Should Rawlsian end-state principles be constrained by popular beliefs about justice?
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https://hdl.handle.net/10037/30569Dato
2023-08-19Type
Journal articleTidsskriftartikkel
Peer reviewed
Forfatter
Angell, KimSammendrag
Although many accept the Rawlsian distinction between ‘end-state’ and ‘transitional’ principles, theorists disagree strongly over which feasibility constraint to use when selecting the former. While ‘minimalists’ favor a scientific-laws-only constraint, ‘non-minimalists’ believe that end-state principles should also be constrained by what people could (empirically) accept after reasoned discussion. I argue that a theorist who follows ‘non-minimalism’ will devise end-state principles that cannot be realized (as end-state principles), or cannot be stabilized (as end-state principles), or are indistinguishable in content from those she would have selected had she followed ‘minimalism.’ The paper ends by outlining the implications of my analysis for the broader methodological map of political philosophy.
Forlag
Taylor & FrancisSitering
Angell K. Should Rawlsian end-state principles be constrained by popular beliefs about justice?. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (CRISPP). 2023Metadata
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