R&D and knowledge transfer strategies
Sammendrag
We study the incentives for firms to share knowledge when they
engage in R&D in order to make an uncertain innovation. The ini-
tial stock of knowledge may be unevely distributed, and we look at
how this affects the type of cooperative agreements that the firms will
find it profitable to enter in to. Specifically, we consider the cases in
which firms share initial knowledge only (reciprocal cross-licensing),
new knowledge only (Technology Sharing Cartel), and one involving
full reciprocal knowledge transfer (similar to a patent pool). These
cases are compared to each other, and to the initial benchmark situa-
tion in which firms go it alone. We find that some kind of cooperative
agreement will always dominate the go-it-alone solution; we use the
analysis to delineate situations in which cooperation should involve
transfer of all or just new knowledge, and show that simply sharing
prior knowledge is dominated by the other cooperative agreements.
We consider the effects of knowledge sharing on R&D, and draw con-
lusions for industrial policy and firm strategy.
Forlag
Universitetet i TromsøUniversity of Tromsø
Serie
Working paper series in economics and management, 2007, nr 3Metadata
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