Is the Beneficiary Pays Principle Essential in Climate Justice?
Permanent lenke
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/24063Dato
2021-09-09Type
Journal articleTidsskriftartikkel
Peer reviewed
Forfatter
Heyward, Jennifer ClareSammendrag
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’ admits many interpretations. In the philosophical literature on climate justice, it has typically been cashed out in
terms of the following three principles: the ability to pay principle (APP), the beneficiary pays principle (BPP), and
the contribution to problem principle (CPP). Many of these accounts have given prominence to the CPP and APP,
but there are some who argue that the BPP deserves greater consideration. In this paper, I want to ask whether the
BPP must feature in any plausible account of remedial responsibility for climate change. I examine this question by
looking at three different ways in which the BPP has been incorporated into accounts of climate burden-sharing. In
each case, there are questions about the particular role that the BPP is assigned and it looks like either the BPP must
be given equal prominence to the CPP, or the BPP might be redundant when it comes to specific task of remedying
the injustices of climate change. I suggest in the conclusion one possible reason to maintain the BPP
Forlag
UniversitetsforlagetSitering
Heyward. Is the Beneficiary Pays Principle Essential in Climate Justice?. Norsk Filosofisk tidsskrift. 2021Metadata
Vis full innførselSamlinger
Copyright 2021 The Author(s)