1.2.1. These policies are divided into three blocks: the first one belonging to the European Union, the second to Norway and the third to the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country.

Chapter 3 is divided into two main sections. The first (section 3.1) presents the historical context in which the different policy papers made their appearance. The second part (section 3.2) analyses the content.

3.1 Regarding the Context

The first document, COM 1, was presented in 2005, roughly one month after the July the 7th attacks in London that killed 52 people, and builds on the statement made by the European Council on the 17th of December of 2004[6] that called for the elaboration of an action plan to tackle radicalisation. This mandate came after the fatal incidents in Madrid in March the 11th 2004 and in Holland in November the 2nd 2004, when the Dutch film director Theo van Gogh was assassinated (Jordán, 2012).

Likewise, the SCRRT 1 (2005), the EUCTS (2005), the SCRRT 2 (2008) and COM 2 (2010), were presented in a very similar historical context. From the presentation of COM 1 in September 2005 to November 2010 when COM 2 was published, there were no successful terrorist attacks in Europe linked to groups with an Islamic background (Jordán, 2012). It is necessary to mention, however, that a study made by Javier Jordán (2012), a Spanish expert on Islamic terrorism, shows that in the same time period, 30 plots, related to Islamist groups, had been disrupted or had failed (p. 400-404). The Glasgow international airport attack, on June the 30th 2007 and the attempted bombing of the Northwest Airlines flight 253 during the flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on December the 25th 2009, might be the most known of those plots.

The RAN (2012) documents were presented relatively soon after the events in Frankfurt airport, where two US airmen were killed in a shooting, and in Toulouse and Montauban, where three soldiers and four civilians died in three different attacks carried out by the same person.

Between the publications of RAN in December 2012 and COM 3 in January 2014, a successful attack and a failed copycat were carried out. The first attack took place in Woolwich on the 22nd of May 2013 when a British Army soldier was attacked and killed by two Muslim converts, and the second, three days later in Paris, when a French soldier was stabbed by another Muslim convert.

The first two Norwegian documents, NorCom 1 (2011) and ColSec (2011) are presented in a very similar context to that of COM 2 and RAN. It is worth mentioning, however, that these two

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[6] http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf

documents were made public relatively close to the Stockholm suicide attack of 2010, when a man detonated two explosive in the city centre, and that it could have influenced their elaboration, due to the proximity between the countries.

The third Norwegian document, NorCOM 2, comes two years after the July 22nd attacks in Oslo and Utøya in 2011, where 77 people were killed by right-wing lone wolf Anders Behring Breivik. This episode meant the context in which NorCOM 2 was presented was different to the previous two Norwegian documents.

In a similar fashion to NorCOM 2, the Basque PPC is presented in a country specific historical context. On October the 20th 2011, ETA made public a document announcing the definitive cessation of their armed activity[7]. This announcement influenced the creation of the General Secretariat for Peace and Coexistence[8], a political body under the government of the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country, that later authored the PPC.

3.2 A Look into the Content

In order to look at the content, a list of 54 words was created. These words were divided in four different categories.

The first category (section 3.2.1) inquires around the portrayal of the phenomenon of radicalisation in the documents through analysing the word selection for its description and the word selection for the description of the action taken to confront it. Thus, the following key words were selected for the computerised search: *radical, radicalism, radicalisation, violent radicalisation* and *violent radical,* grouped under *radical** for analytical purposes*; extremist, extremism, violent extremism,* grouped under *extremist**; *terrorist, terrorism,* under *terrorist**; *counter, countering,* under *counter**; *prevent, preventing, prevention,* also referred as *prevent**; *address, addressing,* as *address**; *combat, combating,* as *combat**; and, *fight* and *fighting* as *fight*.*

The second category (section 3.2.2) examines the presence of references to Islam in the documents through the words *Islam, Islamist, Islamism*, grouped under *Islam*,* and *Muslim.*

The third category (section 3.2.3) looks at the presence of causes of radicalisation presented in Chapter 2. In order to conduct the count and following the main conclusion of chapter 2, the following words were selected: *psychopathology, psychopathologies and psychopathological*, as examples of the conceptualisation of radicalisation as a non-process phenomenon, *identity, identities* and *belonging,* also shown as *identity**; *stigmatisation* and *discrimination,* as *discrimination**; *opportunity* and *opportunities,* as *opportunities**; *trust*; *relative deprivation*; *narrative* and *narratives,* grouped as *narrative**; *network* and *networks,* as *network**; *foreign*

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[7] http://www.berria.info/dokumentuak/dokumentua849.pdf
[8] http://www.lehendakaritza.ejgv.euskadi.net/r48-subpaz/eu

policy; and, *intervention* and *interventions,* as *intervention**; as markers of radicalisation understood as a process.

Following the TTSRL (2008b, p. 10) classification *discrimination*, opportunities* and *narrative** were deemed contributing factors at the individual level, *identity*, relative deprivation* and *networks*,* as factors at the social level and finally, *trust*, *foreign policy** and *intervention**, as factors at the external level.

The fourth category (section 3.2.4) focuses on the concept of western liberal democracy used in the documents mentioned in chapter 1 section 1.2.3, as a foundation to conduct the content analysis. All six documents were processed through a word-mining software[9] in search of the most used terms. A 100% co-occurrence and a frequency higher than 50 was set as a precondition for creating the list presented in Appendix A. Out of the 31 terms that fulfilled the requirement the 10 most relevant terms were selected. Thus, the list was formed as follows: *state, law, public, rights, human, protection, freedom, respect, person and nations*.

In order to do the word-count in PPC and NorCOM 2, all the words were translated to the closest Spanish and Norwegian equivalent: the list of equivalences is presented in Appendix B.

The results of conducting the word search through the documents are presented in Appendix C. In order to test the validity of the results, the data was re-coded by an assistant with the result of 3 differences in the coding out of the 540 possibilities.

3.2.1 Portraying the phenomenon of radicalisation. As mentioned in chapter 2, the first document on counter-radicalisation presented by a European body, COM 1, defines in the very beginning of the document what radicalisation is: "the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism" (EC 2005, p. 1) acknowledging that not all individuals in contact with radicals end up radicalised and that not all radical groups end up committing terrorist acts (EC 2005, p. 4).

The Norwegian ColSec, the main opus of the Norwegian government regarding counter-radicalisation, defines radicalisation as "the process whereby a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of violence to achieve political goals" (Norwegian Ministry of Justice and the Police [NMJP] 2011, p. 7). The document clarifies that under given circumstances radicalisation could lead to extremism i.e. accepting the use of violence to achieve a political goal (NMJP 2011, p. 7). The Basque PPC does not present a definition of radicalisation. However, for the purposes of this study it will be assumed that it does not differ from those proposed in COM 1 and ColSec.

Both definitions share certain commonalities such as the understanding of radicalisation as a

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[9]   Wordstat by Provalis Research

process, in line with the conceptualisation presented in Chapter 2, and the defence of the idea that radicalisation does not necessarily lead to terrorism (COM 1) or extremism (ColSec). These differences in the selection of words to refer to the possible outcome of the radicalisation process, however, do matter. As said in Chapter 1, section 1.2.5 language has the power to make meaning of things and this, in turn, influences how people think and act towards that specific thing (Mehan, 1997, p. 250). Correspondingly, using the terms terrorism, extremism and violence will shape the perception of radicalisation in a different manner.

Therefore, it is of notable interest to analyse the terminology used in the aforementioned policy papers when referring to the phenomenon of radicalisation and also the word selection made for the description of actions taken to confront it.

Figure 1

When looking at Figure 1, a gradual shift can be observed in the use of words that describe the subject towards which these policies are directed. In the European documents, the use of *terrorist** throughout the first four papers (COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2) is noticeably higher than that of *radical** or *extremist**. In these documents *terrorist** is used 55.6% of the time on average, *radical** 36.3% and *extremist** an 8.1%. The shift becomes evident with the RAN documents and COM 3, where the softer words *radical** and *extremist** gain terrain over *terrorist**. In these last two policy papers *terrorist** is used in a 16.7% of the time on average, *radical** 51.4% and *extremis** 31.9%.

A similar trend can also be appreciated in the Norwegian documents. NorCOM 1 has a clear predilection for *terrorist** (75%) over *radical** (12.5%) and *extremist** (12.5%). However, it changes with ColSec when these last two terms (*radical** 37.0% and *extremist** 38.5%) surpass the previous (*terrorist** 24.4%). In NorCOM 2 the predominance of the term *radical** becomes more evident at 58%, to the detriment of extremist* (25%) and *terrorist** (17%).

The Basque PPC uses the term *terrorist** (32 times through the text) exclusively. The word

radical* shows 1 hit, and *extremist** is absent from the document. It must be said, however, that radical is used as an adjective for *distrust*: "We come, however, from a time of radical distrust"[10] (Secretaría General paz y Convivencia [SGPC], 2013, p. 24).

Respecting the use of *violent radical**, it must be said that according to the data presented in Appendix C, it seems to lose its predominance in the European documents after the presentation of COM 1. In this particular paper, out of the 59 hits on the term *radical**, in 38 cases *violent* is used as a descriptor of the term *radicalisation* and *radical* 64.4%. In contrast COM 3, issued by the same European body and of a similar length, shows 70 hits on *radical**, but none of them has the adjective *violent* ascribed to it.

In line with COM 3, the Norwegian papers do not present the connection between the concepts of radicalism and violence. Out of the 100 times that *radical** is mentioned in ColSec, only once does the adjective *violent* appear next to it and as can be seen, it describes the quality of a *group* not of a *radical*: "[...] deciding that violent radical groups offer an easy answer to the complex challenges they face" (NMJP 2011:10). This document does, however, propose a connection between extremism and violence. The fact that out of the 104 times that *extremist** appears, 77 times (67.3% of the time) it has the adjective *violent* attached to it. This facilitates the understanding that violence is inherent to extremism, a notion first presented in the very definition of extremism adopted in ColSec (NMJP 2011:7).

ColSec is not, however, the first document to make this connection. While the use of *violent radical** diminished in the European papers after the appearance of COM 1 and *violent extremism** was absent in COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2. The term made its first appearance in COM 2 (1 hit) and increased to reach 80 hits in RAN and 18 hits in COM 3.

Figure 2

Regarding the words describing actions taken against radicalism, terrorism and extremism

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[10]   Own translation. Original in Spanish: "Sin embargo, venimos de un tiempo de desconfianza radical" (PPC 2013:24).

Figure 2 shows a similar trend to Figure 1. On the side of the soft words, both *counter* and *prevent**
gain prominence through the documents, nonetheless, at the same time *address** is gradually
reduced. In respect of the hard words it must be said that through the first four European
documents, (COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2) *combat** can be counted in a similar
percentage, (15%, 23.5%, 20% and 30% respectively) while *fight** is absent after COM 1 (27.5%).
In the RAN papers and COM 3, however, *fight** makes its way back into the documents (4.1% and
3.6% respectively) in exchange of *combat** that nearly disappears by being mentioned three and
five times respectively (1.5% and 6.0%). The predominant use of soft words throughout the texts is
also present in the Norwegian policy papers where there is a remarkable preponderance of *prevent**,
which starts with 43.8% in NorCOM 1 and reaches its peak in ColSec with 83.4% and 70% in
NorCOM 2. In a similar fashion, the PPC mostly utilises *prevent**. While *prevent** is used 56.5% of
the time in this document, *address** is used 29.62% of the time and *combat** and *fight** each appear
4.3% of the time.

The analysis shows that COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS, and SCRRT 2 use a lexicon that
facilitates the unconscious linkage between the concept of radicalisation, extremism and terrorism,
and radicalisation and violence. The results for COM 2, RAN and COM 3, however, show a
tendency towards softer wording. The term *radical** becomes predominant, which helps in
understanding that radicalisation is the focus of the documents. The linkage between radicalisation
and violence is broken through the texts, although it is *extremist** that becomes easily linked to
violence. These last three documents also use less aggressive jargon to refer to the action taken to
confront the phenomenon of radicalisation.

The Norwegian documents, especially its main paper ColSec, also show a big predilection
for the less emotionally charged words such as *prevent** and *radical**. The Basque PPC in turn uses
terrorist* exclusively, but then uses the word *prevent** to refer to the actions to be taken.

This section has argued that soft descriptors become more utilised through the documents
while hard descriptors diminish. This could generate the idea that a negative relationship between
the two types of descriptors exists, i.e. the increase in soft terms is related to the decrease of the
hard ones and vice versa. When looking at the correlation between the use of these words, however,
Pearson´s r does not show any relation between *radical** and *terrorist**, $r(11) = .53$, $p > .09$; and,
extremist* and *terrorist**, $r(11) = .46$, $p > .15$. Therefore, it could be argued that the trend itself
does not respond to linguistic reasons, but to some external factors such as the historical context.

In a similar way, the relation between soft action descriptors and hard action descriptors is
virtually non-existent. Pearson´s r, once again, shows no relationship between *counter** and
combat*, $r(11) = .13$, $p > .69$; *counter** and *fight**, $r(11) = .40$, $p > .22$; *prevent** and *combat**, $r(11)$
$= .48$, $p > .13$; *prevent** and *fight**, $r(11) = .21$, $p > .53$; and *address** and *combat**, $r(11) = .29$, $p >$

.39. There is, however, a mild relationship between *address** and *fight**, r(11) = .66, p > .03. It could be argued that the lack of correlation, as mentioned before, is not related to linguistic reasons, but points towards external factors to explain the trend shown in Figure 2.

When looking at the correlations between the use of the terms describing individuals and actions, the following can be seen: there is a strong relationship between the use of hard descriptors of individuals, *terrorist** in this case, and the hard action descriptors, *combat** and *fight**. Person´s r analysis shows that r(11) = .78, p > .004; in a similar way it can be said that the soft descriptors, *radical** and *extremist**, and soft action descriptive terms, *counter**, *prevent** and *address** are strongly correlated: r(11) = .98, p > .000.

From these results, it could be interpreted that *radical**, *extremist**, *counter**, *prevent** and *address** are part of a narrative, and *terrorist**, *combat** and *fight** of another. Terrorism is combated and fought, however, radicalism is countered, prevented and addressed, and since this last notion is the one gaining weight through the documents it could be argued that counter-radicalisation has started to become different from counter-terrorism.

3.2.2 Pointing towards Islam. Another interesting point regarding the selection of words in the documents refers to the use of *Islam** and *Muslim*. Four European documents (SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2 and COM 2) issue the recommendation of developing a non-emotive lexicon to avoid the stigmatisation of specific communities. In the same line, it is stated in COM 1 that "there is no such thing as Islamic terrorism, nor catholic terrorism, nor red terrorism" (EC 2005:4). Similarly, ColSec mentions that radicalisation has been proved not to be intrinsic to any specific group, ideology or political orientation (NMJP 2011:9). These same texts, however, claim that Islamist radicalisation is currently the number one threat Europe faces (NMJP 2011:9; EC 2005:2).

Figure 3

31

By looking at the results of the word count in figure 3 it can be seen that the European documents seem to follow the proposed recommendation and progressively diminish the use of *Islam** and *Muslim**. The increase in the presence of the selected terms in the RAN documents does not necessarily imply that the document has re-started the focus on Islam. First, because in the documents Islam and Muslims are still the focus even though they are not mentioned specifically, as can be seen in COM 2, "Terrorist organisations adapt and innovate, as demonstrated by the 2008 Mumbai attacks, the attempted attack on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009 and plots uncovered recently affecting several Member States" (EC 2010:7) and COM 3

> Armed with newly acquired combat skills, many of these foreign fighters could pose a threat to our security on their return from conflict zone. In the longer term they could act as catalysts for terrorism. The phenomenon of foreign fighters is not a new one, but as fighting in Syria continues, the number of extremists travelling to take part in the conflict is rising. And as the number of Europeans rises, so does the threat to our security (EC 2014:2).

And second because in relative terms and due to the length of the document (20,174 words) the presence of *Islam** is lower than in COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2 and *Muslim** is lower than in COM 1 and SCRRT 1.

The trend present in the European documents, however, is not completely clear in the Norwegian papers since *Islam** and *Muslim* show a high number of hits in ColSec, however, NorCOM 2 does not show any of these terms. It is worth stressing that the speaker avoids referring to Islam and Muslims even when directly asked about them. The Basque PPC does not show any hits in either of the selected terms, this is due to the fact that its sole focus is clearly ETA (a word count on *ETA* will show a total amount of 121 hits.

3.2.3 On the causes of radicalisation. Although the papers being analysed do not necessarily deal with the contributing causes of the radicalisation process, the fact that they all present measures to address this phenomenon opens the possibility for their mention. Therefore, this section seeks to inquire into the presence of those contributing factors in the selected policy papers.

Figure 4

Figure 4 shows the use of radicalisation factors through the documents. The first interesting point to mention is that following the trend in research done around radicalisation, references to the psychopathological theory are absent from all the documents. The term *relative deprivation*, however, is also missing in all documents. In addition the term *narrative** is also absent from the Norwegian documents and *discrimination** and *foreign policy** from the PPC.

Among the terms that at least show one hit in any of the documents *foreign policy** would be the most scarcely represented. The term has been used 19 times throughout the documents and shows the smallest co-occurrence (RAN, NorCOM 1 and ColSec).

Looking at the general picture presented in Figure 4, *narrative** is the number one repeated contributing factor through the documents due to the high amount of hits that the terms shows in the RAN documents (103). *Opportunities** is, however, the factor of radicalisation that co-occurs more frequently (nine documents), being present in COM 1 (2 times), SCRRT 1 (3 time), EUCTS (1 time), SCRRT 2 (3 times), COM 2 (1 time), RAN (12 time), COM 3 (3 times), ColSec (13 times) and PPC (6 times).

RAN is the document mentioning the highest amount of the contributing factors, namely *identity** (7 times)*, discrimination* (4 times)*, opportunities** (12 times)*, trust* (10 times)*, narrative** (103 times) *networks** (24 times), *foreign policy** (7 times) and *intervention** (33 times)*.* On the contrary, EUCTS and NorCOM 1, are the documents showing the fewest amount of hits in the selected words (1 hit on *discrimination* and 1 on *opportunities** in the first, and 1 hit on *trust* and 1 hit on *foreign policy** in the second). In a similar manner COM 2, with 1 hit on *opportunities**, 2 on *narrative** and 3 on *networks*,* also shows a low amount of hits in the proposed terms.

When looking at the radicalisation factors by blocks (individual, social and external) some other interesting inferences can be made. Regarding the European policy papers, COM 1 appears to focus on the social level showing 77.4% of the hits at this level. The SCRRT 1, SCRRT 2 and COM 2 share a focus on the social and the individual level. The first and third documents show 50% of

the hits at each of the two levels while the SCRRT 2 shows a 44.4% at the individual and 55.6 at the social.

In a different way, the EUCTS, the RAN documents and COM 3 reveals a predilection for contributing factors on the individual level. In this manner all the first document's hits belong to this level as well as 59.9% of the hits on the second document and 52.9% on the third. It is in the RAN documents and the COM 3 that the first mentions of contributing factors at the external level are made, with 25% and 11.8% of the hits respectively.

Regarding the Norwegian policy papers it could be said that NorCOM 1 shows an exclusive focus on the external level while ColSec appears more diversified by showing 39.4% of the hits at the individual level, 31% at the social level and 29% on the external level. NorCOM 2 in turn shows 60 % hits on the social level and 40% on the individual.

Finally, the Basque PPC has a diversified focus showing a high percentage of hits in all three levels. However, it could be pointed out that this document seems to stress the social and external level by showing 40.4% of the hits on the first and 38.3% on the second.

3.2.4 Counter-radicalisation policies and the notion of western liberal democracy. As mentioned in Chapter 1, section 1.2.3, the Norwegian constitution, the Spanish constitution, the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights will be used in Chapter 4 in order to see if the recommendations proposed by the selected policy documents to address radicalisation, guarantee the liberties surmised in a western liberal democracy.

This section, however, seeks to explore if the selected policies are embedded in the western liberal democratic tradition. That is, if their wording matches the wording of the aforementioned four documents.

Figure 5

Figure 5 shows that *human* and *rights* are the terms that co-occur the most, appearing in nine

out of the 11 documents. In addition these are also the terms repeated more times (156 and 169 times respectively). The high number of *right** and *human,* however, is due to the fact that they appear 140 times (*right**) and 127 times (*human*) in the PPC. On the contrary, nations is the term co-occurring the least (3 documents) as well as showing the fewest amount of hits (8).

ColSec and PPC are the documents that show the highest amount of selected words, 10 out of 10, and the highest amount of total hits (108 the former and 314 the latter). The RAN documents also show a high presence of terms (nine out of 10) and an overall hit number of 90. In contrast, NorCOM 2 and COM 2 show no hits on a single term in the first, and one hit in the second (in *law*).

The wide use of the selected terms, disregarding the two aforementioned papers, especially in the longest documents, shows that the policy papers are well embedded in the western liberal democratic tradition. This serves to put in context the comments about countering radicalisation through "transparent, democratic and generally accepted methods" (NMJP 2011:8) used in some documents, and validates the analysis on the extent to which the measures proposed in the selected counter-radicalisation policies are compatible with the liberties surmised in a western liberal democracy.

3.3 Wrapping up Chapter 3

Chapter 3 has presented the historical context in which all the documents were published, following the idea that policy papers have to be understood in relation to the events occurring close to their publication time.

This chapter has also looked into the content of the documents by analysing the words used to describe the individuals undergoing the radicalisation process, the words used for describing the actions taken to counter the radicalisation phenomenon, the terms identifying the specific group of interest of this study,. As well as the presence of direct mentions to the contributing factors of radicalisation presented in Chapter 2, and the embedding of the policy papers within the western liberal democratic discourse through a list of widely used terms in the UDHR, ICCPR, ECHR, CFREU and the Norwegian and Spanish constitutions.

The word analysis points towards the existence of trends that show a reduction in the use of hard terms such as *terrorist**, *combat** and *fight** and an increase in the softer descriptors *radical**, *extremist**, *prevent**, *counter** and *address**. It has been argued that such a change could be related to the historical context and the establishment of counter-radicalisation as a concept that is linked to, but different from counter-terrorism. In addition, the content analysis has shown that a positive relationship exists between the use of hard descriptors for individuals and hard descriptors for the actions taken, as well as between their soft counterparts. In a similar way, Chapter 3 has drawn attention on the downward tendency in the use of words that identify Muslims as the receiving

group of these policies, and has argued that it might respond to the attempt of avoiding the stigmatisation of the group, and with it the contributing factor of discrimination. It must be said, however, that a careful reading of the documents is enough to understand Muslims are still the main focus of the policies.

This chapter has also shown that term-wise the COM 1 appears to be more focused on the contributing factors at the social level, the SCRRT 1, SCRRT 2 and COM 2 seem to focus on a combination of social and individual contributing factors and the EUCTS, RAN and COM 3 focus mainly on the individual level. In turn, while NorCOM 1 focuses on the external level contributing factors NorCOM 2 focuses on the social, and ColSec appears more diversified, setting a similar focus on all three levels. Regarding the PPC, Chapter 3 has shown that it stresses the social and the external levels.

Finally, the content analysis has shown that at the very least, the three longest documents, RAN, ColSec and PPC could be defined as being in consonance with the western liberal democratic discourse.

Chapter 4

Following the contextualisation and content analysis of the selected policy papers made in chapter 3, the reader will find the analysis of the overlapping of the counter-radicalisation measures and the contributing factors of radicalisation presented in Chapter 2.

The majority of the documents do not present the reader with a set list of measures. It is, however, possible to conduct a manual identification and compilation of the proposed measures. A full list of these policy recommendations is presented in Appendix D.

4.1 Policy Recommendations

4.1.1 Policy recommendations in COM 1. A total number of 11 recommendations that address, in a direct way, the radicalisation phenomenon have been identified in the document.

Two of the 11 proposals (number 1 and 2) could be classified as hard measures; both addressing the narrative factor. In addition to this contributing factor, measure number 2 could also be considered as addressing the *social network* factors when referring to the prohibition of internet services provided illegally (EC, 2005, p. 4), if the possibility of prohibiting virtual meeting points such as chat rooms and forums is considered.

Measures 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8, address identity related issues. While number 3 stresses the importance of promoting cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue and putting emphasis on the European common values (EC, 2005, p. 5). Measure number 4, calls for the development of the concept of European citizenship and intercultural understanding (EC, 2005, p. 5-6) and in a very similar way measure number 8 makes the case for promoting inter-faith dialogue (EC, 2005, p. 7). Measure number 5 calls for the promotion of integration and the prevention of a double sense of non-belonging and stresses that a "holistic approach to integration is necessary that includes not only access to the labour market for all groups but also measures which deal with social, cultural, religious, linguistic and national differences" (EC, 2005, p. 6). The possibility of integrating without having to renounce to one´s own identity could be considered not only as a measure preventing possible inter-group tensions, but also as a possible reducing measure of the group relative deprivation factor. To this measure number 6 adds that discrimination has to be taken as a key element to integration (EC, 2005, p. 6).

Measure 3 also focuses on discrimination by stressing the importance of tackling racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia (EC, 2005, p. 5).

Measure number 7 responds to the factor of opportunities. It calls for the promotion of equal opportunities for the disadvantaged groups and encourages "increased regeneration of, and accessibility to, deprived areas and neighbourhoods, improved housing conditions, encouraged access to education and protection from social exclusion […] fulfilling quality of life and ensuring individuals are engaged with society, on a personal level" (EC, 2005, p. 6-7). This measure could also potentially serve to deal with feelings of discrimination and relative deprivation.

Measure 9 proposes increasing the engagement of the police and other security forces with civil society, and especially with the youth (EC, 2005, p. 7). This could potentially enhance the credibility of the political system among civil society by showing that the role of the police is not that of repression. In a similar way and most likely with a similar effect, the aforementioned measure number 8 proposes promoting dialogue between the state and religion (EC, 2005, p. 7), opening the political arena for those who had not a strong voice previously.

Finally, measures number 10 and 11 set their focus on the western foreign policy perception factor. They propose firstly to offer assistance to third countries in order to reduce inequalities, support democratisation and promote human rights. And secondly cultural and inter-religious understanding between Europe and third countries is proposed (EC, 2005, p. 9).

4.1.2 Policy recommendations in SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2. The SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2 concur on most of the proposed measures to tackle the phenomenon of radicalisation as can be seen in Table 1. The * represent a minor wording modification and the *x* represent the absence of a similar measure.

Table 1

	SCRRT 1	EUCTS	SCRRT 2
measure #	1	1	1
measure #	2	2	2
measure #	3	3	3
measure #	4	4	4

measure #	5	5	5
measure #	6	6	6
measure #	7	x	7
measure #	8	x	8*
measure #	11	x	9*
measure #	13	7*	10*
measure #	14	8*	11
measure #	15	10	12
measure #	16	11	13
measure #	17	12	14
measure #	18	9	15

A quick look at Table 1 and a read through the documents shows that the text of SCRRT 1 was transferred only with minor changes to the EUCTS and its 2008 revision the SCRRT 2. In this manner, the SCRRT 1 proposes only three measures (number 9, 10 and 12) out of 18 that are not mentioned in the other two documents. The EUCTS and the SCRRT 2 propose one each (measures 13 and 15), one measure out of 13 in the EUCTS and one out of 16 in the SCRRT 2.

Regarding these measures, it must be said that measures number 9 and 10 of the SCRRT 1 address the factor of narrative by encouraging the availability of mainstream literature (about Islam) and the emergence of European Imams (CEU, 2005a, p. 4). Measure number 12 of the same document: "correct unfair and inaccurate perceptions of Islam and Muslims" (CEU, 2005a, p. 4) would respond to the discrimination factor. Regarding the stand-alone measure proposed by the EUCTS it could be signalled as dealing with narrative and social networks as it proposes dealing with both incitement and recruitment in specific key environments (CEU, 2005b, p. 9). The SCRRT 2´s measure number 15 of developing "external economic policies" (SCRRT 2 2008:5) in turn could be said to set its focus on influencing the factor of foreign policy.

Measures number 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the three papers, as well as the aforementioned measure number 13 of the EUCTS, could be considered as coercive. Measures number 2 "monitor internet and travel to conflict zones" (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8, 9; CEU 2008, p. 4) addresses the factors of narrative and social

networks. This double focus would lie primarily on the monitoring of the internet where both propaganda and specific virtual meeting points could be controlled. In a similar way measure number 3 calling to limit those individuals playing a role in radicalisation could be said to be addressing also the narrative and social network factors. Measures number 4 and 6 of the three documents set their focus on social networks, supposing that contacts are the primordial requirement to access terrorist training. Measure number 5 calls for setting a "legal framework to prevent individuals from inciting and legitimising violence" (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008:4), which could be classified as addressing the narrative factor.

Measure number 1 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2, calling to build community policing (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008, p. 4) and measure number 7 of the SCRRT 1 and SCRRT 2, encouraging political dialogue (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2008, p. 4) could be said to be addressing the lack of confidence in the political system factor, first by showing that the police is part of the community and second by reducing the divide between political institutions and society.

The SCRRT 1 and SCRRT 2 call in their measure number 8 for empowering mainstream voices (CEU, 2005a, p. 4; CEU 2008, p. 5) in an attempt to counter the narratives used by extremists, and therefore these measures could be classified as answering the narrative factor.

The three documents (with measure number 18 in SCRRT 1, 9 in EUCTS and 16 in SCRRT 2) propose promoting "good governance, human rights, democracy, as well as education and economic prosperity" in third countries (CEU, 2005a, p. 5; CEU, 2005b, p. 9; CEU, 2008, p. 5). Both SCRRT documents (measure 11 in SCRRT 1 and 9 in SCRRT 2) also call for actively changing the perceptions of European and western policies, SCRRT 1 specifies by adding "particularly among Muslim communities" (CEU, 2005a, p. 4; CEU, 2008, p. 5). It could be said that the focus of these measures is addressing the radicalising power of foreign policy.

Developing a non-emotive lexicon to avoid linking terrorism and Islam (CEU, 2005a, p. 4; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008, p. 5) is mentioned in the three documents, in order to avoid exacerbating divisions in society and stigmatising a specific group. Thus, it could be said that measure 13 of the SCRRT 1, 7 of the EUCTS and 10 of the SCRRT 2 address the radicalising factors caused by identity and discrimination.

Measure number 14 in SCRRT 1, 8 in EUCTS and 11 in SCRRT 2 call for eliminating the structural factors that prompt radicalisation, such as the lack of political

and economic prospects, unresolved international and domestic strife, inadequate and inappropriate education, cultural opportunities for young people or identity issues (CEU, 2005a, p. 4; CEU, 2005b, p. 9; CEU, 2008, p. 5). The wide array of factors mentioned could not only be said to address the lack of opportunities, identity and the foreign policy factor, but also that of relative deprivation. In a similar way measure number 15 of the SCRRT 1, 10 of the EUCTS and 12 of the SCRRT 2 call for "targeting inequality and discrimination" (CEU, 2005a, p. 5; CEU, 2005b, p. 9; CEU, 2008, p. 5), which also sets the focus on the opportunities and discrimination factors.

Finally, measures number 16 and 17 of the SCRRT 1, 11 and 12 of the EUCTS and 13 and 14 of the SCRRT 2, through the promotion of inter-cultural dialogue and the promotion of long term integration (CEU, 2005a, p. 5; CEU, 2005b, p. 9; CEU, 2008, p. 5), could be said to be focusing on identity issues. It should be noted that the EUCTS adds the necessity of extending inter-cultural dialogue to the international sphere (CEU, 2005b, p. 9), and thus it could be considered an attempt to influence the foreign policy factor.

4.1.3 Policy recommendations in COM 2. The document offers a total number of four measures addressing radicalisation in a direct manner. All four measures could be classified as soft measures due to their proactive nature.

Measures number 1 of promoting close cooperation between local authorities and civil society and number 3 of developing local community-based approaches and prevention policies (EC, 2010, p. 3) could address the radicalising factor of lack of trust in the political system.

Measure number 2: "empowering key groups in vulnerable communities" (EC, 2010, p. 7) could be understood as providing them with opportunities to achieve a meaningful life which would not only offer an answer to the lack of opportunities factors, but could also be qualified as addressing relative deprivation.

Finally, measure number 4 focuses on the narrative factor by calling for the support of civil society organisations in countering extremist narratives by exposing, translating and challenging them (EC, 2010, p. 7).

4.1.4 Policy recommendations in RAN. The RAN documents present the reader with a total amount of 48 measures. The documents are divided into eight different sections, namely RAN-POL (proposing 3 measures), VVT (4 measures), RAN

@ (2 measures), PREVENT (9 measures), P&P (4 measures), HEALTH (2 measures), INT/EXT (16 measures) and HLCP (8 measures).

Out of the 48 measures, two (measures number 1 and 22) could be considered coercive. Measure number 1 does not only call for the removal of illegal extremist material from the internet, but it also presents the collaboration between internet service providers and security agencies as positive in the countering of radicalisation and, as has been pointed out previously (see measures 1 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2), this could be said to be answering the *narrative* and the *social network* factors. Measure number 22, which calls for the supervision of communications in prisons (Radicalisation Awareness Network [RAN], 2012e, p. 4), addresses the factor of *narrative* as well.

Among the soft measures identified through the documents, numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 18, 21, 26, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46 and 47 address the radicalising influence of the *narrative* factor in different ways. Measures number 14, 40 and 45 for example call for the involvement of "formers" in order to counter extremist narratives (RAN, 2012d, p. 5; RAN, 2012g, p. 7; RAN, 2013, p. 3). In a different fashion, measures number 4, 5, 6 and 7, all part of the VVT section, call for the participation of victims in constructing narratives to challenge extremist propaganda (RAN, 2012b, p. 3-4). In addition, measures 3, 18 and 46 make their case for the idea of promoting critical thinking and enhanced digital literacy among the youth to build resilience against extremist narratives (RAN, 2012a, p. 3; RAN, 2012d, p. 9; RAN, 2013:3).

Measure 29 also promotes tackling the *narrative* factor, however, due to its mention of promoting student exchanges it could be defined as also dealing with identity issues (RAN, 2012g, p. 4). Around these identity issues revolve measures 31 and 32. The first one calls for the enhancement of the parenting and communication skills of diaspora communities (RAN, 2012g, p. 5), and although enhancing parenting skills could be perceived as a negative stereotype, the enhancement of communication skills is aimed at dealing with identity issues such as the double sense of non-belonging. Measure number 32 proposes exchanges (RAN, 2012g, p. 5) in a similar way to the aforementioned measure 29.

In addition, measure 32 also proposes fostering youth entrepreneurship (RAN, 2012g, p. 5), which could be said to deal with the lack of opportunities factor. Measures number 20 and 24 could be said to be dealing with this same factor as well. The former

proposes lowering the number of factors that could lead to grievances inside prisons (RAN, 2012e, p. 3) and the latter calls for the empowerment of migrants, minorities and individuals in vulnerable situations (RAN, 2012f, p. 4). Furthermore, measure 24 mentions the importance of making individuals and groups in danger of social exclusion feel included rather than excluded from public services (RAN, 2012f, p. 4) which could in turn, be classified as tackling the factor of discrimination. The combination of addressing the lack of opportunities factor and the discrimination factor could make measure 24 also a positive influence regarding relative deprivation. Measures tackling feelings of discrimination are also number 10, 16, 26, 34 and 48. Challenging racism, intolerance, institutional prejudice, avoiding collectively labelling communities and preparing de-stigmatising campaigns are the proposed actions in these measures (RAN, 2012d, p. 2, 7; RAN, 2012g, p. 3, 5; RAN, 2013, p. 3). This last measure could also be classified as tackling identity issues that could appear in case of direct stigmatisation of a community by the government.

Many of the measures in the RAN documents seem to have their focus on targeting the lack of trust in the political system factor. In this manner measures number 11, 12, 15, 17, 19, 23, 28, 30, 33, 38, 42, 43 and 44 call, among other things, for empowering local actors to collaborate in counter-radicalisation initiatives (RAN, 2012c, p. 3), opening forums to discuss domestic and foreign policy (RAN, 2012d:6), encouraging community policing (RAN, 2012f, p. 2), providing psychological counselling to traumatised families and youth (RAN, 2012g, p. 4) and increasing dialogue with and support for diaspora communities (RAN, 2013, p. 2).

In addition, the aforementioned measures 19 and 28, 44 could be said to also focus on the social networks factor. The availability of "safe" social networks could prevent individuals in difficult situations from joining "non-safe" support networks.

4.1.5 Policy recommendations in COM 3. A total of 12 measures have been identified in COM 3. Out of these 12, two could be categorised as coercive measures (number 3 and 4). Their focus on preventing extremist propaganda and removing illegal content from the internet (EC, 2014, p. 8) could be said to address, as mentioned in the measures in previous documents, not only the narrative factor, but also social networks if one understands certain virtual meeting points as illegal.

Among the measures classified as soft, the first two call for an enhanced collaboration between front line workers, security services and civil society, and

emphasises trust building (EC, 2014, p. 4), and could be defined as measures addressing the radicalising factor of a lack of confidence in the political system.

Measures 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11 set their focus on challenging the extremist narratives through the spreading of a positive and carefully focused message, encouraging critical thinking and empowering victims and funding projects that enable them to tell their stories (EC, 2014, p. 8, 9).

In contrast to the general line of focus in COM 3, measure number 7 proposes encouraging intercultural dialogue and youth exchanges and even building resilience against extremist propaganda (EC, 2014, p. 9). This would be classified as addressing the narrative factor, dialogue and exchange, and as has been signalled in previous policy papers, it would also serve to influence identity related issues.

Finally, measure number 12 could be said to address the foreign policy factor since it states that the external dimensions of counter-radicalisation should be in consonance with the internal dimensions (EC, 2014, p. 11).

4.1.6 Policy recommendations in NorCOM 1. NorCOM 1 presents the reader with five measures to counter the radicalisation phenomenon. All five measures could be said to be addressing the lack of trust in the political system factor. Measure number 1, which calls for tolerance of views and opinions and to fight them with democratic methods and intellectual weapons when necessary (Thorshaug, 2011), would be a clear example while measure number 4 would go further and address the discrimination factor as well (Thorshaug, 2011).

4.1.7 Policy recommendations in ColSec. The document presents the reader with a set list of 30 measures of which 13 address the radicalisation phenomenon in a direct form. Measure number 1, "better information about regulations relating to people who may pose a security risk" (NMJP 2011:28) addresses in a similar way to measure number 3 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2, the factor of social networks, and therefore should be considered as a coercive measure.

Measures number 2 and 3 that call for revising the government´s and the Ministry of Justice and the police's crisis communication strategy (NMJP 2011:29, 31) could be said to address the radicalising factor of discrimination and identity, as the stigmatising of a specific group would enhance the breach between social groups. In turn, measure number 4, 8 and 9 that propose the promotion and facilitation of

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collaboration between civil society, the police and other authorities (NMJP 2011:31, 32, 33) could positively influence the lack of trust in the political system factor.

Measures number 5 and 6, setting "courses in Norwegian social conditions for religious leaders with immigrant backgrounds" (NMJP 2011:31) and setting a course for newly arrived immigrants in "Norwegian social studies and understanding democracy" (NMJP 2011:32) could be said to be influencing the narrative factor as well as being part of a broader integration policy and therefore be classified as also dealing with identity related factors. In this category of addressing the narrative factor measure number 13, that calls for strengthening religion and faith group programmes for prisoners, could also be placed (NMJP 2011:34).

Measure number 7 of pushing international dialogue and working to deliver appropriate foreign policies addresses the foreign policy factor. Finally, policy numbers 10, 11 and 12, which propose working towards strengthening the Norwegian National Housing Bank, getting more people to complete secondary school and delivering initiatives directed to unemployed youth (NMJP 2011:33, 34), address the lack of opportunities factor but also when taken altogether they influence positively relative deprivation.

4.1.8 Policy recommendations in NorCOM 2. A total number of six measures have been identified in this document. Measure number 2, which calls for considering placing international travel restrictions upon those at risk of radicalisation, could be classified as a hard measure.

Regarding the other five it can be pointed out that in a similar fashion to NorCOM 1, this paper stresses the measures that address the lack of trust factor. In this manner measures number 4, which proposes strengthening cooperation with minority communities and municipalities (Amundsen, 2013), number 5, calling for the development of a strategy that is publicly open and built from the bottom up to counter the radicalisation phenomenon (Amundsen, 2013), and number 6, mentioning that mechanisms to offer an alternative to informing the police about radicalisation, should be established (Amundsen, 2013), could be identified as such.

Measure number 1 calls for action to stop the internet becoming a venue for recruitment and radicalisation. In a similar fashion to previously mentioned measures, this should be considered on the one side to address the narrative factor and on the other the social networks factor, especially since a direct mention of virtual social networks is

made in the document. Finally, measure number three would answer the identity factor for its plea to work for creating a sense of belonging, putting special attention on the youth (Amundsen, 2013).

4.1.9 Policy recommendations in PPC. A total amount of 18 counter-radicalisation compatible measures have been identified in the document. A quick look through the document shows that the main focus of the PPC is to establish a feeling of peaceful coexistence within civil society and increasing trust in the political system.

In this manner, it could be said that eight of the measures (number 2, 3, 5, 6, 14, 16 and 18) focus on the narrative factor. Measure number 3 for example calls for the creation of new narratives through public debate (SGPC, 2013, p. 38), measure number 14 proposes to use victim testimonies to create awareness in schools (SGPC, 2013, p. 70) and measures that focus on the promotion of peace, coexistence and multiculturalism among the youth (SGPC, 2013, p. 72). Measure number 3 could also be classified as targeting identity issues as the appearance of new narratives created within society might bring the redefinition of social identity, groups and categories existing to the moment.

With the goal of increasing trust the PPC presents measures 8, 10, 11, 12 and 15. In this way enhancing communication channels between civil society and the government mentioned in measure 8 (SGPC, 2013, p. 50), encouraging individuals to contribute with suggestions, criticisms and opinions regarding the programme of measure number 12 (SGPC, 2013, p. 66) or listening to the experiences of the youth regarding peace and coexistence mentioned in measure 15 (SGPC, 2013, p. 72) are initiatives that could potentially serve to influence positively the lack of trust in the political system factor, by changing the perception of detachment between society and political institutions.

Measures number 1 and 7 could be said to be answering the radicalising factor of discrimination. Measure 1 calls for the promotion of an educational system based on the notions of human rights and opposed to sexism, xenophobia, racism and violence (SGPC, 2013, p. 30). Measure 7 proposes to recognise and empower the victims of illicit counter-terrorism operations by putting a special emphasis on victims of torture (SGPC, 2013, p. 44, 46) who were not previously recognised as victims by public institutions. This last measure could also serve to positively influence the sense of relative deprivation felt by parts of society.

Finally, measures number 4, 9 and 17 could be classified as targeting the lack of opportunities factor. Although measure number 9, which calls for the promotion of inmate reintegration initiatives (SGPC, 2013, p. 52), could be equated to the measures focusing on creating more opportunities mentioned in previous documents, measure number 4 and 17 have been included in this category due to the particular context where the enhancement in political participation could be understood as the enhancement of opportunities. Therefore, creating a public space for social debate mentioned in measure 4 (SGPC, 2013, p. 30) and promoting creativity entrepreneurship and social innovation among the youth in order to develop projects regarding peace and coexistence proposed in measure 17 (SGPC, 2013, p. 72), should be understood as tackling the lack of opportunities factor. Measure number 4 could also be said to positively influence the identity issues due to the possibilities that have been opened up for the society to negotiate and redefine social identities and boundaries.

4.1.10 A quick overview. The findings of this chapter can be schematically explained through the following truth table:

Table 2

	Identity	Discrimination	Lack of opportunities	Lack of Trust	Relative deprivation	Narrative	Social Networks	Foreign policy	Intervention
COM 1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
SCRRT 1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
EUCTS	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
SCRRT 2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
COM 2	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	0
RAN	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
COM 3	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0
NorCOM 1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
ColSec	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0
NorCOM 2	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0

PPC	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0

As can be seen in Table 2, none of the documents present measures to counter the foreign policy factor. In contrast the lack of trust factor is addressed in each of the analysed papers. Narrative is the most addressed factor – 61 (29%) out of the 158 proposed measures. None of the documents addresses all of the factors, but COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2 and ColSec address 8 of them. The RAN documents, in turn, address seven, the PPC six, COM 3 five, COM 2 four and finally, NorCOM 1 addresses two.

The data extracted from the measure analysis contrasts in some aspects with the findings of the content analysis of the policies presented in chapter 3, section 3.2.3. The first thing to notice is that although the word count showed the term *relative deprivation* was absent from all documents, the factor of relative deprivation is addressed in every policy paper except for COM 3 and NorCOM 1.

A second observation is that the terms trust and foreign policy were absent until the appearance of the RAN documents. However, both factors are addressed in several earlier documents. Paradoxically, the foreign policy factor is not addressed in RAN. In a similar manner, the term *narrative* shows the first hit in COM 2, nonetheless chapter 4 has shown that this factor is addressed in the previously published COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2.

A third point of discrepancy is that even though the word count shows that *intervention** appears in four different documents (even though PPC does not use the term to mean military interventions), not a single document presents measures addressing this particular radicalisation factor.

In contrast, discrimination and lack of opportunities can be pointed out as examples of convergence between the data gathered in chapter 3 and the analysis results of this chapter.

4.2 Coercive Measures and the Western Liberal Democratic Conception

Out of the 158 measures analysed in chapter 4, 23 (15.82%) have been categorised as "hard" or coercive. In addition to these 23 measures, two extra measures that were not included in the analysis – i.e. they did not address radicalisation factors in a direct manner – have been counted for this section because of their possible implications for

the western liberal democratic conception of liberties. These are the measure proposed in RAN calling for reformulating patient confidentiality (RAN 2012f:2) and the measure of ColSec calling for a "review [of] the regulations relating to duty of disclosure and duty of confidentiality" (NMJP 2011:30).

In brief, COM 1 contributes to the list with two measures, the SCRRT 1 with five, the EUCTS with six, the SCRRT 2 with five, the RAN documents and COM 3 provide three and two each and finally, ColSec contributes with two.

Out of the 25 measures, 13 (60%) were proposed during 2005. In addition, when adding the number of coercive measures proposed in SCRRT 2 (revision of the 2005 SCRRT 1 and closest to the first three documents in temporal terms) the number increases to 18 (72%). The reasons for the high concentration of coercive measures might be related to the historical context in which the policies were presented. As mentioned in chapter 3, section 3.1 COM 1, SCRRT 1 and EUCTS were published soon after the July 7th attacks in London and the year after the Madrid attacks and the assassination of Theo van Gogh. The reasons for the high number of coercive measures in SCRRT 2 would not be that much influenced by the historical context, but as said in chapter 4 for being a copy and paste revision of the SCRRT 1.

These measures set their focus on countering different factors of the radicalisation process and accordingly propose different actions, and could therefore be divided in three different groups. In the first group could be placed measure number 1 and 2 of the document COM 1 that call for the prohibition of broadcasts by channels inciting hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality (EC, 2005, p. 4) and the adoption of measures against internet services provided illegally in the context of terrorism (EC, 2005, p. 4); measure number 6 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2 propose creating measures to impede terrorist recruitment using the internet (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008, p. 4); measure number 1 of the RAN documents recommends encouraging internet service providers to remove and prohibit illegal extremist material and to collaborate with police and security agencies (RAN, 2012a, p. 3); measures number 3 and 4 of COM 3 call for preventing extremist propaganda from reaching its target audience through the internet (EC, 2014, p. 8) and removing illegal material from the internet (EC, 2014:8). In a similar way measure number 5 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2 call for the setting of a legal framework to prevent individuals from inciting and legitimising violence (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008, p. 4), and measure number 13 of the EUCTS calls

for addressing incitement and recruitment in particular in key environments such as prisons, places of religious training or worship, by implementing legislation to make these behaviours offences (CEU, 2005b, p. 9).

Without mentioning the internet factor, but focusing on the spread of extremist narratives through the influence that certain individuals could have, measure number 3 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2 calls for limiting the activities of individuals playing a role in radicalisation processes in prisons, places of education, religious training, and worship (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008, p. 4).

In the second group, measure number 1 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2 and NorCOM 2 mentions the necessity of preventing individuals from getting access to terrorist training (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008, p. 4; Amundsen 2013) and the aforementioned proposal to monitor travelling to conflict zones made in measure 6 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2 (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008, p. 4).

Finally in the third group, measure number 2 of the SCRRT 1, EUCTS and SCRRT 2 proposes monitoring the internet and travel to conflict zones (CEU, 2005a, p. 3; CEU, 2005b, p. 8; CEU, 2008, p. 4), measure number 1 of ColSec recommends improving information about regulations relating to persons who may pose a security risk (NMJP 2011, p. 28) and the two measures that were not included in the list analysed in chapter 3. The first measure is part of the RAN documents and asks for the reformulation of patient confidentiality (RAN, 2012f, p. 2) as a necessary step to use information on individuals in danger of radicalisation collected by the health sector. The second measure, part of ColSec, also calls for a review of the regulations relating to the duty of disclosure and the duty of confidentiality (NMJP 2011:30), allegedly for a similar purpose. And measure 22 of the RAN documents calls for supervision of the communications of the target group to avoid the spread of radical narratives in the prison realm (RAN, 2012e, p. 4).

It can be seen that the first group encompasses the majority of the proposed hard measures – 60%. These measures address the narrative factor, and therefore it could potentially be a threat to freedom of expression. The second group could be considered to be in conflict with freedom of movement if one understands that terrorist training, if not through the internet, would most likely happen in a non-European country, and therefore a possible action would be prohibiting to travel to areas were this kind of activity exists. Three measures could be classified as part of this category – 12% of the

total amount. Finally, the third group could potentially be understood as conflicting with the right to privacy. Seven measures have been identified as part of this category, amounting to a 28% of the total amount of measures.

Freedom of expression is a right guaranteed through article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression […] (UDHR, art. 19)"; article 19.2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR): "Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression […]" (ICCPR, art. 19.2); article 10.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR): "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression […]"; and article 11.1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU): "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression[…] (CFREU, 11.1).

It is possible, however, to argue against the invoking of freedom of expression to defend extremist narratives, using the same texts, since freedom of expression could potentially conflict with some of the rights of the "listener" (Mendel & Salomon 2011, p. 9). The ICCPR mentions in this regard through its Article 19.3 that freedom of expression can be,

> Subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals (ICCPR, art. 19.3)

In addition, Article 20.2 of the ICCPR points out that, "Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law" (ICCPR, art. 20.2). In a similar fashion the ECHR states in article 10.2 that,

> The exercise of these freedoms […] may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime […] (ECHR, art. 10.2)

Although the UDHR and the CFREU do not mention when freedom of expression can be restricted, an appeal to Articles 7 and 8 of the UDHR proclaiming that "All [individuals] are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination" (UDHR, art. 7) and that "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by

the constitution or by law" (UDHR, art. 8); and Articles 1 and 21 of CFREU stating that "Human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected" (CFREU, art. 1) and that,

> Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited (CFREU, art. 21)

This could be raised to highlight the aforementioned conflict between the rights of the "speaker" and the rights of the "listener".

The UN Human Rights Committee has stated that the restriction of freedom of expression must meet a three-part test: it must be provided by a clear and accessible law, it has to pursue one of the two aims listed in Article 19.3 of the ICCPR and the restriction has to be necessary to secure the end (Mendel & Salomon 2011, p. 12-13).

The restriction of freedom of expression in certain cases and following certain rules does not have to be regarded as conditioning the liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy. In this line, the addition of the necessity to "set a clear criteria laid down by law to define which content is illegal" (EC, 2005, p. 5) proposed by COM 1, in addition to its call for "measures against internet services provided illegally in the context of terrorism" (EC, 2005, p. 5), could be understood as the will of the European Union to comply with the western liberal democratic standards when addressing the restriction of freedom of expression.

Preventing access to terrorist training per se would not pose a threat to the conception of what a western liberal democratic state should be, but the measures taken to prevent that access could. Understanding that terrorist training, if not through the internet, would most likely happen in a non-European country a possible action would be prohibiting travel to areas were this kind of activity exists. In this regard, the UDHR states in its Article 13.3 that "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country" (UDHR, 13.3). In Article 12, sections 2 and 4 of the ICCPR, an equal claim is also made by pointing out that "Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own" (ICCPR, art. 12.2) and "no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country" (ICCPR, art. 12.4). In a similar manner Article 2.2 of the fourth protocol of the ECHR states that "Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own […]" (ECHR, art. 2.2).

As is the case with freedom of expression, freedom of movement cannot be considered an absolute right since the ICCPR specifies that it could be restricted if it is "[…] necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others […]" (ICCPR, art.12.3).

As it happens with the aforementioned restriction on freedom of expression, the restriction of movement should, according to Article 12.3, be provided by law and in consonance with the rest of the rights presented in the Covenant.

Restricting freedom of movement, in a similar fashion to the restriction of freedom of expression, does not necessarily have to be considered as jeopardising the standards of a western liberal democracy as long as it complies with the requirements expressed in the aforementioned articles.

Monitoring the internet, improving the information about persons who may pose a security risk, reformulating patient confidentiality and reviewing the regulations relating to the duty of disclosure and the duty of confidentiality are presented in SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2, the RAN documents and ColSec as appropriate tools for enhancing counter-radicalisation initiatives.

As mentioned before, these particular measures could pose a challenge to the rights of privacy and confidentiality present in Article 12 of the UDHR: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence […]" (UDHR, art. 12); Article 17, sections 1 and 2 of the ICCPR: "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence" (ICCPR, art. 17.1) and "Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks" (ICCPR, art. 17.2); Article 8.1 of ECHR: "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence" (ECHR, art. 8.1); and Article 8.1 of the CFREU: "Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or her" (CFREU, art. 8.1). The Norwegian constitution does not have any specific provision dealing with the right to privacy, but Article 110, section c. mentions that "It is the responsibility of the authorities of the State to respect and ensure human rights. Specific provisions for the implementation of treaties thereon shall be determined by Law" (Norwegian Constitution art. 110). This added to the incorporation of the ECHR and the ICCPR inter alia, into Norwegian law (although not constitutional status), makes the previously mentioned articles applicable to Norway (Bygrave & Aarø 2001, p. 333).

It can be said that the right to privacy is part of the western liberal democratic

conception, but in a similar way to the previously discussed rights, it is not absolute. Article 8.2 of the ECHR points out that,

> There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (ECHR, 8.2).

Similarly, CFREU mentions in Article 8.2 that personal data, such as that collected by the health institutions,

> […] must be processed fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law. Everyone has the right of access to data which has been collected concerning him or her, and the right to have it rectified (CFREU, 8.2).

As with the previously discussed freedoms, the right to privacy can be conditioned, according to the ECHR, if it is in the interests of inter alia, national security or the preservation of law and order. In this case, however, the mechanisms to control the restrictions laid down by CFREU, the possibility of this measures not being in line with the undermining of the liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy could be considered.

To sum up, when discussing the compliance of the proposed hard measures with the presupposed liberties of a western liberal democracy the UDHR, ICCPR, ECHR and the CFREU can be used to argue both positions. Without further entering into a legal discussion or diving into the concept of securitisation proposed by Ole Wæver, one could say that at the very least these hard measures could potentially undermine society's trust in the political system, one of the contributing factors to the radicalisation process presented in Chapter 2.

The frequency of hard measures and trust building measures, taking all the policy papers into account, showed no correlation $r(11) = -.17$, $p > .61$. When taking only the action plans into account i.e. the SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2, ColSec and PPC, however, Pearson's r analysis showed a strong negative relationship between the amount of hard measures and trust building measures, $r(5) = -.97$, $p < .01$.

4.3 On the effectiveness of counter-radicalisation policies

As it was advanced in Chapter 1, section 1.2.4, a statement on the effectiveness of the proposed policies was not made with the notion that policies and their effectiveness have crisp boundaries, i.e. either it is effective or it is not. On the contrary, the effectiveness of the policies was considered as having a certain degree of membership to the effectiveness notion using fuzzy set methodology. The degree of membership can be easily calculated by ascribing the value 0 to the policies that do not have any measures addressing the proposed factors, and the value 1 to the policies that address all nine factors, and finally calculating the value of the remaining policies ascribing them a number between 0 and 1.

COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2 and ColSec address eight of the nine proposed factors, and therefore it could be said they have a 0.89 grade of membership in the effectiveness notion. The RAN documents address seven of the factors which would make its grade of membership 0.78, whilst the PPC addresses six factors amounting to a 0.67 grade of membership. COM 3 addresses five, giving it a grade of 0.56, and COM 2 and NorCOM 2 address four factors respectively, which translates to a 0.45 grade membership. Finally, NorCOM 1 addresses two factors, giving it a membership grade of 0.23. With this the first research question - to what extent do the counter-radicalisation policies presented in the EU, Norway and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country address the contributing factors of the radicalisation process? – is answered.

As for the second question - to what extent do the counter-radicalisation policies presented in the EU, Norway and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country guarantee the liberties surmised in a western liberal democracy? – section 4.2 has argued that the 25 identified hard measures do not necessarily conflict with the liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy when three points are respected: it must be provided by a clear and accessible law, it has to pursue one of the two aims listed in Article 19.3 of the ICCPR and the restriction has to be necessary to secure the end (Mendel & Salomon 2011, p. 12-13). The same section has argued, however, that these measures could stir the lack of trust in the political system factor, and therefore potential radicalising qualities of hard countermeasures have to be taken into account in order to calibrate the effectiveness values ascribed to the policy papers. When understanding the existence of these measures as a 1 and the absence as a 0, and applying the same gradation system used before for ascribing effectiveness membership values COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2, RAN, COM 3, ColSec and NorCOM 2 would be considered as having an exacerbation value of 0.11.

Although the result of the calibration could be offered through a single numerical cipher, in order to not obscure the result of the effectiveness, the following scatter plot is presented showing the positioning of each one of the policy documents in respect to the grade of membership of effectiveness calculated taking into account the overlapping between the proposed measures and the contributing factors of radicalisation on the one side, and the exacerbation value ascribed in regards of the hard measures proposed.

Figure 6

4.4 Wrapping up Chapter 4

Chapter 4 has analysed the overlapping between the proposed measures of the policy papers presented in the previous chapter and the contributing factors selected in Chapter 2. The findings have been presented in a truth table (section 4.1.10) that shows that there is not a complete overlapping between the measures proposed in any of the analysed policy documents and the contributing factors of the radicalisation process. This chapter has also identified 25 measures that could potentially pose a threat to the presupposed liberties of a western liberal democracy. The chapter has also delved into the implications that these measures could have in respect to the liberties surmised in a western liberal democracy, and has argued that the measures do not necessarily conflict with the liberties when three points are respected: it must be provided by a clear and accessible law, it has to pursue one of the two aims listed in Article 19.3 of the ICCPR and the restriction has to be necessary to secure the end (Mendel & Salomon 2011, p. 12-13). It has been argued, however, that these types of measures could enhance the

lack of trust factor.

Finally, section 4.3 of this chapter has answered the proposed research questions presented in Chapter 1, section 1.1, of to what extent do the counter-radicalisation policies presented in the EU, Norway and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country address the contributing factors of the radicalisation process? And to what extent do the counter-radicalisation policies presented in the EU, Norway and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country guarantee the liberties surmised in a western liberal democracy? In addition, the potential radicalising qualities of hard countermeasures have been taken into account in order to calibrate the effectiveness notion of the policies.

Chapter 5

This study has examined the effectiveness of 11 counter-radicalisation policies presented by the European Union, Norway, and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country in Spain.

In order to facilitate the analysis on the effectiveness of the policies, the study adopted the premise that for a counter-radicalisation policy to be effective it has to address the contributing factors of the radicalisation processes and it has to be context specific, i.e. maintaining the liberties presupposed in a western liberal democracy. Following this premise, the study has been guided by two research questions: to what extent do the counter-radicalisation policies presented in the EU, Norway and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country address the contributing factors of the

radicalisation process? And to what extent do the counter-radicalisation policies presented in the EU, Norway and the Autonomous Region of the Basque Country guarantee the liberties surmised in a western liberal democracy? (see Chapter 1, section 1.1).

In the process of answering these questions, the study has first, proposed a conceptualisation of the phenomenon of radicalisation based on previous scholarly research on the subject (see Chapter 2). Second, it has analysed the language used through the documents (see Chapter 3, section 3.2). Third, it has identified a total of 158 measures (see Appendix C). Fourth, it has analysed the overlapping between the proposed measures and the contributing factors of radicalisation (See Chapter 4, section 4.1). Fifth, it has discussed the implications that 25 of the identified measures could have to the presupposed liberties of a western liberal democracy (see Chapter 4, section 4.2), and sixth, it has defined the effectiveness of the aforementioned policy documents (see Chapter 4, section 4.3).

5.1 Main Findings

The first main finding of the study is the grade of membership in the effectiveness notion of the 11 counter-radicalisation policies. In this manner COM 1, SCRRT 1, EUCTS, SCRRT 2 and ColSec have a 0.89 grade of membership in the effectiveness notion and a grade of membership of 0.11 in the exacerbation notion. The RAN documents have a grade of membership 0.78 in effectiveness and a grade of membership of 0.11 in exacerbation. The PPC has a grade of membership of 0.67 in effectiveness. COM 3 has a grade of membership of 0.56 in effectiveness and a grade of membership of 0.11 in exacerbation. COM 2 and NorCOM 2 have a grade of membership of 0.45. In addition NorCOM 2 has grade of membership of 0.11 in exacerbation, and finally, NorCOM 1 has a grade of membership of 0.23.

The second main finding is that the policy documents are context specific. This statement is the result of two reasons. The first one is that only a 15.82 % of the measures could be classified as having the potential to threat the presupposed liberties of a western liberal democracy. The second one is that the same documents that define the presupposed liberties open a door for reducing those same rights and freedoms.

In addition to the main findings the content analysis of the 11 policy documents has shown a reduction in the use of hard terms such as *terrorist**, *combat** and *fight** and an increase in the softer descriptors *radical**, *extremist**, *prevent**, *counter** and

address*; a downward tendency in the use of words that identify Muslims as the receiving group of these policies; that COM 1 focuses on the contributing factors at the social level, the SCRRT 1, SCRRT 2 and COM 2 focus on a combination of social and individual contributing factors and the EUCTS, RAN and COM 3 focus mainly on the individual level, NorCOM 1 focuses on the external level contributing factors, NorCOM 2 focuses on the social level, ColSec sets a similar focus on all three levels and PPC, stresses the social and the external levels; and finally, that at the very least, the three longest documents, RAN, ColSec and PPC could be defined as being in consonance with the western liberal democratic discourse.

5.2 Challenges and Future Research Proposals

This paper has considered the radicalisation of second and third generation Muslims in Europe. In this manner, possible contributing factors to the phenomenon have been proposed, measures presented in the selected policy papers have been identified, and the overlapping between the two has been analysed in order to discern the degree of membership these policy papers hold regarding the notion of effectiveness. In addition, the potential radicalising qualities of the hard measures proposed in some of the documents have been evaluated in an attempt to calibrate the aforementioned degree of membership. However, this papers has not considered the potential radicalising qualities that some of the soft measures could have in respect of other sectors of society, e.g. the RAN documents propose, in their measure number 39 and 40 to highlight the experience of disillusioned foreign fighters returning home (RAN, 2012g, p. 6) and to utilise the voice of "formers" to de-construct narratives (RAN, 2012g, p. 7), which could radicalise members of the civil society such as victim organisations. On the contrary, the hard measures that have been classified as potentially exacerbating the radicalisation process of the focus group of this study and their milieu, could act as countering the radicalisation of victim organisations.

A second point that was not taken into account in this study is how the different measures addressing a contributing factor in different documents influence the degree of membership in the effectiveness notion of those policy papers. Although this study has avoided using crisp boundaries to define the effectiveness of the policy papers it has used them to determine the overlapping between contributing factors and proposed measures. In this way, both RAN, with 25 measures addressing the narrative factor, and COM 2, with only one, have been ascribed the value 1 due to the existence of

overlapping. The possibility of a more in-depth qualitative analysis and subsequent use of fuzzy set methodology to determine the degree of membership in the notion of overlapping could offer a more nuanced image of the ultimate degree of membership on the effectiveness notion that each policy paper holds.

These two points could encourage further research to present a more nuanced grade of membership value setting on counter-radicalisation policies.

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Appendices

Appendix A:

	FREQUENCY	% SHOWN	% PROCESSED	% TOTAL	NO. CASES	% CASES
STATE	436	11,5%	1,4%	0,7%	6	100,0%
LAW	324	8,6%	1,0%	0,5%	6	100,0%
PUBLIC	288	7,6%	0,9%	0,4%	6	100,0%
RIGHTS	277	7,3%	0,9%	0,4%	6	100,0%
GENERAL	219	5,8%	0,7%	0,3%	6	100,0%
MEMBERS	209	5,5%	0,7%	0,3%	6	100,0%
PROTECTION	132	3,5%	0,4%	0,2%	6	100,0%
ACCORDANCE	131	3,5%	0,4%	0,2%	6	100,0%
FREEDOM	130	3,4%	0,4%	0,2%	6	100,0%
CASE	117	3,1%	0,4%	0,2%	6	100,0%
ACT	103	2,7%	0,3%	0,2%	6	100,0%
HUMAN	95	2,5%	0,3%	0,1%	6	100,0%
MEMBER	90	2,4%	0,3%	0,1%	6	100,0%
TIME	86	2,3%	0,3%	0,1%	6	100,0%
RESPECT	81	2,1%	0,3%	0,1%	6	100,0%
PERSON	81	2,1%	0,3%	0,1%	6	100,0%
EXERCISE	78	2,1%	0,2%	0,1%	6	100,0%
NATIONS	78	2,1%	0,2%	0,1%	6	100,0%
INTERNATIONAL	77	2,0%	0,2%	0,1%	6	100,0%
FREE	73	1,9%	0,2%	0,1%	6	100,0%
CRIMINAL	70	1,9%	0,2%	0,1%	6	100,0%
POLITICAL	68	1,8%	0,2%	0,1%	6	100,0%
ORDER	67	1,8%	0,2%	0,1%	6	100,0%
ENTITLED	65	1,7%	0,2%	0,1%	6	100,0%
PRINCIPLES	65	1,7%	0,2%	0,1%	6	100,0%
ECONOMIC	63	1,7%	0,2%	0,1%	6	100,0%
DATE	58	1,5%	0,2%	0,1%	6	100,0%
ELECTIONS	58	1,5%	0,2%	0,1%	6	100,0%
VOTE	53	1,4%	0,2%	0,1%	6	100,0%
SECURITY	53	1,4%	0,2%	0,1%	6	100,0%

Appendix B:

ENGLISH	SPANISH	NORWEGIAN
radical	radical	radikal
radicalism	radicalismo	radikalisme
radicalisation	radicalización	radikalisering
violent radical	radical violento	voldelig radikal
violent radicalisation	radicalización violenta	voldelig radikalisering
extremist	extremista	ekstremist
extremism	extremismo	ekstremisme
violent extremist	extremista violento	voldelig ekstremist
violent extremism	extremismo violento	voldelig ekstremisme
terrorist	terrorista	terrorist
terrorism	terrorismo	terrorisme
counter	contrarrestar	motvirke
countering	contrarrestando	motvirker
prevent	prevenir	forebygge
preventing	previniendo	forebygger
prevention	prevención	forebygging
address	abordar	adressere
addressing	abordando	adresserer
combat	combatir	bekjempe
combating	combatiendo	bekjemper
fight	lucha	kamp
fighting	luchando	kjempe
islam	islam	Islam
islamist	islamista	islamist
islamism	islamismo	Islamisme
muslim	musulmán	Muslim
psychopathology	psicopatología	psykopatologi
psychopathologies	psicopatologías	psykopatologier
psychopathological	psicopatológico	psykopatologisk
identity	identidad	identitet
identities	identidades	identiteter
belonging	pertenencia	tilhørighet
stigmatisation	estigmatización	stigmatisering
discrimination	discriminación	diskriminering
opportunity	oportunidad	mulighet
opportunities	oportunidades	muligheter
trust	confianza	tillitt
relative deprivation	privación relativa	relativ berøvelse
narrative	narrativa	narrativ
narratives	narrativas	narrativer
network	red	nettverk
networks	redes	nettverk

foreign policy	política exterior	utenrikspolitikk
intervention	intervención	intervensjon
interventions	Intervenciones	intervensjoner
state	estado	stat
law	ley	lov
public	público	offentlig
rights	derechos	rettigheter
human	humanos	menneske
protection	protección	beskyttelse
freedom	libertad	frihet
respect	respeto	respekt
person	persona	person
nations	naciones	nasjoner

Appendix C

	COM 1	SCRRT 1	EUCTS	SCRRT 2	COM 2	RAN	COM 3	NorCOM 1	ColSec	NorCOM 2	PPC
radical	12	2	1	3	1	8	4	0	4	0	1
radicalism	0	1	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
radicalisation	9	12	6	17	8	138	66	2	95	7	0
violent radicalisation	37	1	0	1	0	17	0	0	0	0	0
violent radical	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
extremist	2	2	2	2	2	28	17	0	20	0	0
extremism	2	2	1	3	0	11	2	0	7	2	0
violent extremism	0	0	0	0	1	80	18	2	77	1	0
terrorist	31	7	5	8	3	7	8	0	24	0	0
terrorism	31	22	10	22	5	24	25	12	42	2	32
counter	1	4	3	4	2	87	19	1	15	0	0
countering	0	2	1	2	0	6	9	1	1	0	0
prevent	3	3	4	3	2	26	18	1	62	2	4
preventing	4	1	1	2	0	25	14	0	17	0	0
prevention	3	0	0	0	3	23	5	6	67	5	9
address	6	1	2	1	1	14	5	1	3	0	8
addressing	6	2	1	2	0	3	5	0	0	1	0
combat	3	1	0	2	1	0	3	0	4	0	1
combating	3	3	3	4	0	3	2	0	3	0	0
fight	6	0	0	0	0	5	2	6	3	2	1
fighting	5	0	0	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	0
islam	9	4	1	0	0	3	0	0	2	0	0
islamist	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0

islamism	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0
muslim	2	5	0	0	0	8	0	0	2	0	0
psychopathology	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
psychopathologies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
psychopathological	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
identity	10	1	0	1	0	3	0	0	5	0	0
identities	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1
belonging	3	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	3	3	0
stigmatisation	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
discrimination	5	1	1	1	0	3	0	0	15	0	0
opportunity	0	2	0	2	1	4	0	0	4	2	3
opportunities	2	1	1	1	0	8	3	0	9	0	3
trust	0	0	0	0	0	10	1	1	6	0	16
relative deprivation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
narrative	0	0	0	0	0	41	0	0	0	0	4
narratives	0	0	0	0	2	62	6	0	0	0	0
network	3	0	0	0	3	17	3	0	9	0	17
networks	8	3	0	4	0	7	3	0	5	0	1
foreign policy	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	1	11	0	0
intervention	0	0	0	0	0	15	1	0	4	0	2
interventions	0	0	0	0	0	18	0	0	0	0	0
state	9	1	1	1	0	25	4	0	5	0	4
law	10	0	0	0	1	6	4	1	15	0	9
public	6	0	0	2	0	32	3	4	28	0	11
rights	12	2	1	2	0	3	4	1	11	0	133
human	9	1	1	1	0	7	1	2	7	0	127

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protection	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	5	0	5
freedom	3	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	9	0	4
respect	3	1	0	1	0	6	3	0	11	0	14
person	1	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	14	0	5
nations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	2

Appendix D

COM 1

1. Prohibition of broadcast to channels inciting to hatred on grounds of race, sex, religion or nationality (EC, 2005, p. 4).

2. Adopt measures against internet services provided illegally in the context of terrorism (EC, 2005, p. 4).

    a. Set clear criteria laid down by law to define which content is illegal (EC, 2005, p. 5).

3. Create and support programmes promoting cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue, European common values, respect for human rights and to combat racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia (EC, 2005, p. 5).

4. Develop the concept of European citizenship and intercultural understanding (EC, p. 2005:5-6).

5. Promote integration and work in the prevention of the double sense of non-belonging (EC, 2005, p. 6)

    a. Take a holistic approach to deal with integration not only promoting access to the labour market, but also taking social, cultural, religious, linguistic and national nuances into account (EC, 2005, p. 6).

6. Promote non-discrimination as a key aspect of integration (EC, 2005, p. 6).

7. Promote equal opportunities for disadvantaged groups. Improve housing conditions, encourage access to education, regenerate deprived areas and make them more accessible, facilitate the access to the job market and strengthen the protection from social exclusion (EC, 2005, p. 6-7).

8. Promote interfaith dialogue and between the state and religion (EC, 2005, p. 7).

9. Promote the engagement of the police at the local level, especially with the youth (EC, 2005, p. 7).

10. Offer assistance to third countries in order to reduce inequalities, support democratization and promote human rights (EC, 2005, p. 9).

11. Promote cultural and inter-religious understanding between Europe and third countries (EC, 2005, p. 9).

SCRRT 1

1. Foment community policing (CEU, 2005a, p. 3).

2. Monitor internet and travel to conflict zones (CEU, 2005a, p. 3).

3. Limit the activities of those playing a role in radicalisation in prisons, places of education, religious training, and worship (CEU, 2005a, p. 3).

4. Prevent individuals from getting access to terrorist training (CEU, 2005a, p. 3).

5. Set a legal framework to prevent individuals from inciting and legitimising violence (CEU, 2005a, p. 3).

6. Create measures to impede terrorist recruitment using the Internet (CEU, 2005a, p. 3).

7. Pursue political dialogue (CEU, 2005a, p. 3).

8. Empower moderate voices by engaging with Muslim organisations and faith groups (CEU, 2005a, p. 4).

9. Support the availability of mainstream literature (CEU, 2005a, p. 4).

10. Encourage the emergence of European imams and enhance language and other training for foreign imams in Europe (CEU, 2005a, p. 4).

11. Change the perceptions of European and Western policies particularly among Muslim communities (CEU, 2005a, p. 4).

12. Correct unfair or inaccurate perceptions of Islam and Muslims (CEU, 2005a, p. 4).

13. Develop a non-emotive lexicon for discussing the issues in order to avoid linking Islam to terrorism (CEU, 2005a, p. 4).
    a. Ensure that policies do not exacerbate division (CEU, 2005a, p. 4)

14. Eliminate structural factors that prompt radicalisation processes.
    b. Lack of political and economic prospects, unresolved international and domestic strife; and inadequate and inappropriate education, cultural opportunities for young people or identity issues (CEU, 2005a, p. 4).

15. Target inequalities and discrimination (CEU, 2005a, p. 5).

16. Promote inter-cultural dialogue and debate (CEU, 2005a, p. 5).

17. Promote long term integration (CEU, 2005a, p. 5).

18. Promote good governance, human rights, democracy, education and economic prosperity outside the union, and engage in conflict resolution in third countries (CEU, 2005a, p. 5).

EUCTS

1. Foment community policing (CEU, 2005b, p. 8).

2. Monitor internet and travel to conflict zones (CEU, 2005b, p. 8).

3. Limit the activities of those playing a role in radicalisation in prisons, places of education, religious training, and worship (CEU, 2005b, p. 8).

4. Prevent individuals from getting access to terrorist training (CEU, 2005b, p. 8).

5. Set a legal framework to prevent individuals from inciting and legitimising violence (CEU, 2005b, p. 8).

6. Create measures to impede terrorist recruitment using the Internet (CEU, 2005b, p. 8).

7. Develop a non-emotive lexicon to discuss these issues (CEU, 2005b, p. 8).
   a. Ensure that policies do not exacerbate division (CEU, 2005b, p. 8).

8. Eliminate structural factors that prompt radicalisation processes.
   a. Lack of political or economic prospects and of educational opportunities (CEU, 2005b, p. 9).

9. Promote good governance, human rights, democracy, education and economic prosperity outside the union, and engage in conflict resolution in third countries (CEU, 2005b, p. 9)

10. Target inequalities and discrimination (CEU, 2005b, p. 9).

11. Promote inter-cultural dialogue and debate both nationally and internationally (CEU, 2005b, p. 9).

12. Promote long term integration (CEU, 2005b, p. 9).

13. Address incitement and recruitment in particular in key environments, for example prisons, places of religious training or worship, notably by implementing legislation making these behaviours offences (CEU, 2005b, p. 9).

SCRRT 2

1. Foment community policing (CEU, 2008, p. 4).

2. Monitor internet and travel to conflict zones (CEU, 2008, p. 4).

3. Limit the activities of those playing a role in radicalisation in prisons, places of education, religious training, and worship (CEU, 2008, p. 4).

4. Prevent individuals from getting access to terrorist training (CEU, 2008, p. 4).

5. Set a legal framework to prevent individuals from inciting and legitimising violence (CEU, 2008, p. 4).

6. Create measures to impede terrorist recruitment using the Internet (CEU, 2008, p. 4).

7. Pursue political dialogue (CEU, 2008, p. 4).

8. Empower mainstream voices by stepping up the dialogue with political, religious and separatist groups which favour moderation and exclude recourse to violence (CEU, 2008, p. 5).

9. Change the perceptions of European and Western policies (CEU, 2008, p. 5).

10. Develop a non-emotive lexicon for discussing the issues in order to avoid linking religion to terrorism (CEU, 2008, p. 5).

    a. Ensure that policies do not exacerbate division (CEU, 2008, p. 5).

11. Eliminate structural factors that prompt radicalisation processes.

    a. Lack of political and economic prospects, unresolved international and domestic strife; and inadequate and inappropriate education, cultural opportunities for young people or identity issues (CEU, 2008, p. 5).

12. Target inequalities and discrimination (CEU, 2008, p. 5).

13. Promote inter-cultural dialogue and debate (CEU, 2008, p. 5).

14. Promote long term integration (CEU, 2008, p. 5).

15. External economic policies (CEU, 2008, p. 5).

16. Promote good governance, human rights, democracy, education and economic prosperity outside the union, and engage in conflict resolution in third countries (CEU, 2008, p. 5).

COM 2

1. Promote close cooperation between local authorities and civil society (EC, 2010, p. 7).

2. Empower key groups in vulnerable communities (EC, 2010, p. 7).

3. Developed local community-based approaches and prevention policies (EC, 2010, p. 7).

4. Support the work of civil society organisations exposing, translating and challenging violent extremist propaganda on the internet (EC, 2010, p. 8).

The RAN documents

1. Encourage internet service providers to remove and prohibit illegal extremist material and to collaborate with police and security agencies (RAN, 2012a, p. 3).

2. Utilise consistent counter-messaging across the EU to discredit the radicaliser´s rhetoric (RAN, 2012a, p. 3).

3. Encourage educationalists to introduce better programs of learning to promote "critical thinking" by young people (RAN, 2012a, p. 3).

4. Support the message of victims of terrorism and make them part of the counter-narrative (RAN, 2012b, p. 3).

5. Capacitate victims and associations of victims to bring counter-radicalisation narratives inside state funded institutions, such as schools (RAN, 2012b, p. 3).

6. Use testimonies of victims culturally close to the target group (RAN, 2012b, p. 4).

7. Assist and support victims in countering extremist narratives in the internet and social media (RAN, 2012b, p. 4).

8. Refine counter-narratives taking into account the audience, the messenger, the context, and the message (RAN, 2012c, p. 6).

9. Fund messengers to increase their capacity, and the effectiveness of the counter-narratives (RAN, 2012c, p. 6).

10. Promote early interventions in schools, youth groups and community settings to challenge racism and social exclusion (RAN, 2012d, p. 2).

11. Empower local actors and experts instead of "parachuting" experts (RAN, 2012d, p. 3).

12. Involve NGOs, civil society organisations and local actors in the counter-radicalisation efforts and fund their initiatives (RAN, 2012d, p. 3, 4).

    a. Promote multi-agency. NGOs and civil society organisations should be considered as significant partners by the statutory sector (RAN, 2012d, p. 4).

13. Produce and support well researched and context-dependent counter-narratives, and present a clear guidance on how to deliver it (RAN, 2012d, p. 5).

14. Involve "formers" in awareness campaigns (RAN, 2012d, p. 5).

15. Promote discussion, and allow criticism of foreign and domestic policy (RAN, 2012d, p. 6).

16. Launch targeted programmes to deal with institutional prejudices (RAN, 2012d, p. 7).

17. Monitor Security forces and develop a guide to help them (RAN, 2012d, p. 7).

18. Improve the "digital literacy" of the youngsters in order to make them more resistant to online and social media propaganda (RAN, 2012d, p. 9).

19. Promote active interaction between prisoners and staff to enhance security and gain access to other sources of information (RAN 2012e, p. 3).

20. Lower the number of factors which could lead to grievances (RAN, 2012e, p. 3).

21. Let in moderate versions of religion (RAN, 2012e, p. 3).

22. Supervision on communication of the target group to avoid the spread of radical narratives (RAN, 2012e, p. 4).

23. Use community policing approach to protect the individual in the pre-criminal space (RAN, 2012f, p. 2).
    a. Favour a multi-agency approach with the police and other public sector services as equal partners to promote a holistic approach (RAN, 2012f, p. 2).

24. Empower migrants, minority groups, and individuals in vulnerable situations and make them feel included rather than excluded in terms of public services (RAN, 2012f, p. 4).

25. Avoid collectively labelling communities (RAN, 2012g, p. 3).

26. Deconstruct extremist narratives using linguistics and acknowledgeable scholar in de- and counter-radicalisation (RAN, 2012g, p. 4).

27. Identify counter-radicalisation actors and facilitate exchange platforms of religious authority figures (RAN, 2012g, p. 4).

28. Establish support networks of women and families of foreign fighters (RAN, 2012g, p. 4).
    a. Promote women groups cross border connections (RAN, 2012g, p. 5).

29. Develop educational material and promote youth, and school level, exchanges to tackle perceptions of an idealised homeland and conflict (RAN, 2012g, p. 4).

30. Provide psychological counselling to traumatised families and youth (RAN, 2012g, p. 4).

31. Enhance parenting skills of Diaspora and communication skills between parents and the second generation (RAN, 2012g, p. 5).

32. Foster youth entrepreneurship and exchanges (RAN, 2012g, p. 5).

33. Engage dialogue and cooperation between Somali clan elders. religious authorities and police (RAN, 2012g, p. 5)

34. Undertake strategies for making intolerance unacceptable (RAN, 2012g, p. 5).
    a. Avoid framing diaspora communities as problems or assigning them blame (RAN, 2012g, p. 5)

35. Reclaim extremist appropriated terminology (RAN, 2012g, p. 5).

36. Publicise the reconciled reality of life in Diaspora communities (RAN, 2012g, p. 6).

37. Work with media agencies to produce material to reach target audiences (RAN, 2012g, p. 6).

38. Develop national public forums debating foreign policy and provide a public outlet for grievances (RAN, 2012g, p. 6).

39. Highlight the experience of disillusioned foreign fighters returning home (RAN, 2012g, p. 6).

40. Utilise the voice of formers to de-construct narratives (RAN, 2012g, p. 7).

41. Teach children about democratic values, history and critical thinking (RAN, 2013, p. 2).

42. Involve NGOs more in prevention of radicalisation (RAN, 2013, p. 2).

43. Increase the dialogue with and the support to Diaspora communities (RAN, 2013, p. 2).

44. Establish support networks for families of prospective and departed foreign fighters (RAN, 2013, p. 3).

45. Engage formers to deconstruct extremist narratives (RAN, 2013, p. 3).

46. Develop more targeted counter-narrative actions (RAN, 2013, p. 3).

47. Support local actors in developing counter-narratives (RAN, 2013, p. 3).

48. Prepare for de-stigmatising communication by authorities following an attack to avoid stigmatisation (RAN, 2013, p. 3)

COM 3

1. Involve NGOs, front line workers, security services, civil society, and experts in prevention initiatives (EC, 2014, p. 4).

2. Put emphasis in trust building (EC, 2014, p. 4).

3. Prevent extremist propaganda from reaching its target audience through the internet (EC, 2014, p. 8).

4. Remove illegal material from the internet (EC, 2014, p. 8).

5. Spread a positive and carefully focused message to counter extremist propaganda (EC, 2014, p. 8).

6. Encourage young people to think critically about extremist messages (EC, 2014, p. 9).

7. Encourage intercultural dialogue and personal exchanges between young people as a key method to build resilience against extremist propaganda (EC, 2014, p. 9).

8. Support local community groups working with former violent extremists and with victims of extremist violence to show young people the other side of the story (EC, 2014, p. 10).

9. Offer support to Member States, third countries, the private sector, civil society, and individuals in their efforts to create a positive online counter-narrative (EC, 2014, p. 8).

10. Encourage community groups, citizens, victims, and former extremist to develop counter-narratives (EC, 2014, p. 8).

11. Empower victims and fund projects that enable them to tell their stories (EC, 2014, p. 9).

12. Promote initiatives in third countries and make sure that the internal and external dimensions of counter-radicalisation are well connected (EC, 2014, p. 11).

NorCOM 1

1. Tolerate any views and opinions and fight them with democratic methods and intellectual weapons when necessary (Thorshaug, 2011).

2. Promote preventive talks by the police (Thorshaug, 2011).

3. Strengthened dialogue, openness and public debate in the fight against terror (Thorshaug, 2011).

4. Make the national threat assessments public to avoid suspicion and fear from parts of the population (Thorshaug, 2011).

5. Build confidence and establishing trust and contact between the government and civil society (Thorshaug, 2011).

ColSec

1. Better the information about regulations relating to persons who may pose a security risk (NMJP, 2011:28).

2. Revise the government´s crisis communication strategy (NMJP, 2011:29).

3. Revise the communication strategy of the ministry of justice and the police (NMJP, 2011:31)

4. Establish meeting places for dialogue and contact between representatives of civil society and public authorities centrally and locally (NMJP, 2011:31).

5. Set courses in Norwegian social conditions for religious leaders with immigrant background (NMJP, 2011:31).

6. Set courses in Norwegian social studies and understanding democracy for newly arrived immigrants (NMJP, 2011:32.

7. Push international dialogue and foreign policy work (NMJP, 2011:32).

8. Promotion of dialogue and freedom of expression between police and immigrant organisations (NMJP, 2011:32).

9. Continue to develop police preventive talks (NMJP, 2011:33).

10. Strengthen and define the role of the Norwegian National Housing Bank in the local authorities´ plan work through co-operation with the police councils (NMJP, 2011:33).

11. Work towards getting more people to complete their secondary school education (NMJP, 2011:34).

12. Continue working on initiatives specially targeted at unemployed young people (NMJP, 2011:34).

13. Strengthen the offers of faith group programmes for inmates (NMJP, 2011:34).

NorCOM 2

1. Prevent the internet from been a venue for recruitment and radicalisation (Amundsen, 2013).

2. Consider regulatory changes that could help preventing exit, such as confiscation of passports, in situations where risk of radicalisation exists (Amundsen, 2013).

3. Work for creating a sense of belonging putting special attention in the youth (Amundsen, 2013).

4. Strengthen the cooperation with minority communities and municipalities (Amundsen, 2013).

5. Encourage the development of an open bottom-up strategy to counter radicalisation (Amundsen, 2013).

6. Establish mechanisms to offer an alternative to informing the police about radicalisation (Amundsen, 2013).

PPC

1. Promote an education system based in the notion of human rights as opposed to sexism, xenophobia, racism or violence (SGPC, 2013:30).

2. Make use of the media to launch campaigns promoting the goals of the programme (SGPC, 2013:31).

3. Promote the creation of new narratives through social debate in relation to social and political traumatic experiences (SGPC, 2013:38).

4. Create a public space for social debate (SGPC, 2013:38).

5. Remember and remind what terrorisms has been both in the local and global context (SGPC, 2013:40).

6. Delegitimise the use of violence as a mean to pursue goals (SGPC, 2013:40).

7. Recognise and empower the victims of illicit counter-terrorism operations, putting a special emphasis on victims of torture (SGPC, 2013:44, 46).

8. Enhance the communication channels between public institutions and the civil society (SGPC, 2013:50).

9. Design and promote a prisoner reintegration programme (SGPC, 2013:52).

10. Reaffirm the approach between police and the civil society (SGPC, 2013:60).

11. Develop a strategy to ensure that collaboration between social groups and the government is not broken in difficult situations (SGPC, 2013:64).

12. Encourage the civil society to contribute with suggestions, criticisms and opinions regarding the programme (SGPC, 2013:66).

13. Promote and support initiatives within the civil society (SGPC, 2013:68).

14. Use victim testimonies to create awareness in schools (SGPC, 2013:70).

15. Listen to the experiences of the youth regarding peace and coexistence (SGPC, 2013:72).

16. Promote the notions of peace, coexistence and inter-culturalism among the youth and equip them with the necessary tools to deal with conflict in a constructive way (SGPC, 2013:72).

17. Promote creativity, entrepreneurship and social innovation among youth in order to develop projects regarding peace and coexistence (SGPC, 2013:72).

18. Promote critical thinking within society (SGPC, 2013:74).

Appendix E

Policy	Measure #	Identity	Discrimination	Lack of opportunities	Lack of trust in the political system	Relative deprivation	Narratives	Social networks	Foreign policy	Interventions
COM 1	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	5	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	6	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	7	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
	8	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	9	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
SCRRT 1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	7	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	8	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	9	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	10	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	12	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	13	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	14	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
	15	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	16	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	17	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
EUCTS	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	7	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	8	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	10	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	11	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	12	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	13	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
SCRRT 2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

	7	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	8	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	10	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	11	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0
	12	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	13	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	14	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
COM 2	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	2	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
RAN	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	6	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	7	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	8	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	9	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	10	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	11	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	12	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	13	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

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14	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
15	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
16	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
18	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
19	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
20	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
21	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
22	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
23	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
24	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
28	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
29	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
30	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
31	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
32	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
33	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
34	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
35	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
36	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
37	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
38	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
39	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
40	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

	41	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	42	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	43	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	44	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
	45	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	46	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	47	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	48	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COM 3	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
	4	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	6	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	7	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	8	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	9	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	10	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	11	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
NorCOM 1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	4	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
ColSec	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

	3	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	5	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	6	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
	8	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	9	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	10	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
	11	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
	12	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
	13	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
NorCOM 2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	4	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	5	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	6	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
PPC	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	3	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	4	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	6	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
	7	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
	8	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
	9	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
	10	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0

11	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
12	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
14	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
15	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
16	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
17	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
18	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0

Appendix F

		radical	extremist	terrorist	counter	prevent
radical	Correlación de Pearson	1	,929**	,530	,886**	,739**
	Sig. (bilateral)		,000	,093	,000	,009
	N	11	11	11	11	11
extremist	Correlación de Pearson	,929**	1	,464	,815**	,898**
	Sig. (bilateral)	,000		,151	,002	,000
	N	11	11	11	11	11
terrorist	Correlación de Pearson	,530	,464	1	,140	,615*
	Sig. (bilateral)	,093	,151		,681	,044
	N	11	11	11	11	11
counter	Correlación de Pearson	,886**	,815**	,140	1	,482
	Sig. (bilateral)	,000	,002	,681		,133
	N	11	11	11	11	11
prevent	Correlación de Pearson	,739**	,898**	,615*	,482	1
	Sig. (bilateral)	,009	,000	,044	,133	
	N	11	11	11	11	11
address	Correlación de Pearson	,748**	,511	,455	,738**	,247
	Sig. (bilateral)	,008	,108	,160	,010	,464
	N	11	11	11	11	11
combat	Correlación de Pearson	,463	,382	,826**	,135	,483
	Sig. (bilateral)	,151	,247	,002	,692	,132
	N	11	11	11	11	11
fight	Correlación de Pearson	,559	,343	,456	,402	,213
	Sig. (bilateral)	,074	,301	,159	,221	,529
	N	11	11	11	11	11

		address	combat	fight
radical	Correlación de Pearson	,748	,463**	,559
	Sig. (bilateral)	,008	,151	,074
	N	11	11	11
extremist	Correlación de Pearson	,511**	,382	,343
	Sig. (bilateral)	,108	,247	,301
	N	11	11	11
terrorist	Correlación de Pearson	,455	,826	,456
	Sig. (bilateral)	,160	,002	,159
	N	11	11	11
counter	Correlación de Pearson	,738**	,135**	,402
	Sig. (bilateral)	,010	,692	,221
	N	11	11	11
prevent	Correlación de Pearson	,247**	,483**	,213*
	Sig. (bilateral)	,464	,132	,529

	N	11	11	11
address	Correlación de Pearson	1**	,288	,658
	Sig. (bilateral)		,390	,028
	N	11	11	11
combat	Correlación de Pearson	,288	1	,167**
	Sig. (bilateral)	,390		,624
	N	11	11	11
fight	Correlación de Pearson	,658	,167	1
	Sig. (bilateral)	,028	,624	
	N	11	11	11

**. La correlación es significativa al nivel 0,01 (bilateral).

*. La correlación es significante al nivel 0,05 (bilateral).

		terrorist	softdescription	hardaction	softaction
terrorist	Correlación de Pearson	1	,509	,783**	,515
	Sig. (bilateral)		,110	,004	,105
	N	11	11	11	11
softdescription	Correlación de Pearson	,509	1	,589	,980**
	Sig. (bilateral)	,110		,057	,000
	N	11	11	11	11
hardaction	Correlación de Pearson	,783**	,589	1	,497
	Sig. (bilateral)	,004	,057		,120
	N	11	11	11	11
softaction	Correlación de Pearson	,515	,980**	,497	1
	Sig. (bilateral)	,105	,000	,120	
	N	11	11	11	11

**. La correlación es significativa al nivel 0,01 (bilateral).

		Nhardmeasures	Ntrustbuildingmeasures
Nhardmeasures	Correlación de Pearson	1	-,173
	Sig. (bilateral)		,610
	N	11	11
Ntrustbuildingmeasures	Correlación de Pearson	-,173	1
	Sig. (bilateral)	,610	
	N	11	11