"Hidden Inwardness" and "Subjectivity is Truth": Kant and Kierkegaard on Moral Psychology and Religious Pragmatism

Abstract

This chapter reconstructs the concept of hidden inwardness, arguing that this term refers to moral characters (and religious characters) that are expressed with deeds and words, rather than referring to a private inner world. By relying on the distinction between morality and legality, the chapter argues that “hidden inwardness” is not compatible with all kinds of behavior, and that it is better described negatively than positively. The concept of hidden inwardness need, therefore, not be as problematic as is often assumed, since it mainly involves the idea that we do not know our hearts and minds. Finally, the chapter shows that “hidden inwardness” sheds light on Kierkegaard’s (Climacus’) controversial theses “Subjectivity is truth” and “Subjectivity is untruth” in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript. “Subjectivity is truth” does not involve objectionable subjectivism, but rather pragmatism about religious belief and subjective appropriation of objective ethico-religious truth.