dc.contributor.author | Labukt, Ivar Russøy | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-11-22T13:34:42Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-11-22T13:34:42Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023-08-17 | |
dc.description.abstract | I present some problems for phenomenal (i.e. consciousness-based) accounts of
personal identity and egoistic concern. These accounts typically rely on continuity
in the capacity for consciousness to explain how we survive ordinary periods of
unconsciousness such as dreamless sleep. I offer some thought experiments where
continuity in the capacity for consciousness does not seem sufficient for survival
and some where it does not seem necessary. There are ways of modifying the standard phenomenal approach so as to avoid these difficulties, but I argue that they all
lead to other problems that are no less serious. | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Labukt. Some Problems for the Phenomenal Approach to Personal Identity. Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy. 2023 | en_US |
dc.identifier.cristinID | FRIDAID 2184287 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s10670-023-00722-2 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-0106 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1572-8420 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10037/31849 | |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Springer Nature | en_US |
dc.relation.journal | Erkenntnis: An International Journal of Scientific Philosophy | |
dc.rights.accessRights | openAccess | en_US |
dc.rights.holder | Copyright 2023 The Author(s) | en_US |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0 | en_US |
dc.rights | Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) | en_US |
dc.title | Some Problems for the Phenomenal Approach to Personal Identity | en_US |
dc.type.version | publishedVersion | en_US |
dc.type | Journal article | en_US |
dc.type | Tidsskriftartikkel | en_US |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en_US |